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The present volume is the third in the series "Modern Amer­
ica," dealing with the problems of change and continuity in 
twentieth-century United States history. The first, Change 
and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America, was pub­
lished by the Ohio State University Press in 1964; the second, 
Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America: The 
1920's, in 1968. The eleven essays comprising this volume ex­
plore aspects of, and issues in, American foreign policy in the 
storm-tossed years since the beginning of this century. 
Two of the essays are historiographical. Charles E. Neu of 
Brown University analyzes the changing assumptions and 
presuppositions underlying the writing of American diplo­
matic history from its coming of age in the 1920s to the 
present in his paper "The Changing Interpretive Structure 
of American Foreign Policy." In his "Writings on American 
Foreign Relations: 1957 to the Present/' David F. Trask 
of the State University of New York—Stony Brook surveys 
the major scholarly works on American foreign policy and 
diplomacy of the last decade—a decade exceptionally rich 
in important new contributions. 
viii INTRODUCTION 
Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., of the University of Illinois 
(Urbana-Champaign), in his paper "Bureaucracy and Pro­
fessionalism in the Development of American Career Diplo­
macy," traces the development in the twentieth century of 
an American career foreign service—and in so doing, illumi­
nates an aspect of diplomatic history hitherto too largely 
ignored. 
Three of the essays are concerned with the changing rela­
tionship between the United States and the rest of the world. 
Paul A. Varg of Michigan State University reexamines the 
question "The United States a World Power, 1900-1917: 
Myth or Reality?", and finds that the answer depends upon 
which part of the world you are talking about. Manfred Jonas 
of Union College documents the continuing American re­
sistance during the 1930s to any form of collective security 
in his paper "The United States and the Failure of Collective 
Security in the 1930s." Lawrence S. Kaplan of Kent State 
University, in his essay "The United States and the Atlantic 
Alliance: The First Generation," shows how the United 
States in the aftermath of World War II abandoned its tra­
ditional isolationism by taking the lead in the formation and 
maintenance of NATO. 
The remaining essays appraise United States relations with 
a specific foreign country. Robert Craig Brown of the Uni­
versity of Toronto, in his paper "Canada in North America," 
reviews twentieth-century United States-Canadian relations 
from the Canadian viewpoint. Lyle C. Brown of Baylor Uni­
versity and James W. Wilkie of the University of California 
—Los Angeles detail and explain the dramatic improvement 
in United States-Mexican relations since World War II in 
their paper "Recent United States-Mexican Relations: Prob­
lems Old and New." Allan R. Millett of Ohio State University 
provides in "The United States and Cuba: The Uncomfort­
able Abrazo, 1898-1968" an account of the historical back­
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ground indispensable for understanding Castro and his hos­
tility toward the United States. A. E. Campbell of Keble 
College, Oxford University, questions the meaning of "The 
United States and Great Britain—Uneasy Allies." And War­
ren I. Cohen of Michigan State University reassesses Ameri­
can policy toward China in his paper "From Contempt to 
Containment: Cycles in American Attitudes toward China." 
The editors would like to take this opportunity to express 
their appreciation to Weldon A. Kefauver and Robert S. 
Demorest, director and editor respectively, of the Ohio State 
University Press, without whose kind assistance and patience 
this volume—and series—would not be possible. 
The fourth volume, devoted to the New Deal, is in prep­
aration. 
JOHN BRAEMAN 
ROBERT H. BREMNER 
DAVID BRODY 

The Changing Interpretive Structure 
of American Foreign Policy 
CHARLES E. NEU 
THE STUDY of American foreign policy matured in an era 
that was, in many ways, unfavorable to its growth. American 
diplomatic history came to life in the 1920s, when the con­
servative, evolutionist school of historical writing, from 
which it drew so much of its inspiration, was in a state of 
decline, and when the rising tide of progressive history of­
fered little encouragement to students of American foreign 
policy. Conservative evolutionists emphasized the homoge­
neity and continuity of the American past, set within a frame­
work of evolving institutions. They minimized conflict, fo­
cused upon the development of institutions and principles, 
and confidently identified with the growth of American unity 
and power. In contrast, progressive historians were preoc­
cupied with the process of change, determined to widen the 
area of historical inquiry, and convinced that history must 
serve the purposes of current political reform. They viewed 
the past in terms of persistent and clear-cut conflicts between 
easily identifiable groups and sought to discover the funda­
mental social forces in American society. For progressive 
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historians the meaning of American history resided in the 
unending struggle for liberal reform, not in the gradual 
strengthening of the American Union.1 
There was, to be sure, a considerable overlap between the 
two approaches to history. Both were grounded upon a belief 
in progress and the cumulative nature of historical knowl­
edge, and both ignored the intangible aspects of human 
experience. But the conservative, evolutionist approach was 
more conducive to the study of diplomatic history. It encour­
aged historians to concentrate upon the European back­
ground of American civilization and the interaction between 
European and American institutions. Progressive historians 
were absorbed in the nature of the American experience; to 
them American foreign policy seemed subordinate and pe­
ripheral. As John Higham observes, "progressive thought 
. . . was critical of tradition, insensitive to institutional con­
tinuities, and preoccupied with domestic conflict."2 
Though major trends of American historiography were 
adverse in the years after World War I, both events and a 
significant prewar tradition nourished diplomatic history.3 
The strong interest in the war-guilt question and the origins 
of World War I, as well as the availability of recent diplo­
1. John Higham's brilliant essay in John Higham with Leonard Krieger
and Felix Gilbert, History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965) greatly enlarged
my understanding of the historiography of American history, as did Richard
Hofstadter's The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (New
York, 1968). I am grateful to Ernest R. May and Louis Calambos for their
critical readings of the manuscript, and to Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., for his
comments on a far shorter version read at the December, 1969, meeting of
the American Historical Association. 
2. Higham, History, p. 189. 
3. Apparently, the consciousness of being a specialist in American diplo­
matic history developed slowly and imperceptibly in the twenties. Samuel 
Flagg Bemis, for example, does not remember when he first began to think
of himself in this way. It is interesting, however, that Thomas A. Bailey, who
entered academic life about a decade later than Bemis, recalls 1932 as the 
date of his transformation from a political to diplomatic historian. By the
early thirties, diplomatic history was a clearly recognized specialty. Inter­
view with Samuel Flagg Bemis, September 17, 1968; letter from Thomas A.
Bailey to author, March 10, 1969. 
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matic documents, gave a stimulus to European diplomatic 
history; this in turn affected those studying America's rela­
tion to the world. Events themselves seemed to endow the 
history of American foreign policy with an obvious relevance, 
and an extensive monographic literature written mostly in 
the decade and a half before the war provided a solid struc­
ture upon which diplomatic historians in the twenties could 
build." Nearly all of these monographs were dry, precise, and 
narrowly defined—the very epitome of scientific history. 
They were accompanied, however, by a number of more 
broadly conceived books written by prominent scholars such 
as Archibald Cary Coolidge, Carl Russell Fish, Albert Bush­
nell Hart, John H. Latane, and John Bassett Moore.5 None 
of their studies were based upon extensive archival research, 
but they did embody certain themes and characteristics that 
would be developed in the twenties and thirties. 
All of these authors wrote of a distinctive American dip­
lomatic tradition, one based upon a clear concept of neutral­
ity, freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Open 
4. Some of the more prominent prewar monographs were: Ephriam 
Douglass Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846 (Balti­
more, 1910); James Morton Callahan, The Diplomatic History of the South­
ern Confederacy (Baltimore, 1901); Edward S. Corwin, French Policy and 
the American Alliance of 1778 (Princeton, N.J., 1916); John H. Latane, The 
Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America (Baltimore, 
1900); Jesse S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk (Balti­
more, 1907); Frank A. Updyke, The Diplomacy of the War of 1812 (Balti­
more, 1915); Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplo­
macy, 1815-1915 (Washington, D.C., 1916). 
5. Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power (New 
York, 1908); Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomacy (New York, 1915),
The Path of Empire: A Chronicle of the United States as a World Power(New Haven, Conn., 1919); Albert Bushnell Hart, The Foundations of 
American Foreign Policy (New York, 1901), National Ideals Historically 
Traced, 1607-1907 (New York, 1907), The Monroe Doctrine: An Inter­
pretation (Boston, 1916); John H. Latane, America as a World Power, 
1897-1907 (New York, 1907), From Isolation to Leadership: A Review of 
American Foreign Policy (New York, 1918); John Bassett Moore, American 
Diplomacy: Its Spirit and Achievements (New York, 1905), Four Phases 
of American Development: Federalism—Democracy—Imperialism—Ex­
pansion (Baltimore, 1912), The Principles of American Diplomacy (New 
York, 1918). 
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Door policy. The United States, they argued, had pioneered 
in the development of international law and the application 
of arbitral procedures to international disputes. Their writ­
ing had a legalistic cast as they described boundary disputes, 
the growth of neutrality law, and various quarrels submitted 
to arbitration. In general, American diplomacy seemed to 
them exceptionally pure, and they praised the uninterrupted 
advance of the United States in world affairs. Carl Russell 
Fish entitled the last chapter of his American Diplomacy 
"Success and its Causes"; Albert Bushnell Hart wrote that 
"with few reservations, I feel pride in the purposes and re­
sults of American diplomacy."6 All approved, sometimes 
enthusiastically, the consequences of the Spanish-American 
War. Coolidge believed, for example, that the American 
people were prepared to meet their unprecedented burdens 
with "joyous self-reliance."7 But most were uncertain about 
the nature of these responsibilities, and there was sharp dis­
agreement over whether a new phase had begun in American 
foreign policy. Coolidge, who defined world power as the 
extent to which the United States figured in the calculations 
of the great European nations, saw a definite break with the 
past in 1898; Moore contended the United States had always 
been a world power in terms of ideological leadership; and 
Hart went even further, claiming that the United States had 
consistently asserted its influence throughout the globe to 
defend its vital interests.8 
Despite such differences, these writers believed the estab­
lished principles of American diplomacy still applied after 
1898.9 All would have accepted Fish's judgment that Ameri­
6. Fish, American Diplomacy, p. 497; Hart, Foundations of American 
Foreign Policy, p. v. 
7. United States as a World Power, p. 133. 
8. Ibid., pp. 121, 131; Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 2; Hart, Founda­
tions of American Foreign Policy, p. 4. 
9. With the exception of Hart, who thought that the Monroe Doctrine,
in its original sense, was no longer relevant. Monroe Doctrine, pp. 299-300. 
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can diplomatic success had "rested upon a continuity, both 
of detail and of general policy, which is remarkable."10 In 
retrospect, one is struck by the extent to which these authors 
agreed upon the substance of the American diplomatic tradi­
tion and shared a common approach to its study. But their 
books were only sketches, offering an optimistic, affirmative 
synthesis that had yet to be rooted in systematic research. 
In the twenties historians examined in much greater depth 
both the continuities of principle and policy and the inter­
national setting of American diplomacy.11 Prominent texts 
by John H. Latane and Louis Martin Sears typified this de­
velopment,12 as did the decade's two most impressive books, 
those by Tyler Dennett and Dexter Perkins. Dennett, in his 
monumental Americans in Eastern Asia, explored the essence 
of the Open Door policy, which, he claimed, was "as old as 
our relations with Asia." The precedents upon which that 
policy was grounded retained a "remarkable consistency"; 
the real questions centered around methods, not ends.13 The 
first volume of Dexter Perkins's history of the Monroe Doc­
trine was an even more outstanding work. Based upon multi-
archival research, this book set a new standard of excellence 
and not only placed American foreign policy in its European 
setting but also examined with care the growth of those ideas 
expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. Perkins devoted consid­
10. American Diplomacy, p. 498. 
11. Important titles were: Ephriam Douglass Adams, Great Britain and 
the American Civil War, 2 vols. (New York, 1925); Samuel Flagg Bemis,
Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (New York, 1923), and
Pinckney's Treaty: A Study of America's Advantage from Europe's Distress,
1783-1800 (Baltimore, 1926), ed., The American Secretaries of State and 
Their Diplomacy, 10 vols. (New York, 1927-29); Howard C. Hill, Roose­
velt and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1927); Payson J. Treat, Japan and the 
United States, 1853-1928 (Stanford, Calif., 1928); Alice Felt Tyler, The 
Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis, 1927). 
12. John H. Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York, 
1927); Louis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations (New 
York, 1927). 
13. Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 1922), pp. 
v, 4. 
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erable attention to the impact of domestic politics and public 
opinion upon the formulation of American policy. He gloried 
in his work, believing that the principles of Monroe were 
still relevant. "No task," he wrote in the preface to the sec­
ond volume of his trilogy, "can be more attractive than that 
of tracing the evolution and consolidation of fundamental 
principles."14 
While studies of American foreign policy gained in solid­
ity and sophistication, they lost neither their optimism nor 
their belief in the need for American participation in world 
affairs. Latane and Sears were untroubled by the repeated 
involvement of the United States in wars that, in their judg­
ment, generally could have been avoided. One of Dennett's 
purposes was to prove the necessity for a cooperative policy 
in Eastern Asia among the United States, Great Britain, and 
Japan. The choice, Dennett believed, was that nations "must 
either fight each other or cooperate." Three years later, in 
1925, Dennett praised Theodore Roosevelt for his realization 
that America must help preserve the balance of power in 
Europe and East Asia.15 
During the thirties Samuel Flagg Bemis emerged as the 
foremost writer in the conservative, evolutionist school of 
American diplomatic history. Bemis had written two mono­
graphs in the twenties, but it was in the following decade 
that he created a powerful codification and elaboration of 
the traditional synthesis, one which remains influential to 
our own day.16 Bemis's approach was multiarchival, his focus 
14. Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1927), and The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), 
p. vii. 
15. Americans in Eastern Asia, p. viii, and Roosevelt and the Russo-
Japanese War (New York, 1925). 
16. His major publication was, of course, A Diplomatic History of the 
United State* (New York, 1936); but during the decade he also produced,
aside from a variety of articles. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution
(New York, 1935), and, in collaboration with Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide 
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upon both the European context of American diplomacy and 
on its continuities. His work was marked by an exuberant pa­
triotism and a frequent use of superlatives to describe the 
triumphs and errors of American statesmen. "The heroic pe­
riod of American nationality" occurred in the late eighteenth 
century, and Bemis looked wistfully back at great figures 
such as Franklin, Washington, Hamilton, and Adams, who 
had so wisely guided the nation through perilous times. Not 
only had the nation prospered under their tutelage but by 
1796 they had laid the foundations of American foreign pol­
icy, which only needed to be capped in 1823 by the Monroe 
Doctrine. In the first edition of his text (1936) Bemis listed 
eight of these fundamentals, including freedom of the seas, 
nonentanglement in European politics, continental expan­
sion, and the various tenets of the Monroe Doctrine. His be­
lief in the relevance of most of these basic principles never 
altered; they were the unchanging continuities of American 
foreign policy. Washington's Farewell Address, which "em­
bodied the experience and wisdom of the Fathers . . . be­
came so firmly established an American policy as to stand, 
even in our days in a vastly altered world."17 
Unlike his predecessors, Bemis did not view American di­
plomacy as a continual triumph extending to the thirties. He 
saw a sharp break in American foreign policy at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Until then, guided by the aphorisms 
of the Founding Fathers, American diplomatists had made 
no serious mistakes. After 1898 one catastrophic error fol­
lowed another. American imperialism was a "Great Aberra­
tion," entangling the nation in the politics of Europe and 
to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921 (Washington,
D.C., 1935). The most recent assessment of Bemis is H. C. Allen's "Samuel
Flagg Bemis," in Marcus Cunliffe and Robin W. Winks, eds., Postmasters: 
Some Essays on American Historians (New York, 1969). 
17. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy(New York, 1949), p. 3; Diplomatic History, p. 110. 
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Asia, where it possessed no vital interests. The acquisition of 
the Philippines, in Bemis's judgment, was the "greatest 
blunder" of American diplomacy; the Open Door Notes a 
"grandiose and sentimental floriation," a "protean error." 
Bemis deplored the departure of the United States from a 
policy of isolation and its involvement in affairs outside the 
Western Hemisphere. He doubted, in retrospect, the wisdom 
of entering World War I and felt that the Senate's rejection 
of the League had worked to the nation's advantage. Amer­
ica could wait, secure in its own hemisphere, for the world 
to grow better. And so, in the mid-thirties, he urged Ameri­
cans to avoid a confrontation with Japan and to withdraw 
from China, which was "not in any sense vital." Shifts in 
American foreign policy in the thirties such as neutrality 
legislation and the liquidation of imperialism seemed to 
Bemis a "clarification," a grasping of enduring principles lost 
sight of in previous twentieth-century diplomacy. The 
United States, he argued, should remain aloof from turmoil 
in Europe and East Asia and develop, in the inter-American 
system, a noncompulsory concept of collective security as a 
model for the world.18 
Bemis's views were partly a reflection of the profoundly 
isolationist mood of the middle years of the decade, but they 
also expressed a firmly held set of convictions that tran­
scended the period in which he wrote. Though he later came 
to accept the need for American involvement in World 
War II and for the postwar confrontation with the Soviet 
Union, he could never comfortably adjust to the new posi­
tion of the United States. For him there was always the be­
lief that American principles set the nation apart from the 
rest of the world, always a nostalgia for the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. 
18. Diplomatic History, pp. 463, 482, 501, 806; Bemis, "A Clarifying 
Foreign Policy," Yale Review XXV (1935), 221-40. 
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Other scholars continued to write in the tradition of diplo­
matic history that Bemis most successfully embodied. De­
spite the dominance of progressive history and the unfavor­
able climate it produced, the decade saw a great burst of 
scholarship in foreign policy.19 Charles Callan Tansill pub­
lished several detailed diplomatic histories; Dexter Perkins 
extended his study of the Monroe Doctrine; and A. Whitney 
Griswold, building upon the work of Dennett, produced a 
seminal book on the history of American Far Eastern policy.20 
Griswold shared Bemis's belief that in 1898 "American di­
plomacy departed from the traditions of one century and as­
sumed the obligations of another," and he was also critical 
of the involvement produced by twentieth-century American 
diplomacy. Emphasizing the European context of American 
policy, he saw a consistent, cyclical pattern of advance and 
retreat in the pursuit of illusory objectives in East Asia.21 His 
interpretation was to remain an influential one because of its 
breadth of conception and high level of analysis. Like so 
much of the work done in American foreign policy in the 
thirties, it has yet to be replaced. 
19. Philip Coolidge Brooks, Diplomacy and Borderlands: The Adams-
Onis Treaty of 1819 (Berkeley, Calif., 1939); John H. Ferguson, American 
Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939); Alice M. Morrissey, The 
American Defense of Neutral Rights, 1914-17 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939); 
Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan,
1853-1905, 3 vols. (Stanford, Calif., 1932-38); and Richard Heathcote 
Heindel, The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898-1914 (Philadelphia, 
1940), though it moved beyond the conservative, evolutionist tradition in 
its emphasis on the interaction of the two civilizations. Bemis expressed this 
sense of momentum among diplomatic historians in "Fields for Research in 
the Diplomatic History of the United States to 1900," American Historical 
Review XXXVI (1930), 68-75. 
20. Charles Callan Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish West Indies (Baltimore, 1932), The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873 (Baltimore, 1938); Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, and 
The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Baltimore, 1937); A. Whitney Gris­
wold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938). 
21. Far Eastern Policy, p. 3; Robert H. Ferrell and Waldo H. Hein­
richs, Jr., comment upon Griswold's thesis and its influence in Dorothy 
Borg, ed., Historians and American Far Eastern Policy (New York, 1966), 
pp. 14-21, 38--41. 
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While Bemis and others wrote in the conservative, evolu­
tionist tradition, another school of diplomatic historians 
emerged that was in the mainstream of American historiog­
raphy and that drew its inspiration directly from progressive 
history. These historians, neglecting the evolution of princi­
ples and the international setting of diplomacy, sought out 
the domestic sources of foreign policy—the economic, in­
tellectual, and political forces that dominated the formula­
tion of policy. Some were inspired by Frederick Jackson 
Turner and his followers, others by different strands of pro­
gressive historiography. The result was a different kind of 
diplomatic history that emphasized change far more than 
continuity.22 
During the twenties Julius W. Pratt and Arthur P. 
Whitaker published monographs emphasizing the impor­
tance of the West and of sectional forces in American foreign 
policy.23 In the next decade Whitaker became a specialist in 
Latin American history, and Pratt produced one of the most 
original books of the decade, Expansionists of 1898. In one 
sense, this book was path-breaking because it moved behind 
the facade of public opinion to an analysis of the views on 
expansion and war of specific groups, such as business and 
organized religion. Pratt displayed a vigorous interest in the 
ideas that affected foreign policy and offered an extensive 
analysis of what he termed the "new Manifest Destiny." 
Though an impressionistic book, Expansionists of 1898 sug­
22. Aside from those mentioned below in the text, some of the best 
monographs in this genre were: John D. P. Fuller, The Movement for the 
Acquisition of all Mexico, 1846-48 (Baltimore, 1936); Frank L. Owsley, 
King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of 
America (Chicago, 1931); Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo 
(Durham, N.C., 1927); Joe Patterson Smith, The Republican Expansionists 
of the Early Reconstruction Era (Chicago, 1933). 
23. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York, 1925); Arthur P. 
Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795 (Boston, 1927). 
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gested approaches to the 1890s that would not be fully ex­
ploited for many years.24 
Pratt was not alone in his use of intellectual history to en­
rich the study of American foreign policy. Harley Notter's 
semibiographical appraisal of Woodrow Wilson recreated 
the intellectual precedents for Wilson's foreign policy deci­
sions, and Albert K. Weinberg's Manifest Destintj analyzed 
American expansionist thought over the whole of the na­
tion's history. Manifest Destiny suffered from serious organi­
zational flaws: it tended to isolate ideas from their historical 
milieu and, by seeking to unwind the various strands of Man­
ifest Destiny, it failed to capture the wholeness of the ideol­
ogy at any one time. But in its choice of subject, this book 
offered an important example for future diplomatic histo­
rians.25 
Thomas A. Bailey served approximately the same function 
for this progressive approach to diplomatic history as Bemis 
did for the more conservative one. Most of Bailey's scholar­
ship appeared during and after World War II, but in 1940 
he published an influential and popular text that summed up 
the new attitude. Bailey, along with Pratt and Whitaker, 
viewed foreign policy from a domestic perspective, though 
he did not share their responsiveness to intellectual history. 
His text, like his first monograph on the Japanese-American 
crisis of 1906-9, focused on the influence of public opinion 
and domestic politics and on the alternatives confronting 
statesmen during foreign policy crises.26 It also gave a more 
24. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii 
and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936). 
25. Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wil­
son (Baltimore, 1937); Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of 
National Expansionism in American History (Baltimore, 1935). 
26. Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American 
Crises (Stanford, Calif., 1934); A Diplomatic History of the American Peo­
ple (New York, 1940). 
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prominent position to decision-making and to personalities 
and the images that the United States and other nations held 
of each other. Impressed with the power of public opinion, 
Bailey sought to reach a larger audience in order to destroy 
popular myths and illusions. Bailey wrote in reaction against 
diplomatic history "merely presenting digests of official cor­
respondence" and with the conviction that "diplomatic af­
fairs cannot be conducted in a vacuum . . . since they 
cannot be isolated from political, economic, and social devel­
opments." He specifically rejected the continuities of princi­
ple and policy emphasized in previous texts. "If, at times," 
he observed, "it seems as though the narrative were con­
cerned with a series of unrelated incidents, it must be borne 
in mind that for considerable periods that is precisely what 
American diplomatic history has been." " 
Though Bailey, Pratt and others added a new dimension 
to the writing on American foreign policy, they were in 
many ways dependent on the conservative, evolutionist tra­
dition. Bailey's text, for example, was episodic; it provided 
no compelling themes, no synthesis to bind periods together. 
It also failed to give a larger meaning to the record of Ameri­
can diplomacy. It remained for Bemis and those who shared 
his views to provide an overview of American diplomatic his­
tory based upon the triumph of uniquely American princi­
ples. When diplomatic historians fused together the two 
traditions after 1945, the conservative, evolutionist frame­
work retained its dominance because of its powerful, syn­
thetic qualities. 
Even in the twenties and thirties, however, the two tradi­
tions were closely related to one another. Whatever the ma­
jor characteristics of a scholar's work, there were always 
portions of it that linked him to the other school, as well as 
27. Diplomatic History, p. xi. 
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occasional shifts in an individual's point of view.28 Moreover, 
diplomatic historians did not seem particularly conscious of 
a difference of approach and easily assimilated the insights 
of one another. Bemis, for example, incorporated the conclu­
sions of Pratt on the origins of the War of 1812 into his text, 
while Bailey drew on Bemis's scholarship in his analysis of 
American diplomacy in the late eighteenth century. The 
underdeveloped state of historiography encouraged this 
blurring of what were, in fact, distinctive genres of diplo­
matic history. These seem far more evident now because of 
the passage of time and because of our own generation's 
need to locate itself more precisely in the historical spectrum. 
Scholars who were specialists in other areas such as Latin 
America, Europe, or the British Empire, also made during 
the twenties and thirties, as they do today, substantial con­
tributions to the literature of American foreign policy.29 
Generally their studies fitted closely into one tradition, 
though at times they fell somewhere in between. Charles 
Seymour wrote the decade's best analysis of American inter­
vention in World War I, while Arthur P. Whitaker published 
one of the outstanding books of this period.30 The United 
States and the Independence of Latin America presented, in 
Whitaker's own estimate, "a broader view of the subject 
than has been given before, by adding to the conventional 
28. Bemis's early work showed some progressive influence. This was 
evident in his first article on "The Settlement of the Yazoo Boundary Dis­
pute: The First Step in Southern Expansion," Magazine of History XVII 
(1913), 129-40, and in his first monograph, Jay's Treaty. 
29. A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North 
America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War 
of 1812 (New Haven, Conn., 1940); Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in 
American Diplomacy, 1896-1906 (New York, 1928); Lionel M. Gelber, 
The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, 1898-1906 (New York, 1938); 
Charles Carroll Griffin, The United States and the Disruption of the Span­
ish Empire, 1810-1822 (New York, 1937). 
30. Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy during the World War 
(Baltimore, 1934), American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (New Haven, Conn., 
1935); Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of 
Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore, 1941). 
14 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
narrative of diplomacy an account of economic interests, 
political ideas, and cultural relations." Whitaker traced the 
growth of concepts, such as the belief in inter-American 
unity, and also revealed the intricate interplay of forces shap­
ing foreign policy decisions. It was a book that fused to­
gether the distinctive features of the conservative and pro­
gressive approaches to foreign policy.31 Another Latin 
Americanist, J. Fred Rippy, employed a variety of tech­
niques, the most original of which examined the private 
economic structure linking the United States to other na­
tions.32 
Whatever their approach to the subject, few diplomatic 
historians completely escaped the isolationist assumptions so 
prevalent in the thirties or the influence of revisionist writ­
ings on American intervention in World War I. There were, 
of course, some variations. Bailey and Perkins seemed to ac­
cept American involvement in world politics in the twentieth 
century, and even the critique of those such as Bemis was 
muted by their belief that the nation's record in foreign af­
fairs was largely a noble and inspiring one. Still, the bulk of 
the writing dealing with twentieth-century American diplo­
macy had a critical tone, and, compared with earlier periods, 
some notable shifts in interpretations occurred.33 Previously 
historians had applauded the skill of McKinley and Roosevelt 
in guiding the nation's emergence as a world power; now 
they often made a harsh and negative appraisal of their di­
plomacy. Interpretations of American East Asian policy 
underwent a similar change. Before World War I historians 
31. The United States and the Independence of Latin America, p. xiii. 
32. J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926);
Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808­
1830 (Baltimore, 1929); The Capitalists and Colombia (New York, 1931)) 
The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York, 1940). 
33. Ernest R. May traces some of these changes in "Emergence to 
World Power," in John Higham, ed., The Reconstruction of American His­
tory (New York, 1962), pp. 180-96. 
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had characterized the Open Door Notes as a bold and effec­
tive diplomatic demarche; in the twenties they had become 
more skeptical of their effectiveness and wisdom; in the 
thirties many condemned the notes and the misunderstand­
ing of the nation's interests in East Asia which they gen­
erated. In 1922 Tyler Dennett had praised the Open Door 
Notes as exemplifying a cooperative policy in East Asia, but 
in 1933 Dennett portrayed them as motivated by Hay's ex­
treme Anglophilia and by domestic political needs. Accord­
ing to Dennett, American interests in China were small, and 
Hay had wisely abandoned adventurous policies there once 
he realized where they might lead.34 
Though the writing of nearly all diplomatic historians dur­
ing the thirties revealed strains of isolationism and revision­
ism, the writers of major revisionist tracts—Edwin Borchard 
and William Potter Lage, C. Hartley Grattan, and Walter 
Millis—were not specialists in American foreign policy. The 
only exception was Charles Callan Tansill. Today their in­
terpretations of American involvement in World War I are 
discredited; at the time, however, their books had a great 
influence upon scholars. This was particularly true of Tan-
sill's America Goes to War, the most substantial work on 
American intervention to appear in the twenties and thirties. 
Revisionists pioneered in the study of the role of propaganda 
and economics in diplomacy, and Millis displayed a sensitive 
if impressionistic understanding of national psychology. But 
their writings suffered from a variety of weaknesses. They 
were often excessively polemical, sometimes vague and con­
tradictory in their analysis of events, and frequently unbal­
anced in their emphasis upon economic factors and in their 
34. See the comments by John A. Garraty and Ernest R. May on the 
Open Door Notes and Tyler Dennett in Borg, Historians and American Far 
Eastern Policy, pp. 4-13, 32-37. Dennett applauded the Open Door Notes 
in Americans in Eastern Asia and criticized them in John Hay: From Poetry 
to Politics (New York, 1933). 
16 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
hostility to Great Britain and to most of Wilson's advisers. 
Finally, they thrived on a parochialism of outlook which, 
while it facilitated a condemnation of Wilson's diplomacy, 
ensured that multinational studies would one day place 
events in a broader framework.35 
Charles A. Beard was the only revisionist who transcended 
the immediate issue of American intervention to offer a con­
vincing interpretation of the whole of American foreign pol­
icy. Beard wrote no studies in diplomatic history until after 
World War II, but in America in Midpassage, the third vol­
ume of his great text, and in other books written during the 
thirties, he sought the domestic roots of foreign policy and 
historical justification for his concept of "continentalism."36 
Out of the early years of the young republic, Beard con­
tended, two conceptions of foreign policy emerged, one 
Federalist-Whig-Republican or "industrialist," the other 
Jeffersonian or "agrarian." The first featured high tariffs 
along with commercial and territorial expansion abroad; the 
second concentrated upon agricultural exports, free trade, 
and international cooperation. Both traditions were vague 
35. Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United 
States (New Haven, Conn., 1937); C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought 
(New York, 1929); Walter Millis, Road to War: America, 1914-1917 (Bos­
ton, 1935); Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938).
Two good discussions of revisionism are: Richard W. Leopold, "The Prob­
lem of American Intervention, 1917: A Historical Retrospect," World Poli­
tics II (1950), 405-25, and Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: 
The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago, 1967). 
36. Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, America in Midpassage (New York, 
1939). Aside from this volume, Beard expressed his ideas about the evolu­
tion of American expansionism most clearly in: The Idea of National Inter­
est: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934);
The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest (New 
York, 1935); A Foreign Policy for America (New York, 1940). Appraisals
of Beard's foreign policy views are offered by Hofstadter, The Progressive 
Historians, pp. 318-46; George R. Leighton, "Beard and Foreign Policy," 
in Howard K. Beale, ed., Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal (Lexington, Ky., 
1954), pp. 161-84; Gerald Stourzh, "Charles A. Beard's Interpretations of
American Foreign Policy," World Affairs Quarterly XXVIII (1957), 111^8; 
and Cushing Strout, The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker 
and Charles Beard (New Haven, Conn., 1958), pp. 135-56. 
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and contradictory, and neither was powerful enough to pre­
vent the United States from following, until the late nine­
teenth century, an essentially isolationist foreign policy dedi­
cated to the expansion of foreign trade without involvement 
abroad. It was only then that the industrialist outlook be­
came intensified and elaborated, leading many to believe 
that the nation faced a "question of commercial expansion 
or stagnation and decay." And so until 1929 the United 
States, led by a "restless elite," aggressively pursued foreign 
economic expansion both to maintain prosperity at home and 
to distract the people from the unresolved problems of do­
mestic reform. Wilsonian internationalism, Beard argued, 
was only an offshoot of industrialism, for Wilson believed in 
the necessity both of commercial expansion and of American 
predominance in world affairs. The great depression was the 
critical event that shattered the illusion of endless advance 
abroad as a solution to domestic problems, and in the thirties 
Beard invited the American nation "to open doors at home, 
to substitute an intensive cultivation of its own garden for a 
wasteful, quixotic, and ineffectual extension of its interests 
beyond the reach of competent military and naval de­
fenses." S7 Americans must, in short, now turn to the enor­
mous, unfinished task of developing the potentialities of their 
own unique civilization. 
Beard was, of course, the most eminent progressive histo­
rian, and his work on foreign policy indicates how the thrust 
of progressive history, when carried to extremes, could be a 
distorting influence. In Beard's hands the exploration of the 
domestic sources of foreign policy often became an economic 
reductionism; the attempt to relate the history of ideas to 
foreign policy floundered upon what Richard Hofstadter 
aptly describes as his ineptitude in dealing "with ideas, with 
37. The Open Door at Home, p. 38; A Foreign Policy for America, p. 
148; The Open Door at Home, p. vii. 
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moral impulses, with cultural forces that could not be closely 
tied to economic origins."38 Beard ignored the international 
setting of diplomacy and wrote as if American leaders had 
no legitimate concern for national security or the actions of 
other powers. His writings on foreign policy, dominated by 
suspicion of Franklin D. Roosevelt and fears for the future 
of American civilization, worked against the natural inter­
penetration of the progressive and conservative traditions of 
diplomatic history. But their obvious polemical nature, their 
confusing twists and turns required by Beard's efforts to fit 
the history of American foreign policy into ever-changing 
needs, undoubtedly weakened his impact on diplomatic his­
torians during the decade. Beard was too obviously a histo­
rian with a cause. Nonetheless, his influence did persist in 
the years after World War II in the writings of William 
Appleman Williams and other "New Left" diplomatic histo­
rians. Though rejecting Beard's dualism, they found mean­
ing in his economic realism and in his emphasis on the do­
mestic origins of foreign policy. More than anything else, 
however, they found in Beard an inspirational figure, com­
mitted to making history serve his social passions and cou­
rageously advocating his reforming vision. 
Beard's weaknesses, like his strengths, were of massive 
proportions compared with those of most other historians of 
the time. What now seem to be significant shortcomings of 
American diplomatic history in the twenties and thirties oc­
cupy a less dramatic scale. Conservative evolutionists, in fo­
cusing on continuities, displayed little sense of the shifting 
meaning of fundamental principles and traditional policies. 
On the other hand, progressive historians, who de-empha­
sized continuities and approached foreign policy from its 
domestic perspective, were often superficial in their analysis 
38. The Progressive Historians, p. 245. 
CHARLES E. NEU 19 
of various domestic forces, particularly public opinion. Even 
when exploring the ideology of foreign policy, they seldom 
linked ideas to the decision-making process or suggested the 
extent to which concepts of policy are time-bound—tied to 
the peculiar intellectual and cultural environment of a given 
period. 
Nor did specialists in American foreign policy dwell upon 
the tragic dimension of history—the unpredictability of 
events, the overpowering of governments and statesmen by 
the massive sweep of historical forces, or the illusions and ir­
rationalities of nations and their leaders. The faith of these 
historians in rational, orderly progress still ran deep. Bailey 
and Bemis were fond of listing the mistakes or blunders of 
American statesmen, suggesting by implication that clear op­
tions existed if only men had been wise enough to see them. 
The multiarchival approach of Bemis, Perkins, and others 
brought an awareness of the interaction of American policy 
with that of other nations; but it did not breed much histori­
cal fatalism, partly because it was multiarchival rather than 
multinational—grounded too much on government archives 
and too little on a broader understanding of the relationship 
between domestic politics and foreign policy. There was, to 
be sure, a strong sense of fatalism in the work of Millis and 
Seymour; but this was not generally the case, and most dip­
lomatic historians were not oppressed with a sense of in­
evitability in dealing with the coming of war in 1812, 1846, 
or 1898. They agreed that in 1812 knowledge of Britain's re­
peal of the Orders-in-Council would have prevented a decla­
ration of war; that in 1846 neither the United States nor 
Mexico really tried to keep the peace; and that in 1898 the 
McKinley administration might have averted war by dis­
playing more firmness toward the American public and more 
patience with Spain. American intervention in World War I 
seemed more complex, and most prominent diplomatic histo­
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rians, with the exception of Tansill, felt ambivalent over the 
possibility of avoiding it. 
Moreover, the results of the War of 1812 and the Mexican 
War aroused considerable enthusiasm. Bemis believed that 
the War of 1812 "galvanized American nationality. . . . 
[and] swelled a new pride in the Union which was to tri­
umph over the great threat of state rights in the middle of 
the century." Though he condemned the war as a "rash 
departure" from traditional policy, Bailey agreed that it 
brought forth a new nation.39 In assessing the Mexican War, 
few challenged Bemis's conclusion that no one would care 
to undo the results of Polk's aggressive diplomacy. Whether 
diplomatic historians praised or condemned the conse­
quences of the Spanish-American War and American inter­
vention in World War I, they were surprisingly gentle in ap­
praising the diplomacy of McKinley and Wilson. All of these 
judgments reflected a pride in the American past and the 
relative freedom of this generation from the many burdens 
of our own time. 
To some extent, however, diplomatic historians shared in 
what John Higham describes as the "crisis in progressive his­
tory" in the thirties. The best of the progressive historians 
had begun in that decade, if not before, to have doubts about 
scientific history and the cumulative nature of historical 
knowledge; they had begun to understand the way in which 
the historian, immersed in the values and perspectives of his 
own era, was bound by its assumptions in examining the past. 
Historical knowledge seemed less secure, less solid, as a crisis 
of confidence spread imperceptibly through the profession. 
Now some questioned the idea of progress, probed beneath 
man's surface motivations, and displayed a new awareness 
of the less tangible aspects of national and individual be­
39. Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 171; Bailey, Diplomatic History, pp. 
139,158. 
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havior. Ideas, traditional values, and the role of the individ­
ual, all achieved more recognition. In the process the 
interpretive structure of progressive history was seriously 
undermined.40 
Diplomatic historians, who were somewhat insulated from 
the prevalent historical attitude, responded slowly to these 
changes. But even in the thirties certain signs of the new his­
torical outlook appeared in their writings. As we have seen, 
there was a critical mood that emphasized the mistakes of 
the past and a tendency, on the part of Bailey and Millis, to 
portray the power and irresponsibility of public opinion. A 
significant interest in biography also developed.41 The most 
impressive of these biographies was Dennett's John Hay, 
which explored with perception and grace the tensions of 
Hay's life. A subtle portrait emerged of a disunified man, 
filled with unresolved contradictions between a love of com­
fort and idleness and a gnawing need to achieve worldly suc­
cess and recognition. Hay was torn between an amateurish 
diffuseness and a recognition that his talents must be focused 
if he was to make a lasting impression upon the world. As 
Dennett wrote, his was "no hero's tale," and yet there was a 
"vein of heroism" in Hay's life because "indolent by nature 
. . . evading most of . .  . [life's] rough spots . .  . he over­
came himself" and became a great secretary of state.42 What 
distinguished Dennett's Hay was the way in which it con­
veyed the sadness of Hay's life, the extent to which he lived 
on the edge of tragedy and was rescued from it by forces 
largely beyond his own control. It was a somber book, illu­
40. Higham, History, pp. 198-211. 
41. Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New York, 1938); Allan Nevins, 
Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York, 1930), 
Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (New York, 
1936); J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett: Versatile American (Durham, N.C., 
1935); Louis Martin Sears, John Slidell (Durham, N.C., 1925), and George
Washington (New York, 1932). 
42. John Hay, p. 443. 
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minating the darker sides of human existence, from which 
one could easily infer parallels between the fate of nations 
and men. 
After World War II these new directions in diplomatic 
history fell into bolder relief. Scholars continued, of course, 
to work in the conservative-evolutionist and progressive tra­
ditions of foreign policy, but now substantial changes of tone 
and interpretation appeared. In the early forties Bemis 
turned to a study of the Latin American policy of the United 
States, one that emphasized continuities, particularly the 
evolution of a legal framework for inter-American relations. 
He reached optimistic conclusions, seeing steady progress 
in the development of the principles of hemispheric unity 
and cooperation and predicting that the inter-American sys­
tem would become the cornerstone of the world's future 
peace structure.43 He then moved on to biography, and pro­
duced, in 1949, the first of two volumes on John Quincy 
Adams. Bemis chose Adams in part because his career as dip­
lomat and secretary of state embodied the foundations of 
American foreign policy and served as a convenient way in 
which to trace their formulation. The first volume, as Bemis 
pointed out, was a "diplomatic biography," " but the second 
was quite different. Foreign policy could no longer serve as 
a major theme around which to group Adams's activities; 
now Bemis saw him as a fervent nationalist and as an up­
holder of the Union. More importantly, the final volume had 
a much broader scope, ranging across many aspects of 
Adams's personal life—the tensions within his marriage and 
with his son, his melancholy, and his compulsive need for 
political contention. Bemis touched upon these inner dimen­
sions of Adams's personality, yet felt inadequately prepared 
43. Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United 
States: An Historical Interpretation (New York, 1943). 
44. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign 
Policy, p. ix. 
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to deal with them. "This task," he wrote, "must be left to fu­
ture biographers."4B 
Bemis also changed his view of the nation's ties with the 
rest of the world. By 1941 he realized that Germany and 
Japan menaced America's security, and, with the end of 
World War II, he accepted the burdens of world power and 
the necessity of the Cold War. The struggle with the Soviet 
Union involved precious freedoms; in 1948 he wrote that 
the nation had lived in a "Fool's Paradise" for fifteen years 
after 1922. Now he moderated many previous strictures 
about the course of American foreign policy since 1898 and 
took the stance of a political realist, determined that no one 
power should dominate Europe and convinced that the 
United States must rely upon the balance of power until the 
nations of the world formed a system of collective security 
and vindicated Wilson's "great moral vision." ** Still, many 
aspects of America's new role made Bemis uncomfortable, 
and in the years after 1945 he experienced a significant loss 
of confidence and reached a deeply troubled assessment of 
contemporary American civilization. He had grave misgiv­
ings about American foreign aid programs, which cast the 
nation in the role of "global Santa Claus." At best he could 
foresee a long armed peace that would test the discipline 
and endurance of the American people, and his presidential 
address to the American Historical Association in 1961 re­
vealed doubts about the nature of their response. He felt 
that the American people had a clear purpose to preserve 
and propagate the "blessings of liberty," but he believed 
they had lost sight of their mission. The nation's will was 
softening, its people absorbed in "self-study and self-indul­
45. Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York, 
1956), p. 544. 
46. Samuel Flagg Bemis, American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of 
Liberty and Other Essays (New Haven, Conn., 1962), pp. 395, 402. 
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gence." Bemis urged a return to national discipline and sac­
rifice and, at the same time, nostalgically evoked the nine­
teenth century, those "happy, golden, bygone years of safety, 
in lucky innocence, apart from the world around us." Like 
John Quincy Adams, his personal motto was "A stout heart 
and a clear conscience, and never despair." But he could not 
repress his fears for the future of his nation.47 
Bemis's scholarship showed the imprint of changing his­
torical attitudes, as well as a sensitivity to broader domestic 
and international currents. The viewpoint of another con­
servative evolutionist, Dexter Perkins, changed less dramat­
ically. In 1941 Perkins summed up and extended his history 
of the Monroe Doctrine, but never again did he undertake 
a major intellectual task. Instead, he published a series of 
smaller books generally designed to explain the American 
heritage in foreign relations and to bring home the lessons 
of history to the public.48 One of these books, The American 
Approach to Foreign Policy, did display a new concern with 
shifts in the public's mood and suggested a diminishing be­
lief in the rationality of decision-making. Neither these in­
sights nor Perkins's loss of faith in collective security altered 
his optimistic view of the history of American foreign policy, 
and after 1945 he was unperturbed, if not complacent, about 
America's role in world politics. He took pride and satisfac­
47. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign 
Policy, pp. 566, 670; and American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of 
Liberty, pp. 6, 14. This pessimism began in the thirties, when Bemis was
hostile to the New Deal and disturbed by the apparent decline of traditional
American virtues. In recent years it has deepened. Interview with Samuel 
Flagg Bemis, September 17, 1968. 
48. Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1941); 
America and Two Wars (Boston, 1944); The Evolution of American Foreign 
Policy (New York, 1948); The American Approach to Foreign Policy 
(Stockholm, 1951); America's Quest for Peace (Bloomington, Ind., 1962); 
The Diplomacy of a New Age: Major Issues in U.S. Policy since 1945
(Bloomington, Ind., 1967). Many of his essays are collected in Glyndon G.
Van Deusen and Richard C. Wade, eds., Foreign Policy and the American 
Spirit: Essays by Dexter Perkins (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957). Perkins reflects on 
his life in Yield of the Years (Boston, 1969). 
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tion in both the past and present and believed that, on the 
whole, American diplomacy had been "remarkably success­
ful." 49 It was an idealistic diplomacy, concerned with gen­
eral principles, dependent upon public opinion, and reluc­
tant to recognize the role of force. Americans were pacific 
and moralistic but also flexible and pragmatic in their re­
sponse to particular problems. Though the occasional naivete 
of American foreign policy worried Perkins, he praised its 
major characteristics. 
Between 1947, when he predicted a "brilliant future" for 
Cuba, and 1967, Perkins's optimism about world affairs wav­
ered but remained strong.60 He clung to his belief that the 
trend was toward stability and order and that war was "more 
and more unlikely." "It may be," he wrote in 1962, "that we 
shall see a great decrease in international tension in the years 
ahead. Surely we should not wring our hands in futility. 
Great winds of hope are sweeping through the world, the 
hope of peace, the hope of economic progress, of a richer 
life for all. This is no time for despair." 61 
Diplomatic historians working within the progressive tra­
dition also continued to publish in the postwar period, but 
with the exception of Thomas A. Bailey, they seemed unin­
terested in building upon their earlier writings. Julius W. 
Pratt showed no inclination to explore the new approaches 
opened up in Expansionists of 1898,52 and J. Fred Rippy, a 
49. The American Approach to Foreign Policy, p. 174; Yield of the 
Years, pp. 139-40. 
50. The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), 
p. 32. This comes out clearly if one compares the preface of the 1947 edition
with that of the 1966 revised edition. 
51. American Historical Review LXXIII (1967), 87; Perkins, America's Quest for Peace, p. 122. 
52. Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment: How the United 
States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire (New 
York, 1950); Cordell Hull, 1933-44, 2 vols. (New York, 1964); Challenge
and Rejection: The United States and World Leadership, 1900-1921 
(New York, 1967). 
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Latin Americanist strongly influenced by progressive history, 
did not really improve his technique of historical analysis.65 
Rippy did, however, become dissatisfied with American for­
eign policy and pessimistic over the future. He complained 
that the United States devoted too little attention to the 
Western Hemisphere, still its "inner fortress," and too much 
to the rest of the world. America's "compulsory benevolence" 
around the globe was badly straining its own society and 
preventing the development of self-reliance in other nations. 
Rippy felt he lived "at a time of terrible crises in the history 
of the human race," when the American epic was "on the 
point of becoming a Greek tragedy." The world was "increas­
ingly complex and dangerous . .  . on the verge of greater 
material prosperity but growing more immoral, inhumane, 
and desolate spiritually." M Rippy had no regrets that his life 
span was nearing its end; the future seemed unlikely to be 
so good as the past. 
Of all those historians concerned with the domestic 
sources of foreign policy, Thomas A. Bailey remained the 
most productive during and after World War II. An intense 
present-mindedness marked his work, along with an interest 
in the nature and education of public opinion. Fearful that 
the United States might "again run through the same tragic 
circle of disillusionment and isolationism," Bailey described, 
in two volumes, the lessons to be learned from Woodrow 
Wilson's efforts to make a just peace and secure its accept­
ance by the American people. Admitting his admiration for 
Wilson and his sympathy with his ends, Bailey focused 
closely on Wilson's various decisions as if they would be di­
rectly relevant to peacemaking in 1945. He concluded that 
53. J. Fred Rippy, Latin America and the Industrial Age (New York, 
1944); Globe and Hemisphere: Latin America's Place in the Postwar For­
eign Relations of the United States (Chicago, 1958); British Investments in 
Latin America, 1822-1949 (Minneapolis, 1959). 
54. Globe and Hemisphere, pp. 28, 95; and Bygones I Cannot Help 
Recalling: The Memoirs of a Mobile Scholar (Austin, Tex., 1966), pp. vi, 
95, 191. 
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Wilson moved too fast and that he failed to realize that 
"mankind is shortsighted and perverse." The failure to win 
Senate approval of the Treaty of Versailles was in part due 
to Wilson's own flaws and was "one of the supreme tragedies 
of human history."55 
Bailey's interest in public opinion climaxed in 1948 with 
the publication of The Man in the Street. Relying heavily on 
public opinion polls, Bailey essentially described popular at­
titudes and illusions toward foreign affairs. There was a cer­
tain muckraking quality to the book, as Bailey decried the 
public's "appalling ignorance of foreign affairs" and equated 
ignorance with a bellicose feeling toward other nations. He 
also emphasized the deficiencies of American democracy and 
the way in which the people had disappointed "the high 
hopes of our friends and . . . fallen so far short of our 
ideals."66 Yet there was, beneath the superficial disillusion­
ment, a basic core of faith that the American people, as they 
gained more understanding of others, would become more 
mature, tolerant, and sophisticated in their foreign policy. 
The Man in the Street left unanswered many questions 
about public opinion. It was, to be sure, a powerful force, 
but the book did not dissect it or establish a connection be­
tween the public's beliefs and decision-making. Nor did 
Bailey ever attempt to move beyond his 1948 analysis. He 
soon turned to another timely subject, Russian-American re­
lations, and after 1950 his work trailed off in a number of 
directions, leaving to others the pursuit of his many original 
insights." At the same time, he sought to revive his faltering 
55. Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 
1944), pp. v, 325; Woodrow Wibon and the Great Betrayal (New York, 
1945), p. v. 
56. Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American 
Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York, 1948), pp. 130, 46. 
57. Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia: Russian-American Rela­
tions from Early Times to Our Day (Ithaca, N.Y., 1950); Presidential Great­
ness: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present (New 
York, 1966); The AH of Diplomacy: The American Experience (New York, 
1968); Democrats vs. Republicans: The Continuing Clash (New York, 
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confidence in America and its mission. But Bailey's claims 
that the United States "towers gigantic and unique," the 
home of a "remarkable people," seemed forced, designed 
more to reassure himself than to convince others.58 
To one extent or another, then, all of the older diplomatic 
historians writing in the postwar period shared the loss of 
confidence so evident in Bemis and Rippy. Both foreign and 
domestic events shook the certitudes of these men; the con­
tinuities of the past seemed less reassuring and less relevant 
to a precarious future. 
John Higham remarks that the late forties and early fifties 
were the "Indian summer" of progressive history, a time of 
ripeness of interpretation, when the ferment of new histori­
cal attitudes was about to break through the surface in a 
massive way.59 Developments in American diplomatic history 
ran parallel to this, though perhaps the upheaval was less 
dramatic. In the late forties and early fifties, Bailey, Bemis, 
Perkins, and Pratt still dominated the field, but the two sep­
arate traditions of American foreign policy that they repre­
sented became less distinct. Assimilating the insights of a 
previous generation, younger scholars tended to blend to­
gether the two strands into a common interpretive structure. 
This process was particularly noticeable in textbooks, which 
were no longer so distinctive as those of Bemis and Bailey.60 
1968). For a selection of his articles, see Armin Rappaport and Alexander
DeConde, eds., Essays Diplomatic and Undiplomatic of Thomas A. Bailey
(New York, 1969). 
58. The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 3d ed. (Boston, 
1966), pp. v, 990. 
59. History, p. 212. 
60. Of the new texts published by the older generation of diplomatic 
historians after 1945, Pratt's A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1955), and L. Ethan Ellis's A Short History of 
American Diplomacy (New York, 1951), were balanced syntheses of the 
two traditions. Richard W. Van Alstyne's American Diplomacy in Action (Stanford, Calif., 1944), stood somewhat apart because of its case study
approach and its emphasis on a dynamic, aggressive concept of American 
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Instead, scholars emphasized both continuities and the inter­
national context as well as specific crises and domestic in­
fluences upon foreign policy decisions. 
But many of the generalizations produced about the 
American diplomatic experience now seemed to be common­
place and inadequate explanations of events. The old con­
tinuities—the foundations of American foreign policy and 
the tradition of equality, liberty, and hope, so vivid in the 
work of Bemis—would perhaps inspire some citizens but 
would hardly satisfy historians.61 They began during these 
years to feel a need to examine American foreign policy in a 
different way in an attempt to achieve a deeper level of un­
derstanding. This meant, of course, that in the fifties a wide-
ranging reworking of periods and problems began that 
brought the whole field of American foreign policy, as one 
critic alarmingly notes, into a "condition of serious intellec­
tual disarray."62 This was, however, a sign of health, not of 
decay, and it produced a new literature that saw the past as 
more pluralistic and fragmented and less related to contem­
porary concerns. 
This restlessness over accepted generalizations stemmed 
from two sources. Partly it was a reflection of the cumulative 
impact of events upon diplomatic historians, who could not 
security. Texts by younger scholars that revealed a substantial consensus 
were: Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History (New York, 
1959); Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A 
History (New York, 1962); Alexander DeConde, A History of American 
Foreign Policy (New York, 1963). Wayne S. Cole, An Interpretive History 
of American Foreign Relations (Homewood, 111., 1968) gave more weight
to the domestic sources of foreign policy. There is, of course, a great varia­
tion in the quality of these texts. 
61. The continuities are spelled out in Frank Tannenbaum's The Ameri­
can Tradition in Foreign Policy (Norman, Okla., 1955). 
62. Francis L. Loewenheim, "A Legacy of Hope and a Legacy of Doubt:
Reflections on the Role of History and Historians in American Foreign 
Policy since the Eighteenth Century," in Loewenheim, ed., The Historian 
and the Diplomat: The Role of History and Historians in American Foreign 
Policy (New York, 1967), p. 70. 
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help but be affected by the tensions and perils of the inter­
national situation. So many developments since the late thir­
ties had suggested the irrational and chaotic nature of world 
politics that diplomatic historians inevitably viewed the past 
from a more somber perspective. In addition, they were af­
fected, though sometimes belatedly, by the disintegration of 
the progressive synthesis in American history and by the 
emergence of many new ways of interpreting the past. No 
longer did historians see American history as a dramatic 
struggle between reform and reaction, one that involved 
clearly defined groups acting for rational purposes and the 
gradual triumph of liberal reform. Now some were struck by 
the widespread agreement upon a largely unarticulated lib­
eral tradition, and they used this consensus as a backdrop 
against which the American experience could be placed. 
Others, more preoccupied with instability and friction, saw 
it in a much different way than did progressive historians. 
They decreased the scope of conflict and transformed its na­
ture, emphasizing the impact of status considerations, rapid 
mobility, and myths and images upon individuals and their 
society. Much of the conflict was internalized in the form of 
psychic tensions that most Americans shared. The result was 
a recognition of the unconscious aspects of human behavior 
and a concentration upon the tragic side of American his­
tory, upon defeat and decay rather than upon fulfillment 
and progress. Finally, an increasing number of historians 
analyzed the basic patterns of American political life and 
broadened our concept of the political process, accelerating 
the movement away from traditional, event-oriented his­
tory.63 
63. By far the best descriptions of these changes are Higham, History, 
pp. 212-32, and Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, pp. 437-66. Samuel 
H. Hays, "Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880-1920," 
Political Science Quarterly LXXX (1965), 373-94, is also excellent for a 
more limited area. 
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All of these various approaches made the past seem more 
complex and raised questions both about man's ability to 
master himself and his society. Now the impact of tradi­
tional reform measures often seemed superficial and change 
appeared as both good and bad, part of a continual process 
of disintegration and reintegration that destroys as well as 
creates. The past seemed so ambiguous, peopled by so few 
heroes or lessons for the present, that historians became 
acutely aware of the tension between their historical knowl­
edge and their sense of our contemporary crisis. As Richard 
Hofstadter observes, they were "caught between their desire 
to count in the world, and their desire to understand it."M 
For the moment, at least, most seemed to reject the present­
mindedness of the progressive generation of scholars and in­
stead to concentrate on the imaginative leap, the creative 
fusion of past and present, that they saw as the essence of 
their craft. 
After 1950 numerous authors reexamined America's in­
volvement in past wars. Generally their books were multi­
national studies that concentrated upon the process of 
decision-making and, at the same time, placed that process 
in a much broader context than historians had previously 
done. Nearly all of these books emphasized the haphazard 
nature of decision-making and the extent to which policy 
was based upon illusions about other nations. Far more than 
in previous studies, these historians portrayed statesmen as 
trapped by the bureaucratic structures that provided infor­
mation and advice or by public opinion, which they dared 
not defy. Their range of choice seemed narrow, their vision 
and understanding limited, and their responsiveness to the 
needs of other nations impeded by intellectual assumptions 
and preconceptions. 
A drift toward fatalism appeared in significant reinterpre­
64. The Progressive Historians, p. 464. 
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tations of most of the major wars in which the United States 
participated. In the twenties and thirties diplomatic histo­
rians had customarily labeled the War of 1812, the Mexican 
War, and the Spanish-American War as unnecessary, and 
generally had seen a possibility of continuing American neu­
trality in World War I.65 New multinational studies, how­
ever, greatly altered these conclusions. In the preface to a 
major work on the War of 1812, Bradford Perkins wrote that 
"scholars have overemphasized the tangible, rational reasons 
for action and . . . have given too little heed to such things 
as national pride, sensitivity, and frustration. . . . Emotion, 
chance, and half choices often mold the relations between 
states as much as or more than cool reason." Perkins stressed 
the cumulative psychological consequences of British as­
saults and brought out the fundamental miscalculations of 
the British and American governments. The British had been 
insensitive to the mood of Americans and had failed to com­
prehend the economic interdependence of the two nations; 
the Americans had overestimated the power of economic 
coercion and assumed that Great Britain would react ration­
ally to various American initiatives. Perkins judged harshly 
the "diplomatic ineptness," the "fumbling and confused anal­
ysis" of Jefferson and Madison. Through action and inaction, 
65. For discussions of some aspects of the historiography of these wars, 
see: Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of
Changing Interpretations," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XXVIII 
(1941), 171-86; Peter T. Harsted and Richard W. Rush, "The Causes of 
the Mexican War: A Note on Changing Interpretations," Arizona and the 
West VI (1964), 289-302; Ernest R. May, American Intervention: 1917 and 
1941 (Washington, D.C., 1960); Daniel M. Smith, "National Interest and
American Intervention in 1917: An Historiographical Appraisal," Journal of 
American History LII (1965), 5-24. There was no important reinterpreta­
tion of the Mexican War. It still awaits a multinational study of its origins to
replace Justin H. Smith's The War with Mexico, 2 vols. (New York, 1919).
In the thirties Charles Seymour, who put the most emphasis on the inter­
national context of American intervention in World War I, was the most 
fatalistic. "Wilson," Seymour wrote, "did not dictate circumstances, but 
was governed by them. As we survey these four years there is something
reminiscent of a Greek tragedy in the obvious omnipotence of Fate" (Ameri­
can Diplomacy during the World War, pp. 396-97). 
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they had led the nation to a point where it had to accept 
either war or profound national humiliation. Perkins be­
lieved the war was "tragically unnecessary" and could have 
been avoided if Jefferson and Madison had displayed the 
wisdom and caution of Federalist foreign policy in the 
1790s.66 But this would have required an alteration of each 
man's basic assumptions. 
Another study of the War of 1812, by Roger H. Brown, 
analyzed more closely the motives of Republicans in opting 
for war. Drawing insights from the work of Cecilia M. Ken-
yon and Bernard Bailyn, Brown identified a strain of uncer­
tainty over the fate of the Republic, a pattern of thought 
that continued to exist after 1787. He described how, in the 
years before 1812, a consensus had slowly developed among 
Republicans that, if the United States failed to show that it 
could defend its honor and endure, a less democratic form 
of government might have emerged. By going to war in 1812 
the nation had thus overcome a crisis of confidence.67 The 
thrust of both these books, with their focus on decision-
making and national psychology, was to add many dimen­
sions to our understanding of the decision for war and to 
narrow the possibility of avoiding conflict. 
The same tendency was evident in studies of the coming 
war in 1898,1914, and 1941. In Imperial Democracy, Ernest 
R. May examined the intersection of Spanish and American 
policy and concluded that neither government was willing 
to accept the domestic consequences involved in the mainte­
nance of peace. Ultimately Spain had preferred losing Cuba 
through war with the United States rather than through con­
cessions to the Cuban rebels; President McKinley had "led 
his country unwillingly toward a war that he did not want 
66. Bradford Perldns, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 
1805-1812 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), pp. vii, 121, 426. 
67. Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964). 
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for a cause in which he did not believe" rather than risk the 
destruction of his leadership and of his party's dominance 
in American politics. For the first time May placed the ori­
gin of the war in its international context and explored the 
domestic pressures upon the Spanish government.68 He also 
moved beyond Pratt's analysis of the structure of American 
public opinion. Tracing the beginnings of the Cuban agita­
tion and its spread to the masses of the people, he showed 
how a popular upheaval had overwhelmed timid politicians 
and caused traditional leaders of public opinion to reverse 
their judgment and accept the necessity of war. The root of 
the public's frenzy was an irrational connection between 
concern for Cuba and the various anxieties of the 1890s. 
May felt that war came from a "terrible human predicament" 
beyond the ability of statesmen to solve.69 
In both Imperial Democracy and his previous book, The 
World War and American Isolation, May provided an excep­
tionally thoughtful canvass of the options of statesmen as 
well as a compelling account of the drift into war.70 Earlier, 
Charles Seymour had argued that no American concessions 
to Germany, short of a complete abdication of rights, would 
have prevented that nation's decision for unlimited sub­
marine warfare. But it was only in the fifties and early sixties 
that books by May, Robert E. Osgood, and Arthur S. Link 
revealed the full complexity of Wilson's thought and of the 
68. Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as 
a Great Power (New York, 1961); the quote is from p. 159. Orestes 
Ferrara's The Last Spanish War: Revelations in "Diplomacy," trans. 
William E. Shea (New York, 1937), used some European archives but was 
a sketchy account that concentrated upon Spain's search for European 
diplomatic assistance. 
69. Emest R. May, "Overseas Expansion: The Coming of War with 
Spain, 1895-98," in Merrill D. Peterson and Leonard W. Levy, eds., Major 
Crises in American History: Documentary Problems, 2 vols. (New York, 
1962), II, 144. 
70. Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1959). 
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decision-making process in the American government.71 
Each emphasized the importance of intangible factors such 
as national honor and prestige and Wilson's sense of inter­
national morality; each found little fault with that diplo­
macy; and each felt the decision for war inevitable, given 
the values of Wilson and the American people. May's book, 
however, provided the most unified account of American in­
tervention because of its exploration of the domestic sources 
of British and German policy, its penetrating analysis of the 
beliefs of Wilson and his advisers, and its taut description of 
the relentless domestic and international pressures that drove 
the nation toward war. "Despite the paradoxes," May con­
cluded, "close analysis cannot find the point at which he 
[Wilson] might have turned back or taken another road. In 
Wilson's dilemmas, as in the contests in London and Berlin, 
there were elements of high tragedy."72 
In contrast to American intervention in World War I, no 
historians, except extreme revisionists such as Beard and 
Tansill, ever questioned the wisdom of going to war with 
Germany in 1941." Both at the time and in retrospect, Nazi 
Germany seemed a threat to the nation's vital interests. 
Moreover, the course of events after World War II never 
created the intellectual atmosphere in which revisionism 
could thrive, and it was further discouraged by the early 
71. Charles Seymour, American Neutrality, p. 79; Robert E. Osgood,
Ideals and Self-interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Trans­formation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1953); Arthur S. Link, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York, 1954),
Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore, 
1957), Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, N.J., 
1960), Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, N.J., 1964), 
and Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Prince­
ton, N.J., 1965). 
72. The World War and American Isolation, p. vii. 
73. Assessments of the literature on American entry into World War II 
are: Ernest R. May, American Intervention: 1917 and 1941; Wayne S. Cole, 
"American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review XLIII (1957), 595-617. 
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publication of William L. Langer's and S. Everett Gleason's 
impressive defense of the American decision for war.74 But 
the coming of war with Japan raised different and more sub­
tle issues, and historians have been preoccupied with the 
might-have-beens of Japanese-American relations in the 
thirties. Japan, after all, was less powerful than Germany, its 
leaders less irrational, and its expansionist aims less danger­
ous to the interests of the United States. Until the very end 
the two governments discussed the terms of a compromise 
settlement, and historians have tried to understand why 
these efforts failed. The first authoritative account, by Her­
bert Feis, assumed that failure was inevitable.75 Feis's narra­
tive, however, was narrow in scope, dealing primarily with 
the American side. It left too many questions unresolved to 
quiet historians' interest in the possibility of a last-minute 
agreement. Eight years after Feis wrote, Paul W. Schroeder 
published the most forceful statement of this position. Con­
demning the moralistic tone of American diplomacy, 
Schroeder suggested that, since Japan was on the defensive 
by late 1941, a modus vivendi could have grown into a per­
manent accord.76 More recently Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., 
argues, in his excellent biography of Joseph Grew, that flex­
ible and imaginative American diplomacy might have re­
sulted in a settlement with Japan.77 But Heinrichs's own 
74. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isola­
tion, 1937-1940 (New York, 1952), and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 
(New York, 1953). James V. Compton's analysis of Hitler's bizarre attitude
toward the United States in The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler, the United 
States, and the Origins of World War II (Boston, 1967) has only further
underlined the impossibility of peacefully coexisting with the Second Reich
and its leader. 
75. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J., 1950). 
76. Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Rela­
tions (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958). F. C. Jones anticipated some of Schroeder's 
arguments in Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45
(New York, 1954). 
77. Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and 
the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, 1966). 
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analysis of Japanese expansionism and of the extraordinary 
difficulty any Westerner faced in comprehending Japanese 
policy tends to refute his own conclusions. In fact, those 
scholars such as Robert J. C. Butow and Akira Iriye, who 
have probed most deeply into Japanese politics, are pessi­
mistic about the chances of altering the collision course on 
which the two nations were set.78 In other words, the more 
historians know about the internal dynamics of Japanese 
expansionism, the more fatalistic they become over the out­
break of war in the Pacific. 
Thus as diplomatic historians have reached out to under­
stand other nations and their foreign policies, the alterna­
tives that past American statesmen faced seemed steadily to 
decrease. Three outstanding books, two by George F. 
Kennan and one by Roberta Wohlstetter, reinforced this 
tendency. Both authors emphasized the faulty information 
underlying foreign policy decisions and the enormous con­
fusion inherent in the decision-making process. Both vividly 
portrayed the difficulty of controlling bureaucratic structures 
designed to serve statesmen; neither was optimistic about 
the possibilities of correcting these deficiencies.79 Much of 
the recent literature on Vietnam, indicating an enormous gap 
between reality and Washington's conception of it, confirms 
the wisdom of Kennan and Wohlstetter in accepting this sort 
of confusion as an important element in the shaping of for­
eign policy.80 
Other developments in the writing of American foreign 
policy have also underscored the unstable and uncertain 
78. Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, 
N.J., 1961); Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East 
Asian Relations (New York, 1967). 
79. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 
and The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, N.J., 1958); Roberta Wohlstetter, 
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif., 1962). 
80. Perhaps the best example is John Mecklin's Mission in Torment: An 
Intimate Account of the United States Role in Vietnam (New York, 1965). 
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foundations of decision-making. Although diplomatic his­
torians generally have given considerable attention to public 
opinion, as derived from newspaper editorials or, for later 
periods, public opinion polls, they have not explored the 
process through which it is formed or the way in which 
politicians measure and interpret the public's response. 
Ernest R. May's survey of research by behavioral scientists 
suggests that there is no orderly transmission of views to 
governmental officials and that public opinion is far more 
complex and irrational than historians have assumed. Both 
the public and the statesmen who judge its opinions, May 
writes, "may . .  . be arriving at judgments that are prod­
ucts of their own personalities and inner needs."81 
Finally, a finer appreciation of the depths and nuances of 
human personality has increased the historian's emphasis 
upon the subjectivity of foreign policy decisions. Diplomatic 
historians largely ignored any analysis of individual person­
alities in the twenties and thirties, though a modest turn to 
biography began in the thirties.82 Some wrote biographies of 
real distinction, but none pioneered in the study of group or 
individual psychology, as did Thomas Cochran in America's 
Railivay Leaders or David Donald in Charles Sumner and 
81. Ernest R. May, "An American Tradition in Foreign Policy: The Role
of Public Opinion," in William H. Nelson, ed., Theory and Practice in 
American Politics (Chicago, 1964), p. 107. May's most recent book, Ameri­
can Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968), utilizes insights
from behavorial scientists to explore the interplay between public opinion,
the foreign policy elite, and government leaders in the 1890s. Robert H. 
Wiebe's The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), also contains 
illuminating comments on those groups dominating foreign policy in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
82. Postwar biographical or semibiographical studies written by diplo­
matic historians included: Bemis, John Quincy Adams (2 vols.); Wayne S. 
Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis, 
1962); Heinrichs, Grew; Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conserv­
ative Tradition (Boston, 1954); Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat: The 
Life of W. W. Rockhill (Urbana, 111., 1952); and Robert Dallek, Democrat 
and Diplomat: The Life of William E. Dodd (New York, 1968). 
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the Coming of the Civil War.83 There was, however, a spread­
ing awareness of the many layers of personality as diplomatic 
historians drew upon the insights of outstanding biographers 
to penetrate into the conscious and subconscious motives of 
statesmen. Everywhere they turned, diplomatic historians 
were confronted with the dissolution of old certainties and 
of previously accepted generalizations. 
In the fifties and sixties there was also a movement to­
ward widening the context of decision-making, one that in­
volved an assimilation of social and intellectual history. Be­
fore World War II some diplomatic historians had studied 
the intellectual concepts of statesmen and, in subsequent 
years, with the growing maturity of social and intellectual 
history, more became sensitive to the ideas behind foreign 
policy. One consequence was a major assault upon the con­
servative, evolutionist framework, which had assumed a 
continuity of principles meaning the same thing to different 
men at different times. Now these principles seemed relative 
to their time, part of a shifting complex of thought and 
values, and historians sought to understand how the assump­
tions of an age shaped men's outlook toward world affairs 
and influenced their particular decisions. Eventually, new 
generalizations about the history of American foreign policy 
will perhaps appear when a younger generation lays a com­
prehensive foundation of monographic literature. That proc­
ess is, however, far from complete. 
A number of books exemplify this new trend. Felix Gilbert 
has measured the impact of Enlightenment ideas upon the 
formulation of American diplomatic concepts in the late 
eighteenth century; Gerald Stourzh has traced the link be­
83. Thomas Cochran, America's Railway Leaders, 1845-1890 (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1953); David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of 
the Civil War (New York, 1960). 
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tween political action and thought in Benjamin Franklin's 
approach to foreign policy; and, for later periods, Howard K. 
Beale, John Morton Blum, Norman A. Graebner, Robert E. 
Osgood, and Arthur P. Whitaker have published important 
studies.84 Blum and Beale, in different ways, have examined 
the intellectual underpinnings of Theodore Roosevelt's for­
eign policy and attempted to view it, in Blum's words, 
"against the background of the confidence he shared and 
fed."85 Perhaps Osgood has succeeded better than anyone 
else in penetrating the whole intellectual atmosphere of 
early twentieth-century American diplomacy. He has put 
Roosevelt's generally realistic appraisal of international 
politics in perspective by exploring popular attitudes toward 
world affairs, particularly the significance of the peace move­
ment. Finally, Whitaker has sketched the rise and decline of 
The Western Hemisphere Idea, which had inspired men 
since the early nineteenth century, and Graebner has an­
alyzed the intense debate over foreign policy in the early 
fifties. More recently, the appearance of Graebner's Ideas 
and Diplomacy in 1964 symbolizes the assimilation of intel­
lectual history into diplomatic history. Previous documentary 
collections consisted largely of official diplomatic corre­
spondence and the texts of treaties; Graebner designed his 
readings to reveal the ideas behind American diplomacy 
and their relationship to the contemporary intellectual 
milieu.86 
84. Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American 
Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J., 1961); Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin 
and American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1954); John Morton Blum, The 
Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Howard K. Beale, Theo­
dore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956); 
Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest; Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemi­
sphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y., 1954); Norman A. 
Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy 
since 1950 (New York, 1956). 
85. The Republican Roosevelt, p. 1. 
86. Norman A. Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intel­
lectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1964). 
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Though this fusion of diplomatic, intellectual, and social 
history had widespread implications for the whole history of 
American foreign policy, the bulk of the new scholarship has 
crystallized around certain periods and issues. In the twen­
ties and thirties diplomatic historians did not recognize the 
unique cluster of values and ideas embodied in the progres­
sive era, partly because they were too close in point of time, 
partly because they did not attempt to isolate the intellectual 
characteristics of any period. Wilson's idealistic view of 
international affairs, for example, seemed an individual 
phenomenon with a continuing relevance. But once histo­
rians identified the distinctive aspects of the years before 
World War I,87 the assumptions of Wilson's wartime diplo­
macy became far more comprehensible. Wilson's concept 
of a community of power appeared as the ultimate expression 
of an era that believed that nations could order their relations 
in a rational, legalistic, and humane way. As Robert E. 
Osgood has pointed out, "we live in a world he [Wilson] 
never envisioned. . . . [For his] conception of collective 
security was firmly rooted in nineteenth-century liberalism 
and twentieth-century progressivism." ^ 
This development, combined with a comparative analysis 
of American and European politics, has also greatly enlarged 
our perspective on Wilson's role at the Paris Peace Confer­
ence. Diplomatic historians long realized that political con­
ditions in Europe impeded the achievement of Wilson's 
goals, but they did not pursue this insight and exaggerated 
the gap between Wilson's aims and those of various Euro­
pean leaders. In 1961 Seth P. Tillman's study Anglo-
American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 
87. Henry F. May's The End of American Innocence: A Study of the 
First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York, 1959), was perhaps
the most helpful analysis of our prewar culture. 
88. Robert E. Osgood, "Woodrow Wilson, Collective Security, and the
Lessons of History," Confluence V (1957), 349, 354. 
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pointed out the large area of agreement between the two 
governments, and two books by Arno J. Mayer explored with 
painstaking detail and intellectual subtlety the linkage be­
tween politics, ideology, and diplomacy in Europe and 
America. Mayer emphasized certain neglected aspects of 
Allied and American diplomacy—such as its counterrevolu­
tionary impulse—and his conclusions reduced the impor­
tance of the questions American diplomatic historians tradi­
tionally asked about Wilson's efforts at peacemaking. The 
composition of the American delegation, Wilson's decision to 
go to Paris, and his appeal for a Democratic Congress now 
seemed peripheral as Mayer illustrated how different deci­
sions would not have significantly altered events. Wilson 
could not have succeeded unless those political groups in 
Great Britain, France, and Italy that stood for moderate war 
aims and identified with his peace program—"the forces of 
movement"—greatly gained in strength during the war 
years. But their power actually lessened as the tensions 
generated by the war splintered those forces favoring liberal 
domestic and foreign reconstruction. By placing Wilson's 
diplomacy in a larger context, Mayer's works narrow the 
margin of Wilson's influence and further the absorption of 
his individual acts into broader historical currents.89 
Recent scholarship has not only lessened the drama of 
Wilson's diplomacy but has also leveled out interpretations 
of American foreign policy in the thirties. Both developments 
were part of a major tendency in American historiography, 
89. Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Park Peace 
Conference of 1919 (Princeton, N.J., 1961); Arno J. Mayer, Political Ori­
gins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, Conn., 1959), and
Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolu­
tion at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967). Other important works 
were: Jere King, Foch versus Clemenceau: France and German Dis­
memberment, 1918-1919 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), and Generals 6- Poli­
ticians: The Conflict between France's High Command, Parliament, and 
Government. 1914-1918 (Berkelev, Calif., 1951); John M. Thompson, 
Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, N.J., 1966). 
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what John Higham has called "a massive grading operation 
that smoothed and flattened the convulsive dialectic of pro­
gressive history."90 In the past diplomatic historians had 
neglected the study of foreign policy in the early and middle 
thirties and had read back into this period the patterns and 
beliefs of 1940 and 1941. They had assumed that throughout 
the thirties Roosevelt remained a Wilsonian, committed to 
the concept of collective security, and that, though he rec­
onciled himself to the isolationist mood of the era, he never 
accepted its assumptions. Over the last decade scholars have 
deepened our understanding of isolationism in the thirties 
and greatly altered Roosevelt's relationship to it. Though 
they disagree on the origins of isolationism, Selig Adler, 
Wayne S. Cole, and Manfred Jonas have done much to 
advance our knowledge of its ideology and influence.91 
Moreover, studies by Robert A. Divine and Dorothy Borg 
indicate that Roosevelt's Wilsonianism eroded during the 
decade and that he assimilated many isolationist attitudes. 
Like most men of his time, he could not help but be affected 
by the general loss of confidence in the nation's strength and 
in its ability to carry out its historic mission in world affairs. 
For this, and for many other reasons, the President pursued 
a cautious and often passive foreign policy that only gradu­
ally changed as he realized, along with the American people, 
the nation's stake in world affairs. Now Roosevelt appears as 
more a man of his times, bound by the same limited vistas 
as other men, to some extent sharing, along with his country­
men, the psychology of appeasement so prevalent in Great 
Britain and France.92 
90. Higham, History, p. 214. 
91. Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Re­
action (New York, 1957); Cole. Senator Gerald P. Nye; Manfred Jonas, 
Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966). 
92. Robert A. Divine, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Collective Security, 
1933," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XLVIII (1961), 42-59. The 
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Robert A. Divine's recent study of American international­
ism during World War II also endows the president's war­
time commitment to collective security with a more ambig­
uous, shadowy quality. When Roosevelt's ideas began to 
emerge toward the end of the war, he seemed attracted to 
the notion of the Four Policemen and eventually wove this 
concept into the fabric of the United Nations. He occupied 
a shifting, middle ground between realism and Wilsonian 
internationalism that, in retrospect, is almost impossible to 
pin down. It was a position typical of so much of Roosevelt's 
diplomacy, with its endless shifts and clouded rhetoric.93 
The rising importance of intellectual and social history has 
left a large imprint on the writing of American diplomatic 
history, as has the consensus history of Louis Hartz and 
Daniel J. Boorstin. Their focus on the stability and continuity 
of American history has many implications for foreign policy. 
It helped to explain why American diplomatists were often 
unsuccessful in projecting themselves outside of their own 
ideological milieu to grasp the unique political traditions of 
other nations, particularly non-Western ones. In his massive 
study America's Failure in China, Tang Tsou demonstrated 
how American diplomats, scholars, and politicians—unaware 
of the unarticulated assumptions of their own liberal tradi­
tion—misunderstood the nature of Chinese culture and 
underestimated the role of ideology in Chinese communism.9* 
Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago, 1962), The Reluctant Belligerent: Ameri­
can Entry into World War II (New York, 1965), and Roosevelt and World 
War II (Baltimore, 1969); Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine'
Speech," Political Science Quarterly LXXII (1957), 405-33, The United 
States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-38: From the Manchurian Inci­
dent through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1964). Willard Range's Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (Athens, Ga., 1959) was only a partial modification of the traditional view. 
93. Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism 
in America during World War II (New York, 1967). 
94. Tang Tsou, "The American Political Tradition and the American 
Image of Chinese Communism," Political Science Quarterly LXXVII (1962), 
570-600; Americas Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago, 1963). 
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More recently, Hartz's schematic framework has been sys­
tematically applied to Wilson's view of world politics. The 
sophisticated study by N. Gordon Levin, Jr., indicates how 
fruitful this sort of intellectual analysis can be, but it also 
suggests some of its pitfalls. Ignoring the play of events and 
the chaos of decision-making, Levin overrationalizes Wil­
son's foreign policy and makes the sweeping, ahistorical 
claim that Wilson's vision "of a peaceful liberal capitalist 
world order under international law . . . continues to mo­
tivate America's foreign policy decision-makers." In short, 
Wilson set the "main outlines of recent American foreign 
policies."95 There are, to be sure, aspects of Wilson's vision 
that still live in the minds of American statesmen, but its 
idealistic core, centered around a new community of power, 
has largely faded away. It is possible, then, for those work­
ing within Hartz's framework to miss the way in which the 
American liberal tradition was, at any given time, inter­
woven with the values and beliefs of a particular age, which 
in themselves were subject to subtle and continuous changes. 
Consensus history sets the limits of the American experience 
but does not explain its essence.96 
There was another dimension, too, in this shift toward the 
intellectual aspects of foreign policy. Diplomatic historians, 
influenced by works that explored symbol and myth in the 
American past, have devoted more attention to the images 
that the American people and their leaders held of other 
nations (though they did not write some of the pivotal 
books). Cushing Strout's The American Image of the Old 
World concentrated upon literary images and their alteration 
over time, and traced the rise and decline of the notion that 
95. N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: Ameri­
ca's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968), pp. vii, 1. 
96. A superb discussion of the shortcomings of consensus history is in 
Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, pp. 444-63. 
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Europe is an alien world.97 Tang Tsou and Akira Iriye have 
produced significant studies relating images much more 
directly to policy decisions. Both reach disturbing conclu­
sions. Tang Tsou believes that illusions and miscalculations 
dominated America's China policy; Iriye finds a continual 
"gap between reality and perception" in the relations of 
China, Japan, and the United States and a surprising fluctua­
tion in the images the three nations held of each other. He is 
struck by the fact that "policies have been made on the basis 
of considerations tangential to the Pacific, mutual images 
have been formed with little basis in fact, and wars have 
been fought even though policies and images have not pos­
tulated wars."98 Though Iriye fears that the future may be 
no better than the past, he cautiously hopes, along with 
Strout and Tang Tsou, that America can achieve, in the 
words of Louis Hartz, "a new level of consciousness . .  . in 
which an understanding of self and an understanding of 
others go hand in hand." " 
In the early fifties some political scientists and historians 
took a didactic attitude toward leading the American public 
to this new level of awareness. Dissatisfied with the course of 
American foreign policy in the twentieth century, they 
touched off a major debate in scholarly circles. Their leading 
theoretician was Hans J. Morgenthau, whose brilliant ab­
stractions concerning the struggle for power among nations 
served as a model against which American foreign policy 
could be measured.100 Morgenthau and George F. Kennan in 
97. Cushing Strout, The American Image of the Old World (New York, 
1963). Within this genre, Phil Rahv's The Discovery of Europe: The Story 
of American Experience in the Old World (Boston, 1947), was a pioneering 
anthology. 
98. Across the Pacific, pp. xvi, 82. 
99. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), 
p. 308. 
100. Morgenthau's major theoretical work is Politics among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed., New York, 1967), though he makes 
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1951 published stinging critiques of the moralism, legalism, 
and utopianism of twentieth-century American diplomacy.101 
Morgenthau decried the "intoxication with moral abstrac­
tions" and pleaded for the acceptance of the fact that "the 
struggle for power is . .  . a continuum, with each solved 
problem giving rise to a new one in a never ending succes­
sion." He also called for an appreciation of the "contradic­
tions and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of things 
and which human reason is powerless to solve."102 Other 
scholars, such as Robert E. Osgood and Norman A. 
Graebner, have applied this approach with greatly varying 
results.103 On the one hand, these efforts have brought a 
better understanding of the intellectual structure of Ameri­
can foreign policy and, as such, are a part of the larger fusion 
of diplomatic and intellectual history. On the other hand, 
some of this writing is marred by an excessive preoccupation 
with what went wrong, almost an obsession in pointing out 
some interesting observations on the human condition in Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics (Chicago, 1946). His views on the history of American 
foreign policy are expressed best in: In Defense of the National Interest (New York, 1951); "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The 
National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions," American Political Science Review 
XLIV (1950), 833-54; "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of
the United States," ibid., XLVI (1952), 961-88; The Purpose of American 
Politics (New York, 1960). Many of his essays are collected in Politics in 
the Twentieth Century, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1962). 
101. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest; George F. 
Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900—1950 (Chicago, 1951). 
102. In Defense of the National Interest, pp. 4, 92, and Scientific Man 
vs. Power Politics, p. 206. 
103. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest. Graebner stressed the gap between 
ends and means in a variety of works, particularly in his "The Year of 
Transition (1898)," in Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: 
American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1961), 
Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1962), and Ideas and 
Diplomacy. Other books following Morgenthau's approach were: Stourzh, 
Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy; Tang Tsou, America's 
Failure in China; Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of
Innocence: A Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, 111., 1966); and, to a 
lesser extent, Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of 
Power (Bloomington, Ind., 1955). Osgood was most successful in achieving
historical understanding, Glad and Buehrig least successful. 
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the alleged errors of American diplomacy. Though this may 
have served the cause of public education, it certainly does 
not serve the cause of history, because these scholars often 
fail to work inside the intellectual and social atmosphere of a 
given period and frequently obscure the reasons why men 
believed and acted as they did. The very questions they ask 
seem to blur their comprehension of the past. 
They have also created their own historical myths. Mor­
genthau, In Defense of the National Interest, echoed Bemis 
in his veneration of the Founding Fathers. Hamilton in par­
ticular had formulated the realist position "with unsurpassed 
simplicity and penetration," and this legacy had basically 
endured until the end of the nineteenth century, when the 
moralistic period of American foreign policy ensued. Even 
then Morgenthau detected, beneath the idealistic rhetoric, a 
realist tradition that American statesmen instinctively had 
acted upon during major crises. Encouraged by the "great 
innovations of 1947," for a time Morgenthau saw "a slow, 
painful, and incomplete process of emancipation from 
deeply ingrained error, and a rediscovery of long-forgotten 
truths."1<M But his optimism soon passed as American foreign 
policy in the fifties and sixties seemed unable to respond 
with imagination to challenges far different from those of the 
late forties. Most recently, Morgenthau has softened many 
of his harsh strictures on American foreign policy in The 
Purpose of American Politics. There he paints the past in 
gentler shades, recognizing the "pragmatic genius" of Ameri­
can statesmen and displaying more sympathy than anger in 
dealing with the way in which Americans sought to apply 
their tradition of "equality in freedom" to foreign problems.105 
Of all those who deplored the lack of realism in American 
104. In Defense of the National Interest, pp. 14, 39, and Politics in the 
Twentieth Century, II, 2. 
105. Pp. 22, 132. 
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diplomacy, the most eloquent was George F. Kennan. As a 
career diplomat, he viewed foreign policy from a unique 
perspective, one which valued orderly lines of communica­
tion, well-defined spheres of authority, and rational and un­
emotional exchanges among governments. As a devout Chris­
tian, the methods employed by statesmen concerned him as 
much as the results they achieved. Kennan was preoccupied 
with both the morality and the effectiveness of policies; he 
analyzed the past in order to understand how the West had 
reached its perilous contemporary position. More particu­
larly, he scrutinized the history of American foreign policy in 
this century to pinpoint those alternatives that might, if 
pursued, have furthered the larger interests both of the 
United States and Western civilization. He saw, to be sure, 
that deeply embedded American traditions and ideals pre­
vented the pursuit of some of these options, and in part his 
work was an effort to educate public opinion and policy-
makers. But he was originally concerned with the openness 
of history, with the re-creation of possibilities that were 
never followed. This was the outstanding characteristic of 
his first book, American Diplomacy, which made little at­
tempt to penetrate the milieu in which statesmen operated. 
Kennan was impatient with American statecraft and con­
temptuously dismissed "the nonsensical timidities of techni­
cal neutrality" that so heavily influenced Wilson from 1914 
to 1917.106 With the passage of time and the maturation of 
his scholarship, however, certain shifts have occurred in 
Kennan's attitudes. In his two superb volumes on Soviet-
American relations, he still sought to understand what went 
wrong during this initial encounter between the two op­
posing systems; and he argued that if only American military 
intervention had been avoided, "the entire subsequent course 
106. P. 71. 
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of Soviet-American relations might have materially 
changed."10T But this thesis seems strained and artificial, for 
the whole thrust of this study was to re-create the atmos­
phere of decision-making in Washington and Moscow and, 
by doing so, to demonstrate how much statesmen are at the 
mercy of chaotic conditions, dated and erroneous informa­
tion, and national traditions and preoccupations that dim 
their grasp of reality. 
In effect, then, as Kennan became a better historian he be­
came a less convincing critic of American foreign policy. 
Confronted with the complexity of the historical process, he 
perceived more clearly the limits upon effective action by 
men and nations. There was always a brooding sadness in his 
work, but this theme is more noticeable in his great auto­
biography, a somber, sensitive book, the tale of an intellec­
tual's striving to find order and meaning in the modern 
world. It is a book that still reflects many of the old criticisms 
and often brilliantly discusses policies that, in retrospect, 
seem superior to those adopted. But Kennan does not really 
attempt to argue that these alternatives could have been 
chosen, and a mood of pessimism and skepticism pervades 
the book. Kennan is oppressed by the "vast, turgid, self-
centered, and highly emotional process" through which 
decisions are made in Washington; by the plight of under­
developed nations and the ineffectiveness of our aid to them; 
and by the constant intrusion of domestic politics into the 
foreign policy-making process. He wonders, increasingly, if 
the American government can ever conduct "a mature, 
consistent, and discriminating foreign policy." The United 
States would be wiser to concern itself less with foreign prob­
lems and more with domestic ones, though he doubts our 
ability to solve even these. In fact, Kennan hovers on the 
107. Russia Leaves the War, and The Decision to Intervene, especially 
p. 302. 
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edge of despair, convinced that man's ego is "demonic, anar­
chic, unbridleable," estranged even from himself. In a haunt­
ing metaphor Kennan writes that 
one moves through life like someone moving with a lantern 
in a dark woods. A bit of the path ahead is illuminated, and 
a bit of the path behind. But the darkness follows hard on 
one's footsteps, and envelops our trail as one proceeds. Were 
one to be able, as one never is, to retrace the steps by day­
light, one would find that the terrain traversed bears, in 
reality, little relationship to what imagination and memory 
had pictured.108 
Inevitably his Memoirs evokes comparison to The Education 
of Henry Adams. Both men identify more with the eight­
eenth century than with their own; both seek to overcome 
alienation from American society and to impose order on the 
relentless change of modern civilization; both fail and finally 
come to fear deeply for the future. And Kennan undoubtedly 
shares Adams's hope that some day, beyond his era, there will 
be a world "that sensitive and timid natures could regard 
without a shudder."109 
If Kennan's Memoirs is symptomatic of a drift among 
diplomatic historians toward fatalism and despair, the "New 
Left" represents quite a different direction in scholarship.110 
This is, to be sure, a somewhat protean term, but it does refer 
to a certain intellectual mood and to a radical critique of 
American society. New Left history is infused with a feeling 
108. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967). The 
quotations are from pp. 4, 295, 483. For a more recent statement of 
Kennan's pessimism about the future of American civilization, see his De­
mocracy and the Student Left (Boston, 1968), p. 228. 
109. The Education of Henry Adams (Modern Library Edition, New 
York, 1931), p. 505. 
110. Irwin Unger's "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent 
Trends in United States Historiography," American Historical Review 
LXXII (1967), 1237-63, provides an excellent dissection of this historical
phenomenon. 
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of acute dissatisfaction with the condition of American civi­
lization and the course of American foreign policy; its goal is 
to create a "new past" that would substantiate its contempo­
rary analysis. This is a formidable task, and the New Left 
reconstruction of domestic history is still in an early and 
contradictory stage. But in foreign policy the work of creat­
ing a new synthesis is much further along. As early as 1959 
William Appleman Williams, in The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy, outlined a comprehensive interpretation of 
American foreign policy that a younger group of American 
diplomatic historians has found extremely persuasive. Draw­
ing upon the insights of Beard and Turner, Williams saw a 
conscious, highly-rationalized outward thrust as the main 
motif of the whole of American foreign policy.111 With the 
closing of the internal frontier in the late nineteenth century, 
Americans had ended the continental phase of their expan­
sion and had turned to the creation of an open-door empire 
abroad, meeting with remarkable success as "hard-headed 
and practical" statesmen gradually developed and imple­
mented the vision of an American Century. They sought to 
evade domestic inequities and failures by attempting to 
sustain both democracy and prosperity through continued 
overseas expansion, a "twentieth-century Manifest Destiny." 
This was at the root of American involvement in every war 
111. The fullest statement of Williams's foreign policy views is in The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New York, 1962). In The Con­
tours of American History (Cleveland, 1961), he sets them within a broader
context and deals with the entire span of American history, not just the 
twentieth century. The United States, Cuba, and Castro: An Essay on the 
Dynamics of Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (New York, 1962), 
and The Great Evasion: An Essay on the Contemporary Relevance of Karl 
Marx and on the Wisdom of Admitting the Heretic into the Dialogue about 
America's Future (Chicago, 1964), cover limited, contemporary topics.
Aside from Beard and Turner, Williams and those sharing his approach were
apparently affected by Richard W. Van Alstyne's The Rising American Em­
pire (New York, 1960), and by various ideas expressed by Fred Harvey 
Harrington. On the basis of his published writings, the reasons for 
Harrington's great influence are not clear. 
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since 1898, as well as the Cold War, and through its very 
success tied Americans to an oppressive status quo. Accord­
ing to Williams, the tragedy was that in the postwar period 
Americans failed to see the urgent need for a socialist com­
monwealth at home and instead continued to believe that 
their "freedom and prosperity depend upon the continued 
expansion of . .  . [their] economic and ideological system 
through the policy of the open door." But Soviet and Chinese 
power now blocked this expansion, as did the worldwide 
revolutionary ferment; and if Americans persisted in pursu­
ing their "vision of omnipotence," they might bring disaster 
upon themselves and the world.112 Later, in 1964, Williams 
sees another alternative—that Americans might avoid con­
fronting their domestic failure by creating a new frontier in 
space through which "the evasion will become literally pro­
jected to infinity."11S 
Despite the boldness of this analysis, Williams's elabora­
tion of it is moderate. He recognizes the genuine idealism 
and humanitarianism of American statesmen and admits 
that their policies have often been beneficial. They were not 
evil men; nor did they understand the catastrophic conse­
quences of the policies they pursued. In fact, Williams dis­
plays much admiration for Herbert Hoover, Charles Evans 
Hughes, and Henry L. Stimson, whom he credits with a 
lucid analysis of industrial society and a sophisticated con­
cept of empire. Hoover in particular had the courage and 
insight to seek a partial withdrawal from open-door expan­
sionism in order to avoid the imperialist wars it spawned. In 
the end Williams places his hope for the future upon the 
"enlightened conservatives" who might be able "to act upon 
112. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, pp. 50, 53, 203, 301-3. The 
Korean War is an exception to this, though Williams fits the decision to 
cross the thirty-eighth parallel into his interpretive pattern. 
113. The Great Evasion, p. 12. 
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the validity of a radical analysis."114 Nevertheless, this con­
clusion is overshadowed by Williams's tendency to strip 
away the ethical pretenses of American diplomacy and to 
show it for what he says it really was: expansionist, aggres­
sive, and counterrevolutionary. 
Many scholars have followed in Williams's footsteps, 
sharing his assumptions and applying his framework to more 
specific periods. In the process they have developed a sub­
stantial monographic literature that challenges prevailing 
interpretations.115 Like Williams, they admire many of the 
creators of the American Empire and identify a broad con­
sensus for open-door expansion, arguing that foreign policy 
controversies revolved around means, not ends. In contrast 
to Williams, however, these scholars emphasize the economic 
rather than the ideological side of American expansion. Or 
when, as in the case of Walter LaFeber's The New Empire, 
they do venture into intellectual history, they stress the pre­
dominance of economic considerations in the thoughts of 
major historical figures. They also oversimplify the link be­
tween economic forces and decision-making, and find a 
coherence and consistency in the past that is in itself implau­
sible. In short, their approach to diplomatic history seems 
114. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 309. As John Higham
shrewdly observes, Williams represents a "patriotic radicalism, which seeks
some positive basis in the American past for the hope of a cofiectivistic fu­
ture" ("The Contours of William A. Williams," Studies on the Left, II 
[1961], 75). Eugene D. Genovese makes the same observation in "William
Appleman Williams on Marx and America," ibid., VI (1966), 70-86. 
115. Major titles are: Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and 
Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation 
with Soviet Power (New York, 1965); D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and 
Its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 vols. (London, 1961); Lloyd C. Gardner, Eco­
nomic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, Wise, 1964); Gabriel 
Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 
1943-1945 (New York, 1968); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An 
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), 
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York, 1967); Thomas 
J. McCormick, China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893­
1901 (Chicago, 1967); Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba: 
Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960 (New York, 1961). 
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somewhat traditional and dated. This obsolete methodology 
is most striking in Gar Alperovitz's impassioned assault on 
the widely accepted interpretation of the origins of the Cold 
War.116 Attempting to demonstrate the aggressiveness of 
American policy, Alperovitz ignores the interplay of domes­
tic politics and public opinion in the decision-making process 
and fails to measure the relative influence of Truman's 
advisers. Nor does he speculate upon the motives behind 
Soviet policy. Alperovitz's approach is, to be sure, narrower 
than that of most New Left diplomatic historians, but much 
of their writing on American foreign policy, like revisionism 
in the thirties, thrives on historical parochialism.1" 
In many ways it is unfortunate that the books of Williams 
and his followers are so infused with the emotions of current 
political controversy. They have, after all, isolated an impor­
tant theme in the American past and are exploring some 
neglected aspects of American foreign policy. But their ex­
aggerated presentism and their resistance to broader devel­
opments in American historiography blunts much of the 
effectiveness of their approach. Resentful of the liberal 
historical establishment and its consensus history,118 they 
116. New Left historians greeted this book with enthusiasm. Thomas C.
Fiddick claimed that Alperovitz had provided "documentary proof of what
Leftists have instinctively known for twenty years, namely, that the Cold
War was begun by Anglo-American leaders even before World War II was
ended"; Christopher Lasch argued that Alperovitz "proceeds with a thor­
oughness and caution which, in the case of a less controversial work, would
command the unanimous respect of the scholarly profession" (Studies on 
the Left, VI [1966], 93-97; "The Cold War, Revisited and Re-Visioned,"
New York Times Magazine, Jan. 14, 1968, p. 51). 
117. The parochialism of revisionism in the thirties is emphasized by 
Ernest R. May in "Emergence to World Power," in Higham, The Recon­
struction of American History, pp. 195-96. 
118. Christopher Lasch asserts, e.g., that "the defection of intellectuals 
from their true calling—critical thought—goes a long way toward explain­
ing . . . the intellectual bankruptcy of so much recent historical scholar­
ship. The infatuation with consensus; the vogue of a disembodied 'history
of ideas' divorced from considerations of class or other determinants of social 
organization; the obsession with 'American Studies' which perpetuates a 
nationalistic myth of American uniqueness—these things reflect the degree 
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seem unable to assimilate methodological advances and in­
stead, in their writings on foreign policy, emphasize ration­
ality, the dominance of economic forces, and the continuity 
of "a comprehensive world outlook."119 Moreover, it is un­
likely that the nature of the New Left approach to American 
foreign policy will quickly change. To study, for example, 
the structure of private, nongovernmental economic relation­
ships and to accept a more varied and contradictory view of 
the past would lessen the relevance of their scholarship to 
current political controversy and weaken the contemporary 
attack on American foreign policy.120 In the short run, this 
unwillingness to adopt a more neutral historical stance may 
add to their influence and vitality if both domestic and for­
eign crises remain unsolved or deepen. But in the long run, 
the New Left will probably be unable to create the new past 
for which it longs, for it stands uncomfortably poised be­
tween the old tradition of progressive history and powerful 
tides of historical reinterpretation. Eventually New Left 
historians must either become more responsive to major 
trends in American historiography and thus dilute much of 
their purpose or be left farther and farther behind. 
It is difficult, of course, for diplomatic historians to find a 
balance between despair and anger, between Kennan's 
to which historians have become apologists, in effect, for American national
power in the holy war against communism" ("The Cultural Cold War: A 
Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom," in Barton J. Bernstein,
ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History [New 
York, 1968], p. 323). This is, of course, an extreme statement, and other 
New Left historians show more appreciation of scholarship written from a
different point of view. Certainly Williams does so in Contours, as does 
LaFeber in America, Russia, and the Cold War. 
119. See, e.g., LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p. 256, and 
Gardner, Economic Aspects, p. 8. 
120. It is interesting that New Left historians see no conflict between 
asking what happened and what went wrong. In fact, several have vigorously
challenged this distinction. William Appleman Williams's review of May's
Imperial Democracy in Studies on the Left, III (1963), 94-99; Robert 
Freeman Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942," in Bernstein, 
Towards a New Past, pp. 236-37. 
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pessimism and Williams's passion for change. Nor is it easy 
to find an enduring answer to the question of the historian's 
relationship to the world about him. New ways of looking at 
the past have opened exciting intellectual vistas and have 
aroused the hope that a new synthesis of the history of 
American foreign policy—more pluralistic and subtle than 
the old—is in the process of creation. But as diplomatic his­
torians have absorbed these concepts of recent American 
historiography and have penetrated more deeply into the 
process through which foreign policy is made, they have 
come to sense that history is closing in, narrowing the pos­
sibilities of the future as well as those of the past. Those who 
acquiesce in this shedding of the old illusions about ration­
ality and progress must struggle to avoid an all-encompassing 
fatalism and acknowledge that small but precious hold which 
men have over themselves and the fate of their nations. 
Those who employ their knowledge of the past to right the 
wrongs of the present must somehow remain reconciled to 
the dilemmas of nations and the ambiguities of man's condi­
tion. Perhaps all will remember that the certainties of our 
own time may become the historiographical curiosities of 
another era, and perhaps all will recognize the vastness and 
complexity of the historical drama of which they are a part. 
Writings on American Foreign

Relations: 1957 to the Present

DAVID F. TRASK 
THE HISTORICAL STUDY of American foreign policy and 
diplomacy now enjoys remarkable popularity, but this 
development is of recent origin. A small but talented cadre 
of scholars established the field from the twenties to the mid­
dle fifties—in particular, Thomas A. Bailey, Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, Dexter Perkins, Julius Pratt, and Richard W. Van 
Alstyne—but these men were lonely exponents of a concern 
that often seemed peripheral to colleagues exploiting the 
domestic insights of historians like Turner, Parrington, and 
Beard. Nowadays all is altered. A great demand exists for 
historians of foreign relations; many of the most talented 
graduate students in the most prestigious graduate schools 
flock into the field. No issue of the American Historical Re­
view or the Journal of American History fails to include re­
views of several major works in foreign relations. Only re­
cently, specialists in the field organized their own scholarly 
society. 
What has caused this dramatic change? The principal 
reason is the vast international involvement of the republic 
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since World War II. This reality has directed most younger 
scholars of diplomatic history to the study of twentieth-
century phenomena. The perspective of the sixties imparts 
extraordinary cogency to the recent American experience of 
world politics, and historians have responded in scholarly 
terms to a pervasive national preoccupation. Another impor­
tant influence was the continuing vigor of Bailey, Bemis, 
Perkins, Pratt, and Van Alstyne. All of them sustained their 
careers into the last decade. A third factor was the availa­
bility of new data as public records and private collections 
became available in bewildering volume. Finally, fellow­
ships and grants for study abroad, notably the Fulbright and 
Ford programs, allowed many scholars to investigate mate­
rials in foreign archives. 
The first fruits of a new generation of American diplomatic 
historians have appeared since 1957. What topics interest 
them? What interpretations have they advanced? What is 
the present shape of the field? What opportunities lie ahead? 
The two "great traditions" in the writing of diplomatic 
history took modern form during the nineteenth century in 
the works of two German historians. One of these scholars 
was Leopold von Ranke; the other was Karl Marx.1 Ranke 
concentrated on power relationships existing between 
nation-states at given points in time. His view placed excep­
tional emphasis on the international balance of power. The 
essence of diplomacy was to divine the nature of the balance 
and through that insight to safeguard the "national interest." 
1. Recent scholars have contested certain customary assumptions about
the views of Ranke and Marx concerning the nature of historical analysis, but
these generalizations are legitimate in the broad sense discussed here. 
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Marx concentrated on the contest of various groups within 
given nations, specifically on the "class struggle." Foreign 
policy was a political consequence of social and economic 
conflict at home. It reflected the interest of the dominant 
class. In short, Ranke looked outward; Marx looked inward. 
Of course, many historians avoid identification with either 
alternative, presenting analyses that give due consideration 
both to internal and external developments. Usually eclectic 
and syncretic in approach, such historians are much less 
susceptible of categorization; in the past they have perhaps 
been less influential than those who opted for some variant 
or extension of Rankean or Marxian interpretation. 
Two historians writing since World War II produced pro­
foundly influential interpretations of American foreign rela­
tions that represent contemporary extensions of the grand 
traditions. George Frost Kennan, who wrote American 
Diplomacy, 1900-1950, in 1951, was clearly within the con­
servative balance-of-power tradition, whereas William 
Appleman Williams, who published The Tragedy of Ameri­
can Diplomacy in 1959, reflected the continuing vitality of 
radical economic interpretation.2 
Kennan began by observing "a lack of an adequately 
stated and widely accepted theoretical foundation to under­
pin the conduct of our external relations." Contemporary 
international problems "seemed in large measure to be 
products of the outcome of . .  . two world wars." American 
deficiencies in world politics were "deeply rooted in the 
national consciousness, and any corrections would be diffi­
cult indeed." Obsessed with the decline in national security, 
Kennan traced it to "a significant gap between challenge and 
response in our conduct of foreign policy," a gap that had not 
2. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951);
also available in paperback as a Mentor Book (citations are to the Mentor
edition); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplo­
macy (Cleveland, 1959); also available in a revised and enlarged Delta 
Book edition (citations are to the Delta edition). 
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been closed and had put the republic in "grave peril." One 
difficulty involved machinery or means; the nation had not 
learned to cope with the "erratic and subjective nature of 
public reaction to foreign policy questions." Another prob­
lem was one of concept or ends. "I see the most serious fault 
in our past policy formulation to lie in something that I 
might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international 
problems." 
In magisterial prose, Kennan offered comments on critical 
events—particularly the Spanish-American War, World War 
I, and World War II—that graphically illustrated his general 
thesis. He questioned the Open Door policy, intervention in 
World War I, and the drive for "total victory" during World 
War II, sustaining at all points his critique of baneful public 
opinion and the legalistic-moralistic approach. Kennan called 
for a "realistic" approach to foreign relations, one that 
stressed the importance of power and attributed error to 
ideologically motivated leaders. An experienced diplomat, 
Kennan did not fail to offer general recommendations. To 
improve the machinery, he called for "much more effective 
use of the principle of professionalism in the conduct of 
foreign policy." To clarify concept, he advocated a re­
strained and reasoned concern for the national interest. Such 
an approach would mean 
that we have the modesty to admit that our own national 
interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and 
understanding—and the courage to recognize that if our pur­
poses and undertakings here at home are decent ones, unsul­
lied by arrogance or hostilities toward other people or delu­
sions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national interest 
can never fail to be conducive to a better world. . . . What­
ever is realistic in concept and founded in an endeavor to see 
both ourselves and others as we really are, cannot be illib­
eral.8 
3. Kennan, American Diplomacy, pp. 5-6, 81-82, 88-89. 
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Kennan's sustained advocacy of the balance of power, his 
"realism," and his enlightened conservatism suggest an 
affinity for the Rankean tradition, to which he imparted 
qualities and modifications reflective of his own time and 
character. 
Williams began his analysis by insisting upon the tragic 
nature of American diplomacy, tragic because it contained 
"several contradictory truths." Utilizing Cuban policy as an 
illustration, he noted three "truths"—the fact of American 
power; the absence of any reality in Cuba corresponding to 
American ideals; and a revolutionary movement in Cuba that 
eventually seized power because of the deployment and use 
of American strength. "The central and miserable truth is 
that there would have been neither revolution nor abortive 
invasion [in Cuba] if American policy had been successful 
within the framework of its own assumptions and logic." Al­
though recognizing the humanitarian aspects of American 
policy, he held firmly: "Other societies come to feel that 
American policy causes them to lose their economic, political, 
and even psychological independence." Williams drew at­
tention to the national conviction that "America's domestic 
well being depends upon . . . sustained, ever-increasing 
overseas economic expansion." Here was a "convergence of 
economic practice with intellectual analysis and emotional 
involvement that creates a very powerful and dangerous 
propensity to define the essentials of American welfare in 
terms of activities outside the United States." This propens­
ity was dangerous because it caused neglect of internal de­
velopments and transferred blame for national problems on 
other peoples. 
American leaders assumed that political and social ob­
jectives at home could be obtained only by economic 
methods, specifically by economic expansion overseas. In 
1898, "American leaders went to war . .  . as part of, and as 
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the consequence of, a general outlook which externalized the 
opportunity and the responsibilities for America's domestic 
welfare; broadly in terms of vigorous economic expansion 
into Latin America and Asia." By 1900 the United States 
developed a general approach to world politics, the Open 
Door policy, which continued to shape American responses 
to international questions across the rest of the century. It 
was unlike previous strategies of aggrandizement in that it 
was a means of expanding without war. It assumed that 
American economic power could dictate pro-American poli­
cies in weaker countries. Much interested in the two World 
Wars, Williams argued that those conflicts deepened the 
notion that Americans were "defending an anti-colonial 
democracy charged with the duty to regenerate the world. 
They . . . also had come firmly to believe that their own 
prosperity and democracy depended upon the continued 
expansion of their economic system under the strategy of 
the open door." Contrary to Kennan, Williams did not at­
tribute American decisions to legal or moral motivations; 
the Open Door policy "was extremely hard-headed and 
practical." Unless modified, it "was certain to produce for­
eign policy crises that would become increasingly severe." 
The key to Williams's historical analysis was the idea that 
the search for an "informal empire" explained growing na­
tional difficulties in world politics over the century. 
What was to be done in order to avoid additional inter­
national difficulties? Williams proposed that the United 
States advocate an "open door for revolutions," working with 
rather than against the great social revolutions of the cen­
tury. The United States faced "the traditional dilemma of 
empire. It could resort to war or it could disengage, safe­
guarding its strategic position by formulating a new outlook 
which accepted the reality of a world in revolution and de­
vising new policies calculated to assist those revolutions to 
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move immediately and visibly toward their goal of a better 
human life." His last words were prophetic in tone and con­
tent: "If the United States cannot accept the existence of 
. . . limits [upon its freedom of action] without giving up 
democracy and cannot proceed to enhance and extend de­
mocracy within such limits, then the traditional effort to 
sustain democracy by expansion will lead to the destruction 
of democracy." 
Williams definitely embraced the tradition of economic 
interpretation. The reader of Lenin's analysis of imperialism 
finds a broadly comparable thesis for the United States in 
Williams's book, although sans the determinism and termi­
nology of Marxist orthodoxy. It can be described as "neo-
Beardian analysis." Williams explicitly claimed radical affil­
iation, offering "a fuller, more accurate picture of reality" 
and calling for fundamental changes in direction. His prose 
possessed a raw, insistent quality that exercised a compelling 
claim on its readers.4 
Despite great differences in form and content, the two 
books have certain common characteristics. Both stress con­
tinuity rather than change in the American approach to for­
eign policy. Both discern a growing deterioration in national 
security. Both are intensely critical of the American record 
in world politics. Both offer solutions, however different in 
nature. Both have been remarkably influential, attracting 
the allegiance of many scholars writing on specialized sub­
jects. 
Of course, the work of many scholars cannot be easily 
classified in either category. One of the most notable of re­
cent trends in the field has been a tendency to break away 
from the confining influences of traditional theories. Most of 
the works that reflect this tendency reveal a commitment to 
4. Williams, Tragedy of American Diplomacy, pp. 6, 11, 37, 49-50, 200, 
295, 309. 
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political liberalism as against the alternatives posed by 
Kennan and Williams—conservatism or radicalism. The 
reader finds in these works a general stress on description as 
against judgment along with a rejection of theories of single 
causation. 
With these broad interpretive tendencies in mind, then, 
let us discuss the literature of the past decade, utilizing one 
of the generally accepted chronologies for the study of Amer­
ican foreign relations during this century: (1) the back­
ground and conduct of the Spanish-American War; (2) the 
"imperial interlude" from 1898 to 1914; (3) World War I 
from 1914 through the peacemaking concluding in 1921; 
(4) the "long armistice" from 1919 to 1939; (5) World War 
II from 1939 to 1945; and (6) the troubled postwar years 
from 1945 to the present. 
II 
In recent years historians have eroded the view that the 
years between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War 
constituted the "nadir" of American involvement in world 
affairs. In addition, they have considered anew the reasons 
why the United States went to war in 1898 with Spain and 
how President William McKinley conducted foreign policy 
at the time. 
In 1962 David Pletcher published his The Awkward Years, 
a study of foreign relations from 1881 to 1885. The 1880s 
bridged the "problems of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
and those of the tempestuous fin de siecle." Through trial 
and error Presidents James Garfield and Chester Arthur pre­
pared the nation to some degree for Theodore Roosevelt's 
imperialism and internationalism. Desires for prestige, mar­
kets, and security stimulated pressures for expansion during 
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the early 1880s. Various interest groups—isolationists, na­
tionalists, and economizers—opposed this pressure, but they 
could not prevent expansion indefinitely. Secretaries of State 
Frederick Frelinghuysen and James G. Blaine opposed ter­
ritorial acquisitions and warfare, but Pletcher holds that his 
evidence allows him to "trace the unfolding of expansionism 
under Garfield and Arthur, to relate it with political and 
economic developments inside the United States, and, as far 
as possible, to explain the reasons why their policies failed." 
He concludes that "foreshadowings and anticipations . . . 
suggest that the 'new imperialism' of the 1890's actually 
germinated before the first Cleveland administration, and 
that the outwardly stagnant years of Garfield and Arthur 
were actually a period of preparation and crude testing in 
response to impulses which, though strong, were still vaguely 
formed and not clearly understood."5 
Walter LaFeber advances a comparable but more general 
thesis for the entire period 1860-98 in The New Empire 
(1963), analyzing "the crucial incubation period of the 
American overseas empire by relating the development of 
that empire to the effects of the industrial revolution on 
United States foreign policy." The empire of 1900 was a 
culmination rather than a break in American history. "Amer­
icans neither acquired the empire during a temporary ab­
sence of mind nor had the empire forced upon them." A 
series of internal disturbances caused by industrialization 
caused American leaders to resolve domestic dilemmas by 
overseas expansion. After exploring expansionist thought in 
the writings of Frederick Jackson Turner, Josiah Strong, 
Brooks Adams, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, and describing 
the strategic and economic goals of American diplomacy, 
LaFeber examines the Panic of 1893 as an instance of internal 
5. David M. Pletcher, The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations 
under Garfield and Arthur (Columbia, Mo., 1962), pp. x-xvi, 356. 
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disturbance leading to aggressive foreign policy—the Ven­
ezuelan boundary crisis. The Anglo-American crisis of 1895 
was not a consequence of Manifest Destiny. "The two cur­
rents of economic overseas expansion and Olney's realization 
that the United States possessed the means to protect its 
interests converged into the Venezuelan controversy." 
Downgrading yellow journalism and congressional bellig­
erence as causes of the Spanish-American War, LaFeber 
stresses "the transformation of the opinion of many spokes­
men for the business community who had formerly opposed 
war." The war rescued the United States from a burgeoning 
"economic and political dilemma."6 
The New Empire is a sophisticated example of economic 
interpretation, integrating diplomatic history and intellectual 
history in a way that lends credence to the "informal empire" 
thesis. LaFeber's debt to W. A. Williams is quite apparent. 
The writer's emphasis on ideas is everywhere evident and 
is one of the most striking developments in the historical 
analysis of foreign relations of late. 
A collection of essays by John A. S. Grenville and George 
B. Young, published in 1966, centers mostly on personalities 
active in shaping American foreign relations between 1873 
and 1900 and lends support to the views of George Kennan. 
The authors draw attention to the "baneful influence of 
[domestic] politics on American foreign policy." Internal 
political considerations rather than rational calculations 
based on realistic assessment of international conditions too 
often determined foreign policy. They maintain that "the 
harmonization of strategy and foreign policy was more often 
a matter of chance than of design," arguing that "an exces­
sive regard for political advantage and a lack of attention to 
strategic considerations has in the past handicapped the 
6. Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American 
Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), pp. vii, 403, 417. 
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conduct of American diplomacy." This criticism is frequently 
illustrated in the biographical essays themselves. Revisionist 
interpretations appear frequently, often critical of economic 
interpretations such as those of LaFeber and supportive of 
power-realist prescriptions for the conduct of foreign rela­
tions.7 
Ernest R. May's Imperial Democracy (1961) is the most 
detailed study of the period 1895-1900 to appear in recent 
years. During these years the United States established itself 
as the "seventh power," and other nations attributed to the 
United States "a government not only commanding great 
resources but the will to use them." May considers this as­
sumption a delusion. The United States "rarely displayed 
any purposefulness whatsoever." Unlike Pletcher and La-
Feber, May holds that "in the 1890's the United States had 
not sought a new role in world affairs. Issues in Hawaii, 
China, Turkey, Venezuela, and Cuba had intruded almost 
of their own accord." Domestic affairs dominated Washing­
ton. American leaders "ran the risk of precipitating Europe 
into a coalition against America. Yet their actions had the 
paradoxical effect of convincing people abroad that the 
United States possessed not only the might but also the will 
to be a force among nations." May concludes mordantly: 
"Some nations achieve greatness; the United States had 
greatness thrust upon it." 
What caused the war? May does not completely discount 
"moral revulsion" against Spanish policy in Cuba and im­
perial interest in Latin America and Asia, but he emphasizes 
the fact that McKinley, preoccupied by domestic problems, 
bowed ultimately to public hysteria. The president 
7. John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, 
and American Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New 
Haven, Conn., 1966), p. xviii. 
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worked always in terrible consciousness of the division in 
public opinion. . . . McKinley was not a brave man. In his 
whole political career, there had been no act of boldness. 
And the one resource he did not employ in 1898 was courage. 
Rightly or wrongly, he conceived that he had some justifica­
tion for demanding a final end to the violence in Cuba, that 
his highest duty lay in keeping his own country united, and 
that the alternative to war might be a domestic crisis tan­
tamount in his eyes to revolution. For these reasons he led 
his country unwillingly toward a war that he did not want 
for a cause in which he did not believe.8 
Like many other historians, May has interested himself 
in the role of ideas and public opinion in the making of for­
eign policy, a concern at the center of his American Imperial­
ism: A Reinterpretation (1967). Why did imperialist ideas 
gain currency in the 1890s? Why did they lose currency very 
rapidly? May does not ignore the influence of "pressures 
of the moment, a latent tradition of expansionism, Social 
Darwinist ideas, naval technology, and economic forces," 
but he concentrates on "the impact in America of English 
and European political debate." He seeks "an explanation 
of the processes by which a variety of influences produced a 
revolution in American attitudes." After postulating certain 
assumptions about public opinion in the late nineteenth 
century, May traces its evolution and emphasizes the impor­
tance of opinion leadership by elites. He discerns a notable 
proliferation of British social-imperial thought in the United 
States, attributing to this phenomenon a relatively important 
role in shaping American behavior in 1898. The work reflects 
the utility of a perspective and research design that is multi­
national. "Americans were members incorporate of an Atlan­
8. Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a 
Great Power (New York, 1961), pp. 159, 267,269-70. 
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tic civilization."9 Here is an arresting piece indeed, one that 
makes extensive use of modern theory and technique derived 
from ancillary social sciences. 
H. Wayne Morgan strongly challenges May's assessment 
of McKinley in his biography William McKinley and His 
America (1963). The president's prewar intention was to 
force Spanish reforms. His failure was not to prepare alter­
natives to war if Spain failed to respond. McKinley opposed 
war, but "he would attain reform in Cuba by neutrality if 
possible, but by force if necessary." Morgan is as adamant 
in opposing the argument that McKinley had no spine as he 
is in refuting the view that Cleveland would have avoided 
war. "Blame for the intervention falls fairly among the Cu­
bans, the Americans, McKinley's policies, and especially the 
Spanish." He admits that McKinley failed to lead public 
opinion. "Fearful of being misunderstood or adding impetus 
to the movement for Cuban relief, he remained silent in 
public, thus seeming to drift." But his final verdict is on the 
whole favorable: 
McKinley often lacked creative vigor, but he had great abil­
ity to synthesize views into policies acceptable to a majority 
of his people and his party. He did not move more rapidly 
in many fields simply because he detected no support for 
such motion. He was not a "great" president, but he fulfilled 
an exacting and critical role with success and ability dis­
played by no other contemporary.10 
No consensus yet characterizes interpretations of these 
early events; a dichotomy is apparent between those like 
Pletcher and LaFeber who consider American policy a 
rational long-term design to resolve domestic class conflict 
9. Ernest R. May, "American Imperialism: A Reinterpretation," Perspec­
tives in American History, I (1967), 123, 279. 
10. H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, 
N.Y., 1963), pp. 375-77, 528. 
 71 DAVID F. TRASK
by overseas expansion as against those like Grenville, Young, 
and May who discern drift, confusion, popular alarms, and 
absence of mind. The search for new evidence and new 
modes of analysis has greatly sophisticated but hardly re­
solved the problems of synthesis, interpretation, and criti­
cism which remain open to additional investigation. On one 
point all agree; these were truly important formative years 
that deserve continuing investigation as dedicated as that 
of the past decade. 
Ill 
The expansion of 1898 signaled new departures in policy 
from that date until 1914 or so, in particular an experiment 
in colonial management and a novel set of relations with 
other great powers. Some important contributions to our 
understanding of American policy in the Caribbean and 
Pacific regions have appeared in recent years. Unfortunately, 
we still do not have sufficient studies on relations with Euro­
pean powers. The subject of relations with Britain, Germany, 
and other European powers is all too often treated simply as 
a by-product of the "imperial interlude," a tendency that 
obscures the role of the United States in the historical devel­
opments that led to the outbreak of World War I. Perhaps 
the approaching publication of research such as that of 
Samuel Wells, Jr., on Anglo-American relations for the 
period 1904-14 will begin to correct the balance. 
The Spanish-American War was a landmark in the emer­
gence of the modern Anglo-American relationship, the sub­
ject of Charles S. Campbell's Anglo-American Understand­
ing, 1898-1903 (1957). Nothing ordained the shift that 
materialized at the end of the century. The two nations "took 
advantage of favorable circumstance and some luck in order 
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to resolve serious controversies beclouding relations . . . 
and even beclouding the peace." Campbell takes his readers 
through many exchanges and negotiations that resulted in 
the imposing settlements of 1902-3. What made these 
achievements possible? British restraint during the war, the 
British recognition of their need for American friendship 
given continental difficulties, and the general Anglo-Ameri­
can agreement concerning the Far East all influenced the 
relationship. "Never again, once the clash over canal policy 
in Central America and once the perils lurking along the 
Alaska boundary were removed, has an issue arisen that 
appeared possibly incapable of peaceful settlement." u Ex­
tremely scrupulous in his research and judgment, Campbell 
is flexible in outlook, difficult to classify definitively in any 
particular school of analysis. 
R. G. Neale has also examined the Anglo-American rela­
tionship during these years, writing Great Britain and United 
States Expansion: 1898-1900 (1966) largely from the British 
perspective. Concerned primarily with diplomatic exchanges 
stemming from American expansion, the author constantly 
adverts to the "quality of friendship" between the two na­
tions. Even before the Spanish-American War, Britain had 
made it clear that it would avoid diplomatic initiatives un­
acceptable in Washington. Nevertheless, Britain made no 
move to influence the behavior of other European powers 
during the war, nor did it attempt to influence American 
policy in East Asia after its conclusion. The extent of friendly 
relations during the conflict has been exaggerated; the British 
were interested but cautious, recognizing the virility of 
Anglophobia across the sea. Alfred Hippisley and Lord 
Beresford had no great impact on American policy; Britain 
was moving toward cooperation with other Asian powers 
11. Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 
(Baltimore, 1957), pp. 5, 347. 
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when the United States began to espouse the open door. Bri­
tain reached two broad conclusions concerning relations 
with the United States: 
Britain should wait upon the slow development of United 
States opinion and policy and then endeavour to accommo­
date to America's unilateral decisions British international 
commitments during this waiting period. . . . Britain 
should resign from any attempt to maintain in the American 
hemisphere those policies which the United States regarded 
as being in any way inimical to her national interests.12 
Both Campbell and Neale demonstrate the utility of mul­
tiarchival research as well as scrupulously balanced evalua­
tion of evidence. Both consider the general international 
context within which emerged the Anglo-American relation­
ship. Hopefully, more studies of the American relationship 
with, other European countries during these years will appear 
in the near future. 
One such effort is that of Calvin D. Davis, who has pub­
lished The United States and the First Hague Conference 
(1962). After tracing the origins of the meeting to 1899, 
Davis argues that "no nation went into the First Hague Con­
ference with greater determination to defeat its original, 
primary objective [disarmament] than did the United States 
of America. Sincere in its desire to establish a permanent in­
ternational tribunal, the Americans would countenance no 
agreement hindering improvement in their army and navy." 
The United States delegation supported the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration but fought hard for a resolution defend­
ing the Monroe doctrine and the principle of no entangling 
alliances. Nobody wanted to limit armaments in 1899. "The 
conference was essentially a failure. . .  . It is doubtful if 
12. R. G. Neale, Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898-1900
(East Lansing, Mich., 1966), p. 214. 
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any of its conventions other than those on the laws of war 
have ever benefited many people."13 The reader senses that 
the imperial enterprise of the post-1898 years was a far more 
important influence on policy than the extensive movement 
for various restraints on warfare. 
One of the more original contributions to the history of 
American policy in the Pacific-East Asian region is William 
R. Braisted's work on the role of the United States Navy in 
that area, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 
(1958). The author seeks to correct certain deficiencies in 
historical research: 
American diplomatic history has too often been written after 
an examination of strictly diplomatic correspondence with­
out adequate consideration of the economic, military, intel­
lectual, and other factors that motivate foreign policy, and 
second . . . American naval history has too often been con­
fined to discourse on wars and campaigns without sufficient 
regard for the Navy's influence on American foreign and 
domestic affairs in times of peace. 
Braisted analyzes the period 1897-1909 because during this 
time the United States greatly altered its Far Eastern policy 
and the Navy vastly expanded its operations in that region. 
The central naval problem was the emergence of Japanese 
power; by 1909 the old European squadrons had been with­
drawn to other stations. "There remained the United States 
and Japan to contend for, or to share, the mastery of the 
Pacific." Ironically, the United States was no more secure in 
1909 than in 1897. The United States failed to achieve effec­
tive liaison between the State and Navy departments, al­
though naval plans were developed in terms of the national 
diplomatic posture. The Japanese defeat of Russia in 1904-5, 
13. Calvin D. Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace 
Conference (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), pp. 110, 112. 
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interfered with naval projects to develop an Asiatic battle 
fleet, a base at Subig Bay, and an advanced base in China. 
The cruise of the White Fleet was an effort to balance the 
power of Japan. Braisted believes that Subig Bay should 
have been developed. He does not fail to note the effect of 
European developments on the navy, in particular the evolu­
tion of planning concepts from a fleet equal to that of Ger­
many to a fleet second to none. "In diplomacy European 
considerations weighed as heavily in determining American 
Far Eastern policies as Atlantic defense determined the 
Navy's outlook in the Pacific." " 
Another recent work on the Far East is Raymond A. 
Esthus's Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (1966). The rise of 
Japanese power serves as Esthus's point of departure. Presi­
dent Roosevelt hoped to mediate the Russo-Japanese War 
because he believed "that a balance of power should be 
established in East Asia with a line of friction between Russia 
and Japan. In establishing that balance of power, he hoped 
to play a key role." T.R. supported the Japanese protectorate 
in Korea because it avoided outright annexation, an event 
delayed until 1910. Much of the book considers Japanese-
American tensions rising from restrictive racial policies in 
the United States. Esthus discerns no world-shaking signifi­
cance in either the Taft-Katsura agreed memorandum of 
1905 or the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908. The first was 
merely "an honest exchange of views. . . . Nothing more 
than a community of interest with Japan and Britain in the 
Far East was implied." And further: "Throughout the [Root-
Takahira] negotiations both governments had been moti­
vated primarily by a desire to signalize the Japanese-Ameri­
can rapprochement with a publicity statement that would 
smooth over the friction of the preceding two years and 
14. William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897­
1909 (Austin, Tex., 1958), pp. vii-viii, 240, 244. 
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silence the war rumors." There was "no great confrontation 
of China and Japan in the arena of American policy making." 
T.R.'s compromise diplomacy is neatly summarized: "Roose­
velt was willing to sacrifice the open door and the integrity 
of China in favor of the strategic and economic interests of 
Japan in Manchuria in order to compensate Japan for dis­
crimination in the United States against Japanese and the 
exclusion of Japanese laborers."15 
Students of United States-Latin American relations during 
the imperial interlude remain very active, and one, Dana G. 
Munro, has offered a general study entitled Intervention and 
Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (1964). He 
attempts to show how and why the United States practiced 
intervention in the Caribbean, believing that an understand­
ing of this phenomenon will help the nation to avoid mistakes 
like those of fifty years past. Munro stresses the strategic as 
against the economic motivation for intervention, arguing 
that the United States sought "to promote stable government 
and economic progress as the best means of warding off 
European influence." Dollar diplomacy was not "a design to 
aid American bankers and other selfish interests in exploiting 
the countries where it was applied." The Platt Amendment 
and the Theodore Roosevelt Corollary were means of putting 
an end to conditions that threatened the independence of 
some of the Caribbean states and were consequently a po­
tential danger to the security of the United States. Revolu­
tions must be discouraged; the bad financial practices that 
weakened the governments and involved them in troubles 
with foreigners must be reformed; and general economic and 
social conditions, which were a basic cause of instability, 
must be removed. 
Despite his critique of the argument for economic motiva­
tion, Munro decries American policy in many respects, es­
15. Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle, 1966), 
pp. 55, 107, 285, 308. 
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pecially the tendency to dispatch incompetent diplomatists 
to the region and the undue proclivity to utilize compulsion 
rather than persuasion.16 
A useful study, The United States in Cuba, 189&-1902 
(1963), by David F. Healy, differs to some degree from 
Munro's views. After 1898 the United States had to decide 
how to govern its overseas dependencies. Cuba was one of 
the laboratories for this decision. There the United States 
worked out three elements of policy that were applied else­
where as well—"the establishment of informal protectorates 
which left a large degree of internal self-government"; "the 
making, through trade treaties or financial arrangements, of 
strong economic ties with the United States"; and "economic 
penetration through United States investment and develop­
ment." The anti-annexationist spirit that had generated the 
Teller Amendment, a self-denying ordinance passed by Con­
gress at the beginning of the war with Spain, precluded the 
absorption of Cuba, but a prevalent racism presumed that 
nonwhite populations were incapable of full self-govern­
ment. Direct intervention by "big business" is hard to find, 
but only because "the necessary decisions were made, not by 
businessmen, but by soldiers, politicians, and civil servants. 
If these decisionmakers sought to satisfy the desires of the 
business community—and obviously they did—they tried 
even harder to satisfy the voting public." 
Healy recognizes that political as well as economic mo­
tives influenced American policy. "While American business 
interests soon got all they wanted in Cuba, they did so under 
a settlement shaped by many forces, prominent among which 
were the clash of domestic party politics and the demands of 
the oft-forgotten Cuban people." The Platt Amendment was 
"a middle course between altruism and annexationism. It 
was a realistic compromise designed to award each side its 
16. Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Carib­
bean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, N.J., 1964), pp. 161, 163, 531. 
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minimum demands." Elihu Root, who was the principal 
framer of the Platt Amendment, deplored the interventionist 
backsliding that came later on.17 
Another much-praised study of United States activity in 
Latin America is Robert E. Quirk's work, An Affair of Honor 
(1962), about the intervention at Veracruz in 1914, during 
the early stages of the Mexican Revolution. The occupation 
of Veracruz accomplished little but left a permanent stain 
on Mexican-American relations. President Wilson "clothed 
American aggression with the sanctimonious raiment of 
idealism. Insisting upon the morality of his acts, he aroused 
both the hatred and the scorn of the Mexicans—hatred over 
the invasion but a deep scorn for what they saw as his hypoc­
risy." The United States must not revert to policy like that of 
Wilson. "We may offer encouragement, friendship, under­
standing, and (when asked) counsel. But never tutelage, 
never superiority, never condescension." Wilson's ends may 
have been noble, but his means were completely unaccept­
able.18 
For the most part American historians have neglected non-
Spanish regions of Latin America, but E. Bradford Burns's 
study of Brazilian-American relations between 1902 and 
1912, The Unwritten Alliance (1966), begins to redress the 
balance. Writing from the Brazilian perspective, Burns's 
basic contention is that the tradition of Brazilian-American 
friendship, often dated from the nineteenth century, actually 
flowered when the Baron of Rio-Branco was foreign minister 
of Brazil (1902-12). Rio-Branco hoped to settle various 
boundary disputes with neighboring states and also to es­
tablish Brazilian diplomatic ascendancy in South America. 
17. David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, 
Politicians, and. the Search for Policy (Madison, Wis., 1963), pp. xii, 211, 
214. 
18. Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the 
Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington, Ky., 1962), p. 6. 
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Good relations with the United States would further these 
objectives. At the same time, the United States saw in Brazil 
an ally in advancing its Latin American policies. The result 
was an unwritten alliance. During the Rio-Branco era, "Bra­
zil shifted its diplomatic axis from London to Washington 
where it has since remained." Brazilian policy reflected a 
strong desire to find markets in the United States. No cor­
responding impulse to sell goods in Brazil motivated the 
Americans, but "dependence on the American importer . . . 
pulled Brazil closer to its giant neighbor in the north. Brazil's 
new diplomatic policies reflected that situation." " 
Most of the historians writing about the years immediately 
after the Spanish-American War have dealt with the imperial 
consequences of that conflict; not enough has been written 
about American contributions during this time to the pro­
cesses that led to World War I. The easy assumption that 
the United States was merely a bystander as Europe moved 
toward war may not withstand critical evaluation. There 
should be continuing study of United States relations with 
Latin America and East Asia, but a truly important field is 
the consequences of the imperial interlude for relations with 
Europe—relations that are an aspect of the origins and cau­
sation of World War I. 
TV 
The study of American foreign relations during World War 
I has recently been one of the most active interests of dip­
lomatic historians. The years from 1914 to 1920 constituted 
the Pandora's box of the century; manifold problems mate­
rialized then that have endured to the present. The search 
19. E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Bronco and 
Brazilian-American Relations (New York, 1966), pp. ix, 75. 
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for the origins of the contemporary international crisis has 
led many investigators back to the Great War. Another in­
fluence has been the astounding richness of research mate­
rials becoming available since World War II. In addition, 
the period permits a close examination of relations between 
force and diplomacy. 
Daniel M. Smith has produced a useful survey of the 
entire period, significantly entitled The Great Departure 
(1965), which concentrates for the most part on the tradi­
tional interests of American historians—explanation of the 
intervention of 1917 and the peacemaking of 1919. His view­
points reflect the influence of power-realist analysis: 
Most Americans lacked an understanding of the basic reasons 
why the country entered the war and of the nation's specific 
stake in the peace settlement. The United States entered the 
war, in an involved controversy over neutral rights, because 
of national self-interests and an even greater concern in the 
creation of a stable and just postwar world society. American 
foreign policy, throughout the neutrality and war periods, 
was in general practical and based on these national interests. 
Even the Wilsonian concept of an idealistic peace and a 
global collective security system was related to practical 
national interests. But the majority of citizens was not made 
fully aware of that fact and was too easily wearied by the 
responsibilities of world leadership. There lay the tragedy of 
America in World War I. 
Smith insists that the picture of Wilsonian moralism so gen­
eral in former writings has been vastly overdrawn. He gives 
special attention to the influential realism of Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing and to the vain effort of Wilson to me­
diate the European conflict prior to the intervention.20 
The towering character and personality of Woodrow Wil­
20. Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and 
World War I (New York, 1965), p. x. 
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son dominates American writing about World War I. Arthur 
Link's magisterial biography has so far extended only to the 
intervention of 1917, but his views on Wilson the Diploma­
tist were summarized in 1957. In many ways this analysis 
extends the pro-Wilsonian interpretation offered by Ray 
Stannard Baker that flowered between the wars but encoun­
tered strong criticism from exponents of neutrality just before 
World War II and from realists as well as radicals after 
World War II. It rejects both trade expansion and unre­
strained international moralism as single-cause interpreta­
tions of the war president's course. In analyzing neutrality, 
Link refutes the view either that Wilson was too neutral or 
not neutral enough. Responsive to public opinion, Wilson 
moved with the feelings of the American people. Interven­
tion was in part a consequence of the absence of constructive 
alternatives and in part a desire to "achieve objectives to 
justify the misery of mankind." His discussion of the peace 
conference is a strong defense of Wilson; he argues for Wil­
sonian success at that time. The real failure of Versailles was 
lack of a will to achievement among the victors of Europe. 
Wilson's inability to obtain assent to the treaty at home is 
ascribed in part to his physical breakdown but mostly to his 
stubborn unwillingness to compromise principle beyond a 
certain point. Wilson ultimately chose the role of prophet 
rather than statesman.21 
Works on neutrality have been relatively few in recent 
years, but one, Ernest R. May's The World War and Ameri­
can Isolation, 1914-1917 (1959), has found broad accept­
ance. May stresses two interrelationships—that between 
European and American decisions and that between diplo­
macy and domestic politics in the United States, Great 
Britain, and Germany. "Scarcely any event in one of the three 
21. Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign 
Policies (Baltimore, 1957), p. 90. 
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states failed to affect the other two. . .  . In Britain and 
Germany questions of American policy became key issues in 
domestic struggles for power." American policy was some­
what different: 
On the American side the drama was less a factional struggle 
than a contest within one man's conscience. A near-pacifist 
President found himself marching step by step toward war. 
. .  . In the end he had to choose war because he dreamed 
of peace. Despite the paradoxes, close analysis cannot find 
the point at which he might have turned back or taken an­
other road. In Wilson's dilemmas, as in the contests in Lon­
don and Berlin, there were elements of high tragedy. 
The submarine controversy led to American intervention. 
May describes Sir Edward Grey's effort to preserve and ex­
tend the traditional Anglo-American understanding. The 
development of German-American antagonism secured the 
Anglo-American relation despite the strains of the war. Wil­
son hoped to achieve a general peace through the vehicle of 
Anglo-American cooperation; unfortunately for Germany 
there was no prior tradition of trust between that nation and 
the United States. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's prudence 
and Wilson's dedication to peace postponed the day of 
reckoning but did not avoid it. May finds it difficult to label 
the President's policy as "unrealistic." "He sought lasting 
peace for its own sake. Since it offered the only sure escape 
from the dilemmas of wartime relations with Britain and 
Germany, it did have its practical side." By 1917 war was 
unavoidable.22 
May's work has a distinctive multinational perspective and 
a multiarchival basis. It demonstrates the advantages of 
avoiding an unduly restricted national perspective and evi­
22. Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. vii-viii, 437. 
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dential base. If the book lends new plausibility to older anal­
yses like that of Charles Seymour, it is a model of scholarship 
and historical writing to which others might repair with 
profit. Though certainly within the Rankean tradition, it 
defies easy classification because of its complex analysis. 
Victor S. Mamatey's influential The United States and 
East Central Europe, 1914-1918 (1957), is appropriately 
subtitled A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda. 
He seeks "to reconstruct . . . the story of the United States 
attitude toward the break-up of the old Habsburg Empire 
and the creation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the re­
unification of Rumania, and the completion of the unifica­
tion of Italy." Eclectic in outlook, Mamatey believes that 
"foreign policy is a set of reactions to impulses both at home 
and abroad." Wilson neither Balkanized East Central Europe 
nor represented bourgeois-nationalist opposition to social 
revolution. "British and Allied policy during the war was 
improvised in a pragmatic and empiric fashion almost from 
day to day; there was little or no planning for postwar days." 
Relying on little-known eastern European sources, Mamatey 
expounds a general thesis: 
The new nations of East Central Europe were not created by 
the Paris Peace Conference; they created themselves by 
their own efforts. Both American and Russian propaganda 
stimulated but did not engender their desire for independ­
ence. The Allies made their independence possible by crush­
ing the main obstacle to it: the military might of the Central 
Powers. Victory over the Central Powers—that was the great 
Allied contribution to the freedom of the peoples of East 
Central Europe. Wilsonian America contributed to the Allied 
victory; Bolshevik Russia did not.23 
23. Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 
1914-1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, 
N.J., 1957), pp. viii, x, 152, 384. 
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This forceful but temperate work reflects the outlook of re­
cent students, far removed from the passions of the period 
and yet deeply involved in its significance for later events. 
Lawrence E. Gelfand, in The Inquiry (1963), has contrib­
uted another striking study of Wilsonian activity by tracing 
the work of Wilson's planners for the peace conference. Far 
from being catch-as-catch-can, American preparations for 
the sessions at Paris were quite extensive. The organization 
and work of the Inquiry in regard to all parts of the world 
becomes clear, the results of unusually thorough research. 
Gelfand gives considerable space to the contributions of 
Sidney Mezes, Isaiah Bowman, Walter Lippmann, James T. 
Shotwell, and David Hunter Miller. Despite its effort, the 
Inquiry had mixed results. Although it did not develop well-
conceived peace proposals, its work was of some use at the 
peace conference; its global proportions at least indicated 
that "the United States by 1917 had reached the status of a 
great world power." Gelfand analyzes with particular care 
the use of scholars for the first time as servants of the govern­
ment. Like other recent students, he sees in Wilson "less of 
the moralistic fiber than is customary." Trade expansion 
does not appear as a dominating motive behind policy plan­
ning.24 
Representative of the continuing preoccupation with the 
relations between public opinion and foreign policy is a 
recent collection of essays edited by Joseph P. O'Grady en­
titled The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies 
(1967). Various immigrant groups in America, ranging 
from the Irish and Jews to the Carpatho-Ruthenians and the 
British-Americans, attempted to guide policy by influencing 
the general public, establishment leadership, local and na­
tional politicians, various departments and agencies, and 
24. Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American Preparations for 
Peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven, Conn., 1963), pp. 314, 333. 
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finally the president and his staff. O'Grady summarizes the 
over-all conclusion: "only two of the immigrant groups 
studied really influenced Wilson and in neither case [Jewish 
and Polish] was the principal means the operation of public 
opinion." The essays frequently suggest that "realistic" cal­
culations based on the relative strength of states were regular 
aspects of Wilsonian diplomacy. O'Grady minces no words 
in his final estimate: 
There are those who hold that diplomacy in the twentieth 
century is controlled by the people and not by the realities 
of power and geography, that it is free from the influence of 
the whims of individuals. Yet in the case of Wilson it would 
seem that geography did influence diplomacy, that power 
played its role, and that the whim of the individual had not 
been eliminated.25 
This writer has examined the relations between American 
diplomacy and military decisions during 1917-18 in The 
United States and the Supreme War Council (1961). The 
Supreme War Council attempted to coordinate the political-
military decisions of the Entente Powers and the United 
States, the first such enterprise in which the United States 
had taken part since the Revolution. Contrary to the views 
of the power realists, Wilson and his advisers appreciated 
the relations between military and political decisions. Five 
case studies of issues dealt with in the Supreme War Council 
led to the conclusion that "American relations with the En­
tente turned on two fundamental objectives, a clear-cut vic­
tory over the Central Powers and the maintenance of Ameri­
can diplomatic independence. President Wilson deemed 
both objectives necessary in order to insure the fulfillment 
of his plans for the postwar world." Wilsonian decisions dur­
25. Joseph P. O'Grady, ed., The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace 
Policies (Lexington, Ky., 1967), pp. 28-29. 
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ing the period of belligerency sought to insure American 
domination of the peace settlement—if necessary to dictate 
the outcome both to the victors and the vanquished of 
Europe.26 
George Frost Kennan himself has investigated the war 
years in his study of Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920 
(1956-). Throughout the two volumes that have appeared, 
he applies some of the general interpretive principles laid 
out in American Diplomacy 1900-1950: 
In the end it is only right principles, consistently applied— 
not the gift of prophecy or the pride of insight—that achieve 
the best [diplomatic] results. These results are never wholly 
predictable; nor are they even easy to distinguish when they 
appear. It is the tragedy of the diplomatic art that even the 
finest achievements are always mingled with ulterior causes 
and are seldom visible or intelligible to the broader public 
until many years have separated them from the decisions in 
which, in the main, they had their origin. 
In Russia Leaves the War Kennan quickly establishes his 
distaste for Wilson, who did not use "diplomatic missions as 
a vital and intimate agency of policy." His general thesis is 
that American policy was misguided because no one really 
understood the situation in Russia and too many amateurs 
like Raymond Robins confused the issues. Discussing a curi­
ous effort to make John Reed the Soviet consul in New York, 
Kennan observes "the infinite possibilities for misunderstand­
ing, confusion, intrigue, and malevolent exploitation that 
are always present when inexperienced people, whose status 
is unclarified, are permitted to dabble in the transactions 
between governments." This dabbling had enormous conse­
26. David F. Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council: 
American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918 (Middletown, 
Conn., 1961), p. 172. 
 87 DAVID F. TRASK
quences: "Out of the resulting confusion grew, in large part, 
the many myths and controversies by which their memory 
has been followed." 
The second volume, The Decision to Intervene, elaborates 
this theme: "Confusion was the predominant element in the 
external relations of Russia in 1918." Kennan criticizes the 
inter-Allied intervention because it "sacrificed . . . the 
slender thread of communication with the new government 
in Russia which had existed in the form of official and semi­
official staffs left after the Revolution in the territory held by 
the Bolsheviki." The writer's deep-seated conservatism and 
advocacy of diplomatic professionalism appear in his vale­
dictory comment: 
The reasons for the failure of American statesmanship 
lay . .  . in such things as the deficiencies of the American 
political system from the grievous distortion of vision 
brought to the democratic society by any self-abandonment 
—as in World War I—to the hysteria of militancy; the con­
genital shallowness, philosophical and intellectual, of the 
approach to world problems that bubbled up from the fer­
mentations of official Washington; and the pervasive dil­
letantism in the execution of American policy. How pleasing 
it would be if one were able to record, in concluding this 
volume, that these deficiencies had been left behind.27 
An entirely different analysis appears in Arno Mayer's 
Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 
1917-1918 (1964). It is a lonely but distinguished study of 
the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy during 
World War I. Mayer analyzes the controversies within vari­
ous European countries between "parties of order" and 
27. George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1956—). Vol. I: Russia Leaves the War, pp. viii, 28, 410­
11; Vol. II: The Decision to Intervene, pp. 14, 470, 471-72. A third volume 
is to appear. 
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"parties of movement" over war aims from March, 1917, to 
January, 1918. This chronology permits comparative study 
and encompasses certain critical events—the military stale­
mate in France, the American intervention, and the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Lenin's April Theses and Wilson's Fourteen 
Points symbolize the "new diplomacy." The old diplomacy 
stressed annexations, protectorates, and spheres of influence, 
appealing to self-defense, national honor, and freedom. The 
new diplomacy called for open diplomacy and nonannexa­
tionist objectives. Insisting on the primacy of "domestic po­
litical determinants," Mayer shows how the parties of move­
ment espoused the new diplomacy: 
The triumph of the New Diplomacy during the last year of 
the war must be assessed not only in the light of Wilson's 
profound faith in the wisdom of open diplomacy and popular 
control of foreign policy, or of the Bolshevik practice of open 
diplomacy at Brest-Litovsk and their conversion to self-
determination, but also in the light of the decided growth 
of the forces of movement in Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
France, and Great Britain. 
During 1917, when World War I became "a worldwide 
revolutionary and ideological struggle," Wilson and Lenin 
pursued comparable principles for different ends. Wilson 
hoped to rekindle the fighting spirit of the Allies and 
strengthen the forces of movement in the enemy camp. 
Lenin hoped to advance the revolution of the proletariat by 
combining a compromise peace with domestic reform. Ulti­
mately reform and revolution became antithetical to each 
other.28 
In a sequel entitled Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemak­
28. Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New 
Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (Cleveland, Ohio, 1964), pp. 8, 33. Originally 
published under title of Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917­
1918 (New Haven, Conn., 1959). 
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ing (1967) Mayer interests himself in the "political and dip­
lomatic context and climate in which the principal peace­
makers dealt with critical issues and problems involving 
fundamental policy considerations." The peace conference 
of 1919 revealed the ultimate recovery of the parties of or­
der. Both Russia and America, although for different rea­
sons, took leave of postwar European politics. "Russia was 
ostracized and quarantined because of her revolutionary 
transgression, and this transgression became both cause and 
excuse for treating Russia as if she were a decaying empire." 
On the other hand, "America's withdrawal, not unlike Rus­
sia's expulsion, was activated by political considerations in 
foreign policy and not by considerations of raison d'etat." 
Mayer summarizes his conclusion grimly: 
The end of the war emergency and the intensifying contest 
between revolution and counterrevolution pushed the pri­
macy of foreign policy into the background. . . . The legacy 
of disorder, frustration, and exhaustion actually intensified 
political tensions beyond what they had been before the 
war; and disappointments with the outcome of the Peace 
Conference intensified these tensions still further. The sign­
ing of a diplomatic document could not lessen or liquidate 
the massive world crisis whose locus shifted from the inter­
national to the internal area. Hereafter foreign policy issues 
became caught up in partisan politics; foreign policy and 
diplomacy became pawns in the domestic struggle for 
29 power.
Mayer's revisionism contrasts starkly with the measured 
tones of Seth Tillman's Anglo-American Relations at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (1961). Tillman discerns 
considerable Anglo-American harmony at Paris but at no 
29. Amo J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Contain­
ment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967), 
pp. vii, 876. 
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point "did the English-speaking powers identify their com­
munity of interests to the point of pursuing acknowledged 
common objectives by a coherent common strategy." If the 
United States maintained a general policy of diplomatic in­
dependence, indicating the continuing influence of the isola­
tionist past, the author argues that "with certain exceptions, 
Britain and the United States were responsible for the most 
enlightened, most progressive, and most moral features of 
the treaties of peace." The Americans and the British clashed 
over colonies and mandates, sea power, and reparations and 
economic settlements, but they were in close accord on the 
European settlement and the covenant of the League. Till­
man looks benignly on the settlement. "Whatever the de­
fects of the particulars of the treaties, the settlement as a 
whole was a reasonable embodiment of the Fourteen Points, 
and, more broadly, of the democratic principles of Anglo-
American society." Because the Americans repudiated the 
Versailles treaty legally, and the British morally, "the worst 
particulars of the treaties were enforced, while the best were 
stillborn."30 
If the historical works on the diplomacy of World War I 
reveal the conventional division of view between power 
realism and economic interpretation, most scholars adopt 
either a neutral or favorable view of Wilsonian diplomacy, a 
definite reaction against the views extant just after World 
War II. No general consensus has as yet emerged, but the 
productivity of those interested in the period may provide 
the basis for a new general synthesis in the not too distant 
future. One universally accepted view is not likely to be 
abandoned—that the history of World War I has all the ele­
ments of high tragedy. 
30. Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Con­ference of 1919 (Princeton, N.J., 1961), pp. vii, 401-2, 408. 
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In late years the interwar years have attracted more stu­
dents of American foreign relations than any other field. 
Archival materials for the period 1919-39 have become 
available in great plenty. Some scholars have concentrated 
on the twenties, concerned with the aftermath of the war, 
but most have pioneered in the study of the years from 1929 
to 1939, examining American behavior during the great in­
ternational decline in security that culminated in World 
War II. 
Perhaps the most influential general work on the over-all 
period is Selig Adler's The Isolationist Impulse (1957). The 
study is not diplomatic history. Like many other students of 
this era, Adler treats domestic attitudes toward involvement 
in world politics from the time of World War I. Ever since 
Sarajevo, "Americans have been torn between a desire to 
use their national power to stabilize the world, and a con­
flicting desire to remain aloof from overseas turmoil." No ir­
reversible commitment was made from 1914 to the middle 
fifties. "Only in times of acute foreign or domestic crisis has 
one desire or another dominated public opinion." The au­
thor studies "mass opinion," analyzing the views of those in 
the middle as well as at the extremes. The result is insight 
into the way in which opinions penetrated into the con­
sciousness of the American people.31 
Waldo Heinrichs has written an unusually detailed biog­
raphy of Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassa­
dor (1966), which spans the interwar period, adding to an 
understanding of the broader course of national policy by 
tracing its impact on a leading member of the Foreign Serv­
31. Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Re­
action, pape-rback ed. (New York, 1957), p. 433. 
92 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
ice. Grew had tours of duty in Washington, but he was prin­
cipally a professional diplomat engaged in field operations, 
notably in Ankara and Tokyo. Grew's ambassadorial role in 
Japan from 1931 to 1941 is the highlight of the biography. 
The emphasis in this biography is on the execution rather 
than the formation of policy, an important dimension to 
which other historians might give more attention.32 
Historians writing about the twenties have emphasized 
domestic influences on policy-making. They have dealt in 
particular with the limiting effects of the great public reac­
tion against Wilson's "crusade" and the shaping forces of the 
"business civilization" that held sway during the presiden­
tial service of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. Recent schol­
ars have been less bitter than those of earlier decades, but 
they remain highly critical of American statecraft in the Re­
publican era. Betty Glad's critical exploration of Charles E. 
Hughes's service as secretary of state from 1921 to 1925, defi­
nitely exemplifies the views of the power realists as influ­
enced by the political scientist Hans Morgenthau. The au­
thor argues that "American foreign policy between the 
World Wars was not based on a solid intellectual founda­
tion." Hughes had a somewhat jarring childhood, an experi­
ence that led him continually to seek personal calm. The 
secretary was unduly concerned with the unsettling conse­
quences of domestic political criticism. "In avoiding the po­
litically objectionable, he may have left untouched the 
really significant problems of his time." Above all, Hughes 
failed to consider the relations between force and diplomacy. 
"Holding to a nineteenth-century rationalist philosophy 
which obscured the relationship of power to social order, he 
had difficulty in formulating foreign policies adequately 
32. Waldo Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the 
Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, 1966). 
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geared to the new international situation of the United 
States." The final judgment is harsh: "because his philosophy 
and his personality would not permit him to face squarely 
the bases of political action, Hughes could not see the funda­
mental changes that had occurred in the international posi­
tion of the United States and adjust his goals accordingly." M 
Another useful study of an influential figure during the 
twenties is John C. Vinson's work on the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William E. Borah, Re­
publican of Idaho. Neither a full-scale biography nor a study 
of policy, the book examines "Borah's actions and methods, 
and . .  . his aims and motives in regard to the problem of 
America's proper responsibility in promoting world peace." 
The senator was "the archetype of absolute insistence on un­
fettered national will that has been loosely identified as iso­
lationism." Vinson sees in his subject a "struggle to preserve 
in full the traditions of a small republic remote from strong 
neighbors against the inroads of recurring crises faced by a 
world power." Borah believed that complete independence 
in foreign affairs was compatible with cooperative endeavors 
to maintain the peace. Particularly fearful of unduly restric­
tive ties to Europe, Borah could favor the Kellogg-Briand 
pact despite his all-out opposition to the League because 
that treaty accorded with the positive aspects of his thought 
on international relations. Vinson concentrates on Borah's 
gradual acceptance of the principle of outlawing war. "The 
Pact of Paris met every test, for it did not entangle the 
United States in foreign politics, it was not an alliance, it 
did not obligate the United States, and it was not based on 
the use of force." Committed to the principles of nationalism, 
sovereignty, and independence, Borah could support the out­
33. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: 
A Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, 111., 1966), pp. 152, 322, 326. 
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lawry of war wholeheartedly without abandoning his isola­
tionist sentiments.34 
Peter Filene's Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 
1917-1933 (1967), deals with domestic attitudes toward a 
particular issue of great significance. "Intensive analysis of 
this single intellectual theme will indirectly describe Ameri­
cans' conceptions of democracy, of capitalism, and of them­
selves as a society and nation." Dealing with ideas advanced 
by specific interest groups, Filene traces the evolution of 
attitudes toward the Soviet Union through intervention, 
withdrawal, the new economic plan, the first five-year plan, 
and recognition. There was no dramatic shift from hostility 
to reconciliation, but feelings were "decidedly more benign" 
in 1933 than in 1918-19. Filene concludes that "American 
attitudes toward Soviet Russia always included the same set 
of values, but with the order of priorities revised in response 
to the varying situations of war, prosperity, and depression. 
The sequence varied from group to group and often differed 
within groups, of course, but the differences derived from 
disagreement on priority of values rather than the values 
themselves." Attitudes were both fickle and contradictory 
because American values were so pluralistic. The failure to 
make the world safe for democracy and for prosperity ex­
erted great influence on attitudes; it forced America to real­
ize that the Soviet Union would neither surrender nor accept 
defeat.35 
Raymond O'Connor has written a useful study of the rela­
tions between sailors and statesmen in Perilous Equilibrium 
(1962), an investigation of the London Naval Conference of 
1930. Conflicting attitudes troubled this relationship. "The 
34. John Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah and the Outlawry of War 
(Athens, Ga., 1957), pp. ix, 161. 
35. Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 3-4, 273, 274-75. 
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statesman strives for international conciliation and the pro­
fessional reiterates that the fleet which exists is the fleet that 
wins." Great political differences separated the delegates of 
France and Italy from the representatives of the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan at London. This situation 
led to a tripartite arrangement excluding the French and 
Italians. The three greatest naval powers agreed to some 
naval limitation, but the result was a perilous equilibrium 
because the negotiators did not decide clearly whether to 
base the treaty on the "moral force" principle of the Kellogg-
Briand pact or the "military implications" of the League 
Covenant. The treaty insured that the United States would 
possess sufficient naval power to defend the Monroe Doc­
trine and probably its Pacific possessions but not enough to 
preserve the open door in East Asia.36 
The thirties have attracted perhaps more interest than the 
twenties in recent years because of the coming of World 
War II. Among those scholars working on the thirties none 
has been more active than Robert H. Ferrell, whose study of 
the Hoover-Stimson foreign policy, American Diplomacy in 
the Great Depression (1957), generally "realist" in tone, has 
exercised broad influence. Ferrell bases his work on the 
premise that the Great Depression "underlay the deteriora­
tion of American foreign relations during the yearsl929-33." 
He considers the ways in which the national heritage, the 
characteristics of the diplomatists, and the events of the pe­
riod combined to shape policy during the early depression 
years. Notably critical of Secretary of State Henry L. Stim­
son, Ferrell renders negative judgments on his policies dur­
ing the Manchurian crisis of 1929 and the naval negotiations 
of 1930. He gives Hoover some credit in his handling of war 
36. Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and 
the London Naval Conference of 1930 (Lawrence, Kans., 1962); quotation 
is from the Preface, unpaginated. 
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debts and the moratorium but downgrades their importance. 
Most of the book treats the Manchurian crisis of 1931-32, 
and Stimson is roundly criticized once again. Good inten­
tions were not enough. "Only a few individuals . . . were 
willing to try a diplomacy based on force rather than moral 
suasion and legal admonition." Stimson was entirely too 
legalistic; all too often events outran intelligence.37 
Lloyd C. Gardner adopts an entirely different approach to 
foreign relations during the depression. His study of Eco­
nomic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (1964) stresses the 
continuity of traditional American behavior. The passage of 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 committed 
the United States once again to its traditional foreign policy 
—trade expansion—and there has been no real change since. 
In 1933-34 the New Dealers organized for trade expansion 
in response to economic interests endangered by the domes­
tic depression. During 1934-37 they made their initial ef­
forts to penetrate Latin America, Asia, and Europe. From 
1937 to 1941 these beginnings hardened as the Axis challenge 
to trade expansion became apparent. World War II enlarged 
the scope of America's trade expansion diplomacy to the en­
tire world and led to the Cold War. Gardner's conclusion is 
firmly within the school of economic interpretation, and in 
particular the specific viewpoint of William Appleman 
Williams. "In Manchuria . . . , in the Middle East, in Latin 
America, in fact nearly everywhere, the United States 
wanted the Open Door Policy and an open world. Russia did 
not. And therein was the struggle which developed into Cold 
War." » 
37. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: 
Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven, Conn., 1957), 
pp.18, 280. 
38. Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy 
(Madison, Wis., 1964), p. 329. 
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Students of United States-Latin American relations dur­
ing the thirties have continued their analysis of the Good 
Neighbor policy. The most comprehensive effort, The Mak­
ing of the Good Neighbor Policy (1961), is by Bryce Wood. 
Like so many other recent scholars, Wood stresses ideas: 
"The development of ideas about compromise, collabora­
tion, and leadership in unfamiliar political circumstances." 
During the period 1920-33 the United States realized that 
the use of force in the Caribbean was not only expensive and 
undemocratic but also injurious to the national interest. The 
Good Neighbor approach of Franklin D. Roosevelt devel­
oped not only the principles of nonintervention and non­
interference but also the idea of "pacific protection." The 
national interest in security transcended business interests. 
Wood opts for the strategic emphasis of writers like Dana G. 
Munro as against the economic interpretations of Gardner 
and like scholars. His judgment of New Deal diplomacy in 
Latin America is positive, unlike that of the Williams group.39 
E. David Cronon has dealt with a specific application of 
the Good Neighbor ideal in his Josephus Daniels in Mexico 
(1960). Cronon discerns a mixture of interest and idealism 
in Good Neighbor politics. "At times even President Roose­
velt himself seemed unclear as to which aim was primary. 
Neither in motivation nor in application, then, was the Good 
Neighbor Policy a simple, consistent doctrine." Daniels was 
a true exemplar of the Good Neighbor. He realized that the 
United States would accomplish much more by "tact, discre­
tion, patience, and understanding" than by bluster and force. 
The acid test was the crisis over the Mexican expropriation 
of foreign-owned oil properties in 1938. Daniels realized 
that the special interests of the oil companies must be sacri­
39. Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York, 
1961), p. vi. 
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ficed. "In the long run, a higher standard of living would 
bring a greatly expanded demand for American goods and 
capital in Mexico." Change was unavoidable; it was best to 
accept it gracefully, preserving whatever was possible. 
Cronon compares Daniels favorably with one of his prede­
cessors. "Dwight Morrow was the able and effective repre­
sentative of American capital in Mexico; Daniels represented 
the American people." Because the Good Neighbor policy 
was never really a well-articulated line, diplomats in the field 
greatly influenced its development. Cronon concludes that 
the reason for the happy outcome in Mexico was Daniels.40 
Diplomatic historians of the last decade have not neg­
lected relations with East Asia for the thirties. If students of 
relations with Latin America have been generally favorable 
to United States policy, those interested in East Asia have 
been generally uncomplimentary. As in other topics, a num­
ber of revisionist interpretations have been advanced. Armin 
Rappaport has restudied the Manchurian crisis in order to 
explain the failure of the United States and Great Britain to 
restrain Japan during the period 1931-33. Henry L. Stimson 
and Japan, 1931-33 (1963) emphasizes the decision-makers 
and the public mood. Like Ferrell, Rappaport criticizes Stim­
son's inveterate legalism: "There was no "law" against which 
the conduct of nations could be assessed. In diplomacy he 
[Stimson] seemed to have forgotten, if he ever knew, that 
one cannot let emotion or morality be the only guide of con­
duct. One must neither hate nor love, only calculate and 
weigh." Stimson found no support abroad, but did earn the 
enmity of Japan. He brandished an unloaded pistol, "thereby 
transgressing the cardinal maxim of the statesman and plac­
ing his country in jeopardy." Although definitely in the 
40. E. David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison, Wis., 1960), 
pp. ix, 286, 287. 
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"realist" camp, Rappaport nevertheless concedes that the 
United States should have voiced shock at the Japanese ag­
gression.41 
Another important study of United States-Japanese rela­
tions is Dorothy Borg's The United States and the Far East­
ern Crisis of 1933-1938 (1964). Japan pursued two main pol­
icies during this obscure period. From 1933 to 1937 Tokyo 
used peaceful methods of threatening China. Roosevelt nei­
ther appeased nor opposed Japan; he did nothing. Even 
after the China Incident of 1937, the United States main­
tained a policy of inaction despite its interest in world peace. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull took a moral stand but 
avoided use of sanctions. Given the rapid development of 
the world crisis, Borg considers American passivity "aston­
ishing in retrospect." Lassitude rather than action was at the 
core of the American failure to help keep the peace.42 
A different approach to American-Japanese relations pre­
ceding Pearl Harbor is taken by Paul Schroeder in his im­
portant revisionist study, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-
American Relations, 1941 (1958). Downgrading the role of 
conspiracy and unreason stressed by many earlier scholars, 
Schroeder argues that "the attack [on Pearl Harbor] was an 
act of desperation, not madness. Japan fought only when she 
had her back to the wall as a result of America's diplomatic 
and economic offensive." The American demand that Japan 
withdraw immediately from China was unwise, as was the 
refusal to accept Premier Konoye's bid for a summit meeting 
in 1941. Schroeder issues a severe indictment. "In the at­
tempt to gain everything at once, the United States lost her 
opportunity to secure immediately her essential require­
41. Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-33 (Chicago, 
1963), pp. 202, 203. 
42. Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933­
193S: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage of the Un­
declared Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 544. 
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merits in the Far East and to continue to work toward her 
long-range goals." Instead, the nation "succeeded . .  . in 
making inevitable an unnecessary and avoidable war." The 
error was to abandon the policy of dividing Japan from the 
Axis. The quixotic endeavor to liberate China did not halt 
Japan; it brought on war. Like Joseph C. Grew, Schroeder 
believes that the United States should have sought a modus 
vivendi, delaying a showdown until victory in Europe per­
mitted a desirable settlement in Asia. The American ap­
proach was inconsistent, unrealistic, and futile, "a policy de­
signed to uphold principle and to punish the aggressor, but 
not to save the victor." A strong "realist," Schroeder holds 
that sound policy requires "fundamental attention to what 
is practical and expedient at a given time and to limited ob­
jectives within the scope of the national interest."i3 
Isolationist thought and practice has attracted numerous 
scholars. Robert A. Divine has studied the neutrality legisla­
tion enacted by Congress during the period 1935-37 in The 
Illusion of Neutrality (1962). Emphasizing the debate be­
tween isolationists and internationalists, Divine brings out 
the equivocal role of President Roosevelt. He failed to grasp 
the strength of isolationism, and later on could not moderate 
its influence. "Only when the reality of war finally began 
transforming public opinion did he move effectively to re­
vise the neutrality legislation. And even then he had to com­
promise, accepting the cash-and-carry restrictions as the nec­
essary price for the repeal of the arms embargo." Neverthe­
less, the principal responsibility rests with the neutrality 
bloc in Congress, especially Gerald P. Nye, Bennett Clark, 
and Hamilton Fish. Divine also attributes some of the blame 
to Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. In the last analysis, however, the responsibility 
43. Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Rela­
tions (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), pp. 201, 203,208, 214. 
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lay with the American people. They favored the democra­
cies but feared involvement in the struggle. Only Pearl Har­
bor resolved their ambivalence.4* 
Wayne S. Cole has studied the career of one of the lead­
ing isolationists in Senator Gerald P. Nye and American For­
eign Relations (1962). Cole believes that "important roots 
of isolationism may be traced to needs, desires, and value 
systems of major segments of the American agricultural so­
ciety. Agrarian radicalism of the Great Plains and Middle 
West exerted fundamental influences on Nye's foreign policy 
views." Cole also traces the shift of isolationist thought from 
liberalism to conservatism. Isolationism was one means of 
waging war on urban society. After tracing Nye's career, 
Cole concludes that his failure was a logical outcome of ur­
banization—the emergence of a society based on commerce, 
industry, finance, and labor. Business initially attracted 
Nye's scorn, but as he became increasingly fearful of big 
government "he gradually began to move from liberalism to 
conservatism—without abandoning his isolationism."45 
The most recent student of isolationism, Manfred Jonas, 
in Isolationism in America (1966) doubts that he is dealing 
with a full-fledged political philosophy, but as an intellectual 
historian he takes the phenomenon very seriously because it 
was "the considered response to foreign and domestic devel­
opments of a large, responsible, and respectable segment of 
the American people." Isolationist thought had positive as 
well as negative attributes. It tied together unilateralism and 
avoidance of war. It was unified not by geography, politics, 
class structure, or ethnic allegiance, but by the notion of go­
ing it alone out of fear. Isolationism gained strength in the 
44. Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago, 1962), p. 
334. 
45. Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Rela­
tions (Minneapolis, 1962), pp. 4, 76. 
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thirties because of foreign troubles, the Great Depression, 
and revisionist history on the origins of World War I. The 
onset of the international crisis placed the isolationists in a 
dilemma. The nation could seek safety in strength or lead an 
anti-war movement. Unable to accept either alternative, the 
isolationists retreated into an impossible attempt to insulate 
the Republic from outside dangers. This strategy left ulti­
mate political decisions to outside forces; the drift of events 
undermined the isolationist appeal. Jonas summarizes the 
isolationist outlook beautifully: 
Reduced to its least common denominator, the isolationism 
of the Thirties consisted of belief in the amorality of inter­
national affairs and the impregnability of the Western Hemi­
sphere which, taken together, made American intervention 
in a foreign war both unavailing and unnecessary; of the idea 
that peace-loving nations such as the United States became 
involved in war largely through the machinations of selfish, 
greedy minorities; and of the conviction that, since all other 
countries were amoral, warlike, or vulnerable, it was essential 
for the United States to adhere to a policy of unilateralism 
in its foreign relations. Sustaining these attitudes in the face 
of world events that cast doubt on their validity was the 
dread of total war and its domestic consequences. 
As thus stated, isolationism is devoid of political, economic, 
or social content.48 
Perhaps the most notable tendency among the historians 
of the interwar years is their great preoccupation with pub­
lic opinion, attitudes, ideas, and domestic politics at home in 
their relations to foreign policy. Both power realism and eco­
nomic interpretation have attracted adherents, as have the 
insights of intellectual history. There is need for many more 
46. Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1966), pp. 273-74. 
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analyses of policy formation and execution, an emphasis that 
is now possible because extensive collections of government 
documents are becoming available. An early consensus on 
the history of the long armistice appears quite unlikely, but 
the contributions of the past decade have added greatly to 
historical understanding of the tragic years preceding World 
War II. 
VI 
The serious scholarship on foreign relations during World 
War II is limited, although there is an extraordinary collec­
tion of contemporary observation, journals, memoirs, and 
the like. The paucity of research reflects both the lack of of­
ficial sources and the great complexity of the subject. At this 
point in time, however, the establishment of historical per­
spective and the growing availability of information make 
the period particularly attractive. Most historians to date 
have focused upon the question of how did coalition diplo­
macy work itself out during the period of belligerency. And 
most have approached this general problem by studying vari­
ous more specific and often controversial policies and deci­
sions in order to permit a more detailed and objective syn­
thesis of the period. 
Only a few general interpretations of the war period have 
appeared, of which the leading example is Gaddis Smith's 
American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941­
1945 (1965). Abandoning the search for culpability so char­
acteristic of immediate postwar writings, Smith concentrates 
on a series of stereotypes to which President Roosevelt and 
his associates clung tenaciously. A lack of realism marred 
American statecraft during the war; "they [American states­
men] held too long to stereotypes about the United States 
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and other nations and acted too often on the basis of hopes 
and illusion rather than ascertainable fact." False analogies 
often substituted for actualities. Americans made unduly sim­
plistic assumptions about the motives of their enemies. Lead­
ers distrusted public willingness to shoulder responsibilities 
at war's end. They also overestimated the potential of the 
United Nations, thus neglecting to consider many difficult 
problems. "Reliance on these stereotypes simplified the task 
of wartime leadership . . . but added immeasurably to the 
tasks of . .  . [their] successors." *7 
The most prolific and influential scholar of the war years 
is Herbert Feis, formerly an official in the Department of 
State. He has written Churchill—Roosevelt—Stalin (1957), 
the most useful synthesis of the workings of the Grand Al­
liance. Considering fourteen stages in the evolution of the 
wartime coalition, Feis makes a balanced but definite de­
fense of Anglo-American diplomacy in relation to that of the 
Soviet Union. Circumstances rather than error forced many 
decisions criticized since, e.g., those made at Casablanca and 
Yalta. Political decisions were necessarily delayed until vic­
tory was in sight. Feis attributes postwar difficulties largely 
to the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union: 
Roosevelt and his colleagues were right; the nations needed 
moral law and freedom. Churchill was right; the nations 
needed magnanimity and balance of power. Stalin was sul­
lying a right; the Russian people were entitled to the fullest 
equality and protection against another assault upon them. 
But under Stalin they were trying not only to extend their 
boundaries and their control over neighboring states but also 
beginning to revert to their revolutionary effort throughout 
the world. Within the next few years this was to break the 
coalition and, along with the spread of nationalist passion 
47. Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 
1941-1945 (New York, 1965), pp. 178, 179. 
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in hitherto passive parts of the world, create the turbulence 
in which we are now living.48 
Anne Armstrong's Unconditional Surrender (1961) is a 
study of that decision. Roosevelt's support of the uncondi­
tional surrender principle "represented not only the Ameri­
can war aim in the Second World War but also a basic 
American attitude toward international politics, and toward 
war." Critics maintain that this demand prolonged the con­
flict, undermined anti-Nazi elements in Germany, and 
helped to create a power vacuum in central Europe. Defend­
ers hold that it was not only morally sound but also dictated 
by the reality of total war. Armstrong shows that German 
military success, fears of Russian defalcation, and ideologi­
cal commitment all influenced American policy. F.D.R. at­
tributed sole blame for the war to Germany and believed 
that German defeat would insure a just and lasting peace. 
Any alternative to unconditional surrender would have re­
quired "a more flexible and a more realistic attitude toward 
both Germany and Russia, a view of war as the instrument 
of policy rather than of policy as the handmaiden of strat­
egy." Generally within the realist school, the author does not 
suggest that F.D.R. could have acted much differently, but 
she questions unduly categorical and emotional decision-
making.49 
Stephen E. Ambrose has analyzed another prolific source 
of myths about World War II in Eisenhower and Berlin, 
1945 (1967). What circumstances led to the Russian occupa­
tion of Berlin? Ambrose interests himself in the relations be­
tween force and diplomacy, disposing of two specific myths 
—the idea that the United States could have avoided the 
48. Herbert Feis, Churchill—Roosevelt—Stalin: The War They Waged 
and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, N.J., 1957), p. 655. 
49. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casa­
blanca Policy upon World War II (New Brunswick, N.J., 1961), pp. ix, 261. 
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Berlin problem by occupying that city and the view that 
President Roosevelt ordered General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
to leave the place to the Russians. In any case the United 
States would have withdrawn its forces westward to the 
Elbe, established as the limit of the American advance. "The 
best hope of the world in 1945 was American-Russian co­
operation, and the achievement of this aim was worth almost 
any effort. I do not believe that hope was doomed from the 
start." Ambrose shows that the boundaries of the occupation 
zones derived from an effort to divide Germany equally 
among Russia, Britain, and the United States. The West 
never contemplated violating the agreements on the zones 
reached in late 1944. Eisenhower's aim was "quick defeat, 
his purpose to overrun Germany, his method exploitation 
under his best General [Omar Bradley]." Fully in agreement 
with Eisenhower's estimates, Ambrose not only doubts that 
the United States could have beaten the Russians to Berlin 
but points out that over 100,000 Russians were lost in the 
operation and that the United States received its zone of the 
conquered city according to the agreement.50 
Robert A. Divine has contributed a pioneering study 
called Second Chance (1967), about the "transformation of 
American attitudes toward international organization during 
the Second World War." Hoping to avoid a third world con­
flict, the United States looked to the Wilsonian past for an 
antidote to war. If Americans during World War II did not 
succeed in abolishing warfare, they did manage to repudiate 
the heritage of isolationism. Divine believes that the war­
time debate was over what new departure to take, rather 
than whether to chart a new course. Various individuals and 
groups tried to influence public attitudes—pressure groups, 
certain political leaders, and a number of publicists. Down­
50. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to 
Halt at the Elbe (New York, 1967), pp. 12, 41. 
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grading the roles of some men earlier deemed of prime im­
portance in the movement toward collective security, includ­
ing F.D.R. and Secretary of State Hull, the author gives 
considerable space to the activities of Republican Senator 
Joseph Ball of Minnesota, Wendell Willkie, Sumner Welles, 
and Clark Eichelberger of the League of Nations Associa­
tion. The work ends on an ironic note: "Throughout the war 
the American people had looked forward to the creation of 
an international organization as the dominant feature of the 
postwar world. Their vision of the future centered in the ful­
fillment of Wilson's dream. Suddenly they discovered that 
scientists working secretly in laboratories in Chicago, Oak 
Ridge, Hanford and Los Alamos were the real architects of 
the brave new world."51 
In recent years historians have reassessed the view that 
the wartime activities of the Soviet Union generated the 
Cold War. An example of this trend is Martin F. Herz's 
Beginnings of the Cold War (1966). After noting the strik­
ing difference between expectations at the time historical 
events take place and the outlook one later attributes to the 
time, Herz concentrates on the months between the Yalta 
and Potsdam conferences in 1945. The wrangle over Poland 
determined the future course of events—not the German 
question. Germany was partitioned because there was no 
other means of satisfying Russia's demand for capital goods 
for postwar reconstruction. "By the time of Potsdam (July 
1945), it was clear that the Western Powers could not accept 
the de facto Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe 
and that they had nothing to offer Russia to make it forego 
the establishment of such a sphere also in central Europe." 
Europe became divided on the basis of military power at the 
end of the war, "when the United States failed to throw into 
51. Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism 
in America during World War II (New York, 1967), pp. 4, 314. 
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the balance its economic power, which was later to play 
such an important role in the conduct of the Cold War."62 
If Herz the realist places great emphasis on a sin of omis­
sion, the American failure to engage in economic diplomacy, 
Gar Alperovitz concentrates on positive acts in his Atomic 
Diplomacy (1965). One of the few works on World War II 
to assume the primacy of domestic considerations in the 
making of foreign policy, the writer points an accusing fin­
ger at President Harry S. Truman, who repudiated F.D.R.'s 
policy of accommodation and "launched a powerful foreign 
policy initiative aimed at reducing or eliminating Soviet in­
fluence from Europe." Alperovitz's basic contention is that 
"the atomic bomb played a role in the formulation of policy, 
particularly in connection with Truman's only meeting with 
Stalin, the Potsdam Conference." The bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki because "a combat demonstration 
was needed to convince the Russians to accept the American 
plan for a stable peace." Recognizing that his argument de­
pends heavily on inference, the author finally concedes that 
"no final conclusion can be reached on this question," but he 
leaves little doubt as to his opinion. The Cold War was an 
American initiative based on the possession of a nuclear 
monopoly.63 
Clearly, this brief survey of recent scholarship in foreign 
relations during World War II suggests that many fruitful 
topics remain to be studied and that historians are far from 
a general agreement on the conduct and outcome of that 
conflict. Recent works on the "myths" of the period depart 
radically from the initial consensus. Power-realist analysis is 
increasingly questioned by historians who stress domestic 
52. Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War (Bloomington, Ind., 
1966), p. 188. 
53. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. The Use 
of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power 
(New York, 1965), pp. 13, 240, 241. 
 109 DAVID F. TRASK
influences on foreign policy and diplomacy. The study of 
World War II provides many opportunities for those inter­
ested in the relation between force and diplomacy. As World 
War II fades into the past, changing perspectives and new 
evidence should result in broad reinterpretation comparable 
to that which has reshaped the views of historians about 
World War I. 
VII 
The conventional disadvantages of contemporary history 
have inhibited study of events since World War II—lack of 
perspective and evidence. Nevertheless, some scholars have 
offered general syntheses, interpretations, and criticisms of 
American foreign relations since 1945. Most of them are his­
tories of the Cold War. In the earlier postwar years historians 
concentrated on Russo-American conflict. In later years they 
showed extensive interest in the rise of ex-colonial nations in 
the Third World. Historians have shown great ingenuity in 
analyzing recent events by utilizing advantages such as per­
sonal involvement, interviews, and contemporary reportage. 
Representatives of both power realism and economic inter­
pretation have discussed postwar developments, the former 
school dominating the field in earlier years but giving some 
place to dissenting views of late. Political scientists and even 
practicing diplomats have been frequent contributors to the 
historical debate. 
In 1962 Norman A. Graebner produced one of the first in­
terpretations of the United States in the Cold War, an intel­
ligent application of analytical principles advanced by 
George F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau. Noting the mod­
ern proclivity to turn diplomatic controversies into crusades 
for freedom, Graebner observes that "the tendency to pur­
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sue abstractions rather than concrete interests continued to 
dominate American diplomacy in the postwar era." Stressing 
"the absence of any clearly-defined body of objectives that 
had some relation to American capability or even genuine 
intention," he considers the outcome tragic. "This neglect of 
the fundamental obligation of government to maintain some 
relationship between ends and means in national action ac­
customed the American people to expect too much of foreign 
policy." The United States refused to recognize the obvious 
reality of enhanced Russian power in Europe after World 
War II. This fact was hard to accept; the satiate quality of 
American life suggested an identity between international 
stability and democratic ideals, a correlation not easily ac­
cepted elsewhere in the world. "Only when the United 
States recognized officially that past changes, whatever their 
magnitude, were not synonymous with Communist aggres­
sion would it discard its feeling of universal obligation, elimi­
nate the nagging character of its diplomacy, and cease to re­
spond to every episode as if it were ushering in the Day of 
Judgment." Extremely critical of American responses dur­
ing the period 1945-60, Graebner concludes with a general 
indictment: 
The nation, with its interests ill-defined in a general crusade 
for self-determination, entered a new period of drift after 
World War II not unlike that of the thirties. Thereafter 
through fifteen years of cold war experience American lead­
ership could not prepare the country either to accept the 
necessity of coexistence with those forces which challenged 
its principles or the price required for dismantling the world 
which it could not accept." 
This general outlook appears in another detailed history 
of American foreign policy since World War II written by 
John W. Spanier. Highly critical of the national distaste for 
54. Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Pol­
icy, 1945-1960 (New York, 1962), pp. 9-10, 107,132. 
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"power politics," which "hindered an adequate response to 
the ideological, social, and strategic challenges of our age," 
Spanier is convinced that "the American penchant for sepa­
rating war and peace into two mutually exclusive states of 
affairs and divorcing force from diplomacy hampered a un­
ion of power and policy." Another important weakness of 
the United States was its inability to understand "social 
politics"; "economic progress [in the Third World] must be 
attended by thorough transformation." Any alteration in the 
American approach to foreign policy required domestic 
change, because national attitudes were a "product both of 
our experience and our predominantly middle-class culture." 
Like Graebner, Spanier analyzes the American tendency to 
view "international politics in terms of abstract moral prin­
ciples instead of clashes of interest and power." In order to 
avoid future error, the United States must recognize, first, 
that power is not inherently evil and, second, that it must 
make a great contribution to the social revolutionary process 
in the Third World.55 
John Lukacs also adopts a realist approach in A History of 
the Cold War (1961), but he places his major emphasis on 
Europe. In his view the division of Germany rather than the 
atomic bomb or communism was the principal source of 
postwar instability. Impressed by the continuity of world 
politics since World War I, Lukacs insists that Europe re­
mains the center of world politics. His basic remedy for the 
Cold War is "a truly united and truly independent Europe." 
He is also much concerned with the moral dimension of the 
crisis, believing that religious insight by the western world 
might help to avoid future catastrophes. "Ultimately it is 
the quality of America's stewardship and of Russia's adapta­
tion of the Christian heritage that counts."56 
55. John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 2d. 
ed. (New York, 1965), pp. v, vi, 22. 
56. John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, paperback ed. (New York, 
1962), p. 337. The original hard-cover edition was published in 1961. 
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The most recent realist analysis, The Cold War as History 
(1967), is that of Louis J. Halle, formerly on the Policy 
Planning Staff of the State Department. Taking Thucydides 
as his model, he treats the Cold War as "a phenomenon not 
without precedent in the long history of international con­
flict; as a phenomenon that, typically, goes through a certain 
cycle with a beginning, a middle, and an end." Mindful of 
the "absolute predicament" in which we find ourselves, his 
attitude is one of sympathy for both protagonists in the 
tragic struggle. Russia was, at least superficially, the initial 
aggressor in the Cold War, but "the historical circumstances, 
themselves, had an ineluctable quality that left the Russians 
little choice but to move as they did. Moving as they did, 
they compelled the United States and its allies to move in 
response." The struggle was between opposing constellations 
of power, not between good and evil, a fourth episode in the 
modern history of the balance of power, a "contest in which 
one expanding power has threatened to make itself predomi­
nant, and in which other powers have banded together in a 
defensive coalition to frustrate it." The Cold War precipi­
tated the Asiatic involvements of the United States, but the 
opposed coalitions are now working toward an accommoda­
tion. Nuclear weaponry, paradoxically, had been a peace­
keeping factor because the bomb was too dangerous to per­
mit resolution of the conflict by force.57 
Although analyses such as those of Graebner, Spanier, 
Lukacs, and Halle have found broad acceptance, a revisionist 
trend has developed in very recent years. Those who ad­
vance alternative views often stress the influence of domes­
tic developments on foreign policy, particularly the pres­
sures of capitalism. They usually maintain that the United 
States was at least as responsible for the Cold War as the 
57.	 Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York, 1967), pp. xii, 
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Soviet Union. Denna Frank Fleming's two-volume study 
The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 (1961) was the 
first really influential contribution of this nature. Apocalyp­
tic in outlook, Fleming believes that the outcome of the Cold 
War "will determine whether our civilization is to disappear 
in the nuclear flames of a final war of annihilation or find 
essential unity in one family of organized nations." At the 
root of the conflict was America's refusal to accept the posi­
tion Russia had gained because of its contribution to the de­
feat of the Axis powers. President Roosevelt recognized the 
need for accommodation; President Truman reversed this 
course by opting for containment. Russia's response reflected 
a "dreadful fear of a fourth western attack, backed by the 
atomic bomb." Fleming ends with a chapter entitled "Why 
the West Lost the Cold War," in which he gives ten reasons 
for this outcome. The West refused to accept the conse­
quences of World War II. The West relied too heavily on 
nuclear weapons while discounting Soviet science. We 
wrongly equated Stalin with Hitler. We wrongly equated 
communism with fascism. We disregarded the possibility of 
evolution in the Communist world. We adopted negative 
rather than positive policies toward other peoples. We copied 
the worst aspects of our opponents' system. We over compen­
sated for our isolationist past. We failed to realize that cold 
wars cannot be won. The policy of containment helped to 
foster the power we wished to restrict.58 
Another revisionist, David Horowitz, argues in his The 
Free World Colossus (1965), that the United States con­
sciously heads a global antirevolutionary movement. His 
leading thesis is that the outcome of World War II gave the 
United States "a near monopoly on the strategic decisions 
which would affect the basic structure of international rela­
58. Denna Frank Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 
vols. (London, 1961), I, xi; II, 1045. 
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tions in the post-war world." As for Russia, its leaders, "what­
ever their long-range intentions, were bound by the same 
imbalance of power to make moves of primarily tactical sig­
nificance." Containment theory was a self-fulfilling proph­
ecy; it divided the world into the opposite camps it pre­
sumed at the outset. Horowitz makes lengthy analyses of 
crises in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Guatemala, Vietnam, South 
Korea, Lebanon, Laos, Cuba, and other places in an effort 
to show that the American motive was to preserve vested in­
terests and the position of private capital. Our Russian pol­
icy attempted to deny the Soviet Union the fruits of victory 
in Europe and to seek the downfall of the Soviet system. The 
work concludes with a stinging indictment: 
When America set out on her post-war path to contain 
revolution throughout the world, and threw her immense 
power and influence into the balance against the rising move­
ment for social justice among the poverty stricken two thirds 
of the world's population, the first victims of her deeds were 
the very ideals for a better world—liberty, equality, and 
self-determination—which she herself, in her infancy, had 
done so much to foster. 
Horowitz's general outlook is inescapable; internal forces 
shape foreign policy, and the antirevolutionary scheme is 
both reasoned and mature. The author, of course, is deeply 
opposed to this kind of foreign policy.59 
The most impressive analysis of Cold War history is 
Walter LaFeber's America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945­
1966 (1967). Assuming that internal developments influence 
foreign policy, LaFeber makes four basic generalizations 
about American policy since the 1890s: first, that economic 
forces were most influential among domestic pressures in­
59. David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American 
Foreign Policy in the Cold War (New York, 1965), pp. 19, 434. 
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fluencing international decisions; second, that American 
statesmen believed that restraints on the free flow of inter­
national trade had caused the crisis of the 1930s; third, that 
American leaders thought the United States could achieve 
its objectives by utilizing its economic, rather than its mili­
tary, power; and finally, that American decision-makers 
were willing to use American economic power to gain their 
ends. Russian leaders were equally determined to protect 
their international interests. "Within a year after Hitler's 
demise, America's open-world diplomacy crashed against 
Stalin's iron curtain." Stalin's policies reflected the devasta­
tion that Russia had experienced during World War II. The 
United States reacted to Russian intransigence with military 
initiatives first in Europe and then in Asia. Concerned "to 
point out where and why American foreign policy began to 
pivot away from Europe and to focus on the newly emerg­
ing areas," LaFeber shows how the Cold War mentality was 
transferred to relations with the Third World, a trend he de­
plores. The requirement of the future was to use American 
power not to counteract revolutions abroad but to build "an 
equitable society at home. It would be a Promethean—or 
Sisyphean—effort." Here is an imposing challenge to the 
conventional wisdom of the realist school, clearly expressive 
of the Williams approach.60 
Both realists and revisionists are intensely critical of 
American policy since World War II. Contemporary histo­
rians are a part of their times; the accounting of the recent 
past from Graebner to LaFeber reflects the commitment of 
the profession in the United States to peaceful and honora­
ble resolution of international conflict in the interests of peo­
ples everywhere. Historians have only begun to evaluate 
the Cold War. In all likelihood, the initial interpretations 
60. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 
(New York, 1967), pp. ix, 12, 259. 
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will not endure, but future reconstructions will rest securely 
on the distinguished labors of the first generation. It is also 
probable that the tendency to syncretize rather than to 
choose between the traditional Rankean and Marxian mod­
els, manifest in the work of scholars so different in outlook 
as Graebner and LaFeber, will gain strength during the 
coming years. 
This survey considers only a few representative studies of 
American foreign policy in this century appearing in the 
years 1957-67, but it reveals the variety as well as the vol­
ume of that scholarship. Once diplomatic history was de­
spised because of its undue preoccupation with chronicles 
based on official documents, but historians of American for­
eign relations now utilize multiple concepts and bodies of 
data that might yield fertile information and insight. Noth­
ing has been more notable than the exploration of domestic 
intellectual and emotional influences on decision-making; 
students of foreign policy and diplomacy must continue to 
appropriate the insights of ancillary disciplines if they are to 
remain abreast of colleagues in other branches of historical 
investigation. Historians of foreign relations have also under­
taken a truly extensive investigation of the critical relation­
ship between force and diplomacy, an unavoidable and es­
sential preoccupation. This concern must also sustain itself 
in the future. 
Some scholars have experimented with new perspectives 
on American foreign relations, in particular multinational or 
international approaches. Multiarchival studies utilizing 
many foreign languages are beginning to make their appear­
ance. This trend will continue; those who wish to enter this 
field must be willing to accept the burdens of travel and lan­
guage study. 
For a number of years historians of foreign relations have 
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devoted most of their energies to detailed monographic in­
vestigations. Some broad syntheses have appeared, but there 
is a growing need for over-all works that synthesize recent 
scholarship for the twentieth century as a whole and for ma­
jor subdivisions of the period. Fortunately, those who pre­
sented monographs did so with larger interpretations in 
mind, and they have already helped generate outlooks and 
perspectives that bid fair to inform more comprehensive 
studies. 
At times one detects undue revisionism in recent scholar­
ship. Of course, bold analysis is essential. The dead hand of 
the past must not preclude imagination, but in the end wise 
restraint is the mother of lasting scholarship. Revision for the 
sake of revision might produce brilliant short-run success, 
but it can also force its exponents to lifelong defense of use­
ful but overstated theses rather than to constructive prog­
ress toward fuller, more satisfactory views. New evidence, 
techniques, perspectives, and contexts naturally stimulate 
historical revision. Indeed, they must have this effect, but 
historians must always honor those sound canons of scholar­
ship that ultimately foster humane historical thought. 
No reader of the diplomatic history written in the recent 
past can fail to note its pervasive critique of the American 
past in world politics. Much that seemed entirely appropri­
ate and reasonable at the time now appears generally un­
sound. The pace of change in the modern world forces a 
great discontinuity in historical thought. All too many of the 
initiatives and policies of the past now seem impossible to 
justify either on expediential or moral grounds. The common 
tie that binds diplomatic historians of all persuasions is a 
vast rejection of the established American theory and prac­
tice of foreign policy. Some historians might question this 
preoccupation with the "whether" as well as the "what" and 
the "why" of the past, but historians do have social and po­
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litical as well as intellectual and academic responsibilities. 
We are American citizens as well as American scholars. His­
torians have a responsibility to help shape the future as well 
as to ransack the past. Those who have dedicated their pro­
fessional activity to the history of American foreign relations 
in the past decade have not failed to accept this responsibil­
ity, and there is every reason to believe that they will con­
tinue on the same lines in the future. 
Bureaucracy and Professionalism 
in the Development of 
American Career Diplomacy 
WALDO H. HEINRICHS, JR. 
Introduction 
THE PRINCIPAL THEME in the history of American ca­
reer diplomacy has been the triumph of careerism over 
amateurism. A number of accounts describe the succession 
of legislative and executive reforms that gradually estab­
lished a special civil service system for American representa­
tion abroad.1 What this study seeks to explain is why the sys­
tem assumed the particular form it did. That objective 
requires a special method of inquiry. 
Career diplomacy is a generic term embracing both dip­
lomatic and consular work, though strictly speaking, these 
were two distinct kinds of foreign service activity. Diplomats 
conducted the official relations of the United States with for­
1. William Bames and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the 
United States (Washington, 1961); Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional 
Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative His­
tory (Chicago, 1961); J. Rives Childs, American Foreign Service (New 
York, 1948); Tracy Hollingsworth Lay, The Foreign Service of the United 
States (New York, 1925); Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A 
History of Its Organization, Procedure and Personnel (New York, 1949). 
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eign nations. They resided in foreign capitals and dealt 
directly with central governments. Their principal duties 
were to represent the United States and its interests at the 
highest level, to negotiate treaties and agreements, and to 
report foreign developments of significance to their country. 
Each chief of a diplomatic mission—ambassador or minister 
—had the assistance of a staff, the size of which depended on 
the importance of the mission. Staff members shared the 
privileged status accorded by international practice to repre­
sentatives of sovereign states and assumed the international 
ranks of secretary of embassy or legation in various grades or 
counselor of embassy or legation.2 Consuls were also official 
agents but lacked the favored status of diplomats and dealt 
with local officials. They served in important foreign cities, 
especially seaports, looking after American shipping and 
Americans residing or traveling abroad and seeking out new 
markets for American goods. Generally their tasks were 
administrative, such as issuing visas and passports and certi­
fying invoices. They ranked as consuls general, consuls, and 
vice-consuls, depending on the size of the post and their 
position in it.3 
The history of American career diplomacy has been a 
story of progress. In the nineteenth century patronage ruled 
the separate diplomatic and consular services. The career 
movement began under the pressure of enlarging world 
interests at the end of the nineteenth century. Presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft installed the 
rudiments of merit systems in both services, and their succes­
sors gradually expanded them. In 1924 the Rogers Act com­
bined the diplomatic and consular services into a single 
career system, the Foreign Service. Subsequent acts of Con­
2. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (New York, 1939). 
3. Lay, Foreign Service, chap. 5; Childs, American Foreign Service, 
chap. 10. 
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gress and executive orders provide further benchmarks on 
the path of progress. Crises and backsliding were followed 
by reorganizations and new advances, and with each new 
advance the system became more elaborate, representative, 
adaptable, or efficient—in short, improved. 
We see one system as it evolved through time, yet it is not 
difficult to conceive of constructing a career service in a 
number of ways. It could be semiautonomous or simply an 
extension of the home department. It could assume responsi­
bility for all overseas activities or just traditional diplomatic 
functions. It could recruit at the bottom only or at all levels. 
The government might treat diplomacy as a single endeavor 
or as a host of separate skills. In preferment it might empha­
size intellect or personality, seniority or achievement. Actu­
ally all these sets of values and more have been subjects of 
deliberation and vigorous contention in the history of career 
diplomacy. To define precisely what shape the system took 
and why, we must search out the alternatives, preferences, 
and principles of selection. To find out why the shopper 
chose the black coat, it is necessary to ask why he chose it 
instead of the green one. We must think in greens as well as 
blacks. The idea of an ever-improving career system stretch­
ing back to the wilderness of amateurism leads to a preoccu­
pation with results as formally defined by law or executive 
order. It gives us blacks but not greens. 
We achieve a more satisfactory result if we think of organi­
zations and occupations instead of diplomats. In this light it 
is apparent that American career diplomacy had two pat­
terns of organization, a professional one and a bureaucratic 
one. The origins of the Foreign Service coincided with the 
arrival of the bureaucratic orientation in American society. 
This mode of organization provided the techniques and 
management procedures for securing continuity, flexibility, 
predictability, expertness, and efficiency in a complex and 
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fluid urban-industrial society. It provided these advantages 
also for the conduct of increasingly delicate and important 
foreign relations. In the same period the profession was gain­
ing in numbers and importance as a form of occupation. As 
W. J. Goode says, "An industrializing society is a profession­
alizing society." * Diplomats found the profession the most 
satisfactory form of occupational identification and gave the 
Foreign Service in significant measure the attributes of a 
profession, including a pattern of organization that differed 
in some respects from the bureaucratic pattern. 
American career diplomacy displays the distinctive char­
acteristics of bureaucratic organization as conceived by Max 
Weber.6 Administrators divided and subdivided tasks to 
achieve specialization and expertness. They factored diplo­
macy into political, economic, cultural, and other spheres, 
and compartmentalized work to the point where a political 
officer, for example, might watch over a single political party. 
Career diplomacy developed within a hierarchical authority 
structure, with each officer assigned a place in a pyramid ex­
tending up through the ambassador to the secretary of state 
and the president. Less pervasive was the characteristic of 
"a formally established system of rules and regulations [that] 
governs official decisions and actions." Classical diplomatic 
activities were not readily amenable to routine. However, 
the State Department regulated the form, timing, and scope 
of reporting, and international practice prescribed the man­
ner of representation and negotiation. Most consular work 
involved nothing but the application of laws and regulations 
4. Quoted in Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of the
Professions," Daedalus XCII (1963), 671. 
5. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. 
A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; ed. with Introduction by Talcott 
Parsons (New York, 1947), pp. 329-41. The following discussion is based
on the summary of Weber's distinctive characteristics of bureaucracy in Peter
M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Ap~ 
proach (San Francisco, 1962), pp. 32-33. 
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to specific cases. Career diplomacy functioned in a bureau­
cratic way as a system of offices and ranks, designed for 
impersonality and emotional detachment and hence ration­
ality and stability in foreign relations. It fully adopted 
protocol as a means of upholding an officer's quality as an 
official representative and inserted status distinctions to 
emphasize the difference between offices. Finally, the sys­
tem ultimately provided a full-fledged career with security of 
tenure, entrance by examination, promotion by merit, 
remuneration in the form of salary, and provision for retire­
ment. 
To describe the system as bureaucratic would be only 
partially correct; the bureaucratic mode had limitations, 
especially in the case of diplomacy. The fact that the bureau­
cratic day did not occur at the same time everywhere was 
one limitation. A telegram dispatched in office hours at 
Washington might require action at midnight abroad. A 
diplomat could not shed his official role at 5 P.M.; he was al­
ways serving in a representative capacity. Working in small 
groups of their own nationality in an alien environment, 
diplomats were thrown upon one another and upon diplo­
mats of other nations for companionship. Friendships and 
social groups arose that defied the hierarchical and status 
prescriptions of bureaucracy. The limitations went to the 
heart of the diplomatic function. The diplomat had to cross 
cultural frontiers and create his own universe outside bu­
reaucratic guidelines to carry out the tasks assigned him. 
Furthermore, diplomacy was somewhat unpredictable, irra­
tional, and inefficient. People and nations as corporate 
personalities acted from fear, pride, anger, and human liking, 
feelings that could not be pigeonholed in a bureaucratic pro­
file. Aspects of diplomacy always lay beyond the reach of the 
bureaucratic pattern of organization. 
Along the lines of Bernard Barber's useful definition, the 
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profession has four distinctive characteristics: a generalized 
and systematic field of knowledge; orientation to community 
service rather than self-interest; a system of rewards empha­
sizing prestige rather than monetary income; and self-
regulation of behavior. Professionalism is a matter of degree: 
the extent to which these attributes are present in an occupa­
tion defines its place on a scale of professionalism.6 
Diplomacy was relatively weak as a specialized field of 
knowledge. Diplomatic practice unlike law or medicine re­
quired no prolonged and sophisticated intellectual training. 
Nevertheless, the precisely appropriate method of communi­
cating the views of one's government required special knowl­
edge and remained a mystery to the layman. Though by no 
means exclusively an intellectual endeavor, diplomacy re­
quired constant acquisition of various kinds of knowledge 
even in highly sophisticated and specialized fields. American 
diplomats never agreed on a set of fields peculiar to diplo­
macy but took as their intellectual province the broad area 
of human behavior that pertained to international relations. 
The second attribute, public service, was always present 
among American diplomats, though in varying degree. Some 
early careerists were primarily interested in the social advan­
tages of diplomacy, but usually a career required consider­
able sacrifice and occasional hardship. As to the service they 
provided, American diplomats claimed a general responsi­
bility for accommodating differences between foreign gov­
ernments and their own and for protection and advancement 
of American interests. By having to understand, explain, and 
thereby in a sense represent foreign views to their own gov­
6. Barber, "Sociology of the Professions," pp. 672-73. See also: Everett 
C. Hughes "Professions," Daedalus XCII (1963), 655-68; Morris L. Cogan,
"The Problem of Defining a Profession," Ethical Standards and Professional 
Conduct, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
CCXCVII (1955), 105-11; Roy Lewis and Angus Maude, Professional 
People (London, 1952), chap. 4. 
WALDO H. HEINRICHS, JR. 125 
eminent, diplomats acquired an international character and 
even on occasion an additional role as international concilia­
tor. 
Income has never been one of the rewards of diplomacy. 
The high social prestige attached to diplomatic status was an 
attraction but not a mark of professional achievement, since 
all diplomats enjoyed it. The rewards lay in becoming am­
bassador or minister. The chief of mission had a particular 
aura as representative of the sovereign person or state. Gain­
ing a good share of the top posts for careerists was vitally 
important to professional development. 
Self-regulation was far more prevalent than appears on the 
surface. Corporate consciousness developed early in Ameri­
can career diplomacy and persisted through construction of 
the Foreign Service and its subsequent reorganization. Elites 
and leaders emerged to secure key administrative positions 
enabling them to guard against encroachment and resist mis­
guided reforms. They sought to win public support for pro­
fessional diplomacy and even managed to secure legislation 
recognizing the autonomy of the Foreign Service and pro­
viding for a measure of self-regulation. Diplomats took a 
hand in establishing personnel policies, passing on candi­
dates, and deciding promotions. They organized a nongov­
ernmental association that on occasion served as a means of 
defining and representing their organized professional inter­
ests. In their attitudes toward their work and toward the 
Foreign Service, diplomats displayed a high sense of indi­
vidual responsibility. To a significant extent they acted as a 
peer group. 
Over time, career diplomacy shifted from a low point on 
the scale of professionalism to the middle range. At the 
beginning professionalism was an idea, a name, and a status 
symbol. As the system became less socially exclusive, the 
status factor declined in importance and professional ideol­
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ogy and behavior emerged in sufficient strength to affect the 
administration of the service. In other words, career diplo­
macy evolved according to a professional as well as a bureau­
cratic pattern. 
This duality was not peculiar. The trend in business and 
government was for more professionals to work in bureau­
cratic settings. In government the two modes of organiza­
tion had a number of common assumptions: universalistic 
criteria of judgment, emotional detachment, specialization, 
preferment by achievement, and public service motivation.7 
In addition, diplomats depended on bureaucracy for a ca­
reer structure that provided them authority, position, and 
recognition. Occupying positions in an organizational hier­
archy, they were bureaucrats as well as professionals. 
At the same time there were grounds for incompatibility. 
The intellectual universe of the diplomat in the field and 
that of his superior in Washington were different, and the 
type of specialization deemed necessary was not always the 
same. The fact that the diplomat found all his professional 
associations within the Foreign Service and not partly else­
where, as would the lawyer working for government, made 
for greater professional solidarity and capacity to resist bu­
reaucracy. Above all, the authority structure of the two pat­
terns was different, the bureaucratic based on disciplined 
obedience to orders of a superior and the professional char­
acterized by implicit sanctions, individual responsibility, 
and peer group control.8 These differences made for conflict. 
Insofar as the bureaucratic and professional patterns were 
congruent, adaptation was easy; but when they conflicted, 
change was accompanied by tension and crisis. The result 
7. Blau and Scott, Formal Organizations, pp. 60-63. On the relation be­
tween bureaucratic and professional forms of organization, see also: Robert
C. Stone, "The Sociology of Bureaucracy and Professions," in Joseph S. 
Roucek, Readings in Contemporary American Sociology (Paterson, N.J., 
1961), 491-506; Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1964), chap. 8. 
8. Blau and Scott, Formal Organizations, pp. 62-63. 
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might be ascendancy of one pattern or the other, or a com­
promise of the two, or a standoff. Over time, the inherent 
advantages and limitations of both patterns righted any im­
balance. In other words, internal conflict might impede the 
functioning of the organization in the short run but assisted 
it in the long run. Thus the organization tended toward struc­
tural stability. This conceptual framework provides a more 
precise and comprehensive explanation of the development 
of American career diplomacy. 
The Beginnings of Careerism, 1893-1917 
The growing power of the United States at the end of the 
nineteenth century was not reflected in its representation 
abroad. As late as 1893, it had no ambassadors and fewer 
secretaries of legation than ministers. For consular work in 
important cities abroad the government employed full-time, 
salaried American officials, but in a larger number of small 
cities and ports it engaged Americans and foreign nationals 
on a part-time basis, permitting them to engage in outside 
business and compensating them with small salaries or the 
fees they collected in performing consular services. The top 
salary of a minister was $10,000, of a secretary $2,625, and 
of a consul $5,000, and the average was considerably less. 
The only allowance was five cents a mile for travel. Every 
appointment was to a particular post, and no appointment 
guaranteed tenure. The foreign services lacked permanency, 
adequate or uniform salary scales, provision for selection and 
promotion by merit, and retirement compensation—in short, 
any suggestion of a career system. It is true that many con­
suls and a few diplomats managed to retain their posts from 
one administration to the next or return to them when their 
party came back to power, but they were exceptions. Patron­
age was the rule. Every four years the shifting tides of 
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American politics deposited a new set of officials on foreign 
shores. Managing American foreign relations was a State 
Department of seventy-seven persons including messengers, 
with a budget of $131,500.9 
Beginning in 1893 when Congress authorized the appoint­
ment of the first ambassadors, these quaint arrangements 
gradually gave way to modern systems. During the following 
quarter-century, war, empire, and trade expansion increased 
the volume and complexity of American activity abroad and 
public awareness of its significance. The need for improve­
ment was widely acknowledged. Three principle themes are 
distinguishable in reform sentiment. Most widely held was 
the conviction that career services would protect and en­
large American markets abroad by attracting and retaining 
carefully selected and experienced officers. Second, civil 
service reformers contributed their support, viewing the 
foreign service as a desirable extension of the merit system. 
Finally, many argued that an improved foreign service es­
tablishment would enhance American dignity and prestige. 
Both the Diplomatic and Consular services felt the impact 
of these ideas. Reorganization proceeded steadily until by 
1917 each had a distinct career system. However, reform 
sentiment played on the two services with varying emphasis, 
and each responded according to its character and mission. 
The Consular Service was the more in demand and reformed 
itself more quickly and thoroughly. It became the model 
foreign affairs system to which the sister service was ex­
pected to conform, and the pattern it set was thoroughly 
bureaucratic. 
Consular work lent itself to bureaucratic solutions. Consuls 
moved in a world of specifics, issuing and certifying docu­
ments, assisting Americans in distress, or investigating poten­
9. {Catherine Crane, Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven years in the Depart­
ment of State (New York, I960), p. 21; Department of State, Register of 
the Department of State, 1898 (Washington, 1898). 
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tial markets. Mostly they applied laws and regulations to 
particular cases. With such concrete, routine, and yet var­
iegated functions, the more an officer specialized in one or 
several duties the more knowledgeable and proficient he and 
his clerks became, with resulting improvement in the quan­
tity and quality of work. The larger offices could more 
effectively accomplish their business by subdividing into 
sections for commerce, visas, shipping, citizenship, and so 
forth, and the sections by subdividing to the point where a 
particular desk assumed a single function. Distinctions of 
rank between consul general, consul, and vice-consul facili­
tated a bureaucratic distribution of responsibility. The hier­
archy of offices, from consulate general to consular agency, 
also provided a means of subdividing consular work in the 
host country into easily coordinated and supervised districts. 
With offices scattered all over the world, including colonial 
areas, consuls had little opportunity for familiarity with each 
other and relationships tended to be formal.10 
The needs of the Consular Service coincided with the main 
currents of reform sentiment. Shabby consulates and in­
stances of corrupt, dissolute, and uncouth consuls offended 
the progressive's sense of civic virtue and national pride.11 
But the most powerful impetus for reform was business con­
10. G. Rowland Shaw, "The American Foreign Service," Foreign Affairs 
XIV (1936), 327. 
11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report of the Honorable 
Herbert H. D. Peirce on Inspection of United States Consulates in the Orient, 
H. Doc. No. 665, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1906); Editorial, In­
dependent LII (1900), 561; E. L. Godkin, "Consular Reform," Nation LXI 
(1895), 218; Editorial, ibid., LXXXI (1905), 67; "Our Consular Disgrace," 
ibid., LXXXII (1906), 274; "Good Work for 'Good Americans,'" ibid. 
LVIII (1894), 247-48; William F. Wharton, "Reform in the Consular Serv­
ice," North American Review CLVIII (1894), 412-22; Francis B. Loomis, 
"The Foreign Service^ of the United States," ibid. CLXIX (1899), 350-51; 
Francis B. Loomis, "Proposed Reorganization of the American Consular 
Service," ibid. CLXXXII (1906), 361; Julian Ralph, "A Monopoly to Our 
Rescue," Harper's Weekly XLIII (1899), 472; Editorial, ibid. XLIX (1905), 
1922; "Consular Reform," Outlook LXV (1900), 203; "Consular Reform," 
ibid. LXX (1902), 167-68; "The Consular Service and the Spoils System," 
Century XLVIII (1896), 306-11. 
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cern for trade expansion. The consul as drummer for Ameri­
can trade was a persistent theme of reform literature. The 
constant turnover of political appointees, it was argued, and 
their general incompetence deprived business of accurate, 
up-to-date information about trade opportunities at a time 
when expanding foreign markets were crucial for prosperity 
and competition was keen. The United States required a 
permanent corps of specialists familiar with foreign condi­
tions and practices.12 Business became not only a client but a 
model. Patronage was wasteful. A merit system with careful 
selection, training, and supervision of recruits—in short, 
"businesslike" management—would ensure greater "effi­
ciency." 13 In a broad sense, consular reform was one aspect 
of the fundamental restructuring of American society along 
bureaucratic lines. Especially in the Consular Service, be­
cause of the tangible services it rendered, expertness, con­
tinuity, and regularity would maximize return on invest­
ment.14 
12. Gaillard Hunt, "To Reorganize the Foreign Service," World's Work 
III (1902), 1606-13; Louis E. Van Norman "The Consular Service of the 
United States," Chautauquan XXXV (1902), 224-29; John Ball Osborne,
"The American Consul and American Trade," Atlantic XCIX (1907), 161; 
J. Sloan Fassett, "Congress and the Consular Service," American Review 
of Reviews XXXIII (1906), 555-60; Harry A. Garfield, "The Business Man
and the Consular Service," Century LX (1900), 268-71; Robert Adams, Jr., 
"Faults in Our Consular Service, North American Review CLVI (1893), 
461-66; Henry White, "Consular Reforms," ibid. CLIX (1894) 711-21; 
Thomas R. Jernigan, "A Hindrance to Our Foreign Trade," ibid. CLXIII 
(1896), 443. 
13. "Chance vs. Training in Appointments," Editorial, Independent LII 
(1900), 561-62; Harry A. Garfield, "The Remodeling of the Consular Serv­
ice," ibid., 658; E. L. Godkin, "The Tariff and the Consuls," Nation LVII 
(1893), 340; Edward J. Brundage, "Shall the Government Educate Its Com­
mercial Agents?", World Today XVI (1909), 321-23; A. L. Bishop, "The
Recent Reforms in the Consular Service of the United States," Yale Review 
XVI (1907), 41^43; Charles Dudley Warner, "Our Foreign Trade and Our
Consular Service," North American Review CLXII (1896), 275-76; "Con­
sular Reform," Outlook LXIV (1900), 247; "A More Businesslike Consular 
Service," ibid. CIX (1915), 250-51. 
14. On the "efficiency craze" see Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: 
Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago, 1964), 
pp. ix-xii, 99-116. Also Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 
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The State Department, which rarely finds a constituency 
of its own, responded eagerly to business interest in reform. 
The Department and its public looked at the problem some­
what differently, to be sure. Where businessmen would give 
the consul more work to do, administrative officers worried 
about his present burdens. From 1898 to 1913 foreign trade 
almost doubled and outgoing passengers more than quad­
rupled, burdening consuls with attendant invoices, registra­
tions, protection cases, and other services.15 As an index of 
the increasing volume of consular work, consular fees in­
creased from $532,990 in 1898 to $1,613,835 in 1908.16 But 
bureaucracy thrives on mission, as Willard Straight, fresh 
from service as consul general at Mukden, noted in a letter to 
the director of the Consular Service, Wilbur J. Carr. A more 
active role for the United States in China and South America, 
he wrote, should result in "considerable appropriations for, 
and added sympathy with, the creation of a sufficient and 
well organized foreign service." " Carr was well aware of the 
connection. He noted that consular Advance Sheets, daily 
trade bulletins that began appearing in 1898, created a 
favorable impression of what consuls could do and thereby 
"afforded a practical basis on which to demand a reorganiza­
tion of the service."18 Consequently, State Department offi­
cials actively encouraged business support and directed it 
into appropriate legislative channels. In articles, speeches, 
(New York, 1967), chap. 6; Barry Dean Karl, Executive Reorganization
and Reform in the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management,
1900-1939 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 15-22; Frank Mann Stewart, The 
National Civil Service Reform League: History, Activities, Problems (Austin, 
1929), pp. 84-90. 
15. Table XVII, National Civil Service Reform League, Report on the 
Foreign Service (New York, 1919), p. 194. 
16. Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, p. 155. 
17. Willard Straight to Wilbur J. Carr, August 6, 1909, Can Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
18. Wilbur J. Carr, "The American Consular Service," American Journal 
of International Law I (1907), Part 2, 907-8. 
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and letters they stressed the need, as Carr put it, for "the 
development of this Governmental machinery to its highest 
state of efficiency in the battle for our proportionate share of 
the trade of the world."19 In 1912 Assistant Secretary of 
State F. M. Huntington Wilson wrote over one thousand 
business organizations and another thousand newspapers 
soliciting support for a reform bill as a "matter of the greatest 
importance to our commerce and to the protection of the 
interests of our people abroad." 20 
No individual contributed more to the bureaucratic 
development of the foreign service than Wilbur J. Carr, in 
many ways the epitome of the bureaucrat. His career was a 
tribute to the merit system. An Ohio farm boy, he ventured 
forth to a commercial college to learn bookkeeping and 
shorthand and then after passing civil service exams entered 
the State Department as a clerk in 1892. By diligence and 
proficiency he rose through the hierarchy of clerks to become 
director of the Consular Service in 1909. Later he would be 
assistant secretary of state and finally minister to Czechoslo­
vakia.21 He worked in the same office of the old State Depart­
ment building for thirty-four years.22 Punctual, methodical, 
prudent, and disciplined, he was the typical bureaucrat. 
Consular work suited his mind well: it was "fascinating" to 
"take a collection of facts and apply to them principles of 
law."23 He strove to introduce order and routine to the di­
verse and miscellaneous tasks of the Consular Service, start­
ing a precedent file, writing an annotation of shipping acts, 
and revising the Consular Regulations. His was a world of 
19. Draft of speech by Carr, n.d. [about 1910], Carr Papers. 
20. File 120.1/21c, State Department Archives, National Archives. See
also File 120.1/17,30, State Department Archives.
21. Crane, Carr; "The Little Father of the Consuls," Saturday Evening 
Post CXCV (January 27, 1923), 26. 
22. "Interview with Herbert Hengstler in Commemoration of Wilbur J.
Carr's Fortieth Year in the Department of State," American Foreign Service 
Journal IX (1932), 212. 
23. Crane, Carr, p. 9. 
 133 WALDO H. HEINRICHS, JR.
figures, facts, cases. On one occasion, when serving on an 
oral examination board and noticing the candidate's jugular 
vein thumping under the tension, he took out his watch to 
count her pulse (120) .2" His own life was a search for maxi­
mum efficiency. He almost never lost his temper, but on one 
rare occasion when he did, he attributed it to the press of 
business, which 
caused my overstrained nerves of the brain to lose their 
power to coordinate, and created a condition quickly degen­
erating into passion. . . . This experience convinced me of 
two things. The loss occasioned by overstrain is most expen­
sive and is economic waste.25 
Carr was an exponent of scientific management. Government 
was a machine, and it was his function to make it run 
smoothly. His special responsibility was the Consular Serv­
ice, and that organization, he would be proud to say in 
1924, was "as near perfection as possible."26 
To characterize Carr simply as a bureaucrat would be 
wrong. No faceless functionary could have transformed the 
foreign service as he did. A deeper understanding begins 
with the fact that he was an intensely ambitious person, 
eager for prominence in the political and diplomatic worlds 
of Washington. Ultimately his "great adventure," as he called 
it, might culminate in a significant policy-making role or an 
embassy. Yet at the same time he was acutely sensitive to the 
limitations of his little red schoolhouse background. He con­
fided to his diary that he was "conscious always of an in­
feriority of preparation and of mind, lacking in information 
but by determination and endless hours of labor doing what 
better educated and more highly placed men had failed to 
24. Carr Diary, January 20, 1925, Carr Papers. 
25. Ibid., October 19, 1919. 
26. Joseph C. Grew to Hugh Gibson, June 5, 1924, Grew Papers, Hough­
ton Library, Harvard University. 
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do." He took evening courses to secure a law degree and 
admission to the bar. Frequently he returned to the depart­
ment at midnight to work several hours more. Exercises in 
self-improvement included Pliny, Aristophanes, Thucydides, 
Dante's Inferno, violin lessons, and the mandolin, altogether 
a Chautauquan conception of upper-class cultural attain­
ments. However "comfortable" his clerkly niche seemed at 
times, Carr wanted something "greater." "Mere consular 
work" was dwarfing to the mind, he wrote in 1901. The pur­
suit of high office meant abandoning civil service security 
and exposing himself to political dismissal, however, and 
Carr was not prone to taking risks: "If only I did not have 
this curse of timidity . . . which apparently I have culti­
vated as a virtue until now it has come to deprive me of so 
much that I should give a great deal to have." " His problem 
was how to attain the high standing he cherished without 
risking the gains he had so painstakingly secured. 
Carr's answer to his dilemma was to make himself indis­
pensable. As chief of the Consular Bureau and director of the 
Consular Service, he secured absolute control over his 
specialty. All outgoing correspondence originated with him 
or passed across his desk. He retained final authority over 
promotions, transfers, and retirements. Needs and problems 
of consuls received his close and sympathetic attention.28 He 
came to be a kind of father to the consular brood. One consul 
wrote him: "All of us have at times regarded you instead of 
the service as our employer." It was not a question of Carr's 
connection with the Consular Service, another consul re­
called; he was the consular service.29 At the same time Carr 
27. Crane, Carr, pp. 6-7, 28, 146; Carr Diary, November 7, 1900, April 
26, 1901, June 22, 1927, Carr Papers. 
28. Crane, Carr, p. 131. On Carr's direction of the Consular Service and 
widening role in the department: ibid., chaps. 7-17. 
29. Stewart McMillan to Carr, August 21, 1924, Carr Papers; Crane, 
Carr, p. 122. 
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extended his influence laterally in the department by accept­
ing fiscal and budgetary responsibilities. With grasp of the 
department's financial threads went knowledge of all its 
workings and assignment to appear before congressional ap­
propriations committees. Patient, helpful, expert, economy-
minded, he made an excellent impression on the Hill. With 
this strategic position inside the State Department and his 
relations with the business community on reform and with 
Congress on reform, appropriations, and constituents' prob­
lems of trade and travel, Carr amassed extraordinary power. 
In 1920 he was described to the new secretary of state, 
Bainbridge Colby, as the "backbone" of the department.30 
Secretaries of state could scarcely afford to carry on without 
him. 
Carr's fiefdom in the department had an archaic personal 
quality about it, yet his role had great significance for bu­
reaucratic development. He had to systematize the Consular 
Service to free himself from what he called "desk slavery."31 
As chief of the Consular Bureau, he trained an assistant to 
take over routine functions so he could concentrate on con­
trol and change. Bureaucratic solutions not only opened the 
way for him to broaden the scope of his responsibilities but 
also enabled him to mould the Consular Service to his image. 
Given a free hand by Secretaries Elihu Root and Philander 
C. Knox, he was in a position to effect radical change in 
procedure and organization. Furthermore, his position 
opened a new management echelon between the clerks, who 
would never escape their narrow spheres, and the assistant 
secretaries, who seldom remained long enough to under­
stand, let alone change, the system. Thus Carr was a key 
figure in the transition to modern bureaucratic organization. 
30. Carr Diary, March 23, 1920, Carr Papers. 
31. Ibid., January 31, 1925. 
136 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Acts of 1906 and 1915, an Executive Order of 1906, and 
Carr's innovations radically reorganized the Consular Serv­
ice. Classification of consulates according to importance, 
assignment of specific territory to each, and increase in the 
numbers and supervisory functions of consulates general 
brought about a more rational division of labor and tighter 
control. Reduction in the number of hybrid offices, consular 
agencies and the like, more appropriate location of offices, 
provision of standard equipment and furniture, assignment 
of American clerks, replacement of fee compensation by 
salaries, and prohibition of outside business activity en­
hanced the official and American character of consulates. 
Introduction of the fee stamp system ensured honest ac­
counting of funds. Most important in standardizing the 
service and raising its quality was the establishment of an 
inspection corps. Inspectors set forth on biennial rounds with 
thirty-page schedules devised by Carr that inquired ex­
haustively into the management and expenditures of offices. 
They rated officers on a scale of 100 for honesty, morality, 
sobriety, standing, force, and loyalty, as well as more tan­
gible qualities. Appointment to class rather than post and 
provision for service in Washington allowed greater flexibil­
ity in assignment and broader experience. Entrance by 
written and oral examination at the two lowest grades and 
promotion on the basis of experience and efficiency records 
all but eliminated political jobbery. New officers received a 
month of orientation before going overseas. Tenure, the 
merit system, transportation allowances, and higher salaries 
offered young men substantial inducements to make a ca­
reer.32
 All in all, the Consular Service developed according 
to a classical bureaucratic pattern. 
32. Department of State, Register, 1898, Register of the Department of 
State, 1915 (Washington, 1915); Lay, Foreign Service, pp. 287-88; Bames 
and Morgan, Foreign Service, pp. 162-77; Crane, Carr, pp. 82-112, 121-26. 
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To a degree the Diplomatic Service grew according to the 
same pattern. Diplomatic secretaries tripled in number be­
tween 1898 and 1918, from thirty-one to ninety-seven; every 
mission received at least one and the larger embassies from 
three to seven.33 As numbers increased, the pyramid of offices 
enlarged with the addition of counselors of embassy and 
second and third secretaries. During World War I busy 
embassies subdivided into sections, and senior secretaries 
emerged as administrative officers.34 Like consuls, diplomats 
gained transportation and post allowances, a merit system of 
admission and promotion, and appointment to classes instead 
of posts. Congress permitted modest attempts to secure 
government-owned embassies and legations and, under 
Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, approved a significant num­
ber of promotions of secretaries to ministerships and even 
ambassadorships. No less than eighteen of Taft's chiefs of 
mission came from the lower service. The creation of geo­
graphical divisions in the State Department (the first being 
the Far Eastern Division in 1908), the introduction of a new 
filing system, instructions for more comprehensive reporting, 
the establishment of a student interpreter corps for Japan 
and China, and the beginnings of a training period for new 
officers suggest the systematization and specialization char­
acteristic of bureaucratic development.35 
There similarities end. The organization of American di­
33. Department of State, Register, 1898, and 1915. 
34. Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and
the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, 1966), 
pp. 22—23. For a description of the division of labor in a typical embassy
see the testimony of J. Butler Wright, U.S. Congress, House of Representa­
tives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service of the United States, 
Hearings on H.R. 17 and 6357, 68th Cong., 1st Sess (Washington, 1924), 
p. 71. 
35.. Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, pp. 142-47, 155-57, 165-86, 
195; "The Far Eastern Division," American Foreign Service Journal IX 
(1932), 385-90; Consul General James B. Stewart, "Foreign Service Officer
Training School," ibid. X (1933), 224-27. 
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plomacy, such as it was, posed obstacles to bureaucratic 
change. The principle of appointing only career officers as 
heads of mission has never been accepted, and progress in 
that direction was wiped out by President Wilson's dismissal 
of nearly all of Taft's veterans.36 The result was that career 
diplomats had no assurance that merit and experience would 
open a path out of the secretarial world. And a humble world 
it was. The highest diplomatic officer in the London embassy 
next to the ambassador received one-fourth the salary of the 
consul general.37 Whereas in the Consular Service the differ­
ential between ranks was roughly the same, the gap in status 
and power between counselor or first secretary and ambas­
sador or minister was enormous. Furthermore, since the head 
of mission was a creature of the president, not the secretary 
of state, he enjoyed considerable autonomy, making it diffi­
cult to manipulate offices and officers from Washington. 
Finally, no diplomatic figure emerged in the department 
with the power and permanence of Carr. A. A. Adee was a 
quaint reminder of the old days, more concerned with form 
than with system.38 Huntington Wilson was an innovator 
comparable to Carr, but he was dismissed in the Democratic 
clean sweep of 1913, which Carr survived. William Phillips 
took an interest in diplomatic reform, but he was young and 
lacked forcefulness. As a result, the central control, inspec­
tion system, standardization of work, and rationalization of 
offices of the Consular Service did not carry over to the 
Diplomatic Service. 
Diplomatic reform had to overcome deeply entrenched 
popular notions about diplomacy and diplomats that consu­
lar reform was largely spared. The America that was passing 
away clung to republican simplicity and was indifferent to, 
36. Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, p. 184. 
37. Department of State, Register, 1915. 
38. Crane, Carr, chap. 5. 
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or unaware of, what happened abroad, if not profoundly 
suspicious of entanglement with Europe. The village mental­
ity associated diplomacy with monarchy, aristocracy, in­
trigue, duplicity, and war. From this point of view those 
served best who served least, and political appointees by 
their very impermanence made the safest envoys. How much 
of this old view remained is difficult to determine, but re­
formers seemed painfully aware of it.39 A modern version ap­
peared in the notion that the advent of the cable made diplo­
macy obsolete. As Mr. Dooley said, "If me frind Prisident 
Tiddy wants to know what's goin' on annywhere, all he has 
to do is subscribe to the pa-apers."40 The reverse argument 
could be used against change as well. According to Edwin A. 
Grosvenor, the very importance of diplomacy made it nec­
essary for the president to appoint men of his own mind, 
and no better preparation existed than "the practical school 
of American politics." In engaging foreign nations, "the 
American stroke is the stroke for us."41 Out of their own 
limited view of American political interests abroad or per­
haps in recognition of the strength of old prejudices, reform­
39. Perrin Galpin, ed.,^Hugh^ Gibson, 1883-1954 (Newjork 1956), 
p. 27; Edward G. Lowry, "Bryan's Diplomatic Appointments," Colliers LII 
(February 7, 1914), 9; An Anglo-American, 'American Ambassadors 
Abroad," North American Review CXCVIII (1913), 310; An American 
Diplomat, "The Diplomatic Service: Its Organization and Demoralization," 
Outlook CVI (1914), 533; David Jayne Hill, "Why Do We Have a Dip­
lomatic Service," Harpers CXXVIII (1914), 191; Hill, "Shall We Standard­
ize Our Diplomatic Service?", ibid., 690-98; Hill, "Can Our Diplomatic 
Service Be Made More Efficient?", ibid. CXXX (1915), 190-98; "Plush 
Pants," Harper's Weekly LIII (June 26, 1909), 6; "Our Legations Abroad," 
Independent LXIV (1908), 763; "Our Need For a Permanent Diplomatic 
Service," Forum XXV (1898), 702-11. 
40. "A More Self-Respecting Diplomatic Service," Outlook XCVII 
(1911), 379; Henry Loomis Nelson, "The Need of Trained Diplomats and 
Consuls," Harper's Weekly XLV (1901), 599; "Literature and Diplomacy," 
Nation LXX (1900), 394; E. L. Godkin, "Ambassadors," ibid. LVI (1893), 
247; Finley Peter Dunne, "Our Representatives Abroad," Dissertations by
Mr. Dooley (New York, 1906), pp. 92-93. 
41. Edwin A. Grosvenor, "American Diplomacy," American Historical 
Association Annual Report (New York, 1898), pp. 294, 299. 
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ers seldom alluded to the argument that expert representa­
tion abroad was more likely to preserve peace and protect 
national security in a dangerous world.42 
The same reform impulses that provided a favorable en­
vironment for change in the Consular Service helped over­
come these prejudices and facilitate reform in the Diplomatic 
Service as well. Both services received examination systems 
simultaneously in 1905, and both gained a system of appoint­
ments to grades rather than to particular posts by the Stone-
Flood Act of 1915. Reformers emphasized the need in di­
plomacy no less than in consular work for expertness and 
efficiency, acquired by training, specialization, and perma­
nence. They stressed that diplomats no less than consuls 
assisted in trade expansion.43 
Pressure for reform of the Diplomatic Service, however, 
was weaker. The merit system for diplomatic secretaries 
lagged three years behind that for consuls, and it was only 
at the insistence of the administration that the Diplomatic 
Service was included in the reforms achieved in 1915.44 Busi­
ness remained primarily concerned with consular reform, 
from which it expected more immediate and tangible re­
42. Those who did present this argument: Nelson, "The Need of Trained
Diplomats and Consuls," p. 599; An American Diplomat, "The Diplomatic
Service," p. 534; "Merit and Diplomacy," Outlook LXXXV (1907), 212;
Perry Belmont, "The First Line of National Defense," North American Re­
view CCI (1915), 886; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 52-53. 
43. "Chance vs. Training in Appointments," Independent LII (1900), 
561-62; "Our Diplomatic Service," ibid. LXXXI (1915), 446; Godkin, 
"Ambassadors," 246—47; "Our Diplomatic Service," Forum LVI (1916), 
611-18; Hill, "Can Our Diplomatic Service Be Made More Efficient?", 
196-97; John Barrett, "An American School of Diplomacy," Harper's Weekly
XLIV (March 3, 1900), 193-94; "The First Year of the Wilson Administra­
tion," Outlook CVI (1914), 523-25; "For Efficiency, Not Wealth, in the 
Diplomatic Service," American Review of Reviews XLVII (1913), 750-51; 
James D. Whelpley, "Our Disorganized Diplomatic Service," Century
LXXXVII (1913), 123-27; "The Diplomatic Service," Nation LXXXIX 
(1909), 398; An American Diplomat, "The Diplomatic Service," pp. 533-58;
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 55. 
44. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 106-7. 
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suits.45 The National Civil Service Reform League also 
worried less about diplomatic than consular reform, and in 
1913 limited itself to recommending establishment of a 
"merit tradition" in the appointment of envoys, while insist­
ing on elimination of the spoils system elsewhere in the 
services.46 In effect, the Diplomatic Service hitchhiked on the 
consular reform movement. It achieved its career system, 
yet remained somewhat shaded from the public values that 
encouraged bureaucratic solutions on the consular side. 
The Diplomatic Service did not lack a distinctive reform 
theme. Again and again, the pages of magazines such as the 
Nation, Independent, Outlook, Harper's, and North Ameri­
can Review reflected concern over the impression made on 
foreigners by American envoys and their quarters. Writers 
warned that European governments viewed the ambassador 
as the "incarnation of national sovereignty" and laid much 
stress on outward appearances of rank and power. In this 
light the American representative cut a sorry figure. He lived 
in "conspicuous shabbiness" on a salary reflecting his govern­
ment's "ostentatious parsimony." Often incompetent, igno­
rant of foreign ways and languages, even of "the ordinary 
usages of polite society," he became the laughing stock of 
the community. It was a "humiliating," "mortifying" condi­
tion. Ostentatious wealth seemed equally out of keeping with 
the character of the nation. The appointment of "dollar 
diplomats" smacked of plutocracy. America required salaries, 
allowances, residences, and offices adequate to maintain the 
dignity and self-respect of a great nation and allow its ablest 
citizens to serve. James Monroe was quoted in the Arena as 
advising: 
45. Nelson, "The Need of Trained Diplomats and Consuls," p. 599; 
William Phillips, "Cleaning Our Diplomatic House," Forum LXIII (1920), 
167; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 70. 
46. National Civil Service Reform League, Report, pp. 148-50. 
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A minister can be useful only byfilling his place with credit 
in the diplomatic corps, and in the corresponding circle of 
society in the country where he resides, which is the best in 
every country. By taking the proper ground, if he possesses 
the proper qualifications, and is furnished with adequate 
means, he will become acquainted with all that passes. . . . 
Deprive him of the necessary means to sustain the ground, 
separate him from the circle to which he belongs, and he is 
reduced to a cypher.47 
The period from 1893 to 1917 was the heyday of what 
might be called prestige diplomacy. In 1905 John Bassett 
Moore noted "a visible tendency toward conformity to cus­
toms elsewhere established . . . accelerated by the natural 
drift of a great and self-conscious people toward participa­
tion in world affairs."48 Mark Twain reflected this new self-
consciousness when he wrote from Vienna in 1899 that the 
idea of an ill-paid American ambassador was ludicrous, "a 
billionaire in a paper collar, a king in a breech clout, an 
archangel in a tin halo." America had come of age, he said, 
like a young girl reaching eighteen, who "adds six inches to 
her skirt . . . has a room to herself, and becomes in many 
47. "Permanent Housing for Diplomats," American Review of Reviews 
XLIII (1911), 693; "Rich and Poor Ambassadors," Literary Digest XLVI 
(1913) 760; "American Diplomacy," Nation LVI (1893), 251; H. C. 
Chatfield-Taylor, "American Diplomats in Europe," North American Review 
CLXIII (1896), 125-28; Captain F. M. Barber, "The Government Owner­
ship of Diplomatic and Consular Buildings," ibid. CXC (1909), 359; "Our 
Diplomatic Service," Outlook LXXXIII (1906), 309; "American Representa­
tives Abroad," ibid. LXXXVIII (1908), 844-45; "The Kaiser, the Towers, 
and Mr. Hill," ibid. 806-7; Elizabeth Ballister Bates, "The Etiquette of 
American Diplomats," Independent LIV (1902), 2650; Editorial, "The 
Salaries of Our Diplomats," ibid. LXIII (1907), 580-82; Nicholas Long-
worth, "Bettering Our Diplomatic Service," ibid. LXI (1906), 19-23; "Our 
Ambassadors Abroad: The Embassy in France," Harper's Weekly XLIV 
(1900), 506; "Our Ambassadors Abroad: The Embassy at Rome," ibid. 
754-55; Frances Benjamin Johnston, "The Eagle's Perch Abroad," ibid. LI 
(1907), 726-30; Sydney Brooks, "Our Embassy in London," ibid. LVII 
(1913), 11, and "Two Embassies," ibid. LVIII (1913), 7-8; Herbert H. D. 
Peirce, "Our Diplomatic and Consular Services," Arena XVII (1897), 916. 
48. John Bassett Moore, "American Diplomacy: Its Influence and Tend­
encies,''Harper's CXI (1905), 695. 
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ways a thundering expense. But she is in society now and 
papa has to stand it; there is no avoiding it." The Nation 
agreed: "If we are going into the game we must play it ac­
cording to the rules."49 
This concern for a proper American diplomatic establish­
ment manifested itself most strongly in genteel magazines 
read by families of the old upper and upper middle classes. 
Harper's Weekly was only describing its readers when it said 
that the demand for diplomatic reform originated in the 
"politer" East. Similarly, Outlook found the origins among 
"more educated, and therefore more thoughtful people."50 
The readers were well-to-do, old-stock, Anglo-Saxon Ameri­
cans in established businesses and professions, who regarded 
themselves as guardians of American traditions of public life. 
Among them were urban elites with the cosmopolitan out­
look and additional wealth and status to mix in European 
court society, and who were accordingly most sensitive to 
America's image abroad. In this restricted environment of 
"seasoned wealth and seasoned conscience," to use Richard 
Hofstadter's happy phrase, the Diplomatic Service found its 
own constituency.61 
E. L. Godkin's "respectable classes" looked on diplomacy 
as their special preserve. They believed in public servants of 
intellect and integrity, above selfish interest and party 
greed, in short, of the "better elements" of society them­
selves.62 In a swiftly modernizing America one of the few 
49. Mark Twain, "Diplomatic Pay and Clothes," 1899, reprinted in 
Forum XCV (1936), 137; "The Ambassadorship Muddle," Nation LXXXVI 
(1908), 298. 
50. "Plush Pants," Harper's Weekly LIII (June 26, 1909), 6; "Uncle 
Sam's Tin Halo," Outlook CXXVII1921), 253. 
51. American residents in London increased in numbers by about thirty
percent in the years 1899-1900 alone, according to Richard H. Heindel, 
The American Impart on Great Britain (Philadelphia, 1940), p. 47 n. 1. 
The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1956), 139. 
52. Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, pp. 99-102. 
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paths of public service not requiring a radical change of life 
style and values was diplomacy. The idea of diplomacy as a 
profession interested them. They noted that Europe con­
sidered it a profession, and they likened it to the army, the 
navy, law, medicine, and architecture. Diplomacy, if it pro­
vided a career, would be an honored calling suitable for sons 
of the best families. They were not sure about qualifications, 
but some spoke of diplomacy as a science, requiring special 
training. Others stressed experience, using the analogy of 
the sailor, whose seamanship came not only from a host of 
skills but also from weathering many gales. They stressed 
special aptitudes as well, such as intellect, character, person­
ality, and social skills, which only the home and school pro­
vided.53 When they visualized the career diplomat, they saw 
themselves or their sons. The connection was made explicitly 
by a career diplomat when he described the kind of recruits 
the Diplomatic Service should seek. They should come from 
"homes with tradition," said Hugh Gibson: "Some of them 
are simple homes—no butlers or footmen—but where the 
boys go to college—the bills are paid—Sunday observed, 
good books read, and where a standard obtains in respect to 
private life and public policies." Another diplomat put it this 
way: "We want men in our foreign service to represent the 
good will and good breeding of their country." 54 The origins 
and agents of prestige diplomacy had much in common. 
In sum, two strains are evident in the movement for dip­
lomatic reform. One was forward-looking, responding to the 
53. G. L. Rives, "Our Need for a Permanent Diplomatic Service," Forum 
XXV (1898), 702-711; F. M. Huntington Wilson, "Improving the Ameri­
can Diplomat," Harper's Weekly LVI (August 24, 1912), 21; Wilson, "The 
American Foreign Service," Outlook LXXXII (1906), 499-501; Hill, "Shall 
We Standardize Our Diplomatic Service?", pp. 690-98; Belmont, "The 
First Line of National Defense," p. 886. 
54. Galpin, ed., Gibson, p. 97; Francis B. Loomis, "The Foreign Service 
of the United States," p. 351. 
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dominant impulses of the progressive movement, emphasiz­
ing the rational organization and special skills of the modern 
bureaucratic society. The other looked backward, stressing 
individual qualities and elite rule, a last vestige of mug­
wumpery.55 The progressive strain had the momentum and 
broad appeal to provide the formal definition of the new ca­
reer, but the elite strain provided the wealth and motivation 
to staff it. Which strain would predominate only time would 
tell, but the diplomatic careerists possessed one crucial 
advantage, their indispensability. The continuity of Repub­
lican administrations from 1897 to 1913, the introduction of 
the merit system, the survival of the secretarial service under 
the Democrats, and the exigencies of World War I ensured 
that able recruits could remain and acquire skill. Since only 
the wealthy could afford to serve, no administration could 
afford to dispense with staff that knew the ropes. Conse­
quently, the careerists were in a strategic position to define 
their role themselves. 
Professionalism took hold among diplomatic secretaries 
who entered the service during the period 1893-1917. Theirs 
was a peculiar sort of professionalism, shadowy and incom­
plete in many respects, and somewhat spurious. Nonetheless, 
it had a distinct meaning and character that carried into the 
future. It derived from the background of the officers, their 
motivations in pursuing diplomacy, and their occupational 
and group experiences in the service. 
It was an overwhelmingly upper-class group. Illustrating 
this fact are the following examples of secretaries who went 
on to become ministers and ambassadors. The wealth of 
Joseph C. Grew, later ambassador to Japan, derived from 
55. For a definition of the mugwump outlook, see Geoffrey Blodgett, 
The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 33-47. 
146 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
the wool business, the China trade, and western mining, and 
his wife, a Boston Perry and Cabot, had her own resources. 
As secretary at Berlin, he spent $15,000 a year on a salary of 
less than $3,000.66 Ten thousand dollars a year in private in­
come was considered the minimum necessary to support a 
bachelor secretary.57 Peter Jay was a descendant of John Jay, 
and pre-Civil War railroad fortunes stood behind John W. 
Garrett and Leland Harrison.58 Chicago meat-packing and 
soap manufacturing underwrote the careers of Norman 
Armour and Alexander Kirk.59 Lloyd Griscom's family, de­
scended from original Philadelphia Quakers, flourished anew 
in rails, oil, and shipping, and boasted liveried coachmen.80 
One grandfather of John Van Antwerp MacMurray, later 
minister to China, had founded an iron works in St. Louis, 
and the other, a descendant of original Dutch settlers, was a 
prosperous Albany banker.61 One grandfather of Arthur Bliss 
Lane had built a $2,500,000 business, and the other was a 
successful cotton broker.62 Corporation law and castor oil 
("Castoria—Children Cry For It") set up Robert Woods 
Bliss in diplomacy, the Knickerbocker Club, and Dumbarton 
Oaks.63 Irwin Laughlin was treasurer of Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Company at thirty-three when he entered diplomacy. 
56. Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 3, 9, 16. 
57. J. Pierrepont Moffat to Charles C. Curtis, December 14, 1927, Moffat
Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
58. On Harrison's grandfather see E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentle­
men: The Making of a National Upper Class (New York, 1958), 183-84. 
59. On Kirk see George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 
112-15. 
60. Lloyd C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking (New York, 1940), p. 8; 
Lloyd Griscom Transcript, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia 
University Library. 
61. "Register of the Collection," p. 40, John Van Antwerp MacMurray 
Papers, Princeton University Library. 
62. John A. Sylvester, "Arthur Bliss Lane, American Career Diplomat," 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967), p. 1. 
63. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, Washington Merry-Go-Round 
(New York, 1931), p. 144. 
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William Phillips, whose great uncle was Wendell Phillips, 
became financially independent at twenty-one.64 
Most of these budding career diplomats had strikingly 
similar backgrounds. The typical recruit came from an 
upper-class stronghold such as New York, Boston, Philadel­
phia, Baltimore, or Chicago. He received a private early 
education with tutors, in a day school, or at a New England 
or European boarding school. Three New Yorkers, Sheldon 
Whitehouse, Peter Jay, and Leland Harrison, attended Eton. 
Usually the diplomatic secretary was a graduate of Harvard, 
Yale, or Princeton, one in three being a Harvard man. Several 
went on to the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. It was a small 
and probably self-conscious minority that did not receive 
some form of fashionable education.65 
The boarding school performed a number of important 
functions. Generally the wealth of these young men had 
seasoned for at least a generation, but where acquisition 
was in the immediate background, the school was a means 
of upper-class ascription and acculturation. Hugh Wilson 
worked in his family's shirt manufacturing firm and knew 
where his money came from, but thanks to Hill School, Yale, 
and diplomacy felt comfortable about understanding "in­
stinctively the social gradations . .  . of any cosmopolitan 
group." Also, Groton and schools like it, by gathering in the 
64. William Phillips Transcript, Columbia Oral History Collection. 
65. Based on biographical statements on all diplomatic secretaries who
served in Europe between 1898 and 1914 in Department of State, Register,
1915. Also Who's Who in America and Dictionary of American Biography. 
Of these ninety-five officers, information about colleges attended was avail­
able for sixty-three. Twenty-two attended Harvard and thirteen Yale or 
Princeton. Information about secondary schooling was available for only 
thirty of the sixty-three, of whom twenty-eight listed private schools, St. 
Paul's, St. Mark's, Groton, and Lawrenceville, in particular. Ilchman (Pro­fessional Diplomacy, pp. 170-71), working with secretaries recruited be­
tween 1914 and 1922, found that 72.3 percent attended boarding schools,
that 84 percent received some form of private secondary education, and 
that 73.9 percent attended an Ivy League college. In my group of sixty-
three, 85 percent received some form of fashionable education, including 
college as well as secondary school. 
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sons of city-bound elites, fostered a common upper-class 
identity, as did the college and its clubs.66 
The boarding school way of life, modeled on the English 
public school, tended to encourage a professional rather than 
a bureaucratic orientation. The Grotonian—loyal, orderly, 
disciplined, imperturbable, formalistic—would seem well 
suited to bureaucratic life, and in these respects he was. In 
other respects he was not. Like his English counterpart bred 
to the idea of the gentleman amateur, he shied away from 
expertness and specialization. Viewing leadership in tradi­
tional or charismatic terms, he was essentially prebureau­
cratic. He learned to conform, but to an internalized 
gentlemanly code rather than to formal, explicit rules. The 
professional idea, with its implicit sanctions, avowedly ethical 
pursuit, sense of corporate identity, and mystique, would 
better fit private-school expectations. On the other hand, a 
reliance on taste, common sense, intuition, and instinct, and 
a disdain for theorizing and speculation, would not carry 
the Groton or Eton mind far into the intellectual realm of 
professional activity.67 
As with any walk of life, it is difficult to generalize about 
why these men entered diplomacy. Most of them probably 
had no idea of devoting their lives to it because it offered no 
realistic prospect of success in terms of ministerships and 
ambassadorships.68 Rather, diplomacy often represented a 
career rejection. Hugh Wilson claimed that a life in business 
held no appeal to young men of his background because 
66. Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 293, 303; Hugh R. Wilson, 
Diplomacy as a Career (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 33. 
67. For a study of English public school values and their relation to 
government service, see Rupert Wilkinson, Gentlemanly Power (London, 
1964), especially Parts I and II. Wilkinson does not make the distinction
made here between professional and bureaucratic modes. Weber, Theory 
of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 328-41; Baltzell, Philadelphia 
Gentlemen, pp. 303, 316-17; Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 4-5. 
68. Harold J. Coolidge and Robert H. Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge, 
Life and Letters (Boston, 1932), p. 17. 
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ease and education made it difficult for them to understand 
the grimness with which their fathers pursued the amassing 
of fortunes. "If you ever hear of me starting in on State 
Street," Grew wrote a friend, "please send flowers as the end 
will not be far off."69 Diplomacy more often than not was a 
second or third start. One in three attended law school first 
but undoubtedly found the law confining or simply boring, 
as Phillips did.™ They also found their communities confin­
ing. Life at Albany, bound by a set of "provincial ideas," 
seemed "narrowing and numbing" to MacMurray. A Brah­
min life in Boston looked pallid to Phillips.71 According to 
Hofstadter, American provincial city elites suffered status 
loss at the end of the nineteenth century because "the arena 
for prestige, like the market for commodities, had been wid­
ened to embrace the entire nation." 72 Local social eminence 
counted for less with this generation. They went shopping 
for something interesting and more rewarding. 
Diplomacy brought these young men into the national 
scene, and by a more genteel route than politics. At the least 
it would keep them decently occupied, as parents and soci­
ety demanded, while they savored the life of European 
courts and satisfied their yen for travel.73 There was an ap­
peal to youthful idealism as well. The idea that the rich and 
well-born had an obligation to serve their nation, one con­
stantly affirmed and exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt, 
was assiduously cultivated at schools like Groton. America's 
69. Hugh Wilson, Education of a Diplomat (New York, 1938), pp. 2-4; 
Grew to Hugh Gibson, September 15, 1922, Grew Papers. 
70. Department of State, Register, 1915; Phillips Transcript, Columbia 
Oral History Collection. 
71. MacMurray to his mother, February 9, 1902, MacMurray Papers; 
Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), pp. 5-6. 
72. Hofstadter, Age of Reform, p. 138. 
73. MacMurray to his mother, May 6, 1902, MacMurray Papers; Wilson,
Diplomacy as a Career, p. 2; Heinrichs, Grew, p. 8; Griscom, Diplomatically 
Speaking, chaps. 3-6; Coolidge and Lord, Coolidge, pp. 17-18. 
150 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
emergence as an imperial power provided a natural focus 
for such idealism in service abroad.74 The ambitious sought 
to satisfy a craving for national recognition but lacked a 
Baedecker to point the way. A number of paths lay open, 
including colonial administration and consular work as well 
as diplomacy. A man might take one path and shift to an­
other depending on opportunities. Indeed, Roosevelt felt it 
would be debilitating for a young man to play at courtier 
diplomacy too long.76 Somewhere ahead lay a governor gen­
eral's palace perhaps, or an embassy.76 With no more precise 
notion of what they were about than Kipling provided, 
America's favored sons began working at diplomacy. 
At his first posts the novice found more of a family than an 
office. The embassy was a social unit, and the wife was no 
less important than the officer in maintaining its standing in 
the diplomatic community. Originally the secretary was part 
of the ambassador's household if not actually his son, as was 
the case with generations of Adamses. Some of the old feel­
ing persisted and merged with the boarding school idea of 
surrogate family, the ambassador and his wife carrying on 
the father and mother roles of the Reverend and Mrs. Endi­
cott Peabody.77 The rhythm of work defied scheduling. When 
there was no work to be done, the diplomat was not supposed 
to pretend to work.78 Sport and other leisurely pursuits led to 
74. Interview with G. Howland Shaw, January 6, 1959; Shaw, "Ameri­
can Foreign Service," p. 327; William Phillips Transcript, Columbia Oral 
History Collection; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy; Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 
8-9. 
75. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 88. 
76. William Franklin Sands, "Basil Miles: An Appreciation," American 
Foreign Service Journal VII (1930), 79-80. 
77. Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, p. 303; Harold Nicholson, "The 
British Foreign Service," American Foreign Service Journal XIII (1936), 
430. On "family" feeling in the Diplomatic Service: Interview with William
Phillips, November 17, 1958; Frederick Dolbeare to Ellis L. Dresel, October
[?], 1920, Dresel Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; Diary of
Joseph C. Grew, July 3, 1915, Grew Papers. 
78. Lord Strang, The Foreign Office (London, 1955), p. 99. 
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friendships with other secretaries that developed easily 
from common upper-class, boarding school, and Ivy League 
background. In a crisis everyone pitched in and worked 
twelve-, fifteen-, even twenty-hour days. In the case of the 
American embassy at Berlin, 1914-17, shared privations, 
constant tension, and an alien environment deepened group 
loyalty and internal cohesiveness.79 Thus the embassy or 
legation, as a detached and isolated unit fusing social and 
occupational roles, developed primary group relations that 
supplied informal sanctions, loyalties, and procedures out­
side the formal organizational structure.80 
As secretaries stayed on from one administration to the 
next, they shifted posts and enlarged acquaintance.81 Occa­
sionally they managed to move as a group and keep their 
"family" together, but in any case the service was becoming 
clannish.82 With a good part of the world still colonial, nearly 
half of the secretaryships were in Europe, and it was con­
venient to visit neighboring embassies to renew acquaintance 
and exchange gossip. Assignment to Washington was also 
more frequent, and there, with other "sons of Empire" in 
Congress, the army, and colonial administration, they formed 
79. Heinrichs, Grew, p. 23. 
80. Charles Hunt Page, "Bureaucracy's Other Face," Social Forces XXV 
(1946-47), 89. 
81. Whereas from 1867 to 1898 the secretary had only one chance in 
twelve of shifting posts, by 1914 four out of five had served in one or 
more mission. Nearly half of the prewar secretaryships were in Europe, so
that by 1914 four-fifths of the secretaries on duty were serving in or had 
served in Europe. Diplomatic Service lists in the annual Department of 
State Register for the years 1867 to 1914 (Washington, 1867-1914). 
82. One such "family" migrated as follows in the years 1915-21: Fred­
erick Dolbeare: Vienna, Berne, Berlin; Allen Dulles: Vienna, Berne, Berlin; 
Ellis Dresel: Berlin, Beme, Berlin; Hugh Wilson: Berlin, Vienna, Berne, 
Berlin. Close ties are readily apparent in Grew's correspondence with Wil­
son, Gibson, J. Butler Wright, and Ulysses Grant-Smith in the Grew Papers,
in the Dresel-Gibson and Dresel-Dolbeare correspondence in the Dresel 
Papers, in the correspondence of Gibson, Hugh S. Gibson Papers, Hoover
Institution On War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, and in the
Wilson correspondence, Hugh R. Wilson Papers, Herbert Hoover Presiden­
tial Library, West Branch, Iowa. 
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a bachelors' mess at 1718 H Street that became a sort of club 
for the social elite of the Diplomatic Service.83 "The Service 
would have been far from a congenial career all those years," 
Grew recalled, "if it hadn't been for the little group of men 
who have known each other intimately, and when serving at 
different posts, have kept up their friendship." M Secretaries 
began keeping track of career progress in the group as a 
whole and taking pride in "this old Service of ours." They 
recognized a developing esprit de corps.85 An amateur am­
bassador acknowledged the new corporate identity when he 
referred to them as a Secretaries' Union.86 One of the most 
elitist of the secretaries described the service as a "club."87 
A club in fact is what it resembled in the sense of social ex­
clusiveness, broad acquaintanceship and loyalty, knots of 
close friendships, and dislike of formal organization. 
With corporate identity and esprit de corps there de­
veloped a sense of craftsmanship. Command of protocol, 
fluency in key languages, familiarity with elements of inter­
national law, polish in writing dispatches and diplomatic 
communications, facility in "certain finesses . . . certain 
little necessary discriminations," gave the secretaries a feel­
ing of expertness.88 MacMurray felt he had learned his letters 
during his first tour in Siam and looked forward to gaining 
finish at Petrograd by contact with the high politics of Eu­
83. On the 1817 H Street "club" see: Sands, "Basil Miles," p. 80; Le­
land Harrison Papers, Library of Congress; Carr Diary, March 25, 1935, 
Carr Papers; Grew to A. H. Frazier and E. L. Dresel, July 5, 1917, Grew 
Papers. 
84. Grew to Frederick Dolbeare, February 29, 1928, Grew Papers. See
also Hugh Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York, 1941), p. 165. 
85. Grew to John W. Garrett, October 18, 1919, Grew Papers. 
86. Brand Whitlock, quoted in Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 
137-38. 
87. Hugh Wilson used the term "pretty good club": Minutes of Foreign 
Service Personnel^ Board Meeting, March 30, 1927, Grew Papers. Shaw, 
"Foreign Service," p. 327. 
88. Grew to his mother, December 7, 1914, Grew Papers; Heinrichs, 
Grew, pp. 17, 24-25. 
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rope.89 Toward their amateur chiefs they felt the scorn of the 
professional naval officer for the landlubber who could not 
tell a binnacle from a pelican hook. They did the dirty work, 
rescued their chiefs from blunder, took charge in their ab­
sence, and thus felt qualified for top posts themselves.90 
This sense of craftsmanship developed not in a vacuum 
but in the competitive environment of European diplomacy. 
There diplomats enjoyed a fully established career sanctified 
as a profession, a sort of Freemasonry with a corporate iden­
tity of its own apart from national identities. The Americans 
moved easily into this upper-class world. They and their 
foreign opposites learned the same ropes, worked up through 
the ranks the same way, sported together, and formed friend­
ships. The Americans felt they measured up, and identified 
with the Europeans as colleagues in the same profession. 
Hugh Gibson, for example, particularly admired the British 
Diplomatic Service because of its long traditions.91 The idea 
of diplomacy as a profession had a status value. An honored 
calling, a gentlemanly profession above "trade," would dig­
nify their activities, especially for families who were footing 
the bill.92 They recognized that American diplomacy was de­
ficient in the crucial respect that it lacked a full career. Only 
when ambassadorships and ministerships, the real prizes, 
were within their grasp would American diplomacy qualify 
as a "permanent profession."93 
89. MacMurray to his mother, October 14, 1908, MacMurray Papers. 
90. ^ MacMurray to his mother, February 19, 1914, MacMurray Papers;
Page, "Bureaucracy's Other Face," p. 94; George Kennan, Russia Leaves 
the War (Princeton, N.J., 1956), p. 396. 
91. MacMurray to his mother, October 14, 1908, MacMurray Papers; 
Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomacy (New York, 1962), p. 102; 
Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era; A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 
1904-1945, ed. Walter Johnson, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), I, 22-23; 
Perrin Galpin Transcript, Columbia Oral History Collection. 
92. M. F. Egan, "Your Move, Mr. Harding," CoUiers LXVII (Febru­
ary 5, 1921), 12. 
93. Grew to Managing Editor, Harvard Crimson, November 12, 1913, 
in Grew, Turbulent Era, I, 114. 
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To sum up, the Diplomatic Service as of 1917 was an or­
ganization developing in two different ways. Formally it was 
becoming more bureaucratic. Informally it gained the group 
feeling, craftsmanship, and orientation of a profession. 
The Establishment of the Foreign Service, 1917-1927 
The following decade, from 1917 to 1927, witnessed a 
second wave of change in American representation abroad. 
The main impetus came from outside the Diplomatic Service 
in the form of legislation and executive reorganization that 
joined the Diplomatic and Consular services into one Foreign 
Service and tightened the administration of diplomatic per­
sonnel. This bureaucratic thrust evoked a professional re­
sponse. The diplomats feared that proposed reforms would 
destroy their service and moved to its defense. By emphasiz­
ing professional aspects of diplomacy and by organizing to 
influence drafting of legislation and administration of the 
Foreign Service, they sought to restrict access and preserve 
their autonomy. For a time they succeeded, but their efforts 
provoked opposition that came to a head in 1927. In a show­
down that year the diplomats lost, and their influence dimin­
ished. 
Foreign service reform received strong support in the 
years following World War I. The argument in favor of 
amateur diplomats was the exception; generally, expressions 
of opinion favored opening top posts to career officers and 
providing them adequate compensation. Nevertheless, ac­
ceptance of the career principle did not mean approval of 
the kind of diplomacy represented by the Diplomatic Serv­
ice. The war brought a shift in popular conceptions of di­
plomacy. The emergence of the United States as the most 
powerful nation in the world eased concern for its image 
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abroad. In periodicals the prestige consciousness of the turn 
of the century, with its partiality for diplomatic reform ac­
cording to elitist conceptions, diminished, and the upper 
class itself lost influence. Meanwhile, Wilsonian ideals, the 
Paris Peace Conference, and the fight over the Versailles 
Treaty aroused old prejudices against diplomacy. It was as­
sociated with reactionary upper classes that arranged secret 
treaties and incited territorial aggrandizement. Europe's 
professional diplomats, said one commentator, had proved a 
supreme failure in preventing the outbreak of the Great 
War. Traditional diplomacy endangered rather than ad­
vanced American interests.94 
The dominant themes of reform sentiment were those 
that had earlier facilitated the more rapid and extensive re­
form of the Consular Service. Here the main function of di­
plomacy was the expansion of American trade. Arthur Sweet­
ser in World's Work argued that the questions of the future 
concerned solely "the struggle for markets and wealth, in 
which an efficiently organized foreign service will greatly 
benefit us." According to Colliers, an efficient State Depart­
ment and competent ambassadors were needed "to keep the 
wheels of American industry turning full time." Emphasis 
on training, skill, economy—in short, efficiency—suggests 
that as before the connection between reform and business 
was not simply a matter of increasing wealth but also of 
improving organization.95 As Robert Wiebe says: 
94. Will Irwin, "Business in Diplomacy," Saturday Evening Post CXCIII (August 14, 1920), 66; William T. Ellis, "Frank Words On the Trained 
Diplomat," Outlook CXXVII (1921), 383; Ilchman, Professional Diplo­
macy, pp. 138-39. 
95. Egan, "Your Move, Mr. Harding"; Egan, "Our Extraordinary En­
voys," Collier's LXVII (March 26, 1921), 7; Egan, "More Business in Di­
plomacy," ibid. LXIX (February 4, 1922), 9; Irwin, "Business in Diplo­
macy," pp. 29-30; Arthur Sweetser, "Why the State Department Should 
Be Reorganized," World's Work XXXIX (1920), 514; Wilbur Carr, "To 
Bring Our Foreign Service up to Date," Independent CV (1921), 207; 
"Praise for Harding's Diplomats," Literary Digest LXXIV (September 2, 
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What emerged by the war was an important segment of the 
population, a crucial one in terms of both public and private 
leadership, acting from common assumptions and speaking 
a common language. A bureaucratic orientation now defined 
a basic part of the nation's discourse. The values of continuity 
and regularity, functionality and rationality, administration 
and management set the form of problems and outlined their 
alternative solutions.96 
Reformers made a sharp distinction between the two 
services. The Diplomatic Service had a poor public image. 
Rich career secretaries replaced rich amateur ambassadors 
as the target for criticism. They seemed undemocratic, un-
American, and useless, mere social ornaments of an outdated 
courtier diplomacy. Respecting class origins at least, the 
image was accurate, and British dress and manner were 
sufficiently common to make the diplomats a perpetual cin­
der in the public eye.97 For example, Leland Harrison, Eton, 
Harvard (Porcellian Club), Knickerbocker Club, served in 
Washington as assistant secretary of state for several years, 
where his accent, spats, Rolls Royce, and aloofness even 
among social equals were not likely to appease democratic 
instincts.98 He was an extreme case, but extremes establish 
1922), 16; National Civil Service Reform League, Report, p. 12; Remarks 
by Representatives R. Walton Moore and Edward E. Browne, Congres­
sional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923), 3163, 3165, and by Tom 
Connally, ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), 7573. 
96. Wiebe, Search for Order, 295. 
97. "Representation Allowances For Our Ambassadors," World's Work 
XLVIII (1924), 16; Egan, "Your Move, Mr. Harding," pp. 12, 27, 28; 
Irwin, "Business in Diplomacy," pp. 30, 69; Sweetser, "Why the State De­
partment Should Be Reorganized, p. 515; Herbert Corey, "He Has Jobs for 
Rising Young Men," Collier's LXXII (November 3, 1923), 14; Norval 
Richardson, 'My Diplomatic Education," Saturday Evening Post CXCV 
(February 10, 1923), 8-9; "When Diplomats Write Ads," New Republic 
XXXV (1923), 167-68; Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 48-50. 
98. On Harrison: Grew to Major T. M. Langton, January 25, 1919,
Grew Papers; Diary of Gordon Auchincloss, August 4, 1918, Colonel Ed­
ward M. House Papers, Yale University Library; J. Pierrepont Moffat to
Gibson, June 29, 1921, Moffat Papers; Herbert O. Yardley, The American 
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popular stereotypes. Consuls, on the other hand, were mostly 
middle class. Fewer came from the Northeast; the rural West 
and South were better represented. Most had received some 
form of college education, often vocational, and the propor­
tion of college graduates was increasing. But their education 
was typically middle class: three out of four consular re­
cruits in 1924 attended public school and only one out of 
four an Ivy League college." Theirs was a reorganized serv­
ice, "keen, highly-trained, and efficient to the last degree," 
according to Literary Digest. They dealt with the general 
public more often and their work yielded practical, tangible 
benefits. They were the humble cousins of the diplomats, 
"working on quietly, unspectacularly, winning markets for 
American merchants." 10° 
The obvious way to remedy the deficiencies of the Diplo­
matic Service was to make it resemble the Consular Service. 
This was the approach taken in legislation first introduced 
in 1919 by Representative John Jacob Rogers of Lowell, 
Massachusetts. A leading Republican on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Rogers was by far the outstanding congressional 
proponent of foreign service reform from 1919 until his 
death in 1925. In its final form the Rogers Bill encouraged 
promotion of the best officers to ministerships, though it 
failed to provide for a class of career ministers. It also drasti­
cally improved salaries, increasing the top class from $4,000 
to $9,000, and authorized retirement benefits, paid home 
Black Chamber (Indianapolis, 1931), p. 19. Grew believed Yardley's de­
scription of diplomats was a perfect portrait of Harrison (Grew Diary, 
July 13-27, 1931, Grew Papers). 
99. Information on consuls derived from a sampling ("A" through "H" 
of the alphabet) of biographical statements in State Department, Register,
1915, and Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 164, 170-71. 
100. "The Yankee Consul, New Style, On the Job," Literary Digest 
LXVIII (January 29, 1921), 60-62; Irwin, "Business in Diplomacy," pp. 
30, 66; Sweetser, "Why the State Department Should Be Reorganized," 
p. 515. 
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leave, and representation allowances. Such improvements 
would not necessarily alter the complexion of the Diplomatic 
Service, however, or alter it soon enough. Robert P. Skinner, 
consul general at London, had a quick solution. He proposed 
dissolving the Diplomatic Service and incorporating its mem­
bers in the Consular Service. This would probably have 
caused a mass resignation of diplomats. The problem was to 
devise a combination of the two services that would take 
into account their separate functions and effect the necessary 
social change, yet not too radically. Wilbur Carr supplied 
the answer in the Foreign Service idea that was a central 
feature of the Rogers Act. This was a personnel system clas­
sifying secretaries and consuls together for salary and pro­
motion purposes while keeping them functionally separate. 
Provision for interchange of officers at all levels would per­
mit progressive integration of the two services to the point 
where assignment depended not on old service affiliation but 
on the interest of the government and the officer's abilities.101 
Carr's was a classic bureaucratic solution. His scheme re­
moved the artificial barrier between consular and diplomatic 
offices. The two services performed many similar and com­
plementary functions anyway. A single source of personnel 
would improve coordination of political and economic work 
and permit the Department of State to meet the particular 
needs of an office from a broader range of skills. The plan 
101. Excerpts from Carr Memo, May 2, 1920, enclosed in Carr to Grew,
November 12, 1925, Carr Papers; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 
148-50; Crane, Carr, pp. 248, 255-56. The text of the Rogers Act is in Lay, 
Foreign Service, Appendix E. As Ilchman concedes, Carr's authorship of 
the Foreign Service idea is based on inference (Professional Diplomacy, 
p. 150 n. 106), but this seems a reasonable inference. In addition to the 
circumstantial evidence Ilchman cites is the fact that Carr claimed all ver­
sions of the bill were drafted in his office (Crane, Carr, p. 284), and that 
Carr wrote Undersecretary Frank Polk as early as June 7, 1919, some 
months before any of Rogers's reform bills were introduced, that there was
a need for a "much closer" relationship between the Diplomatic and Con­
sular services, with secretaries subject to service as consuls and vice versa
(File 120.1/57, State Department Archives). 
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offered the advantage of bringing consuls versed in commer­
cial problems into embassies as well as that of assigning dip­
lomats to politically sensitive consulates such as Calcutta, 
Ottawa, Capetown, and Melbourne, where no diplomatic 
mission existed. Furthermore, junior officers would be tested 
in a variety of situations and could then find the type of 
work best suited to them. The Foreign Service system would 
effect economies such as housing consulates in embassies and 
consolidating personnel offices. Carr was playing on popular 
themes but with the genuine enthusiasm of an exponent of 
scientific management.102 
The Rogers Bill appealed to almost everyone. The themes 
of efficiency and trade echoed from committee hearing room 
to the floor of Congress to newspapers and periodicals and 
back again. A congressman expressed the consensus when he 
said: "Every rotary, every commercial organization wants 
this bill passed. Why? Because they want an efficient foreign 
service and know that it benefits business." 103 Congress also 
thumped lustily on the idea of making the Diplomatic Serv­
ice more democratic and American. The irrepressible Tom 
Connally delighted a House hearing by mimicking, with 
appropriate gestures and accent, an American secretary 
102. Memorandum by Carr, October, 19, 1922, and Secretary of State 
to Rogers, October 19, 1922, File 120/102a, State Department Archives; 
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Service of the United States, Hearings on H.R. 12543, 67th Cong., 
4th Sess. (Washington, 1922), pp. 5-6, 16, 46; U.S. House of Representa­
tives, Committee on Appropriations, Hearing Held before the Subcommittee 
in Charge of Departments of State and Justice Appropriation Bills, 67th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922), Part I, p. 19; Hearings on H.R. 17 
and 6357, pp. 9, 11, 30, 130-31; Crane, Carr, p. 234. 
103. Rep. Edward E. Browne in Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th 
Sess. (1923), 3165. Also Reps. Rogers and R. Walton Moore, ibid., 3145, 
3163; Rep. Tom Conally, ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), 7573; testi­
mony of Carr and Skinner, Hearings on H.R. 12543, pp. 17, 39, 80; testi­
mony of Carr, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations for 
the Department of State, 1925, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1925), 
p. 113. On the history of the Rogers Bill: Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy,
chap. 4. 
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aping the Europeans, "trying to walk like one, holding his 
stick like one, wearing his handkerchief like one, and trying 
to talk like one [Laughter]."104 Consular work would be 
good medicine for these young men and keep the new re­
cruit's "American spirit fresh."105 The State Department 
leadership, faced with a vast increase in postwar overseas 
responsibilities, saw the need for more and better recruits 
and the weeding-out of the incompetent and superannuated. 
Secretary of State Hughes testified himself and made the 
bill an administration measure.106 Needless to say, consuls 
approved.107 Carr tirelessly drafted all versions of the bill, 
worked to gain public support, and testified before Con­
gress.108 He undoubtedly saw a larger role for himself in the 
consequence. In 1921 he disengaged himself from direct 
supervision of consuls by setting up an office of consular per­
sonnel under his wing, which, he believed, would serve for 
diplomatic personnel as well in time.109 The intent of Con­
gress to make Carr chief of the Foreign Service was clear in 
an amendment to the Rogers Bill that abolished the office of 
director of the Consular Service and applied its salary to a 
104. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Hearings on the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation Bill, 66th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1920), p. 75. Also Congressional Record, 
67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923), 3145, 3159, and 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
7565-7566. 
105. Skinner testimony, Hearings on H.R. 12543, p. 77. 
106. Correspondence between Charles Evans Hughes and President 
Warren G. Harding, and Memoranda by Carr, 1922 and 1923, File 120. 
Rogers Act/No. 1, State Department Archives; Hughes to Harding, August
22, 1922, File 120.1/70a, State Department Archives; Rogers, "Are Changes
Provided by the Rogers Bill Necessary?", Congressional Digest III (1924), 
124; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, pp. 195-200; Crane, Carr, pp. 
227-28. 
107. See letters of congratulation from various consuls to Carr, 1924, 
Carr Papers. 
108. On Carr's role see File 120.Rogers Act/No. 1; Carr, "To Bring Our 
Foreign Service up to Date," Independent CV (1921), 207, 220; Crane, 
Carr, chaps. 26, 27. 
109. Crane, Carr, pp. 247-48. 
 161 WALDO H. HEINRICHS, JR.
new assistant secretaryship. The amendment circulated in 
the State Department beforehand and was approved.110 
The diplomats found these proceedings painful, especially 
because the Rogers Bill went so far to satisfy their most ur­
gent needs. In the postwar years pitifully few were attracted 
to diplomacy, and many within the service were tempted 
out by Wall Street.111 The diplomats fully accepted the neces­
sity of making the career attractive to less affluent men and 
regarded the bill's encouragement of service ministerships as 
a triumph for the career principle and their only hope of 
permanency.112 What upset them was amalgamation, espe­
cially talk of free interchangeability, of officers "weaving 
back and forth" between consular and diplomatic work. Out­
numbered four to one, they feared they would be swallowed 
up in the consular establishment. Lewis Einstein, the best 
mind among them, warned that extensive lateral entry, es­
pecially in the middle grades where "corporate conscious­
ness" was formed, would destroy the esprit de corps of the 
Diplomatic Service.113 Grew feared that the consular pattern 
of formal and hierarchical relationships, with Carr in control, 
would "bureaucratize" his own service.114 The diplomats 
could not have been less enthusiastic about being shifted to 
110. Reps. Otis Wingo and Rogers in Congressional Record, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1924), 8823-24; Diary of William R. Castle, Jr., May 19, 1924,
examined when in Castle's possession, now in Castle Papers, Houghton
Library, Harvard University; Grew Diary, May 13, 1924, Grew Papers. 
111. Heinrichs, Grew, p. 98. 
112. Grew to his mother, June 26, 1919, and to Thomas Sergeant Perry,
January 19, 1924, Grew Papers; William Phillips, "Cleaning Our Diplo­
matic House," Forum LXIII (August 14, 1920), 164-72; Ilchman, Profes­
sional Diplomacy, p. 162. 
113. Skinner testimony, Hearings on H.R. 12543, 77-78; Castle Diary,
January 10, 1923; Pierre Boal to Rogers, August 2, 1923, Gibson Papers;
circular letter of Lewis Einstein, June 20, 1923, enclosed in Fred M. Dear­
ing to William Phillips, July 7, 1923, File 111/248, State Department Ar­
chives. On Einstein, see Lewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, ed. 
Lawrence E. Gelfand (New Haven, Conn., 1968). Memorandum, Phillips
to Frank Polk, June 4, 1919, File 120.1/57, State Department Archives. 
114. Grew, Turbulent Era, I, 619; Shaw, "Foreign Service," p. 327. 
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the world of visas, invoices, and stranded seamen.115 Neither 
did they favor leaving the world of European chancellories. 
Gibson supposed they would be sent to Singapore, Cape-
town, or Tegucigalpa "to learn us to chew tibacco [sic] and 
give up spats." The thought of transfer even to Tokyo made 
him feel as if his "spine had been removed by a turkey bon­
ing machine."116 They feared a loss of corporate identity, 
bureaucratization, and shift to a different and less attractive 
type of work. 
Woven into the amalgamation issue was a problem of 
social status. The case of Wilbur Carr is illustrative. In 1917 
he had married a wealthy lady and moved into a mansion on 
Wyoming Avenue.117 He had come far from his humble be­
ginnings, and yet there always seemed much further to go. 
Most of the undersecretaries and assistant secretaries of the 
Harding administration were Harvard or Princeton diplo­
mats, urbane, elegant men who seemed effortlessly to enjoy 
a position and maintain a style of life that he struggled so 
hard to attain. Carr made a point of noting down talk of 
"Harvard society type" diplomats in the department and evi­
dence of their snobbishness.118 American representatives, he 
contended, should come from "neither the most exclusive 
social circle nor from the circle in which no culture is found" 
—in other words, from middle-class people like himself.1" 
If upper-class status was always somewhat beyond his reach, 
he might be able to make diplomacy more bourgeois. 
115. Gibson testimony, Hearings on H.R. 17 and 6357, p. 21; Grew to 
Albert Ruddock, December 11, 1919, Grew Papers. 
116. Gibson to William R. Castle, Jr., February 19, 1923, Gibson Pa­
pers; Gibson to E. L. Dresel, September 1, 1921, Dresel Papers. 
117. Crane, Carr, pp. 201-2. 
118. Carr Diary, January 26, March 17, 1923, July 27, 1925, Carr Pa­
pers; Hubert Herring, "The Department of State," Harper's CLXXIV 
(1937), 228. 
119. Carr notes for speech in Diary, 1922-1923, n.d., Carr Papers. 
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Social tension was only to be expected in joining together 
a homogenous upper-class group and a predominantly mid­
dle-class organization. Though most consuls appear to have 
been more interested in the retirement benefits of the Rogers 
Bill than the opportunities for diplomatic work it provided, 
they resented the social precedence enjoyed by those with 
diplomatic status abroad and in Washington.120 "The diplo­
matic privileges," wrote Nelson Johnson, "ah, there are the 
almost perfect insulations," making "the career secretariat 
immune to criticism by the uninitated." He supposed the 
diplomats would find it "infra dig" to be "jumbled in" with 
consuls.121 Johnson the following year became chief of the 
Far Eastern Division, then assistant secretary of state and 
later minister and ambassador to China. Consul General 
Skinner, who testified before Congress about snobs in the 
Diplomatic Service, asked for a "proper" legation as soon as 
the Rogers Bill passed.122 The status sensitivity of consuls in 
transition reflected the class barrier between the services. 
Occasionally diplomats betrayed a snobbish attitude to­
ward consuls. A diplomat's picture of a person in a "sweat" 
was a consul at an embassy dinner. Consular "standards of 
civilization" were lower, as shown in sentimentality, "a fond­
ness for Y.M.C.A. standards and phraseology."123 Generally 
the diplomats were on the defensive. Grew, who was minister 
to Switzerland at the time, wanted the "few rotters" in the 
Diplomatic Service eliminated and the "decent, red-blooded 
120. Letters of Consuls to Carr, 1924, and Carr Diary, November 5, 
1923, Carr Papers; Rep. Tom Connally, Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 
4th Sess. (1923), 3147. 
121. Nelson Johnson to N. B. Stewart, May 28, 1924, Johnson to M. L.
Myers, July 15, 1923, Johnson Papers, Library of Congress. 
122. Skinner testimony, Hearings on H.R. 12543, pp. 76-81; Skinner to 
Carr, June 26, 1924, Carr Papers. 
123. Cibson to Grew, July 2, 1924, Leland Harrison Papers; Castle 
Diary, December 2, 1924, Castle Papers. 
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men" advanced. Minister to Poland Hugh Gibson, much to 
his chagrin, coined the term "cookie pusher." When the serv­
ice tried to get rid of such incompetents, he contended, con­
gressmen protected them.124 Undersecretary of State William 
Phillips balanced an element of socially ambitious consuls 
against the element of snobbish diplomats.125 This disarming 
frankness and even-handedness might suggest that the social 
factor in amalgamation was insignificant for the diplomats. 
On the contrary, status defense was a vital factor in their 
response, but expressed itself in a subtler manner. 
The hard fact was that the forces marshaled behind the 
Foreign Service idea were too strong to be resisted. The 
Diplomatic Service would have to lose its formal identity to 
secure the career advantages its members regarded as es­
sential. Nevertheless, their position was by no means hope­
less. Charles Evans Hughes conducted a most active diplo­
macy, bilateral and multilateral, and skilled agents and staff 
were in urgent demand. He made it clear to Congress that he 
respected the qualities and motives of his diplomats and that, 
though he favored interchange of officers, it would be kept 
"within reasonable limits." 126 He chose diplomats for all high 
policy posts in the department and took every opportunity to 
appoint service ministers. No less than ten secretaries se­
cured missions between the end of the war and the Rogers 
Act. Valued as they were, the diplomats believed that if they 
could not block the establishment of a single Foreign Service, 
they might at least influence the administration of it so as to 
keep their service substantially intact. In seeking this ob­
124. Grew to T. S. Perry, January 13, 1924, Grew Papers; Gibson testi­
mony, Hearings on H.R. 17 and 6357, p. 40; Gibson to Castle, February 19, 
1923, Gibson Papers. 
125. Carr Diary, November 5, 1923, Carr Papers. Also, Pierre Boal to
John J. Rogers, August 2, 1923, Gibson Papers. 
126. Hughes testimony, Hearings on H.R. 12543, pp. 7-8; Pierre Boal to 
John J. Rogers, August 2, 1923, Gibson Papers; Ilchman, Professional Di­
plomacy, pp. 157-59. 
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ject they acted in ways that significantly departed from the 
bureaucratic structure and pattern. 
The fortunes of the Diplomatic Service came to rest in the 
hands of an elite of six that included, besides Gibson, Grew, 
and Phillips, Hugh Wilson, a secretary serving in Berlin and 
then Tokyo, J. Butler Wright, assistant secretary of state and 
chief of the Diplomatic Bureau, and Ulysses Grant-Smith, 
minister to Albania. These six were assisted from time to 
time by another half-dozen senior careerists.127 The group 
conformed to the social type of the Service and had exten­
sive European experience, as well as in most cases depart­
mental experience that acquainted them with the reform 
movement at home. They were characterized by strong 
esprit de corps, career idealism, and sensitivity to service 
opinion. In the cases of Phillips and Wright, activities assist­
ing the service were a function of office, but the rest worked 
outside their bureaucratic roles. Gibson and Grew were 
beaux ideals of the service, the former a brilliant wit, mimic, 
and raconteur who charmed European society, as well as a 
shrewd, perceptive observer, the latter combining diligence 
and disarming sincerity with suavity, good looks, and a 
sporting instinct. Both had reputations as skilled diplomatists 
and both had panache.128 The elite worked informally be­
cause it suited their style and because overt organizing was 
frowned on.129 They made plans and achieved consensus by 
127. Others identified included Robert Woods Bliss, Frederick Sterling,
Lewis Einstein, Pierre Boal, Leland Harrison, and Ellis Dresel. Identifica­
tion of the group from correspondence among members of the group in 
Grew, Dresel, Gibson, and Wilson papers. 
128. On Gibson: Galpin Transcript, Columbia Oral History Collection; 
Galpin, ed., Gibson; Nancy H. Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943 (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 10-12. On Grew: Heinrichs, Grew. 
129. In 1923 Lewis Einstein sent out a circular letter in the Diplomatic
Service disapproving of Foreign Service amalgamation. Minister Fred M. 
Dealing strongly disapproved of such efforts to organize opposition to the 
Rogers Bill and forwarded Einstein's letter and his reply to Phillips. File 
111/248, State Department Archives. 
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extensive personal correspondence and by seemingly casual 
get-togethers in Paris and Berlin.130 
They moved to protect the service in a number of ways. 
Gibson felt that someone had to testify and show Congress 
that diplomats spoke American and could "find their way 
in and out of a drawing room without the use of a monocle." 
He tried Grew, who passed the assignment back, chuckling 
that "people who talk through their nose and spit on the 
floor will cut a lot more ice than those who try and talk like 
Englishmen."131 Gibson went home and testified. In addition, 
the leadership developed its own ideas for the Foreign Serv­
ice. In 1920 Hugh Wilson drew up a plan with separate Dip­
lomatic and Consular divisions and no interchange of offi­
cers. Five diplomats meeting in Paris approved, but nothing 
came of it.132 What the diplomats needed was stronger rep­
resentation at the highest levels of the State Department. At 
Gibson's suggestion a Diplomatic Personnel Committee was 
formed in 1920. Composed of Assistant Secretary Van Sant­
voord Merle-Smith and four diplomats, its assignment was to 
formulate personnel policy, but it was abolished in the 
change of administration.133 The chief of the Diplomatic 
Bureau was a key position, but Wright seemed too much 
under Carr's influence, and the undersecretaryship assumed 
all the more importance.134 When Phillips left the latter post 
130. On the meetings: Castle Diary, October 21, 1922, Castle Papers;
Grew to Gibson, December 22, 1920, Grew to Grant-Smith, April 15, 1920,
Grew to Robert Woods Bliss, September 30, 1921, and Wilson to Rep. 
Rogers, April 7, 1920, Grew Papers. 
131. Grew to Gibson, March 23, 1923, Grew Papers; Gibson to Castle, 
February 19, 1923, Gibson Papers. 
132. Wilson to John J. Rogers, April 7, 1920, Grew Papers; Grew to
Grant-Smith, April 15, 1920, Grew Papers; excerpts from Carr Memoran­
dum, May 2, 1920, enclosed in Carr to Grew, November 12, 1925, Carr 
Papers. 
133. Grew to Castle, January 30, 1922, Grew Papers; Gibson to Moffat, 
January 23, 1920, Moffat Papers; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 
155-56. 
134. Grew to Gibson, October 15, November 3, 1923, Grew Papers; 
Castle Diary, November 2, 1923, Castle Papers. 
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in 1924, he strongly recommended Gibson and Grew, and 
Hughes was amenable. Gibson declined and urged it on 
Grew for the sake of the service. Grew, a man who would 
"stand hitched" when the Diplomatic Service needed protec­
tion, accepted.135 
The widely held view that Carr would be appointed chief 
of the new Foreign Service was the major concern, and 
Grew, Gibson, and William R. Castle met in Berlin in 1922 to 
form a plan to counter the threat. Their idea was a powerful 
chief of personnel identified with neither branch. Their can­
didate was Castle, whom they recommended to Hughes.136 
In fact, Castle, chief of the Western European Affairs Divi­
sion, was warmly sympathetic to the diplomats. "Joe Grew 
is wonderfully friendly about my being, in the opinion of 
the service men, really a part of the service," he wrote. A 
descendant of one of the original American grandee families 
in Hawaii, and a graduate of Harvard, he fitted easily into 
the club.137 
The Rogers Bill became law on May 24, 1924. It was si­
lent on the administration of the Foreign Service and the ex­
tent of amalgamation, and the opposing forces pressed for­
ward with their separate plans. Carr's plan placed control of 
Foreign Service personnel in a board composed of the un­
dersecretary and two assistant secretaries, as well as one 
consular and one diplomatic officer brought back from the 
field semiannually. Only the undersecretary and assistant 
secretaries would decide transfers between branches. They 
would constitute a quorum and could in any case outvote 
135. Castle Diary, January 29, 30, 1924, Castle Papers; Grew to T. S. 
Perry, February 13, 1924, Grew Papers; Gibson to Wilson, April 16, 1924,
Wilson Papers.
136. Grew to Hughes February 18, 1923, Grew to Gibson, February 20, 
1923, Grew Papers; Castle Diary, October 21, 1922, January 30, 1924, Cas­
tle Papers; Gibson to Hughes, January 17, 1923, Hughes Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
137. Castle Diary, November 11, 1922, Castle Papers. On Castle, Robert 
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression (New Haven, Conn., 
1957), p. 38. 
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the field representatives. With Carr now an assistant secre­
tary and a permanent fixture in the department, the result 
was obvious to Castle: "Everything will lead gently but in­
evitably toward control by the one man who is perma­
nent." 133 The plan of the diplomats, drawn up by Hugh 
Wilson, embodied the Gibson-Grew-Castle scheme of a 
high-ranking personnel chief from neither branch reporting 
directly to the secretary, bypassing the assistant secretaries. 
He was to be chairman of a Personnel Board composed of 
himself and one representative from each branch.139 Carr 
bitterly rejected the idea, claiming the diplomats had no 
experience to justify their submitting a plan. He threatened 
to give up all consular work if someone from the outside 
took over his consular personnel. Further, he disapproved 
of a meeting the diplomats assigned to the department were 
calling to air their views. Undersecretary Grew met this 
problem by suggesting to the diplomats that they call on 
the chief of the Diplomatic Bureau on their own initiative, 
"singly or en masse." 14° They did so, held a two and one-
half hour meeting, and voted fifteen to two to support the 
Wilson plan. With this sampling of diplomatic opinion, 
Grew felt in a position to recommend the Wilson plan to the 
secretary, and also, according to Castle, to advise him to 
keep the two branches distinct for the present.111 
Hughes chose neither plan, or rather, chose both plans. 
The Executive Order for the administration of the Foreign 
138. Memorandum, Carr to Phillips, January 14, 1924, Harrison Papers; 
Grew, Turbulent Era, I, 619-20; Memorandum, Castle to Grew, May 14, 
1924, and Grew Diary, May 13, 1924, Grew Papers. 
139. Gibson to Wilson, February 19, 1924, with attached Memorandum
from Wilson, n.d., and Memorandum, Wilson to Grew, May 5, 1924, with
attached draft memorandum by Wilson, n.d., and Memorandum from Wil­
son, June 2, 1924, Wilson Papers. 
140. Grew Diary, May 13-27, 1924, Grew Papers. 
141. Castle Diary, May 28, 1924, Castle Papers; Grew to Gibson, June 
5, 1924, Grew Papers. 
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Service established a Personnel Board composed of two ele­
ments. One element was the undersecretary and two assist­
ant secretaries with final authority over transfers, as in the 
Carr plan. The other element was an Executive Committee 
with a chairman and two Foreign Service officers, one from 
each branch, as in the Wilson plan, with full voting power 
except on transfers.142 Carr resisted the compromise but 
finally accepted it and conceded that the two branches 
should remain distinct for the present. Grew believed it rep­
resented a substantial gain for the diplomats in that the serv­
ice element would have a more prestigeful, powerful, and 
continuous role in administration. Castle disagreed and de­
clined the position of chairman of the Executive Committee 
because of its reduced significance. He saw no future in a 
scheme that placed responsibility nowhere and left Carr in 
ultimate control through long-term influence in selecting the 
Executive Committee.143 Whatever the future, the first Per­
sonnel Committee suited the diplomats well. Serving with 
Chairman Grew and Assistant Secretaries Wright and Carr 
was an Executive Committee consisting of two consuls and 
Hugh Wilson for the diplomats. Grew and Wright could 
block transfers, and on any other question the Board was 
evenly split between those identified with consuls and those 
with diplomats. The diplomats had by no means ensured 
their autonomy, yet their organized efforts had not been 
unavailing. They had gained permanent representation on 
the board and for the time being at least had halted the 
momentum for change in the composition of the American 
diplomatic establishment. 
The Foreign Service concept forced the diplomats to or­
142. Text of Executive Order of June 7, 1924, in Lay, Foreign Service, 
Appendix F. 
143. Grew Diary, June 5, 11, 1924, and Memorandums, Grew to Carr,
June 5 1924, and Grew to Gibson, June 5, 11, 1924, Grew Papers; Grew,
Turbulent Era, I, 626; Castle Diary, June 5, 10, 1924, Castle Papers. 
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ganize in defense of their autonomy and give some thought 
to justifying it. Their professionalism had come by way of 
ascription, the reference group being European diplomats, 
and they had not bothered to validate their claim as long as 
it went unchallenged. To the extent that American diplo­
macy had been professionally incomplete by failure to pro­
vide permanency, the Rogers Act substantially remedied the 
deficiency. But this solution created a new problem. Now 
simply asserting the professional nature of diplomacy was 
not enough. The Foreign Service embraced consuls as well, 
and if the diplomats were to retain their identity, they 
would need to make some distinction between the two types 
of activity, would need, in other words, to establish profes­
sional criteria. Yet the more sharply they marked off their 
own field, the more they contradicted the combining theme 
that was so prominent in reform sentiment and the official 
State Department position. The problem is reflected in a 
speech Grew made to new Foreign Service Officers in 1926. 
He said: "I only wish I could give each of you, in addition 
to your commission, a roll of parchment tied up with a red 
ribbon conferring on you the honorable degree of Doctor of 
Foreign Affairs, for certainly the Foreign Service is just ex­
actly as much a profession as law or medicine or the minis­
try." 144 What he undoubtedly meant and wanted to say in 
place of "Foreign Service" was "diplomacy" because he had 
referred only a few months earlier to "the consular and dip­
lomatic professions," and because he derived his satisfac­
tion from capping diplomacy as a profession in the old 
sense.145 But of course these were Foreign Service Officers, 
most of whom would start in consulates and not all of whom 
144. Speech by Grew at Foreign Service Officers Luncheon, May 3, 
1926, Grew Papers. 
145. Radio talk by Grew, February 24, 1926, Grew Papers. 
 171 WALDO H. HEINRICHS, JR.
would end in diplomacy, and so an adjustment was neces­
sary. 
Professional distinctions were hard to make for other rea­
sons as well. It was difficult to apply a professional classifi­
cation to the intellectual content of diplomacy. As a close 
student of the problem, himself a diplomat, admitted, "The 
technical knowledge peculiar to the Foreign Service is lim­
ited and may be acquired with relative ease and in a rela­
tively short period of time. . . . "  1 4  6 At the same time, di­
plomacy was as much a matter of personality as intellect, 
embracing a variety of talents in dealing with people. 
Furthermore, so far as diplomacy served the ideal of accom­
modating differences between nations, the postwar years of 
nonentanglement were a discouraging time to advertise that 
service. 
Operating under these paradoxes, constraints, and limita­
tions, the diplomats presented a confusing and ambiguous 
professional image. Generally they preferred the business 
approach, contending that diplomacy no less than consular 
work procured dollar benefits. Indeed, according to Grew, 
it was eminently business-like. Like any profession it had 
undergone change and was no longer mysterious, but 
straightforward and practical, organized like a corporation 
to maximize efficiency. By thus striving to overcome preju­
dice and conform to the business mentality, Grew suggested 
a service his profession performed but not why it alone could 
perform it. Pierre Boal, a diplomatic secretary, used the 
business analogy but managed to insert a distinction by 
likening the diplomat to a corporation's general counsel in 
a foreign country and the consul to its local agent.1" Gibson 
146. Shaw, "American Foreign Service," p. 325. 
147. Heinrichs, Grew, p. 103; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 152; 
radio talk by Grew, February 26, 1926, Grew Papers; Boal to John J. 
Rogers, August 2, 1923, Gibson Papers. 
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alone rejected the notion of diplomacy as a business propo­
sition. He told Congress it was a "specialized profession" 
requiring long experience, and one for which the business­
man was rarely prepared. No one would allow an operation 
on himself by someone equipped only with common sense. 
When it came to specifying the precise function of the 
diplomat, however, he also took refuge in analogy. His 
diplomat was a weather forecaster who plotted a politi­
cal barometric pressure chart from a variety of phenomena, 
while his consul reported varied but not necessarily related 
commercial phenomena.148 Someone suggested that in a daily 
paper the diplomat's work would appear as a signed article 
on page one and the consul's in the market page or want 
ads.149 Another comparison was between a carpenter and a 
plumber, with the diplomat identified with the craftsman, 
the carpenter.150 These analogies implied a superior-inferior 
relation between diplomats and consuls. Together they were 
hardly likely to clarify the public's mind about the unique 
function of the diplomat. 
The diplomats of this generation had a common concep­
tion of the qualifications necessary for their way of life. In­
tellect was less important than personality, and personality 
was related to social status. They looked for flexibility, 
adaptability, imagination, a broad liberal education, "per­
sonal cultivation," "taste for study," "worldliness." Rather 
than "mere knowledge," they wanted knowledge as a way of 
mingling, as a means of "social and intellectual intercourse 
with cultured people." When it came to personal qualities 
such as tact, bearing, and poise, they had in mind the gen­
tlemanly ideal. Thus Grew spoke of the "inborn suavity, 
gracefulness of movement and lightness of touch" possessed 
148. Gibson testimony, Hearings on H.R. 17 and 6357, pp. 41-42, 95-98. 
149. Memorandum, n.a., n.d., Box 14—1A, Gibson Papers. 
150. Grew to Albert Ruddock, December 11, 1919, Grew Papers. 
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by members of Boston's exclusive Somerset Club. When 
Wright, Gibson, and Castle mentioned "breeding" and Grew 
"background," they referred to their own upper-class up­
bringing and schooling.151 The younger one learned lan­
guages the better, to the point where Grew worried that his 
youngsters were learning English before French. English 
should be written with the "old courtesy and grace of style 
and expression." 152 Let it be said that the diplomats empha­
sized hard work, loyalty, forcefulness, frankness, and initia­
tive, too, that they were in many respects admirable men, 
and that the qualities they stressed had worked well for 
them and, broadly defined, would always be associated with 
diplomacy. Nonetheless, consuls by and large did not come 
from "homes with tradition" in Gibson's sense. Upper-class 
membership implicitly formed these definitions. Underlying 
the diplomats' professional criteria was a status-defense 
mechanism. After all, the Diplomatic Service would hardly 
be a club, to say nothing of Wilson's "pretty good club," if 
just anyone were let in. 
During the first two and one-half years of the Foreign 
Service, the diplomats mostly succeeded in having their own 
way. The more attractive career with entrance only at the 
bottom eminently suited their needs. Candidates appeared 
for the written examination in numbers that exceeded ex­
pectations.153 The diplomats regarded this as a preliminary 
151. Grew address to Foreign Service Officers School, April 25, 1925, 
Grew to Senator Frank B. Willis, May 14, 1926, Grew to Drescl, Janu­
ary 28, 1920, Grew to Francis Peabody, December 30, 1925, Minutes of 
Foreign Service Personnel Board Meetings, June 13, November 24, 1925, 
November 4, 1926, January 11, 1927, Grew Papers; Wright to Milton 
Conover, May 2, 1925, File 120.1121/11, State Department Archives; Wil­
son, Diplomacy As a Career, p. 33; Hearings on H.R. 17 and 6357, p. 52;
Gibson to Wilson, October 15, 1924, Wilson Papers; Castle Diary, October
9, 1922, Castle Papers. 
152. Enclosure in Grew to Gibson, November 12, 1923, and Grew to his 
mother, October 18, 1919, and Grew speech at Foreign Service Officers 
Luncheon, May 3, 1926, Grew Papers. 
153. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 202. 
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screening, however, because it placed too great an emphasis 
on memorization of facts, and they sought to keep the pass­
ing score low. The crucial test for fitness was the oral exami­
nation where "mentality" and personality could be ex­
plored.154 They strongly resisted the admission of women, 
and as for blacks, "we shall have to fail them . .  . on the 
ground that they do not possess the necessary qualifications 
for the Service."155 The diplomats opposed establishment of 
a special academy for the Foreign Service on the ground 
that diplomacy could not be taught but had to be learned 
by experience.156 Nevertheless, Grew liked to think of the 
new Foreign Service School as a form of postgraduate pro­
fessional training.157 The training period was extended from 
one month to six or eight months, and in addition to bu­
reaucratic orientation and technical instruction, recruits re­
ceived lectures on the art of political reporting by Allen 
Dulles and on history, problems, and policy in sensitive 
areas such as China, Central America, and the Soviet Un­
ion. Other topics included economic problems, disarma­
ment, and international organization. Wright gave a talk in 
which he urged them to build their vocabularies, pointing 
out that the "average cultivated" Englishman had one-third 
to one-half more words at his command than the Ameri­
can.158 From the school the new officers went to consulates, 
154. Milton Conover to Wright, May 2, 1925, and Wright to Conover,
May 8, 1925, File 120.1121/11, State Department Archives; Memorandum
from Grew, October 5, 1925, Grew Papers; Ilchman, Professional Diplo­
macy, p. 206. 
155. Grew Diary, October 31, 1924. On the admission of women see 
also: Grew Diary, January 14, 1925, Memorandum, Grew to Wright, Jan­
uary 19, 1925, and Grew to Gibson, March 25, April 29, May 20, 1925,
Grew Papers. 
156. Memorandum by H. P. Fletcher, April 25, 1921, File 120.1/67, 
State Department Archives; Wilson, Diplomacy As a Career, p. 20. 
157. Talk by Grew at Foreign Service School, October 27, 1926, File

E-623, State Department Archives.

158. Talks by Wright, October 4, 1926, and others, File E-623, State 
Department Archives; James B. Stewart, "Foreign Service Officer Training 
School," Foreign Service Journal X (1933), 224-27. 
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where the most suitable were selected for diplomacy. In 
making assignments in the diplomatic branch, Grew pre­
ferred to hold open positions for these promising new men 
rather than fill them by transfer of established consular of­
ficers.159 
Above the entering classes, the Personnel Board kept the 
two branches almost entirely distinct. Only a token number 
of interchanges occurred, four diplomats to consular work 
and six consuls to diplomatic. Personnel evaluation in the 
Diplomatic Service had been so haphazard that there was no 
basis of comparison with consuls for promotion purposes. 
Consequently, while uniform standards were being devel­
oped, the Board kept separate promotion lists.160 Concern 
for morale in the diplomatic branch repeatedly cropped up 
in discussions of the Board regarding promotions and as­
signments. Hearing rumblings of discontent from the field, 
particularly from Gibson, Grew sent letters to all posts in­
viting statements of grievances.161 The diplomatic side of the 
board could not prevent inclusion of consuls in lists recom­
mending for minister, but Grew disapproved nonetheless. 
On one occasion he contended that consuls by their training 
and experience tended to rely too much on instructions and 
to use too little initiative, and were therefore generally less 
suitable to head a mission than diplomats who steadily 
trained for the post.162 
In spite of their favorable position, the diplomats balked 
at any tightening of the reins. Gibson complained that the 
board was authoritarian and remote. He urged it to minimize 
formal administration and maximize the "human side." The 
board should give special and sympathetic consideration to 
159. Grew to Grant-Smith, May 15, 1926, Grew Papers. 
160. Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 106, 116. 
161. Minutes of Foreign Service Personnel Board meetings, Marrh 21, 
December 7, 1925, December 16, 1926, January 11, 1927, Grew Papers; 
Gibson to Grew, July 10, 1925, Wilson Papers; Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 116-17. 
162. Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 118-19. 
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the problems of the individual. Men in the field should feel 
free to blow off steam and never doubt they were valued 
members of the "family," the "club." One of the first diplo­
matic inspectors objected to revealing adverse comments to 
the individuals involved. Lessons should be administered 
gently, he advised, preferably by example. He had no desire 
to play schoolmaster to men roughly his own age. These 
were sensitive people who could be led but not driven, he 
warned. Gibson rejected a new efficiency report form based 
on the consular system, with percentile ratings of enumer­
ated qualities. He considered it absurd to attempt a mathe­
matical estimation of tact, courage, loyalty, and so forth. 
Honesty, sobriety, and morality should be taken for granted 
unless evidence to the contrary existed. He suggested addi­
tional categories particularly relevant to diplomacy such as 
what sort of first impression a man makes, the appropriate­
ness of his style of living, and his standing in the mission, 
the Diplomatic Corps, with residents, and with traveling 
Americans.163 Additional criteria would of course make a 
common basis for evaluating performance in the Foreign 
Service all the more difficult to achieve. Gibson represented 
the reaction of a loosely organized, individualistic, informal, 
collegial group to extension of the bureaucratic pattern of 
organization. 
The autonomy of the diplomatic branch lasted until "the 
famous State Department smash of 1927." "* The trouble 
began with a side effect of separate promotion lists. Resigna­
tions and the weeding-out of incompetents resulted in a 
faster rate of promotion among diplomats than consuls. By 
163. Gibson to Wilson, October 15, 1924, Tuly 10, October 23, 1925, 
Frederick Dolbeare to Wilson, June 2, 1925, Wilson Papers. See also Grew
Diary, October 11, 1924, Grew to Dolbeare, October 1, 1924, and Grew 
Memorandum, March 29, 1927, Grew Papers. 
164. Pearson and Allen, Washington Merry-Go-Round, p. 142. For de­
tails see Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 119-25. 
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1927 the rate for diplomats was about twice that for con­
suls, and the disparity was particularly great in the upper 
classes.165 Carr believed in substantial amalgamation but 
wanted to move toward it in an orderly way. Even so, he 
became increasingly distressed at the slowness of progress 
and the board's tenderness toward the diplomats. In May, 
1926, the board agreed to work toward a single promotion 
list; but by 1927 it had still not been adopted, and com­
plaints of consuls at the apparent favoritism shown diplo­
mats were beginning to stir congressmen.166 Then in Febru­
ary, 1927, the administration presented Congress a slate of 
nine high appointments to choice legations, an embassy, and 
assistant secretaryships. The list included Wright, Wilson, 
Gibson, Phillips, Bliss, Castle, and Harrison, as well as Fred­
erick Sterling and Francis White. It was a group chosen by 
Secretary Frank Kellogg not on the basis of Personnel 
Board recommendations but largely from personal familiar­
ity with the men. Whatever the basis of selection and how­
ever appropriate individually, appointment of that particu­
lar group at that time could not have been more ill-conceived. 
Not one consul was among them. All were wealthy, all ex­
cept Gibson graduates of Harvard, Yale, or Princeton, all 
except Castle career diplomats, and all except White active 
in promoting the interests of the diplomatic branch. The 
165. According to the State Department's estimate in June, 1927 (Kellofig to Congressman Charles Edwards, June 21, 1927, File 120.31/38,
State Department Archives), of 109 diplomats in service at the end of 1926,
76 had received promotions since the Rogers Act came into force; and of
380 consuls, 136 nad received promotions; or, respectively, 70 percent and
36 percent. Congress in reporting its investigation of the board's personnel
policies, arrived at a slightly different result (63 percent and 37 percent),
largely from using different figures for total strength. U.S. Senate, Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations, Reorganization and Improvement of the For­
eign Service, Sen. Rep. No. 1069, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 
1928), 3. 
166. Carr Diary, April 6, May 7, 1926, February 2, 1927, Carr Papers;
Congressman Edwards to Kellogg, June 16, 1926, and attached memoranda,
File 120.1/114, State Department Archives. 
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diplomats had never presented so large and inviting a target. 
The diplomats were in no position to resist now. The 
February list became notorious, with Grew and Wilson pic­
tured as heads of an "inner circle of social diplomats which 
has set well-to-do diplomats over the hard-working consul." 
There was talk of repealing the Rogers Act and widespread 
public criticism of career diplomats in which the vice-
president himself joined. Periodicals and newspapers that 
had solidly supported Foreign Service reform reflected the 
general disillusion. As the Philadelphia Inquirer said on 
October 15, 1928, "The word 'career' possessed an honorable 
meaning up to about two years ago." The president was re­
ported deeply disturbed and began filling high posts from 
outside the service. The Senate delayed confirming the ap­
pointments (ultimately it confirmed them all) and launched 
an investigation. Meanwhile, the State Department moved 
to repair the damage. Its solicitor ruled that a single promo­
tion list was mandatory under the Rogers Act, whereupon 
the Board adopted one and promoted forty-four consuls in 
reparation for inequities under the double list. The diplo­
mats on the board moved to the field, Grew as ambassador 
to Turkey. Kellogg removed the undersecretary from the 
board and in assigning replacements ensured that those 
identified with the consuls outnumbered those identified 
with the diplomats four to two. Carr was named chairman.167 
The diplomats had decisively lost their fight for autonomy, 
and the development of the Foreign Service entered a new 
phase. 
It was a fight the diplomats stood very little chance of 
winning. They could not long defy the manifest intent of 
167. Grew, Turbulent Era, I, 698-99; Heinrichs, Grew, p. 124; De­
partmental Orders No. 407 and 437, April 23, 1927 and February 25, 1928,
and Kellogg Circular Instruction, March 2, 1928, File 120.11/2,4,5, State 
Department Archives. 
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Congress to fuse the two services. Their professional defense, 
constrained and limited to begin with, contained a large 
element of social caste and was to that extent pseudoprofes­
sional. Nevertheless, their efforts were not merely the last 
stand of a dying social order. In the idea of a powerful and 
independent chief of personnel they hit upon a device that 
the Foreign Service would come back to again and again to 
protect its autonomy. The diplomats entered the Foreign 
Service confidently and hopefully and stayed with it long 
enough for the esprit de corps and elite idea of the old Dip­
lomatic Service to attach themselves to the Foreign Serv­
ice. Finally, they bequeathed to the Foreign Service the 
idea of diplomacy as a profession. These civil servants would 
think of themselves as professionals not in the usual sense 
of individual specialists in a bureaucracy but as members of 
an integral profession within a bureaucracy. In important 
ways the Foreign Service reflected the Diplomatic Service, 
not its intended model the Consular Service. 
The Development of the Foreign Service, 1927-1946 
The "Diplomatic Scandal of 1927" opened a third phase in 
the development of American career diplomacy. It set the 
forces of bureaucratic reform in motion to remedy the de­
ficiencies of the Rogers Act. New legislation provided better 
compensation to ensure that the man without private income 
would suffer no disadvantage and safeguards against favorit­
ism in the administration of the Foreign Service. Carr moved 
into control and increased interchange of personnel to the 
point where the division between the branches was no longer 
significant. With reform carried as far as law and adminis­
tration permitted, the bureaucratic drive slackened, and the 
initiative gradually passed back to the professionals, not the 
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old group but younger men who identified themselves with 
the Foreign Service as a whole rather than with any seg­
ment of it. They grew increasingly restive under what 
seemed a rigid and unimaginative direction of their service 
and searched for a new professionalism devoid of social 
bias and providing a more substantial intellectual founda­
tion to justify a measure of self-administration. In 1937, 
when Carr finally relinquished control and departed as min­
ister to Czechoslovakia, the younger men moved into influ­
ential positions in the State Department hierarchy. At the 
end of World War II they were in a position to draft legis­
lation making the Foreign Service a largely distinct and self-
regulating agency. The Foreign Service Act of 1946, which 
embodied the views of these Foreign Service officers, 
marked the high point of professional autonomy in Ameri­
can diplomacy. 
In view of the public outcry at the conduct of the diplo­
mats on the Personnel Board, corrective action by Congress 
was surprisingly mild. A number of circumstances contrib­
uted to a remedial rather than a root-and-branch solution. 
No one favored a return to the spoils system, and Congress 
was naturally loath to concede that its original formula, the 
Rogers Act, was defective. Indeed, the evidence suggested 
not that the idea was wrong but that it had been perverted 
in practice. Action was delayed by a Senate investigation 
and the variety of reform proposals this inspired.168 In the 
meantime, the State Department had an opportunity to set 
its house in order and take some of the sting out of the at­
tack. Kellogg and Carr explained the circumstances of the 
February promotion list, exonerating the Personnel Board, 
and Carr used his influence to soften some of the more re­
168. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 196-99. For one alternative, 
the Porter Bill, see New York Times, Apr. 19, 1928. 
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strictive features of pending legislation.169 The result, the 
Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931, was a restatement of the 
Rogers Act with amendments to remedy its deficiencies.170 
Its negative and prohibitive features were balanced by con­
structive provisions to make the career more attractive. For 
example, it authorized special allowances for posts where 
the cost of living was substantially higher than in the United 
States. With these features, and reflecting as it did admin­
istrative changes already effected in the department, the 
act came as a welcome relief to the Foreign Service.171 
Those features that the diplomats found unattractive re­
lated to the administration of the Foreign Service. The 
Moses-Linthicum Act vested sole responsibility for its ad­
ministration in a Personnel Board composed of not more 
than three assistant secretaries, with the assistant secretary 
in charge of administration (Carr, of course) as chairman. 
This arrangement was in effect a statutory enactment of the 
Carr plan. The act further provided for a Division of For­
eign Service Personnel to handle housekeeping chores, to 
which no Foreign Service officer below Class I could be as­
signed. Assignment made an officer ineligible for rec­
ommendation for promotion to minister then and for three 
years thereafter. The chief of personnel might attend board 
meetings but could not vote, and had authority only of "a 
purely advisory character" over promotions and transfers. 
Every two years the chairman was to have a single promo­
169. Carr Diary, October 15, 1927, and Charles Bridgman Hosmer to 
Carr, February 19, 1931, Carr Papers; Grew, Turbulent Era, I, 704. 
170. "An Act for the Grading and Classification of Clerks in the Foreign 
Service . . . (Moses-Linthicum Act), 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931), 46 U.S.
Statues 1207 (February 23, 1931). 
171. Carr Diary, February 18, 1931. Wilson, Castle, and Grew all re­
acted favorably to the Moses Bill, which was substantially incorporated in
the final Act of 1931 (Wilson to Grew, June 5, 1928, and Castle to Grew,
May 12, 1928, Wilson Papers; Grew to Wright, June 14, 1928, Grew 
Papers). 
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tion list prepared rating all officers in the service according 
to their relative efficiency. After approval by the board and 
the secretary of state, the list could not be changed except 
by the same process of approval for reasons of conspicu­
ously meritorious conduct or serious misconduct recorded 
in the individual's efficiency record. Thus Congress dis­
posed, in extraordinary and even humiliating detail, of the 
problem of favoritism in the Foreign Service. Administra­
tion by legislation was directed in this case toward more 
effective bureaucratic control, but, of course, it could be 
used for the opposite purpose, as a means of isolating the 
Foreign Service from control by the department and ensur­
ing its self-regulation. 
Carr ran the Foreign Service with a firm hand, deter­
mined finally to achieve consolidation. He had a position of 
unique authority, ranking above other assistant secretaries, 
with responsibility for virtually all the department's activi­
ties except foreign policy. He supervised the examination 
system and training school of the Foreign Service as well 
as managing its personnel.172 He strove constantly for com­
monalty in the service: a single set of regulations, commis­
sioning under both diplomatic and consular titles, and con­
solidation of diplomatic and consular work in capital cities. 
Under the new system, an ambassador could assign staff to 
either type of work as needed and through the head of his 
consular section supervise all the consuls in the country.173 
Service appointments to minister under President Hoover 
were generally to less-favored Latin American posts, and 
Carr was pleased to see Secretary Stimson deal severely 
with Leland Harrison for trying to beg off his assignment 
172. Carr Diary, November 23, 1934, Carr Papers; Crane, Carr, pp. 
304-5; Raymond Moley, "Shake-up," Newsweek X (July 17, 1937), 44. 
173. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 200; Childs, American For­
eign Service, pp. 79-80; Bames and Morgan, Foreign Service, pp. 229-30. 
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to Uruguay.1" Franklin Roosevelt seemed no less inclined to 
discipline the diplomats. He instructed Carr to speed up 
interchange of officers, to extend it to the highest ranks, and 
to inform diplomats of pre-Rogers vintage that service in a 
consulate was considered a normal part of training for 
ministerial rank.175 As a result, more and more diplomats 
found themselves in unaccustomed roles in faraway places, 
the counselor of embassy in Berlin as consul general in Cal­
cutta and the counselor of embassy in Paris as consul general 
in Beirut. The momentum for consolidation became irrevers­
ible. By the end of the thirties the Foreign Service was a 
monolithic organization. Whatever distinctions remained be­
tween the two old services lay in the unreachable area of 
personal relations. 
The period of Carr's greatest power proved to be his un­
happiest. He was nearing retirement, and it seemed the 
"great adventure" might elude him. He wanted a policy 
role under Kellogg but was denied it. He hoped for the un­
dersecretaryship in 1931, but Stimson appointed his enemy 
Castle, explaining he required a policy man.176 Under Roo­
sevelt the post went to diplomats Phillips and Sumner 
Welles. No one mentioned Carr for an embassy. High rank 
made his work less satisfying. He was no longer personally 
managing the careers of consuls, and it was "painful" to 
note how little real understanding they had of his part in the 
new service.177 At the same time, broader responsibilities ex­
posed him to more criticism. Particularly distasteful was the 
174. Grew to Moffat, January 27, 1930, Grew Papers; Evan Young to 
Secretary of State, March 30, 1928, File 120/58, State Department Ar­
chives. On Harrison: Carr Diary, July 3, 1930, Carr Papers; Grew to 
Arthur Bliss Lane, May 24, 1932, Grew Papers. 
175. Carr Diary, June 28, July 6, 1934, January 15, 1935, Carr Papers. 
176. Memorandum, Robert Olds to Frank B. Kellogg, June 29, 1928, 
Kellogg Papers, Minnesota Historical Society; Carr Diary, March 28, 1931,
Carr Papers. 
177. Carr Diary, May 3, 1926, Carr Papers. 
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task of effecting radical economies during the depression. 
Demoralizing cuts in salaries and allowances together with 
the depreciation of the dollar meant income losses as high as 
fifty percent for some officers. Carr pleaded and warned, but 
loyally hacked away at the structure he had spent so many 
years building.178 How bitter it was, then, to be described in 
a national magazine as an official who was popular on the 
Hill because he never begged very hard for appropria­
tions! 179 
For Carr the administration of the Foreign Service under 
Roosevelt was a nightmare. He detested his colleagues on 
the Personnel Board, Assistant Secretaries Welles and R. 
Walton Moore. They formed one of those unmatched teams 
Roosevelt placed in a department to see which man pulled 
hardest and to open up options. Welles was the personifica­
tion of the social diplomat, Groton and Harvard like the 
president, one of the "old 1718 crowd," and owner of Oxon 
Hill Manor, which, Carr had heard, kept twenty gardeners 
busy. Welles would secure presidential intervention in be­
half of certain diplomats while Moore, who shared Carr's 
antipathy for social diplomats, aroused him no less by seek­
ing help outside the board against them, from the field, Con­
gress, the secretary, and the president. Undersecretary 
Phillips had his own problems, and Secretary Hull seemed 
uninterested and diffident. In the circumstances it was im­
possible to administer the service methodically, and the 
board became "a constant humiliation."180 Still, Carr hung on 
178. Ibid., January 7, 1935; File 120.31/182-213, State Department 
Archives; Herman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 229-31; Crane, Can, pp. 
314-17. 
179. Herring, "Department of State," p. 228. 
180. Carr Diary, June 20, 1934, March 25, 1935, Carr Papers. On Can's
difficulties in the administration of the Foreign Service: Carr Diary, 1934­
37, passim. On Moore see also: Robert Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat: 
The Life of William E. Dodd (New York, 1968), pp. 237-38. 
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grimly past retirement age until 1937, when the president 
asked him to go as minister to Czechoslovakia, figuring, Carr 
supposed, the Germans would get there first. After the ap­
pointment, Carr noticed how quickly people changed their 
greeting. And so, after forty-five years in the department, he 
left, nursing the thought that perhaps the machine would 
not run so smoothly when he was gone. 
These demoralizing circumstances had their effect on 
Carr's leadership of the Foreign Service. He was most effec­
tive when his responsibilities were clearly defined and he 
had the support of strong secretaries of state with orderly 
administrative habits, like Root, Hughes, and Stimson. Now 
lonely eminence, crisscrossing lines of authority, and the 
whipsaw of powerful, aggressive personalities intensified 
Carr's insecurity. In 1936 Foreign Service Officer G. How-
land Shaw wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs describing ad­
ministration of the Service—by implication Carr's adminis­
tration—as rigid, unimaginative, and unresponsive.181 Such 
criticism only heightened Carr's anxieties. An article in 
Harper's of the type public officials must often suffer in si­
lence, criticizing him for playing favorites and remaining 
insensitive to the glaring inadequacies of the Service, pro­
voked Carr to consideration of action for libel.182 The inse­
cure and threatened bureaucrat frequently responds with 
exaggerated bureaucratic, or "bureaupathic," behavior, a 
form of ritualism characterized by undue emphasis on com­
181. Shaw, "American Foreign Service." Shaw, in an interview with 
the author, January 6, 1959, claimed that Carr sought to demote him for 
publication of the article. The allegation has not been verified, but Can-
does note in his diary (November 14, 1935) that he placed before the Per­
sonnel Board a memorandum on the Shaw article and secured their approval
of it. Shaw in the same conversation with the author claimed that Carr 
"grew very rigid." 
182. Herring, "Department of State"; Memorandum, Keith Merrill to 
Carr, February 2, 1937, Carr Papers. 
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pliance with rules and stubborn resistance to change.183 Carr 
may well have been such a case. He was caught in a circle: 
the more threatened he felt, the more rigid he became, and 
the more criticism he evoked. Thus the Foreign Service was 
being subjected not merely to an extension of the bureau­
cratic pattern of the old Consular Service, but to such a pat­
tern in exaggerated form. The result was growing dissatisfac­
tion around which formed a new professional movement. 
In 1937 the Foreign Service consisted of seven hundred 
officers divided into eight classes and three probationary 
grades. It was more geographically representative than the 
Diplomatic Service had been, and the distortions—over­
representation of the East and West coasts and urban states 
and underrepresentation of the South—were not a significant 
liability.184 The defeat and consequent discouragement of the 
diplomats in 1927 as well as the temptations of business led 
to an "appalling" rate of resignations in the 1927-29 period.185 
Those who remained accepted the new discipline and ori­
entation of the service. With the depression came financial 
hardship from budget slashing, but there were now few jobs 
outside the service. Consequently, the resignation rate for 
1930-39 was a low 1.3 percent.186 Foreign Service officers re­
tained jobs, but prospects of promotion were discouraging. 
Due to the large intake of the postwar years and the rapid 
promotions of 1924-27, the top four classes were young, close 
to each other in median age, and thus far from retirement.187 
Movement upward slowed. The increase in service ministers 
183. Victor A. Thompson, Modem Organization: A General Theory 
(New York, 1968), pp. 152-69. 
184. "Statistical Survey of the Foreign Service," American Foreign Serv­
ice Journal XVI (1939), 374. 
185. Editorial by Dana Munro, ibid., VI (1929), 410; Moffat Diary, 
April 2, 1929, Moffat Papers. 
186. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 223. 
187. Selden Chapin, "The American Foreign Service." American For­
eign Service Journal XIV (1937), 748-49. 
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and ambassadors under Hoover and Roosevelt was slight, 
from 41 to 48 percent, a numerical difference of nine.188 Slow 
turnover at the top and statutory limitation on the numbers 
in each class, to say nothing of budgetary limitations, virtu­
ally halted career advancement. The Foreign Service of 1937 
was different from the old Diplomatic Service in a number of 
ways. It was committed to the career by necessity if not by 
choice. It was more disciplined, more enured to hardship, 
less buoyant, and less illusioned. 
The significant distinction in the Foreign Service after 
1927 was not vertical, between consuls and diplomats, but 
horizontal, between pre-Rogers and post-Rogers officers. By 
1937 the latter comprised more than a third of the Service, 
occupying that portion from Class VI down. This new group, 
having no stake in the quarrels of the older officers, indenti­
fied themselves exclusively with the Foreign Service. It had a 
distinct character that differentiated it from the older groups. 
The junior officer group was considerably better educated 
than the old Consular Service and somewhat better than the 
Diplomatic Service. The number holding college degrees in 
entering examination groups rose to 91.3 percent in 1939, and 
the number with no college experience dwindled to less than 
1 percent. They were less fashionably educated than the 
Diplomatic Service officers. Approximately one-half had at­
tended high school and one-third boarding school, contrast­
ing with three-fourths from boarding schools in the older 
service. One-third had attended Harvard, Yale, or Princeton, 
compared with two-thirds in the Diplomatic Service. Pos­
sessing the means and motivation to go to college indicates 
a predominantly upper-middle-class group as contrasted 
with the stipulation of private income that marked the 
upper-class origins of the Diplomatic Service. The upper­
188. "Career vs. Non-Career Appointments, 1906-1940," ibid., XVII 
(1940), 679. 
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middle class was the traditional recruiting ground of the 
professions. 
This was a group with strong career motivation and 
professional orientation. They were likely to have taken 
social science courses and in some cases prepared themselves 
specifically by attending Foreign Service schools like 
Georgetown. Two-thirds, rising to three-fourths, had taken 
graduate work. Their entering age was younger: having a 
well-established career to pursue, they were less experimen­
tal in choosing the Foreign Service. To secure entrance they 
had survived keen competition. In contrast to the three or 
four dozen who generally took the Diplomatic Service 
examination, the numbers appearing for the Foreign Service 
examination ranged from 168 to 732 depending on the 
fortunes of the service and the economy. It became a more 
discriminating examination in 1931 when Stimson retained 
Joseph C. Green, a former Princeton professor, as secretary 
of the Board of Examiners. Green disposed of the Civil 
Service examination, which stressed factual knowledge, and 
asked a committee of experts in international law, diplo­
matic usage, educational theory, and testing to draw up a 
new one that placed greater emphasis on intellectual capac­
ity. He also reduced the proportion passing the examination 
from an average of 19.4 percent to an average of 5.5 per­
cent.189 In terms of motivation, preparation, and mental ca­
pacity this was a superior group of officers, an intellectual 
elite in contrast to the social elite of the Diplomatic Service. 
Upon entering the service, they had a number of oppor­
tunities for developing professional conceptions. A few were 
fortunate enough to secure area training. The department 
had long made provision for Chinese and Japanese language 
189. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service List, January 1, 1940 
(Washington, 1940); Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 162, 170, 
204-5, 218-22, 227, 236, 238-40; Who's Who in America. 
 189 WALDO H. HEINRICHS, JR.
training. Beginning in 1925 this was extended to Turkish, 
Arabic, Persian, and Slavic. In urging appropriation of 
funds, Kellogg pointed out that the break-up of empires 
made it necessary to prepare representatives to cope with 
exotic cultures. Under this program junior officers such as 
Raymond Hare and Charles Bohlen studied at the Ecole 
Nationale des Langues Vivantes Orientales in Paris, and 
George Kennan studied Russian language, literature, and 
history at the University of Berlin.190 At Istanbul, Counselor 
of Embassy G. Howland Shaw encouraged junior secretaries 
to file dispatches that carried beyond the normal require­
ments of political reporting and amounted to scholarly 
studies of Turkish life and institutions.191 Roosevelt economy 
measures apparently curtailed the programs, but the con­
cept of special training for service in non-European areas 
had been established, adding a new dimension to American 
career diplomacy. The rigorous experience brought a dis­
tinct intellectual commitment and sense of competency 
within the broad field of diplomacy. 
Junior officers would look in vain to the pre-Rogers diplo­
mats for professional leadership. The older diplomats were 
much in demand, in spite of 1927. As heads of mission, 
counselors, and division chiefs, the old Diplomatic Service 
managed much of the regular business of diplomacy in the 
thirties. Grew was Ambassador to Japan, Phillips to Italy, 
and Wilson briefly to Germany. As ambassadors they had 
graduated from the Foreign Service and were unresponsive 
to its current needs. The satisfaction of achieving career 
diplomacy was soured by defeat, disillusion, and humilia­
tion. They retained the conviction that the wrong approach 
190. Kellogg to Rep. Charles Edwards, January 13, 1927, File 120.1/116,
and File 120.377/1,6,7,52, State Department Archives; Kennan, Memoirs, 
pp. 23-24, 31-34; Ilchrnan, Professional Diplomacy, p. 240. 
191. Heinrichs, Grew, p. 160. 
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had prevailed, with the effect of imprisoning good men in 
irrelevant work.192 To battle for change was another thing. 
Republicans working for Democrats, Edwardians in a mass 
society, gentle civilizers in barbaric times, they could not 
accept, let alone comprehend or manipulate, their world.193 
They would do their duty, but for organizing and directing 
the Foreign Service they had no heart. 
The older generation served as teachers rather than lead­
ers. They were masters of technique and form. In the writing 
of diplomatic communications, they drummed into their 
secretaries the importance of precision, conciseness, clarity, 
an orderly structure of logic, and the avoidance of stylistic 
excrescences. It should be a matter of "professional pride" 
with any officer, Grew told his staff, to withhold his initials 
from a document until he was satisfied that its contents 
were as perfect as possible.194 MacMurray dealt with the 
ethics of the profession in the Foreign Service Journal. He 
insisted that diplomacy had a code of conduct as rigorous as 
any profession. Far from being an affair of duplicity, as 
people imagined, diplomacy had strict rules of play that the 
practitioner disregarded at the peril of contempt from his 
colleagues of other nations. This concern for reputation 
might arise from "guild spirit," the natural desire of a man to 
192. Grew Diary, March 20, 1928, and Grew to Arthur Bliss Lane, 
May 24, 1932, Grew Papers; Wilson to Grew, June 5, 1928, and to Hugh R. 
Wilson, Jr., September 17, 1936, Wilson Papers. Gibson, in "Diplomats Pay 
to Work," Saturday Evening Post CCIX (May 8, 1937), 25, worried about 
representation allowances and amateur ambassadors. 
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offer many illustrations of this state of mind. See for example Moffat Diary, 
March 16-18. August 14, 1931, Moffat Papers, and Alexander Kirk to Wil­
liam Bullitt, October 16, 1939, Wilson Papers, as well as Heinrichs, Grew, 
and William W. Kaufmann, "Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Ken­
nedy," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats, 1919­
1939 (Princeton, N.J., 1953), p. 680. 
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win the esteem of his particular group, but in any case no 
profession took more into account an individual's depend­
ability, loyalty, and scrupulosity. People would be amazed 
to learn, MacMurray continued, that the tradition of diplo­
macy involved not only fair play but positive helpfulness. 
Diplomacy, he concluded, was very much a human institu­
tion.195 
Young Foreign Service officers also learned their craft 
in subtler ways. Kennan writes of his debt to Alexander Kirk, 
under whom he served at Berlin in 1939-40. Kirk was old 
school, a junior to Grew in the same embassy during World 
War I. He was a wealthy and eccentric bachelor who in­
sisted that he entered diplomacy to spare his dear mother 
the trouble of having her bags inspected by customs. "Un­
intellectual as he was," says Kennan, "his instincts were 
very sound; and when one learned enough to see through 
the poses and to look for the deeper meaning of the quips, 
he was a good teacher."196 Kennan learned that how a 
diplomat went about his business was at least as important 
as what he sought to accomplish. Perhaps Kirk overstressed 
good form, and undoubtedly his conception of it was too 
exquisite for modern diplomacy. Nevertheless, ends and 
means were related in diplomacy, and Kirk, Grew, Gibson, 
and their generation helped mature the diplomatic personal­
ities of the younger men by directing their attention to the 
impression made on others, to ambiance, tone, and style. 
They served as models additionally by having a clear sense 
of who they were and what they stood for. That identity 
may not have suited the younger generation, but they 
profited from the example of self-confidence and the easy 
assurance in action that flowed from it. 
Joseph Grew further assisted by providing a definition of 
195. MacMurray, "The Ethics of Diplomacy," ibid., IX (1932), 3-8, 36. 
196. Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 112-15. 
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the professional diplomat broader than that of mere agent 
of his government. The public service ideal and individual 
sense of responsibility that characterized the Diplomatic 
Service at its best were strongly represented in Grew, and 
his decades of service abroad gave him an objective view of 
the attitudes and policies of his own country. He went to 
Japan as ambassador in 1932 determined to establish a 
solid basis for Japanese-American understanding, like an 
architect building a house to last forever. When that hope 
dimmed, he used another professional analogy, the physi­
cian trying to save his patient, the patient being neither 
Japan nor America but their relationship. In the years before 
Pearl Harbor he repeatedly urged both governments to 
begin resolving their differences, on occasion taking un­
authorized initiatives at Tokyo to "start the ball rolling 
toward peace."197 The circumstances were not promising, 
and Grew played the role of middleman so circumspectly 
toward the end that he weakened his purpose. Nevertheless, 
by obviously trying to be a peacemaker, Grew offered a 
conception of professional service with the strongest possi­
ble emphasis on altruism. 
One officer was willing—in fact, anxious—to lead the 
Foreign Service. He was Gardiner Howland Shaw, a Boston 
Brahmin, Harvard graduate, and member of the Somerset 
Club. Shaw entered the Diplomatic Service in 1918 and rose 
in twelve years to Class I in the Foreign Service. He was re­
garded as one of the most promising younger diplomats, 
sure to be minister and ambassador soon.198 A close friend of 
Grew, he admired the qualities Grew represented and fitted 
that type easily. Yet he was also different. Entering the 
197. Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 248, 253, 283, 291-99, 338-50. 
198. Undersecretary Robert Olds to Kellogg, July 12, 1928, Kellogg 
Papers; Who's Who m America; Department of State, Register, October 1, 
1939 (Washington, 1939). 
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service during the war, he never experienced courtier di­
plomacy. Entirely atypical was his scholarly bent: election 
to Phi Beta Kappa, graduate work at Harvard, and lifelong 
study in the fields of sociology, social psychology, and 
psychiatry. Furthermore, he was one of the first area spe­
cialists outside East Asia. Except for several brief stints at 
Paris, he served abroad only in Turkey, at his own insis­
tence.199 In Washington he was chief of the Near Eastern 
Affairs Division. Combining the social background and 
noblesse oblige of the older generation with the intellectual 
qualifications and interests of the new, he was the perfect 
bridge between them. 
Shaw acted from strong faith and conviction. A devout 
Roman Catholic and passionate humanist, he believed that 
life centered on a personal ideal built by the individual for 
himself that governed and directed experience. Intense in­
volvement with human beings, an involvement of seeing, 
caring, feeling, believing, giving, enriched and extended 
the fabric of the "intimate self." Success in living depended 
on the freest possible development of the personality ac­
cording to its own dictates, not society's judgment in terms 
of material rewards. In this ideal of individualism, the pro­
fession could be a source of satisfaction in life only to the 
extent that it had social value.200 Shaw's own ideal directed 
him down two paths of social action: a lifelong interest in 
prison reform and treatment of juvenile delinquency and 
improvement in the personnel management of the Foreign 
Service.201 
199. Shaw, "American Foreign Service," p. 327; Heinrichs, Grew, p. 
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The fundamental weakness of the Foreign Service was its 
inherent tendency to mediocrity, Shaw believed. The work 
as defined was routine, requiring neither superior skill nor 
intensive mental effort. In the important positions work was 
ill-defined, and the man made the job. The poorly educated, 
the insecure person attracted by the status and privileges of 
diplomacy, the "rigid, unimaginative bureaucrat," the "yes" 
man, got by easily enough. But the service needed officers 
who were not likely to fall into a rut, self-contained and self-
sustaining individualists with zest for life, imagination, and 
strong ambition. Shaw believed there was even room for the 
supreme individualist, forever dissenting, upsetting com­
placency, and laughing at solemnities, the man who was pre­
pared to take a calculated risk. Of course the Foreign Service 
officer required basic skills of thought and expression and an 
effective personality, but he must also possess "insatiable 
intellectual curiosity," independence of mind, and capacity 
for constant self-evaluation and criticism. Shaw felt that 
recruiting this type was not the main difficulty; the post-
Rogers Foreign Service officers were of excellent quality. 
The problem was management. By concentrating on organi­
zation and not on the man and his work, the leadership of 
vice-president and director of the Children's Village, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 
director of the National Conference of Juvenile Agencies, and member of
the boards of directors of the Prison Association of New York, the National 
Probation Association, the Boys' Club of New York, the National Commit­
tee for Mental Hygiene, and the executive committee of the National Jail
Association. The therapeutic approach to prisoners has the effect of trans­
forming prisons from commonweal organizations concerned with the pro­
tection of the public into service organizations, oriented primarily to the 
needs and interests of the prisoner "clients," and one consequence is a re­
duced dependence on bureaucratic procedures. See Blau ana Scott, Formal 
Organizations, p. 57. The same would apply more strongly to organizations 
dealing with young offenders. Shaw's connection with this therapeutic
movement suggests that he may have conceived of the Foreign Service in
the same way and sought to add the dimension of a service organization
concerned with the needs of its officer "clients" to a bureaucratic common­
weal organization. 
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the service reinforced the tendency to mediocrity and 
stultified the capable young officers it already possessed. 
The answer was administration that provided an atmos­
phere conducive to the development of each officer accord­
ing to his interests and abilities. Shaw deplored the Jack-of­
all-trades approach that put diplomats into consular work 
and vice versa. Consular work required organizing and 
administrative capacity, whereas diplomatic work called 
for more "individuality, initiative and imagination." The 
man who could do anything usually did nothing well. Shaw 
suggested a service organized by type of work, for example, 
administrative (mostly consular), economic-financial, re­
search, negotiation, and the area specialties. He also sug­
gested an easier entrance examination followed by ten years 
of experimentation by the junior officer in various lines of 
work, during which he would find out what he was best at. 
Then would come a second, searching examination in finan­
cial, economic, legal, and political subjects which would 
determine advancement to the higher grades. 
His idea of specialization combined bureaucratic and 
professional modes with emphasis on the latter. More sophis­
ticated functional specialization fully accorded with the bu­
reaucratic pattern. However, organizational needs would 
not necessarily fit individual competencies. Shaw valued the 
development of the individual according to his own dictates 
and capacities. Specialization on that principle would require 
some adjustment of the needs of the organization to those 
of the individual, contrary to the bureaucratic rationale. 
Furthermore, advancement was based on further specializa­
tion rather than capacity to direct the activities of others. 
Indeed, if administrative work was "ready-made," as Shaw 
defined it, competence in that field would tend to defeat 
advancement. The cream of the service would be those who 
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had developed an esoteric knowledge, an intellectual elite 
oriented more professionally than bureaucratically.202 
Shaw would professionalize the service by strengthening 
its professional organization, the American Foreign Service 
Association. Established in 1924 for active and retired 
officers, the association had no formal connection with the 
government, ran itself on an elective basis, and published a 
monthly journal. The Foreign Service Journal was usually 
a gossipy house organ only fitfully taking an interest in the 
larger needs and interests of the service.203 In 1935 Shaw 
sought to revive the Journal with a letter to the editor in 
which he said: 
Foreign Service is a profession, the purpose of which is to 
render certain public services. If this definition is correct 
then it logically follows that the Foreign Service Journal 
should possess the characteristics of a professional journal 
and these are the very characteristics which, it seems to me, 
it does not now possess. Members of a profession, as a rule, 
do a certain amount of thinking concerning their work and 
concerning methods by which it can be improved. The results 
of this thinking they are anxious to discuss with their col­
leagues, orally and in writing. In the case of the Foreign 
Service, the members of which are scattered all over the 
world, this discussion should be carried on in the Foreign 
Service Journal.20* 
At first the response was disappointing, but later issues 
offered more reviews of books dealing with diplomacy, a re­
202. Shaw, "American Foreign Service"; Editorial by Shaw, "Why Go 
Into the Foreign Service," American Foreign Service Journal VII (1930), 
27; Shaw, "The Individualist and the Foreign Service," ibid., IX (1932), 
218; Shaw, "The Foreign Service: What Is It and How to Prepare for It," 
ibid., XV (1938), 40; Shaw, "Foreign Service Personnel," ibid., 172; Grew 
Diary, August 22, 1930, Grew Papers. 
203. See Seldin Chapin's criticism of the Journal in "American Foreign 
Service," American Foreign Service Journal XIV (1937), p. 748. 
204. Letter to the Editor by Shaw, ibid., XII (1935), 328. 
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print of an article by Harold Nicolson on the British Foreign 
Service, and articles from the field, two of them by junior 
Foreign Service officers, calling for more specialization and 
in-service professional training. One of these younger offi­
cers, Selden Chapin, dealt extensively with recruitment, pro­
motion, and administration and called for freer discussion of 
professional problems.205 That same year Shaw entered into a 
position of direct influence in the association with his elec­
tion to chairman of the executive committee. 
Shaw's second move was to secure control of the adminis­
tration of the Foreign Service. A "significant step towards a 
more democratic system of personnel administration," he 
argued, would be to "give to the Service a measure of real 
self-government." He publicly attacked its current adminis­
tration in January, 1936, with a prize essay in a contest spon­
sored by a retired old-school diplomat, Robert Woods Bliss. 
The essay, which appeared in Foreign Affairs, was a compre­
hensive statement of what he felt was wrong with the service 
and what corrective steps should be taken.206 In November of 
that year he sought Carr's support for the position of chief of 
the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, the position in 
which the incumbent was ineligible for promotion at the 
time and for three years after. Needless to say, Carr opposed 
him.207 Then in 1937, with the world crisis deepening, Roo­
sevelt decided on a major shuffling of the State Department's 
command. He settled on Welles to replace Phillips as under­
secretary, chose Hugh Wilson as a policy assistant secretary, 
and sent Carr to thefield.208 The old Diplomatic Service was 
205. Harold Nicolson, "The British Foreign Service," ibid. XIII (1936), 
429 ff.; George V. Allen, "The Utility of a Trained and Permanent Foreign 
Service," ibid. 5ff.; Chapin, "American Foreign Service," pp. 643 ff. and 
718 ff.; "Saturn," "Field Notes on Service Needs," ibid. XV (1938), 
199-200. 
206. Shaw, "American Foreign Service," pp. 323-33. 
207. Carr Diary, November 14, 15, 1936, April 21, 1937, Carr Papers. 
208. Moley, "Shake-up," p. 44. 
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once again respectable. As Carr's replacement Roosevelt 
selected George S. Messersmith, a highly regarded Foreign 
Service officer who had risen from the consular ranks to be­
come minister to Austria and whose reports on the threat of 
Nazism had been outstanding.209 The new chief of Foreign 
Service Personnel under Messersmith was Shaw. 
In the four years that remained before World War II, the 
Foreign Service sought to recruit officers of the highest intel­
lectual caliber. Shaw encouraged a broad liberal arts back­
ground with specialization in the social sciences, particularly 
social psychology and sociology.210 He argued that the mod­
ern diplomat must consider international relations from a 
broader point of view than classical political science and 
economics. Behavioral scientists like Harold Lasswell offered 
valuable insights into nations' tendencies to pathological 
conduct and ways of resisting such tendencies.211 At the same 
time, Messersmith and Shaw strongly discouraged talk of a 
national academy of foreign affairs on the order of West 
Point and Annapolis. A service academy would encourage 
premature vocational education, Shaw warned.212 Mean­
while, mathematical reasoning and manipulation of symbols 
replaced arithmetic in the entrance examination; questions 
demanded more analysis and written exposition.213 Experts 
209. Robert Dallek, "Beyond Tradition: The Diplomatic Careers of 
William E. Dodd and George S. Messersmith, 1933-1938," South Atlantic 
Quarterly LXVI (1967), 236-37. 
210. Shaw, "The Foreign Service: What Is It and How to Prepare for 
It," pp. 41-42. 
211. "The Modern Diplomat," by "H," Foreign Affairs XV (April, 
1937), 513. Comparison with Shaw's other articles strongly suggests that 
he wrote it. Shaw, "The Foreign Service: What Is It and How to Prepare 
For it," p. 42. 
212. Memoranda, Shaw to George S. Messersmith, April 18, 1938, and 
Messersmith to Cordell Hull, April 13, 1938, File 120.313/68-1/2, State 
Department Archives. 
213. Memoranda, Joseph C. Green to Shaw, September 14, 1937, and 
Green to Messersmith, February 6, 1939, File 120.1121/139.152A, State 
Department Archives. 
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scrutinized the oral examination and found wide variations 
in the judgments of examiners, but were at a loss to discover 
a more scientific method of evaluation.214 
Within the service the spirit verged on the Utopian. At the 
Training School, officers just back from their first tour lec­
tured on the position of the Quichua Indian in the social 
structure of Ecuador, the labor movement in Mexico, minor­
ities and irredentism in Hungary, and Sanskrit as a cultural 
force in the Near East and Indo-China.215 Shaw pressed his 
scheme of matching the functional requirements of posts 
with data he was accumulating on the capabilities, health, 
morals, family condition, and preferences of officers, whom 
he urged to come and talk freely about "all their problems" 
without the slightest fear that anything they said might be 
used against them. He in turn would tell them their general 
standing, especially if their efficiency ratings were beginning 
to slip. With funds once again available for university in­
struction, Shaw assigned a dozen or so specialists, mostly in 
economics, to Harvard, Georgetown, Chicago, Princeton, 
and New York University. He hoped to extend the program 
to other fields, and one junior officer urged that up to thirty 
or forty men a year be permitted to use their leaves of ab­
sence for full-time university study without specification as 
to field; but there were practical limitations even in the Shaw 
216 era.
The larger interests of the Foreign Service were prosper­
ing as well. With an improving economy and deepening 
214. Secretary Hull to Professor Carl C. Brigham, April 28, 1939 and
enclosed Memorandum on the Oral Examinations, File 120.1121/158, State
Department Archives. 
215. David T. Ray, "Activities of the Foreign Service Officers' Training 
School," American Foreign Service Journal XVI (1939), 668. 
216. Shaw, "Foreign Service Personnel," 139-40, 172-73; File 
120.378/24-33, State Department Archives; James W. Gantenbein, 
"Study by Foreign Service Officers in American Universities," American 
Foreign Service Journal XVI (1939), 541, 562-63. 
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world crisis, Congress eased appropriations and officers ad­
vanced more rapidly. By the time of Pearl Harbor an average 
of 45 percent of each of the top four classes had received an 
appointment within two years and only 20 percent had been 
in class longer than four years.217 In 1939 Messersmith won a 
battle Carr had been fighting for years: under the Reorgani­
zation Act of that year the president incorporated the at­
tache services of the Departments of Commerce and Agri­
culture into the Foreign Service, which finally became the 
only foreign service of the United States.218 Shaw, who was 
appointed assistant secretary of state for administration in 
1941, worked to overcome the public image of the service as 
a rich man's club by providing figures showing the wide geo­
graphical distribution of candidates and the large number of 
colleges and universities represented. In the new "stream­
lined" Foreign Service, the argument went, a man was more 
likely to be of modest means, or even poor, than wealthy, and 
was as likely to be a graduate of a middle western university 
as of Harvard. It would have been delusive to suppose that 
the service had more than a tenuous hold on the affections of 
the American people, but favorable comment on its more 
representative and democratic character did appear.219 As a 
result of these developments, the Foreign Service on the 
eve of World War II was stable, confident, and improving. 
This was perhaps the most favorable position it would ever 
achieve. 
217. Department of State, Foreign Service List, October 1,1941 (Wash­
ington, 1941). 
218. Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, pp. 222-23; Ilchman, Profes­
sional Diplomacy, pp. 241-43. On Messersmith's role see File 120.1/304­
389, State Department Archives. 
219. Joseph H. Baird, "Professionalized Diplomacy" (extracted from 
Washington Star, Aug. 6, 1939), American Foreign Service Journal XVI 
(1939), pp. 542-43; Ellery C. Stowell, "The Appointment of Assistant 
Secretary of State G. Howland Shaw and Our Foreign Service," (reprinted 
from American Journal of International Law, April, 1941), American For­
eign Service Journal XVIII (1941), 632-33, 655-66; Washington Post, 
Nov. 24, 1940. 
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The war disrupted the pattern of orderly growth of an 
elite career service. Closing of posts in war zones, emergency 
needs, and proliferation of new functions prevented rational 
matching of needs and capacities. New demands found the 
service understrength. It has grown too slowly in the prewar 
years, only 30 percent since the Rogers Act, as a result of 
economy measures and highly selective recruitment.220 With 
examinations suspended for the duration and officers subject 
to the draft beginning in 1944, the career service actually 
declined in strength, from 833 officers in 1939 to 785 in 1945. 
The Foreign Service Auxiliary, a temporary force, supplied 
staff for cultural, informational, and economic work in the 
higher ranks and consular work in the lower ranks.221 Al­
though the auxiliary officers were temporary, much of their 
work remained permanent. Clearly, in the postwar world 
the United States would have vast new responsibilities and 
interests requiring greatly enlarged overseas representation. 
The question was whether the Foreign Service should con­
duct these activities, and if so, how it should expand to 
undertake them. 
Despite wartime difficulties, the Foreign Service emerged 
in a favorable position to map its future. In 1944 Shaw re­
tired from government and leadership passed to Selden 
Chapin, a graduate of St. Paul's School and Annapolis, and 
one of the first to enter the Foreign Service under the Rogers 
Act. A specialist in Latin American affairs with the naval offi­
cer's strong sense of professionalism as well as a long-stand­
ing interest in the welfare of the service, Chapin was a fitting 
successor. Assisting him were Julian Harrington, a consular 
220. For example, of 483 who took the written examinations in 1940-41, 
only 43 were appointed. Stowell, "The Appointment of Assistant Secretary
Shaw," p. 633. In that crisis year the Service in all likelihood could have
secured funds for as many new officers as it felt it needed. See also Editorial,
American Foreign Service Journal XXI (1944), 74. 
221. "Personnel Inventory of the Foreign Service," ibid., XXII (1945), 
13-14, 47; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 242-47. 
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specialist, and a group of post-Rogers officers that included 
Andrew Foster, Alan Steyne, and Edmund Gullion, gradu­
ates respectively of Dartmouth, Yale, and Princeton. This 
Foreign Service group controlled the Office of the Foreign 
Service, a new, high-level administrative unit with its own 
planning staff. Assistant Secretary for Administration Julius 
C. Holmes was a former Foreign Service officer and a close 
friend of Chapin, and his successor, Donald Russell, was 
anxious to appease service opinion to facilitate the intensive 
postwar negotiations of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. 
Congress, after the Roosevelt years, favored detailed legisla­
tive prescriptions for the executive branch, and members of 
the relevant subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee were favorably disposed toward the administra­
tion, Byrnes, or the Foreign Service. The Moses-Linthicum 
Act of 1931 required a major overhaul, and Chapin and his 
colleagues, after the fashion of Carr, took the initiative in 
drafting it.222 
The basic problem facing the drafters was how to relate 
the new foreign relations functions of the United States to 
the Foreign Service. At one extreme, the service might re­
main a closed career with appointment at the bottom and 
promotion from within. At the other extreme, it might em­
brace cultural, information, technical, scientific, fiscal, and 
administrative specialists at appropriate rank, and in so do­
ing fundamentally alter its character. A similar challenge 
faced the Diplomatic Service after World War I. Shaw, who 
undoubtedly remembered the unfortunate consequences of 
resistance to change in the twenties, had been leaning to­
222. On the background of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 see: "The 
Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Harold Stein, ed., Public Administration 
and Policy Development: A Case Book (New York, 1951), pp. 661-737; 
Arthur G. Jones, The Evolution of Personnel Systems for U.S. Foreign Af­fairs: A History of Reform Efforts, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 1 (1965), chap. 3. 
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ward the latter solution. An enthusiast for specialization, he 
welcomed the new functions. Specialists from other agencies 
could be incorporated on a temporary basis while the For­
eign Service developed its own new experts, using several 
different types of examination.223 His thinking seems to 
have been running toward a multibranch career system such 
as the British installed in their Foreign Service in 1943.224 
In Shaw's conception, officers with academic and area spe­
cialties, an aptitude for political work, and what Kennan 
calls "roundedness of education, judgment and personality" 
would always gravitate toward the top positions, but along­
side, if somewhat lower, would be other career ladders as 
well.225 The object must be to retain control of all foreign af­
fairs activities, he insisted. Exclusiveness that forced other 
agencies to set up their own foreign services would result in 
a setback from which the Foreign Service would take years 
to recover. 
The position taken by Chapin and his drafting groups was 
a compromise. While receptive to demands from outside the 
service for a more flexible and responsive system, they faced 
strong pressure from within to keep it a closed career. Be­
hind this service conservatism lay the defensive reaction of 
men who had contracted for one career system, devoted 
years to it, and now feared a change of terms. Also contribut­
ing to resistance was the Carr tradition that any officer 
should serve in any capacity; "generalists" opposed recruit­
ment for a specific function. Most significant was the exclu­
siveness of a solidary profession with its distinctive selection 
223. Shaw, "The War: The State Department and Its Foreign Service 
in Wartime," State Department Bulletin IX (1943), 291-92; Shaw, "Post-
War Problems of the Foreign Service," American Foreign Service Journal 
XXI (1944), 65, 107-8. 
224. Strang, Foreign Office, pp. 51-70. 
225. George Kennan, "The Future of Our Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 
XXXIII (1955), p. 571. 
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procedures, prolonged apprenticeship, and shared way of 
life. Chapin was no less sensitive to such opinion than Grew 
had been to the concerns of Diplomatic Service officers. The 
draft bill responded to new demands by creating two auxil­
iary branches, a Foreign Service Staff corps for administra­
tive, clerical, fiscal, technical, and consular work, and a For­
eign Service Reserve for higher-grade specialists such as 
labor attaches and information officers. At the same time, the 
bill protected the Foreign Service officer corps by limiting 
reserve appointments to four years and by restricting admis­
sion above the bottom grade to reserve, staff, and depart­
ment personnel who passed written and oral examinations 
administered by the Foreign Service. The Chapin group en­
visaged amalgamation of Department and Foreign Service 
personnel, but gradually over a period of ten years or so. Es­
sentially the draft bill ensured the Foreign Service officers 
a protected, privileged, unitary career service. 
The draft bill was almost everything several generations of 
professionals could have wished. It created a class of career 
ministers, giving the service a regular place among the 
prized positions of diplomacy. A director general, himself a 
Foreign Service officer, administered the service and was a 
member of its policymaking board. Thereby the service fi­
nally achieved a permanent role in its own governance. Pro­
vision for retirement of those who failed to qualify for pro­
motion would speed the rise of able officers and set stricter 
performance standards. Inspection, examination, promotion, 
and training were under the exclusive or preponderant con­
trol of the service. Once again, better salaries, allowances, 
and retirement benefits made the career more attractive. 
The Chapin group skillfully maneuvered their bill through 
the Department of State and other interested departments, 
side-stepped Budget Bureau objections, and delivered it to 
their friends in Congress, where it slid easily to passage in 
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July, 1946, as the Foreign Service Act. On appeal from Secre­
tary Byrnes in Paris, President Truman signed it over objec­
tions from advisers who contended it made lateral entry too 
difficult and unduly limited the administrative discretion of 
the secretary of state. The Foreign Service secured its inter­
ests but left a reserved if not hostile attitude in the executive 
branch. Professionalism triumphed at the expense of bu­
226 reaucracy.
Years of the locust followed. The Foreign Service stub­
bornly clung to its closed career, taking in few officers at the 
higher grades and shying away from new postwar functions. 
The United States Information Agency established its own 
service, and the Department of Agriculture gained author­
ity to reestablish its Foreign Agricultural Service. Congress 
shifted powers vested in the director general back to the sec­
retary of state. Outside dissatisfaction increased: three suc­
cessive management studies called for a more open service 
embracing a variety of skills. In the early fifties, McCarthy-
ism, personnel cuts, and suspension of recruitment brought 
the service to a state of "administrative ruin," according to 
Kennan. In 1954 a major bureaucratic reconstruction, the 
Wriston Program, folded large numbers of departmental, 
reserve, and staff officers, particularly specialists, into the 
Foreign Service.227 A service demoralized and then tripled in 
size lapsed into passivity for a number of years, but finally 
found its voice again. In 1963 Deputy Undersecretary Wil­
liam J. Crockett, a Foreign Service officer, began reforms to 
enhance the status of the service and prod it into greater 
creativity. Then a "Young Turk" movement of frustrated and 
226. Stein, ed., "Foreign Service Act," pp. 664-731. The text of the 
Foreign Service Act of 1946 is in Childs, Foreign Service, Appendix A. 
227. Jones, Evolution of Personnel Systems, chaps. 4-6; John E. Harr, 
The Development of Careers in the Foreign Service, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 3 (1965), 
chap. 1; Kennan, "Future of Our Diplomacy," p. 568. 
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disillusioned junior and middle grade officers took control of 
the Foreign Service Association and demanded redefinition 
of the role of the diplomat and more dynamic leadership.228 
After the 1968 election a Foreign Service reform group urged 
the Nixon administration to grant greater autonomy and self-
management to the service.229 These professional stirrings 
indicate that the dialectic of change in American career di­
plomacy continues. 
228. John Ensor Harr, "The Managerial Crisis," in Smith Simpson, ed., 
Resources and Needs of American Diplomacy, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science CCCLXXX (November, 1968), 
34-37; Elizabeth A. Bean, "The Junior Foreign Service Officer," ibid., 
77-81. 
229. New York Times, Dec. 6, 1968; "Nixon and State," New Republic
CLIX (November 23, 1968), 9-10. See also Simpson, Resources and Needs 
of American Diplomacy. 
The United States a World Power, 
1900-1917: Myth or Reality? 
PAUL A. VARG 
IN 1899 John Bassett Moore, then serving as assistant secre­
tary of state, wrote that the United States, during the pre­
ceding ten years, had moved "from a position of comparative 
freedom from entanglements into the position of what is 
commonly called a world-power." "Where formerly we had 
only commercial interests," he explained, "we now have ter­
ritorial and political interests as well."x The annexation of 
the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico and the temporary 
occupation of Cuba appeared to have thrust the United 
States into the vortex of international politics. 
However, no one explanation of the United States' reac­
tion to its new power position is possible. A study of the 
course pursued in relations with China shows that the 
administrations in Washington moved with a restraint ap­
proaching that of a mere observer. In Cuba the same admin­
istrations acted with energy. These two case studies, con­
stituting the body of this essay, argue against any simple 
1. Edwin Borchard et ah, eds., The Collected Papers of John Bassett 
Moore, 7 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1944), II, 202. 
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explanation of American policy in the years after the Span­
ish-American War. 
The differences in response do not alter the fact that meas­
ured in economic terms, the United States had achieved 
great power status. By 1900 there were 193,000 miles of rail­
road track spanning the continent linking even remote ham­
lets to great metropolitan centers. The prime result was a 
national economy based upon the availability of great nat­
ural resources and a market of continental dimensions. The 
value of manufactures by 1899 stood at $13,000,000,000 and 
surpassed in value the products of agriculture. In 1900 the 
value of iron and steel products reached $803,968,000. The 
production of iron and steel almost equaled that of Germany 
and Great Britain combined. The conditions for mass pro­
duction had already been achieved. At the turn of the cen­
tury, it was estimated that the per capita consumption of 
manufactures in the United States was 50 percent higher 
than that in Great Britain and twice as great as that in Ger­
many and France.2 
Unprecedented material success inspired confidence 
among many Americans that the world at large would inevi­
tably follow in America's wake. The more sober-minded 
among them pondered the question of the relations of this 
new economic colossus to the outside world. Some, like the 
historian John Fiske and the sociologist Franklin Henry 
Giddings, envisioned an extension of Anglo-Saxon political 
and economic institutions to more remote parts of the world. 
Others, like Brooks Adams and Alfred T. Mahan, impressed 
by contemporary struggles for security, prestige, and mar­
kets, concluded that the United States must for reasons of 
survival build a strong navy, protect the sea lanes of the 
2. Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897-1917 (New 
York, 1951), pp. 10, 121; Chester W. Wright, Economic History of the 
United States (New York, 1941), p. 707; Fred A. Shannon, America's Eco­
nomic Growth (New York, 1940), p. 626. 
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world's commerce, and extend its own trade for purposes of 
counteracting the influence of other powers. 
At the same time there emerged the view among many 
congressmen, journalists, and some business representatives 
that the capacity to produce goods was outrunning the eco­
nomic demand of the home market. All were agreed that for­
eign markets were of increasing importance because of the 
danger of an industrial surplus. Some set forth a reciprocal 
trade program as the best answer to this problem. Others 
adhered to the traditional protective tariff policies and 
thought the solution to the surplus lay in a policy of opening 
up foreign markets by aggressive pursuit of colonies, or by 
strong pressure on governments to open the door to Ameri­
can goods. 
The new look outward captured the churches and ex­
pressed itself in a rapid growth of interest in the expansion 
of Christianity. The organization of the Student Volunteers 
for Foreign Missions at Dwight L. Moody's Northfield in the 
summer of 1887 marked the beginning of a church crusade 
calling for "the evangelization of the world in this genera­
tion." China soon gained the highest priority and became by 
1900, as Sherwood Eddy said, the lodestar of young college 
students ready to Christianize the world.3 The crusade never 
lost its religious orientation, but many of the vigorous young 
men became passionate crusaders for sheering away anach­
ronisms of superstition, ignorance, and social injustice. In 
turn they aroused an interest in China among a part of the 
churchgoing public and encouraged the belief that in the 
whole realm of foreign relations, China occupied a position 
of prime importance. 
Those charged with the conduct of foreign relations 
shared the view that the United States was entering upon a 
3. Sherwood Eddy, Pathfinders of the World Missionary Crusade t New 
York, 1945), p. 50. 
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new era. Among these were Theodore Roosevelt, his two 
secretaries of state John Hay and Elihu Root, his friend 
Henry Cabot Lodge, a leader in the Senate, and other sena­
tors including Cushman Davis of Minnesota. Roosevelt's 
predecessor in the presidency, William McKinley, although 
a man with a reputation for moving cautiously, shared the 
vision of a new role for the United States. McKinley, for all 
his later protestations of anguish in making up his mind on 
the question of annexing the Philippines, had acted deci­
sively on that issue in the summer of 1898, when he dictated 
the basis for negotiations with Spain. On no point was he 
more firm than on the stipulation that negotiations could 
only be entered into if Spain agreed that the islands were 
negotiable.4 Neither, according to the testimony of John 
Bassett Moore, was McKinley averse to demanding a sphere 
of influence in China when the outbreak of the Boxers in 
June, 1900, opened up the prospect of a partition of China. 
In spite of his earlier caution in moving toward war with 
Spain, McKinley was on the side of those who advocated an 
energetic foreign policy. 
The transition to a new age of bold engagement in world 
affairs, greeted with eagerness by many, evoked the concern 
of others. Entangling alliances continued to be anathema, 
and not even the most ardent proponents of the "large pol­
icy" advocated a departure from the tradition against them. 
Usually, moves toward involvement had to be clothed in 
terms of duty and national obligation or described as neces­
sary to protect the helpless against the imperialism of others. 
Those opposed to the new developments tended to phrase 
the argument in terms of anti-imperialism versus imperial­
ism; those in favor more often saw the issue as narrow, self-
centered nationalism versus internationalism. 
4. Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, II, 143. 
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The propensity toward moralistic argument obfuscated 
the more vital concerns of those who preferred to eschew 
moralistic arguments or purely intellectual speculation on 
cosmic tendencies. The public debate set up categories that 
were often irrelevant to the more immediate questions of 
what were the vital interests of the nation and how they 
could be defended or advanced. Those charged with direct 
responsibility for foreign relations concerned themselves 
with the more immediate. Although they sometimes contrib­
uted to the confusion by resorting to generalizations loaded 
with value judgments, they reached decisions on the basis 
of pragmatic and mundane considerations. 
What appeared to be a defense of the sovereignty and in­
dependence of less-favored nations evoked popular support 
as long as the defense was limited to moral support. In ad­
vising Secretary of State John Hay, John Bassett Moore 
pointed to the popularity of the Monroe Doctrine. Its popu­
larity, said Moore, was due to the generally held notion that 
the policy had saved Latin America from European imperi­
alism. No one knew better than Moore the falsity of this pop­
ular idea, but he urged Hay to issue the circular note of July 
3, 1900, calling for support of China's territorial and admin­
istrative integrity and independence, for reasons of national 
interest, and assured him that the public would interpret the 
notes in altruistic terms and therefore approve of them.5 
At the turn of the century, Europeans expressed concern 
over the future United States role in world affairs. Their con­
cern had its source in the obvious capacity of American in­
dustry to flood the markets of Europe and the world with 
manufactured goods and also in the fears aroused by United 
States acquisition of an empire as a result of her victory over 
Spain. A writer for a British magazine, the Spectator, wor­
5. Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State John Hay, 
July 1, 1900, John Bassett Moore Papers, Library of Congress. 
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ried over the towering strength of the United States, but he 
was even more puzzled and disturbed by the failure of 
American policy to conform to familiar standards of big-
power behavior. He dreaded an American monopoly of 
world trade and efforts to control the wealth of the world, 
but he feared equally the American unwillingness to see any 
but the native powers in control of the richest countries of 
Asia and America's refusal to take South America or let any­
one else take it. 
The catapulting of the United States onto the stage of 
world politics understandably caused concern in the capitals 
of Europe. Americans appeared to decry alliances, coloniza­
tion, and imperialism. Among Europe's statesmen, these 
were not evils but devices for ordering the world's affairs so 
as to protect the interests of individual nations while at the 
same time preserving the peace. The behavior of the United 
States appeared unpredictable to European leaders while at 
the same time they acknowledged her power. 
Americans who welcomed the new role of the United 
States boldly justified the uniqueness of their policy. The 
editor of the Journal of Commerce replied to the writer in 
the Spectator that Americans did not aim to control all the 
wealth in the world, but neither were they prepared to deny 
themselves the gains within their reach. Like all nations not 
infected with Oriental fatalism, he wrote, Americans were 
"doing the best we can for ourselves, and our energy and 
wealth are such that we are quite likely to end by dominat­
ing some important industries, and though we shall not own 
all the wealth of the world, we may be creditors of all na­
tions." 
The editor of the Journal of Commerce also gave his own 
explanation of the policy of the United States in Asia and 
South America. The Chinese and the South Americans were 
entitled to independent governments. Americans, he wrote, 
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wished exclusive control nowhere, but they likewise were 
determined not to be excluded. As to South America, Ameri­
cans had no reason to take it, but neither would they permit 
their own security to be threatened by permitting European 
states to establish themselves there. "The South Americans 
have their own governments," he wrote, and he found them 
no worse than some European governments. "What they 
need," he concluded, "is less of Europe; not more of it."6 
However flamboyant American rhetoric, the American 
government usually behaved with restraint. When examined 
closely, specific actions of the United States in world affairs 
argue against easy generalizations about imperialism or 
world power status. The variety of approaches reflected the 
different assessments placed upon the importance of national 
interests in the many areas of the world. A comparative 
study of the developments in each major theater, the Far 
East, Latin America, and Europe, reveals a common tend­
ency toward greater involvement but likewise marked dif­
ferences. 
A series of half-truths have become part of the popular 
lore concerning relations with China in the years between 
1890 and American entry into World War I. It has been too 
readily assumed that China was considered to be of major 
importance by the policy-makers, that altruistic considera­
tions advocated by both missionary leaders and church or­
ganizations weighed heavily in the councils of statesmen 
charged with foreign affairs, that the China market was 
viewed as so important to the American economy that an 
alliance of business groups and the Department of State 
assumed a major role in Chinese affairs, and that the Open 
Door policy provided at least a minor shield for the protec­
6. Editorial, "Europe and the United States," Journal of Commerce and 
Commercial Bulletin, April 29, 1904. 
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tion of China against European and Japanese imperialism. 
The acquisition of the Philippines was both a result of an 
awakening interest in China and, later, a reason for being 
concerned about developments on the mainland of Asia. 
Yet, possession of the islands did not give to the United 
States the leverage in Chinese affairs that was anticipated. 
Other powers—Russia, Japan, Great Britain, and, to a some­
what lesser degree, France—were much more effective in 
making their influence felt in Peking. The weak government 
of the Manchu dynasty could only effectively resist demands 
made upon it by any one of these if it could enlist the sup­
port of one or more of the others. China did, on occasion, 
turn to the United States for support; but Washington had 
little influence because everyone, including the Chinese, 
recognized that the American government was not ready to 
resist a determined foe. Other governments, especially Rus­
sia and Japan, having much more at stake, were more ada­
mant in demanding or in opposing the demands of others. 
Their own security, and likewise their important trade and 
investments, assured firmness in their negotiations. 
The United States, on the other hand, had strictly limited 
interests. Its major concern was the security of the Philip­
pines, and the islands were far removed from the path of the 
storm brewing in Manchuria at the close of the Boxer Re­
volt. To be sure, American trade centered in the northern 
provinces, and the inroads of Russia and Japan raised the 
specter of Americans being excluded, but this trade was not 
of sufficient importance to call for a strong policy. Although 
protests in the defense of equality of commercial opportunity 
flowed from Washington with regularity, these were con­
veyed in a spirit of pious hope rather than from a posture of 
unswerving determination. Moreover, the promise of a fu­
ture market increasingly faded, especially after 1905, when 
exports to China failed to increase. Even at the peak of the 
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optimism concerning the China market, the American busi­
ness community made little effort to expand sales in that 
part of the world.7 American investments in China were 
even less important. 
Consequently, the government in Washington treaded 
water whenever it found itself headed toward a dangerous 
confrontation. Only when American lives were in danger 
was there a willingness to proceed boldly. The Boxer Revolt 
provided such an occasion, and there was no hesitancy in 
sending a military expedition. On lesser occasions the navy 
went to the rescue or displayed sufficient force to calm the 
waters. 
The caution of the Department of State before deciding 
on the Circular Note of 1900 illustrates the point. Pressed to 
pledge support of China's integrity by Consul-General John 
Goodnow, who spoke for the leading viceroys in the Yangtze 
Valley, Hay weighed this proposal and at the same time pon­
dered upon the support of President McKinley and his at­
torney general for seizing a leasehold and laying claim to a 
sphere of influence. Hay strongly opposed the latter. In is­
suing the Circular Note calling for support of China's inde­
pendence and territorial and administrative integrity, he 
sought no more than to provide a catalyst whereby the na­
tions would, for a brief time, be enabled to extricate them­
selves from a race for partition and find security for their 
interests in a common program of restraint. China could not 
herself resist their demands, and they could not themselves 
find security unless there was a mutual commitment to re­
straint. John Bassett Moore remarked to Hay "that the idea 
might, by many, be thought to be fanciful, but that after all, 
it might not be found to be impracticable." 
Hay had no need to worry that he was making a hazard­
7. For a detailed factual account, see the author's "The Myth of the 
China Market," American Historical Review LXXIII (1968), 742-58. 
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ous commitment. He did no more than commit his own gov­
ernment not to violate the principle enunciated; other par­
ties were invited to join in the policy of self-denial, but they 
were not served notice that the United States would come 
to China's aid if her independence and administrative and 
territorial integrity were threatened. Hay did show concern 
that Russia would probably reject the pledge she was to be 
invited to make and that France would blindly follow in the 
steps of the czar's government, but if this should happen, 
Hay would suffer no more than minor embarrassment. 
Moore, in advising Hay, made no reference to the impor­
tance of the China market. He advanced only two arguments 
in favor of the United States' taking a stand. The United 
States, he said, had an immediate interest "in the fate of 
China in consequence of holding the Philippines. If Russia, 
or Russia and powers in alliance with her, held China," 
Moore argued, "we should be at their mercy in the Philip­
pines." Second, he pointed out "that the idea of supporting 
the independence and integrity of China would accord with 
the sentiments of our people; that it was the principle of 
helping other nations to maintain their independence and 
integrity that had made the Monroe Doctrine so popular 
amongst them. . . ." 
Moore not only eschewed the argument of the importance 
of the China market but dismissed as foolish the other con­
sideration that held the attention of missionary-minded in­
terests. According to Moore's memorandum of his conversa­
tion with Hay, Moore remarked 
that some of our people, mostly students and men unfamiliar 
with practical affairs, had conceived that it would be a good 
thing if the Powers would take China under their tutelage, 
and reorganize her and transform her; that this seemed to 
leave out of consideration the 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 
people in China, with an ancient and persistent civilization, 
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and was, in my opinion, on the whole a fantastic conception, 
based on erroneous principles.8 
Placing the Circular Note of 1900 in the context out of 
which it emerged reduces it from a ringing declaration in 
behalf of China to a cautious pronouncement by a govern­
ment that did not view China as of vital importance to its 
own interests. 
The estimate of the Department of State of China's impor­
tance to American interests did not change, although there 
were occasions when the vigor of diplomatic notes suggested 
the contrary. In spite of apparent determination to affect 
the course of developments, the United States moved with a 
restraint that accorded with the relatively low estimate the 
nation at large placed upon its interests in Asia. 
There were, however, those in the United States who held 
those interests to be vital and, therefore, called for a policy 
of unyielding opposition to the aggressiveness of Russia or 
Japan. Before the Russo-Japanese War the most ardent ad­
vocates of a strong posture were the small group of com­
mercial interests within the business community who spoke 
through the American Asiatic Association and the Journal of 
Commerce and Commercial Bulletin. The editorials of the 
New York weekly newspaper affirmed that the nation's eco­
nomic future hung on access to the China market and that 
the United States as a Pacific power could not sit idly by 
while Russia unilaterally absorbed Manchuria and put itself 
in a position to dominate Peking. "Opinions may be divided 
as to the source from which the most serious obstacles to an 
agreement have come," wrote the editor in March, 1901, 
"but unless western civilization is to confess itself baffled by 
the Chinese problem, there must be an end to the pursuit 
8. Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State John Hay, July 
1, 1900, Moore Papers. 
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of individual ambitions at the expense of the common 
cause." He closed by proclaiming: "The United States is in 
a position to lend a powerful impulse to greater unity of ac­
tion, and it is to be hoped that no weak fear of foreign en­
tanglements will allow the opportunity to slip."9 
Russia's attempts to strengthen its hold over Manchuria 
after the Boxer Revolt did cause the Department of State to 
make some moderately vigorous protests. For a brief period 
the policy seemed to harmonize with the position of the Jour­
nal of Commerce. Given the lead taken by Japan and Great 
Britain, the United States could show firmness without fac­
ing the danger inherent in being in the forefront of the re­
sistance. The alignment with Tokyo and London reached 
its peak when Washington turned its negotiations of a new 
commercial treaty with China into a campaign for opening 
cities in Manchuria to foreign trade and residence.10 Russia 
saw a threat in the requests of the United States to its own 
program and therefore used its influence in Peking to have 
the Chinese decline the American request. Throughout the 
spring and early summer of 1903, Secretary of State John 
Hay and W. W. Rockhill, his adviser on Far Eastern affairs, 
doggedly pushed forward. An almost pathological distrust 
and dislike of Russia increased their firmness. 
In July, 1903, they changed course. It was during that 
month that Japan and Russia entered upon negotiations that 
clearly portended a showdown. Too close alignment with Ja­
pan and Great Britain posed the danger of involvement in 
possible war. Neither American interests nor public opinion 
provided support for a dangerous course. By the end of July 
the United States quietly withdrew from insisting that three 
9. Editorial, "The Negotiations at Peking," Journal of Commerce and 
Commercial Bulletin, March 25, 1901. 
10. U.S. State Department, United States Foreign Relations, 1903 
(Washington, 1904), p. 53; John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, April 28, 
1903, John Hay Papers, Library of Congress. 
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cities in Manchuria be opened by a specific date and that 
they be open to foreign residence. The removal of these two 
points by the United States enabled Russia to withdraw her 
opposition to the commercial treaty.11 Russia's opposition 
had rested largely on the fear that her own sphere in Man­
churia would be inundated by Japanese settlers if the cities 
were open to foreign settlement. 
Manchuria was clearly not worth military involvement. 
However, after Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, Ameri­
can attention was once again focused on the sprawling plains 
north of China proper. Americans had looked upon Japan as 
fighting their war and believed that a victory over Russia 
was a victory for the principles of the Open Door. War did 
not solve the problem. Russia and Japan, within their newly 
defined spheres, sought to improve their positions. 
Both countries had importaht railway interests they were 
determined to protect. Given [the weakness of Chinese ad­
ministration and the consequent threats of disorder, both 
St. Petersburg and Tokyo made moves to control the mu­
nicipalities that were important railway centers. Russia 
moved first. Harbin, an important terminus on the Chinese 
Eastern Railway, was the scen^ of disorder, and unruly ele­
ments deprived the more stably citizenry of a feeling of se­
curity. Late in 1907 the Russia^ subjects in Harbin and the 
officials of the railway proposed a set of municipal regula­
tions that would, in effect, have made the railroad company 
the real governing authority. 
Fred Fisher, the American consul at Harbin, called the 
proposals to the attention of Wijlard Straight, consul-general 
at Mukden, and Henry Fletcher, charge d'affaires at Pe­
king.12 Straight promptly endorsed Fisher's protest and ar­
i l  . Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States 
and Japan, 1895-1905 (Stanford, Calif., 1938), p. 186. 
12. Fred Fisher to Assistant Secretary of State, November 25, 1906, 
State Department Papers, National Archives. 
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gued that the real importance of the issue would be in its 
influence on the Japanese, who would use it as a precedent 
for establishing their own governments in the towns along 
the South Manchuria Railway. William Phillips, third as­
sistant secretary, after study of these reports, wrote in early 
March that acceptance of the Russian regulations would 
amount to relinquishing a part of American treaty rights in 
China because American residents would be subject to the 
Russian municipal authorities and thereby be deprived of 
their extraterritorial rights. To accept the Russian view, said 
Phillips, would be to acknowledge "that China's sovereignty 
had been violated." He concluded with the observation: 
The results of a recognition now by the United States Gov­
ernment of an absolute Russian administration at Harbin 
would be our formal acquiescence in the principle of the 
erection by Russia and Japan of large and commercial cities 
within Manchuria wholly independent of China, and main­
tained on the supposition that they are appurtenances to 
Railway property. The integrity of China would then be at 
an end.13 
This conflict with the principles enunciated earlier by 
John Hay rested on legalisms. It had little relationship to 
American interests. The Russian minister in Peking told 
Henry Fletcher that "there were but 'one and a half Ameri­
can citizens there and that our interests in Harbin did not 
seem to justify the active opposition of our consul." By April 
the Department of State learned that the protests against 
the proposed municipal regulations for Harbin had set off 
much discussion and widespread newspaper editorials in 
both Russia and Japan decrying American interference and 
13. Memorandum from William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary, 
March 6, 1908, State Department Papers. 
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speculating on what far-reaching imperialistic design the 
United States was about to launch.14 
A vigorous protest from St. Petersburg early in June 
against the actions of the American consul at Harbin com­
pelled Secretary of State Elihu Root to look at the conse­
quences of pursuing the controversy with firmness. The ear­
lier legal interpretation, however correct, did not square 
with the realities. Root now called for caution: "We do not 
wish to be bumptious or disputatious or unfriendly in the 
assertion of our rights, or to become a protagonist in Man­
churia," he noted. Our interests, Root observed "are the fu­
ture interests of the open door and there is no present inter­
est which would justify us in exhibiting undue excitement in 
this quiet and firm maintenance of our position."15 
Root clearly did not consider American interests in China 
of sufficient importance to justify boldness. A little more 
than a year later, the new secretary of state, Philander C. 
Knox, naively imagined that he could gain acceptance of a 
scheme for neutralizing the railroads of Manchuria by win­
ning the support of Great Britain, Germany, and France to 
pressure Russia and Japan into disposing of their valuable 
holdings. Knox suffered a severe rebuke, and his action 
caused Russia and Japan to join hands in a treaty completed 
in July, 1910.16 Knox clearly underestimated the importance 
to Russia and Japan of their holdings in Manchuria, and he 
likewise failed to recognize the importance the other powers 
attached to their interests. 
Woodrow Wilson took a kindly interest in China. He 
shared the missionary view of China and sympathized with 
14. Montgomery Schuyler to Elihu Root, April 4, 1908, and Thomas
O'Brien to Root, April 16, 1908, State Department Papers. 
15. Root to Alvey A. Adee, June 19, 1908, State Department Papers. 
18. Edward H. Zabrislde, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A 
Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), 
p. 169. 
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the work of the missionaries. When he became president, 
he refused to support the bankers' consortium on the ground 
that the conditions of the loan posed a danger to China's 
sovereignty. He demonstrated genuine sympathy with the 
Chinese when Japan presented her Twenty-One Demands 
early in 1915 and again at the close of World War I when 
Japan insisted on retaining the rights Germany had ac­
quired in Shantung. However friendly to China as he was, 
he did not find it possible to do more for her than to protest 
in a cautious manner against Japan's actions in Shantung. 
He confronted a powerful Japan, and Japan had the sup­
port of both Great Britain and France, both of whom had 
committed themselves on this question in secret treaties in 
1917. Wilson, in turning his back on China, responded to 
the realities of the power situation. Short of endangering re­
lations with Great Britain and France, he could only launch 
protests, and he needed both British and French support 
for his plans for Europe. He placed a higher priority on Eu­
jope than he did on Asia. 
Looking back on the relations between the United States 
and China in the years 1900 to 1917, it is clear that the 
United States, although involved in the China question, did 
not wield the same degree of influence in the Asian area as 
that exerted by the other world powers. Her restraint was 
dictated by an awareness that neither her security interests 
nor her economic interests at the time justified a bold course. 
China's importance, as American statesmen saw it, lay in 
the future. Whatever the importance of the China market 
might become, it was not important at the time. Other na­
tions had heavy investments in railways, mining, and other 
enterprises. As late as 1914, the United States portion of 
these investments was only 3 percent." To the degree that 
there was a public interest in China, it was in large part an 
17. C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York, 1933), p. 76. 
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intangible, nonmaterial interest associated with dreams of 
providing tutelage of China in the transition from an ancient 
to a modern society. Missionaries and their allies in the 
church leadership at home shared this vision, but their point 
of view struck almost no response among men of practical 
affairs, whose concern was bound by considerations of se­
curity and the state of the economy. 
By almost any standard, the United States record in the 
Caribbean area differed sharply from the minor role it 
played in Asia. By World War I, five Caribbean states had 
been subordinated to protectorate status, and no nation 
would have openly challenged the dominance of the United 
States. The differences lay in felt concerns as to security and 
the presence of economic interests. In contrast to the re­
straint that characterized the response to developments in 
Asia, the United States overreacted to both dangers and op­
portunities in the Caribbean. In part, the difference can be 
explained by the proximity of the small island republics and 
by the absence of any power capable of seriously testing 
American capability. 
In fact, the most serious deterrent to Yankee imperialism 
in the Caribbean came from within the American body poli­
tic and not from without. Imperialism had a free rein from 
the public when American action could be defended as ne­
gating Europe's imperialism. It met strong opposition when 
American behavior came into conflict with democratic val­
ues antithetic to domination of another people. Sometimes 
the opposition was based on no more than the defense of 
special economic interests. At other times, the opposition 
came from politicians seeking political gains by putting the 
ruling party's policies in the worst possible light. Regard­
less of motives, those who were opposed, by appealing to 
traditional values, paid tribute to their survival. 
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Historians have parted ways over the question as to 
whether strategic considerations or economic interests 
shaped the policy of intervention. It is probably futile to 
weigh the comparative importance of these two factors and 
more profitable to recognize that the new industrial society 
that had come into being fostered ambitions to achieve those 
attributes by which greatness among nations was measured. 
Among these badges of greatness were the capacity to wield 
an influence abroad and to dominate some one region. 
In the aftermath of the Spanish American War, the prob­
lem of future relations between the island of Cuba and 
the republic that had intervened to make it independent of 
Spain served as a test as to whether the old or the new ideals 
were to dominate. Whatever private motives existed aiming 
at the advancement of personal or corporate interests, Con­
gress and the country at large saw the goal as emancipation 
of the Cubans from Spanish rule. The Teller Amendment 
promised that Cuba was to be independent, not only of 
Spain, but likewise of the United States. Some privately 
questioned the wisdom of the self-denying amendment but 
did not dare do so publicly. 
Senator Teller of Colorado gave expression to the senti­
ment of the great majority when he introduced his resolu­
tion. To be sure, there were those who had never favored 
independence for Cuba. They probably voted for the amend­
ment simply for the political reason that they did not wish 
to stand apart from an obviously popular move. Their votes 
do not explain the general support of the amendment. 
The granting of independence to Cuba was something as­
sumed by a majority of Congress in the debates that pre­
ceded the war. Senator Teller later explained that he in­
troduced his measure for another reason than that of curbing 
annexationists moves on the part of the United States. Inde­
pendence for Cuba was so generally accepted, said Teller, 
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that a resolution was not necessary. The reason for the Teller 
Amendment, according to its author, was to diminish the 
danger of European intervention. President McKinley, ac­
cording to one senator, greatly feared that Europe would 
intervene in one way or another. He warned two senators 
who called upon him: "Remember, Senators, if this war 
breaks out, it may be a world's war." Europe was cynical 
about the aims of the United States and did not believe that 
she would go to war against Spain and then set Cuba free. 
Senator Spooner explained that it had been necessary to dis­
pel this cynicism because it could have led some European 
governments to intervene.18 That a nation should make war 
against another in order to take over a colony of the other 
would set a most dangerous precedent. It was thought that 
the Teller Amendment, put before the Senate by the Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations and approved by the Senate, 
would deprive the European powers of a reason for inter­
vening. 
Once the fighting started, the pious resolutions lost their 
sanctity. Raw motives of self-interest and irrational fears 
cradled in a sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority came to the 
surface as Americans came face to face with Cuba's insur­
gents. The army showed its attitude when it restricted its 
commands to the rebels, our Cuban allies, to orders to carry 
out the menial tasks of transporting supplies and digging 
ditches. After the battle of San Juan Hill, General Lawton 
complained that the Cuban troops sat on a high hill to the 
rear of the scene of battle and failed to join in the attack. 
When Santiago was under siege, General Shafter protested 
that the Cuban troops failed to prevent the entry of Spanish 
reinforcements. 
This was only the beginning of complications. The Cu­
18. Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), 5803-6. 
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bans, led by General Garcia, were bitter over the Americans 
ignoring them. And the Americans reciprocated. Upon the 
close of hostilities, Stephen Crane, correspondent for the 
New York World, reported that the Americans had come to 
despise the Cubans. The contempt for the Cubans carried 
over to the political realm, raising questions about their ca­
pacity to govern themselves. General Shafter, after his re­
turn to the United States in December, 1898, was asked: 
"How about self-government for the Cubans?" "Self-govern­
ment!" he replied. "Why, these people are no more fit for 
self-government than gun-powder is for hell." 
The opinions of soldiers and correspondents found then-
way into the newspapers. The Cubans, so recently the he­
roic resistors of Spanish tyranny, were soon dismissed as 
rabble and as wholly unprepared to govern themselves. The 
revised view was expressed by the Cleveland Leader: "While 
our Government disavowed a purpose of conquest, it may be 
absolutely necessary for us to keep Cuba and make it a part 
of the United States."19 
The distrust that attended the fighting increased in the 
months ahead. President McKinley reassured the Cubans 
that they would establish their own government once tran­
quillity had been achieved, but the Cubans also heard Amer­
icans who seemed to favor annexation. In June, 1899, Gen­
eral Leonard Wood, in an interview with the New York 
Times, said that the propertied classes and Spaniards in 
Cuba favored annexation by the United States. These 
groups, he reported, wanted a stable government. Wood ob­
served that "the establishment of another Haitian Republic 
in the West Indies would be a serious mistake."20 
The Teller Amendment became an object of regret. Gen­
19. David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, 
Politicians, and the Search for Policy (Madison, Wis., 1963), pp. 30-36. 
20. Ibid., p. 91. 
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eral James Harrison Wilson, who was in command of one 
part of Cuba, did not propose to alienate the Cubans by 
breaking the pledge, but he envisioned arrangements that 
would tie Cuba to the United States economically and in 
foreign affairs. Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio supported 
General Wilson. When Elihu Root became secretary of war 
on August 1, 1899, he took over responsibility for governing 
Cuba. Root, fearful that Cuban resentment would trap the 
United States into the same bitter kind of warfare in which 
it was already involved in the Philippines, moved cautiously 
and tried to reassure the Cubans that there was no plan for 
annexation. Root proposed the establishment of local gov­
ernments before moving to the problem of drafting a Cuban 
constitution. Like many others, Root feared the control of 
Cuba falling into the hands of the illiterate and propertyless 
classes. Consequently, he prescribed a suffrage based on 
literacy, property, or service in the army.21 
On July 25, 1900, the military government of Cuba called 
for the election of a constitutional convention. The conven­
tion began its sessions the following November. The Cubans 
enjoyed complete freedom in framing their own govern­
ment, but soon found that the United States notions on the 
subject of the relations of the two countries did not conform 
to their own. Root wrote to Hay early in January, 1901, out­
lining his ideas on this subject. He wished to have incorpo­
rated in the Cuban constitution four provisions. The United 
States should have the right to intervene "for the preserva­
tion of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a sta­
ble government." The Cuban government should not be free 
to enter into agreements with foreign powers "which may 
tend to impair or interfere with the independence of Cuba, 
or to confer upon such foreign power any special right or 
21. Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New York, 1938), I, 304-5. 
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privilege without the consent of the United States." The 
United States should have the right to acquire naval sta­
tions. Finally, actions taken during the American occupation 
and all rights acquired during the course of the occupation 
should be maintained and protected.22 
General Leonard Wood conveyed Root's stipulation to the 
Constitutional Convention's Committee on Relations. The 
committee resolved 
that some of these stipulations are not acceptable, inasmuch 
as they modify the independence and sovereignty of Cuba. 
Our duty consists in making Cuba independent of all other 
nations, including the great and noble American nation; 
and if we bind ourselves to ask the consent of the United 
States to our international treaties; if we allow them to re­
tain the right to intervene in our country to support or dis­
place administrations, and to fulfill rights which only 
concern the Cuban government; and if, lastly, we concede 
to them the right to acquire and maintain any title over any 
lands whereon they may establish naval stations, it is plain 
that we should appear to be independent of the rest of the 
world, but surely we should never be so with relation to the 
United States.23 
In the United States, men like Elihu Root and Senator Platt 
of Connecticut replied that certainly the United States in 
intervening to free the Cubans from Spanish misrule, at 
great cost in lives and in money, could not be so derelict in 
its responsibility as to set Cuba adrift to become the scene 
once again of chaos and disorder. 
American leaders gave only polite attention to the plain­
tive protests of the Cubans, but they did find it necessary 
to reconcile for their own sake the Platt Amendment with 
22. Ibid., p. 310 
23. Quoted in Albert G. Robinson, Cuba and the Intervention (New 
York, 1905), p. 238. 
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the promise of independence given in the earlier Teller 
Amendment. How those leaders who promoted it reconciled 
the imposition of these limitations on Cuban sovereignty 
with the Teller Amendment explains something about diffi­
culties inherent in the peculiar idealism of the American 
people when it embarked on a crusade to free a foreign 
people from alleged tyranny and misgovernment. 
Congress had in large part voted for the Teller Amend­
ment in good faith, but an independent Cuba soon appeared 
to present dangers. The editor of the Journal of Commerce, 
in February, 1901, argued that the United States "must have 
regard to the protection of its own interests no less than to 
what the Cuban people may think would be best for them­
selves." In fixing the relation of Cuba to the United States, 
he wrote, "There may be a higher law to be observed than 
the Teller resolution, and other considerations to be taken 
into account than the impatience of the Cuban people to 
try the experiment of self-government."24 In February, 1901, 
Elihu Root, the secretary of war, instructed General 
Leonard Wood to call on the Cubans to incorporate in their 
constitution his four earlier proposals plus an additional pro­
vision that the Cuban government must not contract debts 
beyond its ability to pay.25 The Cubans were strongly op­
posed, especially to the United States' having the right to 
intervene. They gave their consent only because they had 
no real alternative to yielding. Quite clearly, the United 
States, so recently ready to fight against European imperial­
ism in the Caribbean, had now stepped forth as the im­
perialist. Both houses of Congress approved the Platt 
Amendment in February, 1901, but the vote followed strictly 
party lines. 
24. Editorial, "The United States and Cuba," Journal of Commerce and 
Commercial Bulletin, February 28, 1901. 
25. Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 312. 
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One historian, after a detailed and careful study of the 
factors that led to the Platt Amendment, has given his view 
of what happened. 
The real explanation seems rather to lie in a general recogni­
tion that the amendment represented a true compromise. It 
promised to give the Cubans real internal self-government 
and at least the semblance of independence, to end the dan­
gers and vexations of United States rule, and at the same 
time to safeguard American interests in the island as thor­
oughly as anyone could reasonably desire. Besides, no one 
could find an alternative that had any reasonable chance of 
acceptance in both Cuba and the United States. The Platt 
Amendment seemed to represent at once the least that the 
McKinley administration was willing to take, and the most 
that Cuba could be expected to give.26 
This view accords with the political realities of February, 
1901. 
The more interesting question to be answered is why Con­
gress and the McKinley Administration found the degree of 
control retained by the United States necessary. The expla­
nation seems to lie in its disrust of Cuban society even more 
than in its concern for American economic investments or 
any concern for the security of the proposed isthmian canal. 
As concerns the latter, there was almost no mention of the 
canal. Security considerations did enter the discussion, but 
it was the security of the coastline from the mouth of the 
Mississippi to Florida. 
In April, 1901, the North American Review published 
Senator Beveridge's justifications of the Platt Amendment. 
Beveridge, who was privately a supporter of Cuban annexa­
tion, defended it as necessary to prevent foreign interven­
tion and instability and revolt. The danger of revolt had its 
26. Healy, The United States in Cuba, p. 167. 
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basis in the fact of race. The Latins, argued Beveridge, were 
an unstable people given to revolution. The instability, he 
contended, was a racial quality; he made no reference to 
the economic and social, factors that at least explained in 
part the many revolutions in Latin America he cited as 
evidence. 
The senator found it,easy to defend intervention by ap­
pealing to traditional liberal ideals ordinarily marshaled to 
condemn European imperalism. He wrote: 
We are not depriving Cuba of liberty; we are helping her to 
liberty. Landowners are not to be robbed; they are to be 
protected. Cities are not to be sacked; they are to be de­
fended. Equal rights are not to be violated; they are to be 
preserved and enforced. Free speech is not to be suppressed; 
it is to be fostered. Education is not to be destroyed; it is to 
be built up. But anarchy is to be kept down, foreign powers 
kept at bay, and the elements that oppose Cuban progress 
held in check. All this is not the denial of liberty; it is the 
bestowal of liberty; for liberty cannot live without law and 
order.27 
Beveridge's argument harmonized with the appeals made 
in 1897 and 1898 in behalf of the Cubans. Then the cry had 
been that they must be liberated from Spain and permitted 
to have their independence. By 1901, when it had become 
clear that the society of Cuba—poor, illiterate, and torn by 
class divisions—was likely to shape itself after the patterns 
of other similar societies in Latin America, it was easy to 
justify intervention in 4lmost identical terms. 
The idealism that led to intervention in 1898 was em­
ployed in 1902 to justify the Platt Amendment. The reason­
ing was logical even if it ignored a number of realities. If 
27. Albert Beveridge, "Cuba and Congress," North American Review 
CLXXII (1901), 546-48. 
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concern for human rights was a legitimate concern, the 
legitimacy would not, in the eyes of its ardent exponents, 
become illegitimate when it transcended national bound­
aries. The imperialists condemned such a view as parochial. 
However, the logical next question would have been the 
legitimacy of the use of force. Few questioned the Tightness 
of employing force to free the Cubans from Spain. Why 
should they have questioned provisions for the use of force 
in Cuba itself as long as the end was to them legitimate? 
Obviously, Beveridge did not. 
The thinking of Senator Beveridge, however interesting 
and however accurately it reflected one segment of the pub­
lic, did not accord with the views of Secretary of War Elihu 
Root. It was he who carried the major share of responsibility 
for affairs in Cuba and for working out future relationships. 
He drafted the Platt Amendment, and he it was who pierced 
the underbrush of argument set forth by self-seeking inter­
ests, sentimental and idealistic verbiage, and the views that 
stemmed from parochial nationalist feelings. 
Root faced realistically factors in the situation that were 
not taken into account by others. He ruled out annexation 
as unacceptable to the majority of Cubans and as an invita­
tion to a protracted struggle. On the other hand, he accepted 
as a fact that the United States would never sit idly by if 
another power intervened in Cuba. It was wiser, he thought, 
to face this possibility and to provide for the right of the 
United States to intervene, a right she held under interna­
tional law only for the duration of the occupation under the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris.28 The possibility of interven­
tion, remote in retrospect, did not appear so then. German 
intentions were viewed with great suspicion. No evidence 
of such German intentions is to be found in the German ar­
28. Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 287-88, 309-15. 
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chives, and the fear was exaggerated; but given the adven­
turous policies of the European powers in various parts of 
the world, the fear was not wholly unreasonable. Given the 
inability of Cuba to defend itself and the very real possi­
bility of ineffective government even in internal affairs, 
which would in turn endanger foreign interests, the possibil­
ity of a European government being drawn into the situa­
tion was not imaginary. Root, a conservative man intent on 
seeking to take into account the most remote contingencies, 
preferred to risk a degree of Cuban resentment rather than 
leave any flank exposed. 
Root likewise considered how his fellow American citi­
zens might react to some future crisis in Cuba. There was 
much sentiment in favor of annexation. Even anti-imperial­
ists like Josiah Quincy, who strongly opposed the annexa­
tion of the Philippines on the ground that the rule of the 
Filipinos by the United States would undermine republi­
can principles at home, favored the annexation of Cuba. The 
Cubans, Quincy argued, would soon be capable of self-
government. Immigration to Cuba from the United States 
would strengthen self-government. Cuba should be annexed 
when the Cubans so proposed, and it should be made a 
state. It was because Cuba could become a state that Quincy 
viewed the annexation with favor.29 However, Root opposed 
annexation and sought to put blocks in the way of its hap­
pening. 
Years after the Cuban crisis, Root confided to his biogra­
pher, Philip C. Jessup, that it had been necessary "to guard 
against the possibility that the United States itself might 
try to annex Cuba through some foreclosure procedure." He 
wrote: "In all foreign relations it is just as important to 
guard against the injustice o£ one's own country as of any 
29. Josiah Quincy, "Political Aspects of Cuba's Economic Distress," 
North American Review CLXXIV (1902), 12-19. 
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other." "This is true," wrote Root, "although you can't talk 
much about it in public."30 
Concern for economic interests and security contributed 
to the support of the Platt Amendment, but liberal ideology 
facilitated intervention in the Caribbean. 
Some found it necessary to justify every move by idealistic 
argument. It was wholly irrelevant to the consideration of 
others. A year after Congress debated the Platt Amendment, 
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Repre­
sentatives held hearings on commercial reciprocity with 
Cuba. No more mundane discussion could have taken place. 
Cuban representatives, spokesmen for New York merchants, 
agents of the cane growers of Louisiana, and sugar beet in­
terests in California, Colorado, and Michigan argued with 
the vehemence of bargainers at an Oriental bazaar. Two 
questions dominated the discussions. Did the price of sugar 
production in Cuba, given current market prices, make the 
harvesting of the current crop unprofitable, and would, 
therefore, the Cuban economy spin into bankruptcy and 
lead to widespread unemployment and violence? Second, if 
this were true, did the United States have an obligation to 
rescue the sugar economy by opening the American market 
to sugar, or should the obligation be met, as the sugar beet 
representatives argued, by the American people as a whole 
and not by the small segment who happened to be domestic 
producers of sugar?31 
The backdrop for this sugar extravaganza was the situa­
tion of the world market. World sugar production had grad­
ually increased from 1,481,000 tons in 1853-54 to 10,710,000 
tons in 1901-2. Germany was by far the greatest producer 
of sugar. Austria, France, and Russia were next in order. 
30. Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 315. 
31. Reciprocity with Cuba, Hearings before Committee on Ways and
Means, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1902), pp. 205-34, 258-96. 
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The world price was determined by Hamburg. To promote 
exports, Germany and France subsidized exports of sugar 
so that the price of German beet sugar in London averaged 
25 percent of the price in Germany. In 1898 an international 
cartel had been established whereby both production and 
prices could be controlled. In brief, the problem facing the 
sugar planters in Cuba had its source in capitals far removed 
from both Havana and Washington. Yet, if the United States 
lowered the duty on sugar imports from Cuba alone by a 
reciprocal agreement, the Cubans would gain at least tem­
porary relief.32 
Cuba's distress was also the United States' opportunity. 
Members of the Ways and Means Committee showed at 
least as great an interest in capturing the Cuban market for 
American goods as the Cubans showed in gaining access to 
the American market. The best informed witness on this 
phase, Colonel T. H. Bliss, collector of customs at Havana, 
testified that the United States had a monopoly of the mar­
kets in fresh beef, pork, eggs, flour, coal, coal oil, machinery, 
and railroad iron. This, however, was more than counter­
balanced by the imports of a list of ninety articles chiefly 
from other countries. Others controlled the Cuban markets 
in cattle, rice, wines, olive oil, salt, preserved fruits, dried 
beef, cottons, linens, woolens, silk, shoes, hats, and many 
other commodities. 
These articles, said Bliss, could be secured from the 
United States, and would be if a tariff was arranged that 
gave the price advantage to the American products. "Thus," 
he said, "a tariff arrangement that would give the United 
States the control of the trade tabulated . . . would enable 
her to control at least 86 percent of the entire inward trade 
of Cuba." "This," he estimated, "on the basis of last year's 
32. See testimony of Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, Chief of Bureau of Chemis­
try, Department of Agriculture, ibid., pp. 474-519. 
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figures, would have made their export trade to Cuba amount 
to $56,904,000 or just double what it actually was." 
The casual estimate interested the committee members, 
but only in the long run would the proposed reciprocal 
trade program have these results. Bliss informed them of 
many of the difficulties. Almost all importers in Cuba were 
Spaniards with long associations with European business 
houses. New ties would not be established at once. There 
were other problems, too. Bliss cited the willingness of Eu­
ropean cotton manufacturers to meet highly exact weight 
requirements and to guarantee the exact number of threads 
in a piece of goods. These determined in part the rate of im­
port duty, and this in turn made the difference between 
profit and loss. Bliss likewise stressed how the practice of 
limiting credit to thirty days handicapped American sales.33 
Cubans pleaded for reciprocity because of the desperate 
situation of the sugar industry, and they recognized that it 
would be necessary to offer concessions in return. However, 
they were not unaware of the danger of Cuba becoming an 
economic colony of the United States. Their fears were 
nourished by the British minister, Sir Lionel Carden, who 
advised them that the principal benefits would go to the 
Americans and that the Cuban government would suffer 
sharp losses in revenue. In his report to the Foreign Office, 
Sir Lionel stated that the very existence of British trade 
with Cuba was threatened. "These arguments," he wrote "I 
have not failed to urge on several of the leading Cuban dele­
gates, who are already opposed on political grounds to too 
intimate a connection with the United States, and it is to be 
hoped that their efforts may have the effect of neutralizing 
the action of the planters and their sympathizers."34 
President McKinley, Secretary of War Root, and General 
33. Ibid., pp. 382-83, 386. 
34. Quoted in Warren G. Kneer, "Great Britain and the Caribbean, 
1901-1913: A Study in Anglo-American Relations," Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Michigan State University, 1966), p. 179. 
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Leonard Wood put the argument for a reciprocal trade 
treaty in terms of the plight of the Cuban sugar economy 
and the moral obligation of the United States, inherent in its 
intervention in Cuba, to enable the Cubans to achieve eco­
nomic recovery. Economic disaster at the close of the United 
States military occupation would reflect unfavorably upon 
the nation and upon the administration. This was the over­
riding consideration. Theodore Roosevelt, calling on Con­
gress to approve a reciprocal trade treaty, stressed the ob­
ligation of the United States to assist the Cubans. At the 
same time these leaders expressed sympathy for the Cubans, 
they were mindful of other dimensions of the question than 
the immediate crisis. When the final bill was before the 
House of Representatives, Roosevelt urged its approval "not 
only because it is eminently for our own interests to control 
the Cuban market and by every means to foster our suprem­
acy in the lands and waters south of us, but also because 
we, of the giant republic of the north, should make all our 
sister nations of the American Continent feel that whenever 
they will permit it, we desire to show ourselves disinter­
estedly and effectively their friend." 35 
Winning the confidence of the peoples of the Caribbean 
by recognizing their problems and responding to their pleas 
for assistance guided Roosevelt and Root. The administra­
tion saw as its goal constructive leadership and friendly rela­
tions based upon mutual interests. The hope of a future 
market was almost incidental. However, the frankness of 
Roosevelt in stating that the United States aimed at control 
of the Cuban market and supremacy "in the lands and wa­
ters south of us" supports the Cuban critics who later 
charged that the aim was to reduce the island to an eco­
nomic colony. 
The negotiation of a reciprocal trade treaty went forward, 
35. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935 
(New York, 1964), p. 207. 
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but there was strong opposition from the domestic beet-
sugar interests, and Elihu Root for a time had little hope of 
getting the approval of Congress.36 In December, 1902, the 
treaty was completed, and it was approved by Congress the 
following March. The beet sugar interests won a major con­
cession when a provision was introduced making the 20 per­
cent reduction in duty on Cuban sugar dependent upon the 
continuation of the high Dingley tariff duties on sugar from 
all other countries. 
Some historians charge that the aim of the United States 
in negotiating the treaty was economic domination of Cuba. 
Eventually, Cuba did become an economic colony, but this 
was not a result of the trade treaty. Shortly after Congress 
approved of the treaty, Parker Willis, an economist who had 
long favored reciprocal trade, criticized the treaty as falling 
far short of the ideals of reciprocity. He maintained that the 
Cuban reduction of duties on American manufacturers was 
not sufficient to promise any real increase of exports to 
Cuba.37 
The reciprocal trade agreement did not lead to immediate 
American domination of the Cuban economy. It was Cuba 
that derived the greater gain. Imports from Cuba rose from 
$31,371,704 in 1900 to $122,528,037 in 1910. Sugar ac­
counted for $93,543,897 of these imports. The 20 percent re­
duction of the regular duties on sugar originating in Cuba 
explained in part the increasing importance of the commer­
cial tie. Almost the entire amount of sugar produced in Cuba 
was exported to the United States. Imports of tobacco were 
valued at $17,915,616 in 1910 and likewise benefitted by the 
20 percent reduction.38 
36. Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 326-27. 
37. H. P. Willis, "Reciprocity with Cuba," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science XXII (1903), 129-47. 
38. Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor, 
The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Year
Ending June 30,1910 (Washington, 1910), pp. 30, 346, 354-55. 
 239 PAUL A. VARG
The exports of the United States to Cuba in 1910 fell far 
short of the optimistic predictions that had been made dur­
ing the discussion in 1902 of the benefits to be gained by a 
reciprocal agreement. Exports did increase from $26,513,400 
in 1900 to $52,858,758 in 1910, but Cuba continued to buy 
from Europe in large part rather than from the United 
States. British cotton goods far outsold American cottons. 
American investments in Cuba spiraled upward much 
more rapidly than exports of goods. In 1898, prior to the war 
with Spain, they approximated $50 million. By 1911 they 
had risen to more than $200 million.39 
The question of whether the United States had attained 
the status of a world power depends obviously on how the 
term is defined. By the turn of the century, the United States 
had by any economic measure moved to the front rank. It 
was likewise a major power in the Pacific Ocean area, where 
it possessed a series of important island bases and the Philip­
pines plus a strong navy. Any nation seeking to bring about 
change in this region would have confronted a determined 
United States. However, while it exerted a modest influence 
in Eastern Asia and had established its right to a voice in 
international affairs in that area, the United States had only 
minor interests in China, and it did not affect significantly 
the course of events in the Manchu empire. Only in the 
Caribbean did the United States take on heavy commitments 
and dominate political developments. In Europe it was aloof. 
Except for its lasting impact on Spain in depriving her of the 
last of her empire and participation in the Algeciras Con­
ference of 1906, the United States played no part in Euro­
pean affairs, although she was important to Europe as an 
economic competitor and as a supplier of both agricultural 
and manufactured goods. 
The most significant development in American foreign 
39. Kneer, "Great Britain and the Caribbean," p. 13. 
240 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
relations was not an increasing impact on the course of world 
diplomacy but the emergence of foreign relations as a major 
problem. Varied responses to the question came to the fore 
ranging from a clamor for markets, speeches, and editorials 
on America's mission in the world, to thoughtful probing of 
the question of national interests. Much of the debate cen­
tered on duty and on opportunity and almost none of it on 
the complexities. 
The heritage of a generation determines in large part the 
conduct of its diplomacy. At the turn of the century the heri­
tage included neither a sense that the nation's welfare was 
in any way dependent upon developments abroad nor any 
significant public awareness that the existing world order, 
so benign in terms of American interests, rested on the com­
plex arrangements of treaties, dominance of underdeveloped 
areas by the European powers, and control of the seas by 
Great Britain. Apart from a few leaders, such as Theodore 
Roosevelt and, to a lesser degree, Woodrow Wilson, there 
was no recognition of the advantages to the United States 
of the existing order in Europe. The heritage continued to 
nourish parochialism and counterbalanced the thrust of new 
forces. However, the dawn of a new era was at hand. New 
concerns made themselves felt and new ambitions came to 
the fore. 
The United States and the Failure 
of Collective Security in the 1930s 
MANFRED JONAS 
"IN MY OWN MIND," Senator Arthur Vandenberg of 
Michigan confided to his diary some time after the event, 
"my convictions regarding international cooperation and 
collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon 
of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for 
any realist."x Vandenberg had been slow to reach the con­
clusion that the development of the United States into a 
major power and the increasing interdependence of nations 
brought on by the technological advances of the twentieth 
century had rendered the traditional American approach 
to foreign policy obsolete. But when the Japanese forcibly 
demonstrated that this country was also no longer safe from 
foreign attack, even the Michigan senator, a longtime con­
gressional isolationist and former member of the Nye Com­
mittee, underwent a conversion. 
By 1944 Vandenberg had become the champion of an 
international organization capable, should it prove neces­
1. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed. (with Joe Alex Morris), The Private 
Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 1. 
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sary, of maintaining peace through cooperative military 
action, and he promoted this objective as a member of the 
United States delegation to the San Francisco conference 
in 1945.2 There can be little doubt that most Americans 
underwent a similar conversion during this period. From a 
nation overwhelmingly committed to the avoidance of any 
and all "entanglements," the United States moved, certainly 
by the end of 1941, to the realization that it had an important 
stake in world peace and world order that it must work ac­
tively to preserve.3 
To describe his new cause, Vandenberg used the phrase 
"collective security," a term that had gained currency in 
Europe and in some circles in the United States during the 
decade. Political scientists generally define collective secu­
rity as that system of power management in international 
relations which occupies "the middle zone of the spectrum 
in which balance of power and world government represent 
the terminal points."4 Such a system, of necessity, requires 
the establishment of an international organization whose 
members are committed to the settlement of controversies 
through discussion, arbitration, or the decisions of an inter­
national tribunal, and who agree to the use of diplomatic, 
economic, and perhaps even military force against nations 
2. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), 7957; see also 
Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares, 2d ed. (New York, 1959), pp. 
77 ff. 
3. TTiis subject is treated in some detail in Walter Johnson, The Battle 
against Isolation (Chicago, 1944); William L. Langer and S. Everett 
Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York, 1952); and 
Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1955). For the conversion of the isolationists during this
period, see Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1966). 
4. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York, 
1964), p. 94; see also Willard N. Hogan, International Conflict and Collec­
tive Security: The Principle of Concern in International Organization 
(Lexington, Ky., 1955), pp. 179-81. 
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seeking to make good their claims by warlike acts. The idea 
of collective security in this sense was implied by Theodore 
Roosevelt, both in his Nobel Peace Prize address in 1910 
and in subsequent pronouncements, advanced during World 
War I by the Netherlands-based Organisation Centrale 
pour une Paix Durable and by its American counterpart, 
the League to Enforce Peace, and incorporated in Woodrow 
Wilson's proposal for a League of Nations.5 
It would be difficult to prove, and is indeed unreasonable 
to assume, that Vandenberg and most other Americans had 
such a precise notion of the course on which they were pre­
pared to embark by 1941. It is far more likely that they re­
garded collective security as nothing more than a synonym 
for international cooperation for peace, "as a large envelope, 
into which could be stuffed any and all forms of active par­
ticipation in world politics."6 Yet, they were willing to carry 
on this cooperation within the framework of an international 
body endowed with real, if limited, enforcement powers. 
Indeed, the United States was to become the major force 
behind the establishment of the United Nations Organiza­
tion, and thus behind the reestablishment of potentially ef­
fective collective security machinery. Considering that this 
country never effectively supported the League of Nations 
or encouraged efforts to make collective security a reality 
in the early thirties, America's championing of collective 
security after 1941 represents a fundamental shift in Ameri­
can attitudes and a major turning point in American foreign 
relations. 
The League of Nations, embodying the collective security 
5. Hermann Hagedorn, ed., The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Memo­
rial Edition, 24 vok. (New York, 1923-26), XX, 97, 185; Claude, Power 
and International Relations, pp. 107-8; Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League to 
Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944), passim. 
6. Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 117. 
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principle, had been conceived by Woodrow Wilson as an 
alternative to the balance-of-power system that had failed 
to prevent a world war, and may, indeed, have been one of 
its causes. Wilson saw the League as embodying "an entirely 
new course of action" and urged the American people to ac­
cept participation in it on that basis.7 But either for tactical 
or other reasons he never clearly spelled out just how new 
that course would be. For collective security in the Wil­
sonian sense to become operative, all, or at least almost all, 
nations must be either persuaded or coerced into acceptance 
of the belief that international peace is their primary na­
tional goal and that other national goals in conflict with 
that must perforce yield precedence. Acceptance of that 
belief, however, and agreement to act so as to assure its 
universal acceptance involves a diminution of freedom of 
action, and thus of national sovereignty, greater than that 
which any major power had ever been willing to accept. 
There is some evidence to indicate that the European 
powers were ultimately willing to accept the League of Na­
tions not as a new course of action but, simply, as a stronger, 
stabler, and more sophisticated version of the old alliance 
system.8 Wilson could hardly hope to sell the League on 
this basis in an America nurtured on contempt for this sys­
tem, but he also, in the final analysis, could not persuade the 
United States to relinquish the degree of sovereignty that 
the covenant, taken literally, would have required. Henry 
Cabot Lodge could, and did, endorse the program of the 
League to Enforce Peace and argued eloquently that "na­
tions must unite as men unite in order to preserve peace and 
7. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, 2 vols. (New York, 1928), 
1,42. 
8. See Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1955), pp. 273-74; Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 315; Miller, Drafting of 
the Covenant, II, 372-73. 
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order." But what he had in mind was simply a kind of inter­
national posse comitatus, a vigilante committee in which 
peace-loving states like the United States would voluntarily 
get together to stop international lawbreakers.9 Such an ar­
rangement would not restrict the sovereignty of the partici­
pants. But the covenant went far beyond this and correctly 
appeared to Lodge and the many Americans who shared 
his view as a clear limitation of American sovereignty and a 
general alliance more permanent and more entangling than 
anything Washington might have foreseen. 
The case has often been made that most Americans and, 
indeed, a majority in the Senate favored American ad­
herence to the League of Nations, albeit with some reserva­
tions. It would follow from this that Wilson's own intransi­
geance was a major factor in the defeat of the Versailles 
treaty. It is equally true, however, that the reservations pro­
posed by Lodge would have emasculated the League Cove­
nant, and thus effectively prevented the establishment of a 
genuine collective security system.10 Although it might, for 
practical purposes, have been better for the United States 
to join even an emasculated League, there can be little doubt 
that Wilson was correct in his judgment that neither the ir­
reconcilables nor the reservationists accepted the principle 
of collective security that he saw as essential to the proper 
functioning of the League of Nations. Unhappily for him, 
neither did the American people. 
If the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles thus appears as 
a clearcut rejection of the collective security principle by 
the Senate and the American people, the efforts made by 
9. Works of Theodore Roosevelt, XX, 185, 198; Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Maintenance of Peace: Address Delivered at Union College Commencement, 
June 9, 1915 (Washington, 1919); A. Lawrence Lowell, "A League to 
Enforce Peace," Atlantic Monthly CXVI (1915), 400. 
10. The reservations are listed in Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 163. 
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the United States to reach a modus vivendi with the League 
during the 1920s do nothing to alter this picture. American 
participation in the nonpolitical work of the League, the 
sending of judges to serve on international tribunals, and 
even the eventual sending of observers to the political dis­
cussions at Geneva, in no way reflect even a minimal accept­
ance of the collective security idea. Nor does the work of 
those organizations friendly to American League member­
ship in the twenties suggest a different conclusion. The 
founding members of the League of Nations Non-Partisan 
Association, the forerunner of the League of Nations As­
sociation, agreed in 1923 merely to endorse American entry 
on terms "consistent with our constitution and consonant 
with the dignity and honor, the moral responsibility and 
power of our Republic." In its subsequent educational ef­
forts, the organization promoted the League not as an instru­
ment of collective security but merely as a "method of co­
operation open to those states which wish to use it." The 
other groups which were formed to promote a greater degree 
of internationalism in American thinking, such as the Wood­
row Wilson Foundation, the Foreign Policy Association, and 
the Council on Foreign Relations, did no more.11 
If the concept of collective security was developed, and 
rejected by most Americans, during the years surrounding 
World War I, the term itself did not gain currency until the 
1930s. It was first given prominence when it became the 
subject of the seventh and eighth International Studies Con­
ferences held under the auspices of a League of Nations 
affiliate, the International Institute of Intellectual Co-opera­
tion, at Paris in 1934 and London in 1935. It provided the 
subject for the annual meetings of the Geneva Institute of 
International Relations in 1935 and 1936, and for the twelfth 
11. Robert A. Divine, Second Chance (New York, 1967), pp. 12, 16, 
18-23. 
 247 MANFRED JONAS
Institute under the Norman Wait Harris Foundation held at 
the University of Chicago, June 23-JuIy 2, 1936.12 
Why the term should come into vogue after 1934 is by 
no means clear, but it would be unwise to reject as flippant 
C. W. A. Manning's suggestion of August 22, 1935, that "it 
was invented, quite recently, as a sly means of suggesting 
to the more 'soft-boiled' Americans that somehow their coun­
try, in signing the Kellogg Pact, had inadvertently and 
against its desires assumed a quasi-membership in the 
League."13 If so, the means were not sly enough, however. 
Certainly American individuals and groups friendly to the 
League of Nations were involved in the early discussions of 
the subject. Philip C. Jessup represented the Council on 
Foreign Relations as a participant in both International 
Studies Conferences and submitted for consideration of the 
London conference a lengthy memorandum on the American 
role in collective action for peace. Allen W. Dulles, William 
C. Scroggs, Isaiah Bowman, Raymond Leslie Buell, Joseph P. 
Chamberlain, Tyler Dennett, Edwin F. Gay, Admiral Wil­
liam V. Pratt, DeWitt C. Poole, James T. Shotwell, General 
George S. Simonds, and Quincy Wright served along with 
Jessup on the committee responsible for the report, which 
was seen as the definitive statement of views of what was 
rather grandiloquently designated as the National Coordi­
nating Center in the United States for organizations en­
gaged in the study of international relations.1* 
12. The published results of these meetings are to be found in Maurice
Bourquin, ed., Collective Security: A Record of the Seventh and Eighth
International Studies Conferences (Paris, 1936); Geneva Institute of 
International Relations, Problems of Peace, Tenth Series: Anarchy or World 
Order (London, 1936) and Problems of Peace, Eleventh Series: The League 
and the Future of the Collective System (London, 1937); and Quincy 
Wright, ed., Neutrality and Collective Security (Chicago, 1936). The Harris
Foundation Lectures had dealt with problems related to collective security
in 1924,1927, and 1930, but the term itself was not used before 1936. 
13. Geneva Institute, Anarchy or World Order, p. 152. 
14. Philip C. Jessup, International Security: The American Role In 
Collective Action for Peace (New York, 1935), p. vii and passim. 
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At the International Studies Conference in London, Jessup 
was joined by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of For­
eign Affairs, Malcolm W. Davis of the European Center of 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Allen 
W. Dulles. Dulles, who had left the United States Diplo­
matic Service in 1926 and had subsequently served as legal 
adviser to the American delegations to the Three-Power 
Naval Conference in 1927 and to the Geneva Conference 
for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in 1932-33, 
was chairman of the study meetings of the conference and 
delivered one of the opening addresses.15 The 1936 Harris 
lectures included one on "The United States and Collective 
Security," by Dean Edwin DeWitt Dickinson of the School 
of Jurisprudence of the University of California, and the 
entire series of lectures was published by Quincy Wright 
under the title Neutrality and Collective Security.16 The 
lectures on the subject Anarchy or World Order delivered 
under the auspices of the Geneva Institute of International 
Relations in 1935 included one on "World Organization 
through Democracy," by Clarence K. Streit, then the Geneva 
correspondent for the New York Times, and another by Pro­
fessor John B. Whitton of Princeton University that raised 
the question "Is American neutrality possible?" " The 1936 
series included not only another lecture by Streit but also 
contributions by Professor Phillips Bradley of Amherst Col­
lege, and by Otto Nathan, a New York University econo­
mist.18 
Nevertheless, it was clear even to the American partici­
pants in these events—and they represented an infinitesimal 
15. Bourquin, Collective Security, pp. 40-41, 488, 490-91, 496-97. 
16. Wright, Neutrality and Collective Security, esp. pp. 157-82. 
17. Geneva Institute, Anarchy or World Order, passim. 
18. Geneva Institute, The League and the Future of the Collective 
System, passim. 
 249 MANFRED JONAS
minority of the American people—that the United States 
was opposed to the notion of collective security that perforce 
involved the possibility of sanctions. "The United States," 
Philip Jessup concluded, "will not now enter into any treaty, 
pact, covenant, agreement or understanding, which binds it 
in advance to use its military, air, or naval forces as a means 
of bringing pressure on a state which threatens to resort to 
war or actually begins hostilities. There is no realistic ad­
vantage from the American standpoint in discussing such 
an arrangement at this time." "Further," he continued, "it 
may be asserted that the United States is also unwilling to 
bind itself in advance to apply economic or financial sanc­
tions." 19 
The failure of the United States to respond affirmatively to 
the collective security discussion of the middle 1930s had 
roots deep in history. Washington's Farewell Address had 
made the case that America's "detached and distant situa­
tion" permitted this country to follow a course different 
from that of other powers. He had foreseen the time when, 
given unity and efficient government, "belligerent nations, 
under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will 
not lightly hazard the giving us provocation"; and he had 
warned against "interweaving our destiny with that of any 
part of Europe" and thus entangling our peace and pros­
perity "in the toils of European Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, 
Humour or Caprice." Hamilton had urged avoidance of the 
wars engendered by the French Revolution on much the 
same grounds. Both men, if we may couch their statements 
in more modern terminology, had argued that the security 
of the United States could not be threatened unless, indeed, 
this country embraced collective arrangements of some sort. 
"All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined," the 
19. Jessup, International Security, p. 126. 
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youthful Abraham Lincoln had told the Young Men's Ly­
ceum of Springfield, Illinois, in 1838, "with all the treasure 
of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest, with 
a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force take a 
drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in 
the trial of a thousand years." And Carl Schurz had assured 
the readers of Harper's Magazine in 1893 that "in our com­
pact continental stronghold we are substantially unassail­
able."20 
Given this long-standing commitment of the United States 
to an independent foreign policy, it would have required 
the realization on the part of the American government and 
people that American security was actually threatened and 
that the United States was incapable of countering such a 
threat on its own to make the idea of collective security 
appealing. There is no evidence to support the assumption 
that such was indeed the case. Quite the contrary, the tra­
ditional view of the relationship of the United States to the 
rest of the world enjoyed wide acceptance throughout the 
1930s. The halls of Congress echoed to the claims of Repre­
sentatives John B. McClellan of Arkansas, Eugene B. Crowe 
of Indiana, Henry Ellenbogen of Pennsylvania, Martin Dies 
of Texas, and others that America was safe because it 
was separated "by thousands of miles of ocean and natural 
barriers" from the rest of the world.21 Most military experts 
shared these views. Major General Johnson Hagood was 
certain that we could "build a fence around our property 
20. James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers 
of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 8 vols. (Washington, 1899), I, 221-23: 
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Constitutional 
Edition, 12 vols. (New York and London, n.d.), V, 88-89; Roy P. Basler, 
ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, 
N.J., 1953-55), I, 109; Frederic Bancroft, ed., Speeches, Correspondence 
and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, 6 vols. (New York and London, 1913), 
V, 207, 258-59, 264-65. 
21. See for example Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), 
2247,2261, and 75th Cong. 1st Sess., (1937), Appendix 748. 
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and warn everybody to keep out." Major George Fielding 
Eliot praised "Providence in its infinite mercy and wisdom" 
for having given this country a geographical position far 
removed irom danger and expressed the opinion that aggres­
sive warfare could not reach American shores. "No military 
tidal wave could prevail against our continental and hemi­
spherical impregnability," the New York Times's Hanson 
Baldwin assured the readers of the American Mercury as 
late as 1939.22 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
heard the same views expressed by Bernard Baruch, General 
Hugh Johnson, and L. D. Stillwell of Dartmouth College.23 
Even Phillips Bradley, a participant in the Geneva Institute 
of International Relations lecture series on collective secu­
rity in 1936, wrote in Amerasia in 1937 that "our geographi­
cal position, unique among the nations, makes avoidance of 
other people's wars possible. We are insulated against ef­
fective attack." He had spoken at Geneva of his hope for a 
"coincidence" between American foreign policy and the 
principle of collective security.24 
Such a "coincidence" was not likely to occur, however, 
without some concern that American security could not be 
maintained by the unaided efforts of this country. In the 
absence of a perceived threat, the advice and counsel of the 
Founding Fathers, which had been the mainstay of Ameri­
can foreign policy from the outset, was likely to prevail. John 
Adams claimed to have told the Continental Congress in 
22. Johnson Hagood, "Rational Defense," Saturday Evening Pont CCIX (October 24, 1936), 6, 40-43, and We Can Defend America (Garden City, 
N.Y., 1937), pp. 2-29; George Fielding Eliot, The Ramparts We Watch (New York, 1938), p. 351; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Impregnable America," 
American Mercury XLVII (1939), 267. 
23. U.S. Senate, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Neutrality, Peace Legislation and 
Our Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations
(Washington, 1939), pp. 55, 280, 562. 
24. Phillips Bradley, "Neutrality and War," Amerasia I (1937), 79; 
Geneva Institute, The League and the Future of the Collective System, 
p. 126. 
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1775 that "our real if not our nominal independence would 
consist in our Neutrality." Hamilton's abstract of points for 
possible inclusion in Washington's Farewell Address in­
cluded the admonition that the "greater rule of our foreign 
politics" ought to be to have little or no connection with for­
eign nations and to "cherish the sentiment of independence." 
Washington, of course, had warned of permanent alliances 
and Jefferson of entangling ones, and Monroe's doctrine en­
visioned separate spheres of influence for the United States 
and Europe.25 All of them ruled out meaningful collective 
action, and the loud echoes of their sentiments persisted 
well into the thirties, when they were tested in a number of 
crises, the first of which arose in connection with the Japa­
nese invasion of Manchuria. 
The Manchurian crisis fell into the term of Herbert Hoo­
ver, whose opposition to any form of collective security had 
been unequivocally expressed on numerous occasions. In an 
Armistice Day address in 1929 he had described the appli­
cation of force to compel nations to settle their difference as 
a road the United States had refused to travel, and expressed 
the hope that aggression could be countered successfully 
by merely subjecting it "to the searchlight of public opinion." 
Five months later, Hoover had reaffirmed to the Daughters 
of the American Revolution his basic belief that America 
was sufficiently secure without collective arrangements: 
Because of our geographical situation, because of our great 
resources and of the American genius for organization, we 
have, in a sense that no other country has it, security from 
attack and harm by other nations. We are not only more free 
from attack, but our people are more free from the haunting 
fear of attack than are any other people in the world. 
25. "The Autobiography of John Adams," Adams Papers (microfilm; 
Boston, 1954-56), Pt. Ill, No. 180; Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address 
(Princeton, N.J., 1961), pp. 138-39, 141; Richardson, Papers of the Presi­
dents, I, 222, 323. 
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This freedom, he argued, did not diminish America's respon­
sibility to work for world peace, but that responsibility could 
"only be fulfilled to its fullest measure by maintaining the 
fullest independence," and in particular by "independence 
from any combination pledged to the use of force" to main­
tain peace.26 
In a memorandum the president read to his cabinet shortly 
after the Mukden Incident had caused China to bring the 
whole issue before the League of Nations, Hoover applied 
these views directly to the Far Eastern crisis. Calling the 
Japanese action immoral and an outrageous affront to the 
United States, he nevertheless insisted that "the Nine-Power 
Treaty and the Kellogg Pact are solely moral instruments 
based upon the hope that peace in the world can be held 
by the rectitude of nations and enforced solely by the moral 
reprobation of the world." "We are not parties to the League 
of Nations, the covenant of which has also been violated," 
he added with something less than regret. Once again, the 
conclusion followed logically: 
We should co-operate with the rest of the world; we should 
do so as long as that co-operation remains in the field of 
moral pressures. . . . But that is the limit. We will not go 
along on war or any of the sanctions either economic or 
military, for those are the roads to war.27 
Although the United States cooperated with the League 
of Nations during the Manchurian crisis to a greater degree 
than ever before, it never deviated from this policy. The 
most obvious possibility for passing beyond "the field of 
moral pressures" lay in the application of economic sanctions 
26. William Starr Myers, ed., The State Papers and Other Public Writ­
ings of Herbert Hoover, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1934), I, 128, 234-35, 
239. 
27. Ibid., pp. 156, 158-59: The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet 
and the Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York, 1952), pp. 368-70. 
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against Japan. The League itself never committed itself to 
move in that direction, and the United States neither urged 
it to do so nor seriously contemplated this step on its own. 
China initially appealed to the League on September 21 to 
take immediate steps "to prevent the further development 
of a situation endangering the peace of nations." But it did 
so under Article XI of the League Covenant, rather than 
under Articles XV and XVI under which sanctions might 
have been applied. In response to this, the League consid­
ered the idea of sending an investigating commission to 
Manchuria. Since Japan was opposed to such a commission, 
and since Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson believed 
that the Tokyo government did not support its army in Man­
churia and could be persuaded to call off the action if it were 
not pushed too hard, the United States opposed even the 
sending of a commission.28 
When Japan continued its advance into Manchuria in 
early October, the State Department for the first time began 
even to discuss the question of sanctions,29 but there is no 
evidence of any favorable consideration at this time. The 
League too, speaking through its secretary-general, Sir Eric 
Drummond, still regarded sanctions to be "entirely out of 
the question."30 The United States did agree to send its con­
sul at Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert, to sit with the League Coun­
cil during its meeting, which began on October 16; but Gil­
bert's instructions limited him to participation in discussions 
relating to possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
28. Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observa­
tions (New York, 1936), pp. 38, 42-43; Prentiss Gilbert to Stimson and 
Hugh Wilson to Stimson, September 22, 1931, and Stimson to Wilson, 
September 23, 1931, in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1931, 3 vols. (Washington, 1946), III, 35-36, 37, 48-49 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations). 
29. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, p. 57. 
30. Gilbert to Stimson, October 7, 1931, Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 
130. 
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which, as Hoover had repeatedly pointed out, relied en­
tirely on moral pressure for its effectiveness.31 When the 
League attempted to draw Gilbert into a more general dis­
cussion of the problem, Stimson instructed him to cease to 
attend meetings and only reluctantly agreed, after a tele­
phone call from British Foreign Secretary Lord Reading, to 
permit him to go to one more secret and one more open ses­
sion, but only as an observer at a seat away from the con­
ference table. When it turned out that there were no seats 
away from the table and when Briand added his plea that 
Gilbert should nevertheless remain, Stimson reluctantly 
agreed to "let him go on sitting at the damned table," on 
condition that he "keep his mouth shut."32 
On October 24 the League Council, without any further 
advice or participation by the United States, voted to urge 
China and Japan to compose their differences and asked Ja­
pan to evacuate Manchuria, hopefully prior to the next 
Council meeting on November 16. No such action was, of 
course, forthcoming. On November 10 the United States 
decided to send someone to Paris, where the Council meet­
ing was to be held. Accordingly, Stimson called the ambas­
sador in London, Charles G. Dawes, and asked him to go to 
Paris, not to attend Council meetings, but merely to be avail­
able for discussions with League members in his suite at the 
Ritz.33 When the Council reconvened, the subject of eco­
31. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 64-65; Stimson to Gilbert, October 
16, 1931, Foreign Relations, 1931, HI, 203. In a telephone conversation on
the same day, Stimson urged Gilbert "to keep in the background" and "not
give Japan occasion to feel that we are seeking to guide the whole thing"
(ibid., 203-7). 
32. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression(New Haven, Conn., 1957), pp. 142-43; Stimson Diary, October 20, 1931,
Stimson Papers, Yale University Library; Stimson to Gilbert, October 19, 
1931, and telephone call of same date, Reading to Stimson, Foreign Rela­
tions, 1931, III, 248, 259-60,248-58. 
33. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 142-43; telephone conversation, 
Stimson to Charles G. Dawes, November 10, 1931, Foreign Relations, 1931, 
111,407-14. 
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nomic sanctions received attention for the first time, at least 
in private conversations. On November 17 the New York 
Herald-Tribune carried, under a Washington dateline, the an­
nouncement that it had learned from "high official authority" 
that the Japanese ambassador in Washington had been offi­
cially informed that the United States would not support 
League sanctions or the withdrawal of diplomatic represent­
atives from Japan. Stimson denied this in a cable intended 
for Dawes, and Undersecretary of State William R. Castle, 
Jr., informed the British ambassador in Washington that the 
denial was correct. Castle did not imply, however, that the 
United States favored sanctions, but insisted simply that 
this country had "reserved complete liberty for future ac­
tion." 34 
On the very same day Dawes informed Stimson that Dr. 
Alfred Sze, the Chinese counsel at Geneva, had told him 
that China planned to ask the League within the next day 
or so to proceed under Articles X, XII, XV, and, if necessary, 
XVI, and thus to raise officially the question of collective 
action, probably in the form of sanctions. The American 
reply was immediate and definite. Stimson called Dawes in 
Paris and ordered him to stay away from League meetings 
especially now, "because they are going to take up the ques­
tion of sanctions." Stimson was certain that the United States 
would not interfere with an embargo decided on by the 
League—though he did not wish to say so publicly—but he 
also expressed doubt "whether it is advisable for the League 
to go on with an embargo." "We do not ourselves believe in 
the enforcement of any embargo by our own government." 
he added.35 
34. Stimson to G. Howland Shaw, November 17, 1931, and Castle 
Memorandum, November 18, 1931, Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 466-67, 
477. 
35. Shaw to Stimson, November 18, 1931. and telephone conversation, 
Stimson to Dawes, November 19, 1931, ibid., pp. 484-85, 488-98, esp. 
489, 496. 
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Outside official circles some sentiments favorable to Amer­
ican imposition of sanctions were expressed. Upton Close 
and John Dewey advocated such a course in speeches to 
the New York chapter of the League for Industrial Democ­
racy, and the National Council for the Prevention of War, 
the Foreign Policy Association, and the League of Nations 
Association among other groups were sympathetic to such 
action. On balance, however, it seems clear that opposition 
to sanctions, and for that matter opposition to any coopera­
tion with the League of Nations, overshadowed these views. 
Even the sending of Gilbert to attend the meetings at Ge­
neva had been attacked as "a Wilsonian delusion" and a 
"sample of nitwit diplomacy."36 
The claim that Secretary Stimson initially favored sanc­
tions and "constantly returned to this idea" was made by 
Herbert Hoover and seconded by William Starr Myers.37 
But though Stimson may have toyed with the idea of sanc­
tions, at least in the fall of 1931, and indeed discussed the 
matter with Hoover, the evidence already presented as well 
as entries he made in his diary suggest that he never really 
espoused such a course and eventually came to oppose it 
vigorously. At a meeting in the State Department on Decem­
ber 6, the secretary's principal advisers, Allen T. Klots, James 
Grafton Rogers, and Stanley K. Hornbeck expressed them­
selves as inclined to use sanctions, provided that some nation 
other than the United States took the initiative. Undersecre­
tary Castle was unalterably opposed, and Stimson, though 
still tempted by the idea, was already considering the safer 
alternative of "non-recognition" and eventually supported 
Castle's position. As a result, the others retreated, and no 
36. Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan (Chicago, 1963), 
p. 88; New York Times, Nov. 12, Dec. 13, 1931; Stimson Diary, December 
6, 1931, Stimson Papers; Literary Digest CXI (October 31, 1931), 3-4. 
37. Hoover, Memoirs: The Cabinet and the Presidency, pp. 366-67; 
William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933 (New York, 1940), pp. 162-63. 
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action was taken.38 When he came to write his own account 
of events, both independently in 1936 and with MacGeorge 
Bundy in 1947, Stimson never mentioned that he favored 
sanctions actively at any time during the Manchurian cri­
sis.39 
On December 10 the League of Nations finally took ac­
tion. With the consent of Japan it sent the Lytton Commis­
sion to Manchuria to investigate the situation in the hope 
that military action in the area would cease while the com­
mission was carrying out its task. The United States had 
taken no part in this decision and was not officially repre­
sented on the commission. It did, however, agree to the ap­
pointment of an "unofficial" American, General Frank Mc­
Coy, to serve on the commission.40 When the sending of the 
commission failed to halt hostilities or stem the advance of 
the Japanese, Stimson was incensed and turned his mind 
once more to positive action. It was not to sanctions or to 
any form of collective action that he turned. Instead, he 
resurrected an idea first advanced by Secretary of State 
Bryan in 1915 and, with the consent of Hoover, who had 
earlier thought along these lines, formulated the well-known 
nonrecognition doctrine with which his name is usually as­
sociated. When Chinchow fell to the Japanese on January 
2, 1932, he began preparing the note that, on January 7, 
informed Japan and the world that the United States "does 
not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement 
which may be brought about by means contrary to the cov­
enants and obligations of the Pact of Paris."41 In relation 
38. Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 89-90, 92-94; Stimson Diary, 
November 7, 14, 1931, Stimson Papers; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 
155-56. 
39. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, passim,; and Stimson and McGeorge 
Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), esp. p. 233. 
40. Benjamin B. Wallace, "How the United States 'Led the League' in 
1931," American Political Science Review XXXIX (1945), 113. 
41. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 155-58; Rappaport, Stimson and 
Japan, pp. 92-94; Stimson Diary, January 3, 4, and 6, 1932, Stimson Papers.
The text of the note is in Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 7-8. 
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to the issue of collective security, it should be noted that his 
doctrine was once again an appeal to public opinion and not 
to coercion; that it was based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
which also was a "moral" document; and that the action 
taken was wholly unilateral. Stimson had informed foreign 
ambassadors of his plans and hoped that other nations 
would follow the American example, but his doctrine was 
neither a collective formulation nor a commitment to posi­
tive enforcement action. "Non-recognition," Sir John T. 
Pratt has pointed out, "was a peculiarly American tech­
nique, the fruit of American isolationism."42 
Isolationist or not, the Stimson Doctrine did not imme­
diately find support in the world community, particularly 
not in Great Britain, whose cooperation Stimson regarded 
as essential. Certainly it did not inhibit Japan, which, on 
January 28, produced the most startling evidence of its ag­
gressive intent by attacking Shanghai. Stimson was outraged 
and once more sought more positive action. The United 
States sent troops and naval vessels to Shanghai to protect 
American interests and persuaded Britain, France, and Italy 
to join in asking Japan to stop fighting and to enter into 
negotiations with China in the presence of neutral observers. 
Japan refused the offer on February 4." 
It was at this point that the idea of sanctions came once 
again into the realm of public discussion in the United 
States, at least within the academic and business communi­
ties.44 Stimson, always at least half-tempted by the idea, was 
realistic enough to realize that no massive support for such 
a course would be forthcoming either within or without the 
42. John T. Pratt, War and Politics in China (London, 1943), p. 226; 
see also, Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 162-69. 
43. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 147-50; Ferrell, American Diplo­
macy, pp. 178-79. 
44. New York Times, Feb. 2, 18, 1932; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, 
pp. 137-38. 
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government. Faced by the need for some action, however, 
he now attempted to unite the signatories to the Nine-Power 
Treaty in an effort to invoke the provisions of that pact. The 
Nine-Power Treaty, of course, provided for nothing more 
than "full and frank communication between the Contract­
ing Powers" in the event of a breach in its provisions; but 
Slimson regarded its invocation both as a form of "collective 
protest" and as a step which, in the likely event that it prove 
ineffective, might push American sentiment in the direction 
of sterner action, provided, of course, that the League of 
Nations took the initiative.45 
By mid-February the idea of an embargo had gained some 
public support. Organized by Raymond Rich of the World 
Peace Foundation and led by Newton D. Baker, Wilson's 
secretary of war, and President A. Lawrence Lowell of Har­
vard, a movement sprang up in support of sanctions. On 
February 17 Lowell delivered a nationwide radio address 
urging the United States to join a League boycott of Japan. 
A petition was subsequently circulated asking the president 
and Congress "to signify to the League of Nations that the 
United States will concur in any economic measures the 
League may take to restore peace." Twelve thousand signa­
tures were collected, many from the academic community; 
and a number of other petitions, including one containing 
the signatures of 5,000 civic leaders from all sections of the 
country, were submitted to Congress. To coordinate all of 
these activities, an American Committee on the Far Eastern 
Crisis was set up, with headquarters in the New York office 
of the Twentieth Century Fund. The Fund, a private re­
search organization, had itself set up a Committee on Eco­
nomic Sanctions headed by Columbia University President 
Nicholas Murray Butler, to consider the possibility of add­
45. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 160-61; Ferrell, American Diplo­
macy, p. 180; Hoover, Memoirs, II, 375. 
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ing an economic-sanction protocol to the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact.46 "They drove at me," President Hoover complained, 
"with all the usual propaganda weapons."4r 
The movement for sanctions made little headway, how­
ever. Not only did Hoover remain unalterably opposed, but 
all members of the cabinet and all but two senators shared 
that opposition. Walter Lippmann and Edwin M. Borchard 
added their voices to the chorus of protest, and so did the 
editors of the Chicago Tribune and the New York Herald-
Tribune. The Gannett and Hearst chains firmly opposed 
sanctions, and so did the Nation and the New Republic. In 
May, George Soule contributed an article to Harper's en­
titled "The Fallacy of the Boycott."48 Under the circum­
stances, neither Stimson nor anyone else worked actively to 
commit the United States to the invocation of sanctions, or 
indeed, to persuade the League to follow such a course. 
Since the major League powers opposed sanctions as likely 
to lead to war, no action was forthcoming from that quarter 
other than the Assembly resolution of March 11, which de­
plored the existing state of affairs in China, urged the parties 
to submit the dispute to peaceful settlement, and echoed 
the Stimson nonrecognition principle of January. The pres­
sure for sanctions, Hoover noted with satisfaction, simply 
"evaporated,"49 and Stimson proceeded to take his next step. 
It took the form not of collective action nor of the applica­
tion of any kind of sanctions. As a last resort, Stimson merely 
issued a policy statement that, for diplomatic reasons, he 
46. Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, p. 138; various relevant petitions are 
reprinted in Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 4586-4588. 
47. Hoover, Memoirs, II, 371. 
48. Stimson Diary, February 20, 1932, Stimson Papers; New York Times, 
Feb. 14, 21, 24, 1932; Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 
4654 ff.; George Soule, "The Fallacy of the Boycott,' Harper's Magazine 
CLXIV (1932), 702-9; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, p. 139. 
49. Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and World Organization,

1920-1933 (New York, 1938), pp. 431-32; Hoover, Memoirs, II, 371.
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couched in a letter to Senator William E. Borah, in which 
he reviewed the entire Open Door policy, reiterated the 
Stimson Doctrine, and vaguely threatened Japan that the 
United States, in the face of continued Japanese violations 
of the Nine-Power Treaty, might no longer feel itself bound 
to observe restrictions on naval construction or the fortifica­
tion of Pacific bases that it had accepted under the complex 
of agreements coming out of the Washington conference.60 
It would be difficult to read into this series of events any 
serious American commitment to the principle of collective 
security, however vaguely defined. In the face of trouble in 
the Far East, an area that had been the focus of America's 
earliest foreign interests and the arena in which the only 
consistent American foreign policy—that of the Open Door 
—had been developed, the United States reacted more 
strongly than at any time since 1917. Under the administra­
tion of a president with some awareness of the interdepend­
ence of nations and a secretary of state who had some activ­
ist leanings, the United States moved a few cautious steps 
closer to some form of international cooperation. But there 
is no evidence either that the United States ever seriously 
contemplated genuine collective action of any sort or, for 
that matter, any course going beyond the stage of moral 
suasion. And there is ample evidence that anything else 
would have encountered the determined opposition of both 
the Congress and the American people. The most that Stim­
son ever tried to do was to keep the Japanese guessing in 
regard to America's real intentions, and it was for that rea­
son that he always objected to American official statements 
opposing an embargo. "A word unspoken," he told Walter 
Lippmann "is a sword in your scabbard, while a word spoken 
50. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 183-88; Foreign Relations: Japan, 
1931-1941, 2 vols. (Washington, 1943), I, 83-87. 
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is a sword in the hands of your adversary." He never forgave 
Castle for telling the American Conference of International 
Justice in May, 1932, that boycotts led to war and that the 
United States would not go beyond nonrecognition, nor 
Hornbeck for telling essentially the same thing to the Ameri­
can Society of International Law.51 His quarrel with Hoover 
rested on the same grounds. Yet even in Stimson's strongest 
anti-Japanese statement—his speech of August 8, 1932, to 
the Council on Foreign Relations, which was applauded in 
Europe as signifying the end of American neutrality and 
roundly condemned for this reason in much of the American 
press—he suggested nothing more definite than "branding 
the aggressor." Three days later, Hoover restated the official 
American position in his acceptance speech to the Republi­
can national convention: "We shall, under the spirit of that 
[Kellogg] Pact consult with other nations in times of emer­
gency to promote world peace. We shall enter no agree­
ments committing us to any future course of action or which 
shall call for the use of force to preserve peace."62 
When the League took its final action in the Manchurian 
matter on February 24, 1933, by passing a resolution con­
demning Japanese actions in China, withholding recogni­
tion from Manchukuo, and calling for Japanese withdrawal, 
Stimson replied within twenty-four hours to the effect that 
the United States was in substantial accord with the Assem­
bly's "measured statement of conclusions" and expressed 
"general endorsement of the principles thus recommended." 
But he reiterated that American support of the League in­
51. New York Times, May 5, 7, 1932; Proceedings of the American Soci­
ety of International Law, 1930 (Washington, 1930), p. 70; Stimson to 
Lippmann, May 19, 1932, quoted in Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, p. 160. 
52. Stimson Diary, July 14, 18, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 1932, Stimson Papers;
New York Times, Aug. 9, 1932; Myers, State Papers of Herbert Hoover, II, 
260. See also Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago, 1962), 
pp. 19-20. 
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eluded this country's "reserving for itself independence of 
judgment with regard to method and scope." 53 
In terms of collective security it seems clear that even the 
words and actions of Henry L. Stimson, the leading interna­
tional activist in the government, were little more than a 
bluff designed to intimidate the Japanese, a maneuver not 
backed by any real expectation that the United States would 
act decisively when the chips were down. The United States 
in the early 1930s was neither convinced that its security 
was actually threatened by events in the Far East nor par­
ticularly inclined to see collective action in the crisis as 
necessarily the best course. At various points, as in initial 
opposition to sending an investigating mission, in the non­
recognition note, and in the Borah letter, the United States 
acted quite unilaterally. And the foot-dragging of Great 
Britain and the other League powers on matters like the in­
vocation of the Nine-Power Treaty, where the United States 
did believe some form of collective action to be necessary, 
did nothing to enhance the virtues of collective security ar­
rangements in American eyes. 
D. F. Fleming's detailed analysis of press reaction to the 
final action of the League in February, 1933, disclosed wide­
spread, though by no means unanimous, endorsement of that 
course. But support for further action, in the form of an eco­
nomic boycott, was not common. Fleming found at least 
vaguely positive reactions to this idea in the Newark 
Evening News, the Louisville Courier-Journal, the Daily 
Oklahoman, the Galveston Tribune, the Albuquerque Jour­
nal, the Portland Oregonian, and the Rocky Mountain News. 
The list of clearcut opponents, led by the Chicago Tribune 
and the Hearst newspapers, was much longer. Although the 
53. Fleming, United States and World Organization, p. 452; see also 
W. W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Na­
tions (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 500-501. 
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press seemed far more favorably inclined toward the League 
of Nations than before, there is little evidence of a move­
ment toward American participation in a genuine system of 
collective security. It is likely that enthusiasm for such a 
course would have been even less had the crisis arisen in 
Europe, where the dangers of American involvement in war, 
as well as of a general entanglement in big power politics, 
were greater.54 
An agreement to impose economic sanctions was not, of 
course, the only way in which the United States might have 
indicated its willingness to participate in collective security 
arrangements. Another way might have been through a pol­
icy of selectively controlling the trade in arms and ammuni­
tion so as to withhold war materials from "aggressors," vio­
lators of international agreements, or other nations engaged 
in activities that endangered world peace. Although the 
United States had been active throughout the twenties in 
promoting general disarmament and had participated in all 
of the international conferences dealing with that subject, it 
had not seriously considered using the control of American 
arms export as a device for maintaining world peace. Indeed, 
the United States had failed to ratify both the Convention 
of Saint-Germain of September 10, 1919, which provided for 
the general regulation of arms traffic under the supervision 
of the League of Nations, and the Geneva Arms Traffic Con­
vention of June 17, 1925, which was specifically designed to 
remove American objections to the Saint-Germain pro­
posals.55 
54. Fleming, United States and World Organization, pp. 457-94, esp. 
465, 471, 472, 475-76. Some reasons for the differing attitudes toward 
Europe and Asia are suggested in Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 23—24, 
104, 200-201. 
55. Elton Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports (Washington, 
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Early in 1933, mounting American arms shipments to La­
tin America, occasioned by the Chaco War between Bolivia 
and Paraguay, aroused the concern of both the president and 
Congress. Under these circumstances, Stimson was able to 
persuade Hoover to send a special message to Congress on 
January 10 urging ratification of the Geneva Arms Traffic 
Convention or the adoption of legislation that would give 
the president authority to forbid, in conjunction with other 
arms-manufacturing nations, the shipment of arms and am­
munition from the United States. The control of such ship­
ments to areas of international conflict, Hoover explained, 
"would greatly aid the earnest and unceasing efforts which 
all nations now make to prevent and lessen the dangers of 
such conflicts."M 
Hoover's message was accompanied by a letter dated Jan­
uary 6, which the president had received from the secretary 
of state. In it Stimson had gone a great deal further in the 
advocacy of a more active role for the United States in col­
lective peace efforts. "There are times," Stimson had written, 
"when the hands of the Executive in negotiations for the 
orderly settlement of international differences would be 
greatly strengthened if he were in a position in cooperation 
with other producing nations to control the shipment of 
arms."" Despite Stimson's words, the implications of the 
proposal seem to have been lost on both the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee and its chairman, Senator William E. 
Borah. The committee, without serious discussion, unani­
mously reported Senate Joint Resolution 229, which would 
have prohibited the export of arms and munitions from the 
United States to any country or countries designated by the 
56. State Department, Press Releases, VIII (January 14, 1933), 18-19; 
Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 45—46; Atwater, American Regulation of 
Arms Exports, p. 182. 
57. Stimson to Hoover, January 6, 1933, in State Department, Press 
Releases, VIII, 22. 
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president whenever he had found that such exports would 
"promote or encourage the employment of force in the 
course of a dispute or conflict between nations" and "after 
securing the cooperation of such governments as the 
President may deem necessary." The Senate adopted this 
resolution by unanimous consent and without debate on 
January 19, with Borah taking the initiative in urging its 
immediate adoption.68 Only on the following day did some 
senators have second thoughts. At that point the conserva­
tive Connecticut Republican Hiram Bingham moved for 
reconsideration on the grounds that the discretionary powers 
the resolution gave to the president might involve this coun­
try in war.69 As a result of this maneuver, the resolution did 
not go to the House. Undersecretary of State Castle, how­
ever, persuaded the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee, Samuel D. McReynolds, to introduce a separate but 
identical resolution there. This resolution was amended in 
committee to apply only to American countries and was re­
ported out in this form on February 15. No action was taken 
before the Seventy-second Congress adjourned.60 
The incoming president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had al­
ready expressed his support of a discretionary arms embargo 
on January II.61 At the urging of Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull and of Norman H. Davis, the American delegate to the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference, the president agreed, on 
March 10, to recommend introduction of a new arms em­
bargo resolution to the chairmen of the Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Relations committees. In the House the new Mc-
Reynolds resolution, identical to that of the last Congress, 
58. Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933), 2096. 
59. Ibid., pp. 2134-35. 
60. Foreign Relations, 1933, 5 vols. (Washington, 1950-52), I, 358-59; 
New York Times, Jan. 31, Feb. 16, 1933; Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1933), 4209. 
61. New York Times, Jan. 12, 1933. 
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was passed after a bitter partisan debate by a roll-call vote 
of 254 to 109.62 The majority of the Congressmen still saw 
the issue simply in terms of interdicting an undesirable 
form of trade and believed it was intended to apply prima­
rily to situations like the Chaco War, but the administration 
was exploring the possibility of using its new authority, 
were it to be granted, for a somewhat wider purpose. 
In early March, British Prime Minister Ramsay Mac­
Donald offered a new plan for disarmament that would have 
provided for consultation among the European powers in 
case of aggression. At the same time, the chairman of the 
Geneva Disarmament Convention, Arthur Henderson of 
Great Britain, approached the American delegates with a 
scheme to bring the United States at least marginally into 
the collective security picture. Its essence was that the 
United States would consult with the major powers and, if 
it agreed on the identity of the aggressor, halt its trade in 
arms and thus passively cooperate in the use of sanctions. 
Norman Davis discussed the matter further with British dip­
lomats in April and urged the United States to agree to the 
plan.63 When MacDonald and French Premier Edouard Her-
riot came to Washington late in April, Roosevelt discussed 
the issue with them and agreed in principle that this coun­
try would "undertake to refrain from any action . . . which 
would tend to defeat the collective effort which the States 
in consultation might have decided upon against the ag­
gressor." On May 22 Davis announced this new American 
policy in a speech at Geneva. "We are willing," he told the 
delegates, 
62. Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 48-51; Congressional Record, 
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), 581, 1850. The bill was HJR 93. 
63. Hugh Gibson to Cordell Hull, March 8, 12, 1933, and Norman H.
Davis to Hull, April 16, 1933, in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 26, 32, 89-92, 
96-97. 
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to consult the other states in case of a threat to peace, with 
a view to averting the conflict. Further than that, in the 
event that the states, in conference, determine that a state 
has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its 
international obligations and take measures against the vio­
lator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the 
responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action 
tending to defeat such collective effort which these states 
may thus make to restore peace.64 
Davis's speech was the closest the United States came to a 
definite offer of cooperation with collective security meas­
ures, and the reaction in Congress was immediate and dras­
tic. The Foreign Relations Committee, which had been con­
sidering the arms embargo proposal for some weeks and had 
been only partially reassured by Hull's statement that the 
administration planned to apply the embargo to both Para­
guay and Bolivia but not to Japan, acted on May 24 to make 
the arms embargo apply impartially and automatically to all 
belligerents. In accepting this amendment offered by Hiram 
Johnson of California, the committee changed the entire 
sense of the resolution, converting it from a potential collec­
tive security measure to a clearly isolationist one, and bring­
ing it, as Hull pointed out, "directly in conflict with our 
proposal at Geneva as expressed by Norman Davis."65 
Roosevelt, after first accepting this new version of the pro­
posal, quickly recognized the conflict and decided to drop 
the whole matter. On May 24 Congress passed a bill pro­
64. Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Special File, Box 30, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Sir Robert Vansittart Memorandum, April 23,
1933, and William Phillips Memorandum, April 26, 1933, in Foreign Rela­
tions, 1933, I, 103-4, 109-10; U.S. State Department, Peace and War: 
United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), pp. 188-89. 
65. New York Times, May 25, 26, 30, 1933; Divine, Illusion of Neutral­
ity, p. 52; The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York, 1948), I, 
229-30; Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), 4967. 
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hibiting the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay, without 
reference to any action that might be taken by the League 
or by other powers.66 
The effort to align the United States, if only passively, 
with a policy of collective security thus largely failed be­
cause of the determined opposition of Congress and the un­
willingness of the president to push the matter. Not only 
did this leave this country farther than ever from a position 
of meaningful collaboration with other powers in the preser­
vation of peace, it also brought to the fore the idea of an 
impartial arms embargo against belligerents, an idea that 
became a key element in the policy designed to preserve at 
all costs the neutrality of the United States. 
Just how far the United States remained from meaningful 
collaboration with other powers was once again demon­
strated in January, 1935, when the administration reintro­
duced in the Senate the long dormant proposal for American 
adherence to the World Court. Nine years before, the Sen­
ate had voted to join the court by a vote of 76-17, but only 
with five reservations, including, as the fifth, insistence that 
the Court have no connection with the League and would 
not "without the consent of the United States entertain any 
request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or 
question in which the United States has or claims an inter­
est." " This last reservation had met with objections from all 
of the other powers save Cuba, Greece, Liberia, Albania, 
and Luxembourg, and the counterproposal they made was 
in turn unacceptable to President Coolidge.68 Not until 1929, 
66. Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, pp. 60-62. 
67. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), 2556-57; Manley 
O. Hudson, The World Court, 1921-1934, 4th ed. (Boston, 1934), pp. 8-9, 
226-27. 
68. Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and the World Court 
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Hudson, The World Court, pp. 232-39. 
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and then largely through the efforts of Elihu Root, was a 
compromise worked out that seemed acceptable both to the 
United States and to the Tenth Assembly of the League of 
Nations. The United States signed the compromise proposal 
on December 9, 1929, and President Hoover forwarded it to 
the Senate for ratification on the following day.69 By that 
time, however, the United States was deeply involved in the 
deepening domestic economic crisis, and proposals to final­
ize American accession to the Court were repeatedly put off 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In January, 
1935, the first quiet Senate session in many years seemed in 
the offing, and President Roosevelt decided to submit the 
protocols for the accession of the United States to the Senate 
in the sanguine expectation that they would meet with little 
opposition.70 
Adherence to the World Court by the United States would 
not have represented a serious or binding commitment to 
the principles of collective security, since nothing would 
have compelled this country to join in the enforcement of 
any decisions the tribunal might reach. Yet the mere fear 
that adherence to the Court could be the prelude to further 
commitment led the United States to reject such a step. 
Senator Hiram Johnson of California began the attack on 
the protocols with an impassioned and lengthy speech in 
which he declared that acceptance of the protocols would 
simply represent another attempt "to meddle and muddle, 
under an hysterical internationalism, in those controversies 
that Europe has and that Europe never will be rid of" and 
that "going into the Court will ultimately mean going into 
the League of Nations as surely as that night follows day." 
69. Hudson, The World Court, pp. 249-51, 261; State Department, 
Press Releases, I, 437 (December 13, 1929); League of Nations, Official 
Journal (1929), p. 1857. 
70. Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), 468, 480, 483; 
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Of particular concern to Johnson was the possibility of in­
volving the United States in the enforcement of the Court's 
decisions through sanctions imposed by the League, that 
is, by genuine collective action. "Sanctions!", he exclaimed. 
"If there are sanctions behind any decision that this Govern­
ment may render, then this Government has departed so 
widely from its traditional policy that every American ought 
to hang his head in shame." Such views were vehemently 
supported by a sizable group of senators, including Huey 
Long of Louisiana, Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina, 
and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota. "To enter the World 
Court means entering the court of intrigue," Reynolds in­
sisted, " . .  . means entering the League of Nation." "I do 
not believe," Shipstead concluded, "the national policy of 
the United States is one that should make us enter either the 
League or its instrument—the League Court." 71 
To make certain that no one would be likely to interpret 
the acceptance of the protocols by the Senate as a step in the 
direction of collective security, Senator Vandenberg offered 
the following amendment to the instrument of ratification: 
That adherence to said protocols and statute hereby ap­
proved shall not be so construed as to require the United 
States to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding 
upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political 
questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign 
state; nor shall adherence to the said protocols and statute 
be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States 
of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions. 
The Vandenberg amendment, although defeated in the For­
eign Relations Committee by a vote of 11-9, was reintro­
71. Ibid., pp. 563-78, 773, 875. 
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duced in the Senate and there approved by a voice vote on 
January 24.72 
Numerous other crippling amendments were introduced, 
including one by Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, 
which would have reconstituted the objectionable "fifth 
reservation" of 1926 in an even more rigorous form. These 
amendments were defeated, but, as it turned out, defeated 
by a process similar to that which marked the debates over 
the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and 1920; that is, by a com­
bination of the Court's opponents with its anti-reservationist 
champions. Accordingly, the protocols themselves went 
down to defeat in January by a vote of 52-36, seven short of 
the required two-thirds majority, and almost the identical 
tally by which the League of Nations Covenant had been re­
jected in 1920.73 
America's belated adherence to the World Court, hedged 
about as it would have been with reservations, would not 
have been a significant step toward involving this country 
in collective security arrangements. In rejecting the Court, 
however, the Senate clearly demonstrated that the mere sug­
gestion of such arrangements was still regarded as contrary 
to United States policy, and that this country had moved 
barely, if at all, from the position it had adopted in the im­
mediate postwar years. 
By the middle of 1935 it became apparent that the world 
was rapidly approaching a new crisis in which the threat 
of a general war once more became a reality. Japan had al­
ready flouted world order and the League of Nations, and 
Italy and Germany were about to embark on similar courses. 
72. Ibid., pp. 636, 893; Fleming, United States and World Court, pp. 
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Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia confronted the League with 
the first European challenge to its effectiveness as a peace­
keeping and crisis-resolving body, and it offered one more 
chance to test America's stand on the concept of collective 
security. 
The first official information about Italian plans in 
Ethiopia reached the State Department on September 18, 
1934. On that date the War Department forwarded a report 
from the assistant military attache in Rome, who had re­
ported on August 29 that "the General Staff of the Italian 
army have drawn up plans for the military conquest and oc­
cupation of Abyssinia" to be undertaken "whenever Abys­
synia commits an 'overt act.'"7i It was with some sense of 
relief, however, that the State Department received, in an­
swer to its inquiry, a memorandum from Ambassador to 
Italy Breckinridge Long that failed to confirm this report 
and concluded that a "very frank and apparently sincere 
statement" made to him by the Italian Undersecretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs Fulvio Suvich to the effect that 
"the Italian Government has no present intention of attack­
ing Abyssinia" should be accepted at face value. At the same 
time, the American military attache in Rome, Colonel J. G. 
Pillow, repudiated the earlier report of his subordinate by 
placing a rather innocuous interpretation on Italian prepara­
tions in Eritrea and Somaliland.75 
Despite such reassurances, it became clear as autumn 
wore on that a crisis was developing between Italy and 
Ethiopia. On November 23 an armed Ethiopian escort for 
the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission encountered an 
Italian military post at the Wai Wai waterhole in the Oga­
74. Report No. 14028, August 29, 1934, Foreign Relations, 1934, 5 vols. 
(Washington, 1951-52), II, 754. 
75. Breckinridge Long Memorandum, September 19, 1934, and Report 
No. 14057, September 21,1934, ibid., II, 755-57. 
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den desert, some sixty miles within Ethiopian territory. The 
Italians refused passage, and the Ethiopians dug in at posi­
tions facing the Italian post. The long-awaited "overt act" 
was now imminent, and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis had moved 
from the realm of speculation to that of reality. On Decem­
ber 7 the Italian press carried reports of an attack on Wai 
Wai, claimed to be on Italian territory, by six hundred 
Ethiopian troops, an attack that had been repulsed by "colo­
nial troops and aeroplanes."76 Within a week frantic moves 
developed in various European capitals to keep the crisis 
under control, and by December 17 the chief of the Divi­
sion of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department, 
Wallace Murray, thought it "not unlikely that sooner or 
later there will be a move to invoke the Kellogg Pact in this 
dispute." "If so," he told Undersecretary of State William 
Phillips, " . .  . we ought to leave such invocation to the 
League of Nations and make every effort to avoid having 
the matter dumped in our lap." " 
Even more unwelcome than possible invocation of the 
Kellogg Pact was the suggestion contained on the following 
day in a telegram from W. Perry George, the American 
charge d'affaires in Addis Ababa, that Ethiopian Emperor 
Haile Selassie was considering asking for American media­
tion. Secretary Hull immediately asked for confirmation of 
this report, reminding George that the United States had 
not acted in 1931 until after the council of the League of 
Nations had invoked the Kellogg Pact, and instructing him 
to "scrupulously refrain from taking any action which would 
encourage the Ethiopian Government to request the media­
tion of the United States."78 When the Rumanian minister 
76. Alexander Kirk to Hull, December 8, 1934, ibid., II, 767. 
77. Wallace Murray to Phillips, December 17, 1934, ibid., II, 767. 
78. W. Perry George to Hull, and Hull to George, both December 18, 
1934, ibid., II, 769-70. 
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in Washington reminded Hull that Italy's experience in 
Ethiopia—i.e., the action or nonaction of other powers in 
this conflict—would strongly influence Italian attitudes to­
ward the European situation, and offered to inquire of his 
government whether it believed any American efforts at this 
time might prove useful, the secretary promptly gave a 
negative reply and indicated that the United States "pre­
ferred to pursue its present policy and attitude of observer." 
He further asked Charge George in Addis Ababa to explain 
to the emperor that "this Government considers that it could 
not usefully or properly take any action," though it, of 
course, followed "with sympathetic interest" efforts made to 
settle the dispute.79 Even more clearly than in the early 
stages of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the United States thus 
made plain its intention to avoid both involvement in the 
dispute and participation in collective schemes to end it. 
The Ethiopian crisis, of course, produced the greatest dif­
ficulties not for the United States, which simply reasserted 
its "traditional" policy, but for Great Britain and France, 
for whom II Duce's actions appeared as a direct threat to 
the already precarious European power balance. The real 
threat to this balance was Hitler's Germany, and both Brit­
ain and France, particularly France, looked to Italy as a pos­
sible counterweight to German ambitions. Mussolini's ac­
tion in rushing troops to the Brenner Pass after the murder 
of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss in August, 1934, a move 
widely interpreted as intended to forestall a German an­
nexation of Austria, was taken as evidence that Italian co­
operation was vital to any effort to thwart Hitler's designs. 
When the Wai Wai incident muddied the waters, therefore, 
French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval journeyed to Rome to 
resolve outstanding Franco-Italian differences. The Rome 
79. Hull Memorandum, December 20, 1934, and Hull to George, Decem­
ber 21, 1934, ibid., II, 771-72, 774. Italics added. 
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Agreements, which were concluded in January, 1935, con­
tained a secret provision whereby France renounced all in­
terest in Ethiopia save for the Djibouti-Addis Ababa rail­
road, a renunciation widely interpreted as giving Mussolini 
carte blanche in that area in return for continued support 
of the French policy of containing Germany.80 In the same 
spirit Great Britain failed to raise the question of Ethiopia 
at the Stresa Conference that summer and thus could ac­
quiesce in a communique stressing agreement with Italy and 
France on "all international questions which are posed."81 
Given this attitude, it is not surprising that Britain and 
France opposed efforts by Ethiopia to bring the matter be­
fore the League of Nations. When Ethiopia did appeal to 
the Council under Article XI of the covenant on January 15, 
Britain and France persuaded Italy, which also did not want 
the matter before the League, to agree to seek a settlement 
of the matter under the terms of the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty 
of Friendship of 1928. With a sigh of relief, the Council 
thereupon postponed consideration of the Ethiopian re­
quest.82 Subsequent British and French policy was impaled 
on the horns of a dilemma: if the credibility of the League 
as a peace-keeping organization was to be maintained, then 
it must clearly act; but if Germany was to be checked in 
Europe, good relations among Britain, France, and Italy had 
to be maintained. The United States, of course, was not as 
directly involved with these issues as were the European 
powers. But it is clear that the British and French dilemma 
could have been resolved if the United States had in fact 
80. D. C. Watt, "The Secret Laval-Mussolini Agreement of 1935 on 
Ethiopia," Middle East Journal XV (1961), 77; Brice Harris, Jr., The United 
States and the Halo-Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford, Calif., 1964), pp. 8-9. But 
see also Pierre Laval, The Diary of Pierre Laval (New York, 1948), p. 20. 
81. Harris, United States and Halo-Ethiopian Crisis, p. 12. 
82. Prentiss Gilbert in Geneva kept the State Department informed of 
these developments. See Gilbert to Hull, January 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 1935, 
Foreign Relations, 1935, 4 vols. (Washington, 1953), I, 594-99. 
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committed itself to cooperate with the efforts to halt both 
Italian aggression and the German threat, i.e., if the United 
States had committed itself to full participation in some kind 
of collective security scheme. But the United States in fact 
was moving in the opposite direction. 
While the Italo-Ethiopian crisis was coming to a head and 
raising the specter of a new European war, the United 
States was increasingly concentrating its efforts not on ways 
and means to prevent such a war through cooperative ac­
tions with other powers but on schemes to avoid involve­
ment in war once it had broken out. The Senate, on April 12, 
1934, set up what was to become known as the Nye Commit­
tee for the purpose of investigating the munitions industry. 
The basic assumption on which the committee acted was 
that the greed of munitions-makers and other vested inter­
ests was responsible for American involvement in World 
War I, and the committee's well-publicized activities thus 
fostered widespread acceptance, at least for a time, of what 
Charles Beard was to call the devil theory of war.83 The 
logic of the devil theory led to conclusions that made the 
concept of collective security seem irrelevant. If America's 
wars essentially resulted from the activities of selfish men, 
be they bankers, businessmen, munitions-makers, or what­
ever, then they could be best prevented, not by concerted 
international action to stop all wars, but by domestic legis­
lation designed to curb the dangerous proclivities of the 
vested interests. Accordingly, the United States turned to 
the business of drafting so-called neutrality legislation. 
As early as April 17, Hull asked J. Pierrepont Moffat, the 
chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Under­
83. Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1935), 6485; Hull, 
Memoirs, I, 399; Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 144—47; Charles A. 
Beard, The Devil Theory of War (New York, 1936), passim. The best 
account of the activities of the Nye Committee is John E. Wiltz, In Search of 
Peace (Baton Rouge, 1963). 
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secretary Phillips, Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore, and 
the Department's legal adviser Green H. Hackworth, to be­
gin a study of the question of neutrality legislation "with a 
view to keeping us out of further trouble." They immedi­
ately turned for advice to Charles Warren, acknowledged 
as a leading American authority on international law, who 
obliged with a 210-page memorandum entitled "Some Prob­
lems in the Maintenance and Enforcement of the Neutrality 
of the United States." The Warren memorandum called for 
an impartial arms embargo on belligerents and the limita­
tion of arms shipments to neutrals, a ban on American travel 
on belligerent vessels, and the restriction of "contraband" 
trade with belligerents to prewar levels. In substance War­
ren's proposals differed only slightly from those being de­
veloped by the Nye Committee and virtually assumed the 
inevitability of a European war and the consequent useless­
ness of a determined effort to prevent such a war through 
collective action.84 Roosevelt expressed strong interest in 
these proposals and asked the State Department to prepare 
neutrality legislation for submission to Congress.86 
While the State Department was still wrestling with this 
problem early in 1935, Roosevelt met with the Nye Com­
mittee on March 19. Ignoring a memorandum by Hull in 
which the secretary had urged the president not to encour­
age the committee in any way, Roosevelt told the senators 
"that he had come around entirely to the ideas of Mr. Bryan" 
about prohibiting American ships and American citizens 
84. Divine, Illusion of 'Neutrality, p. 70. A copy of the Warren Memo­
randum is in File 811.04418/28, State Department Papers, National Ar­
chives. For Warren's view see also Charles Warren, "What Are the Rights of
Neutrals Now, in Practice?", Proceedings of the American Society of Inter­
national Law, 1933 (Washington, 1933), pp. 128-33, and "Troubles of a 
Neutral," Foreign Affairs XII (1934), 377-94. 
85. R. Walton Moore to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 27, 1934, and
Roosevelt to Hull, September 25, 1934, Files 811.04418/28 and /29, State
Department Papers. 
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from traveling to belligerent nations in time of war, and 
asked the committee to consider the entire neutrality ques­
tion with a view to introducing appropriate legislation.86 
Though Roosevelt requested the committee to show him the 
draft proposal before submission, he could hardly have been 
unaware of the isolationist character of the group or have 
had doubts that a rigid plan for mandatory neutrality legis­
lation would be forthcoming. Yet there is no evidence that 
he even raised the crucial issue of presidential discretion or 
made any suggestion that American neutrality policy should 
be integrated somehow into a general collective security 
scheme. 
The president's meeting with the Nye Committee spurred 
the introduction of a neutrality bill and brought again to the 
fore this key issue of 1933. Any neutrality legislation was 
bound to include an arms embargo. In 1933 feeble attempts 
by the administration to get congressional approval for a 
measure that would have empowered the president to pre­
vent arms shipments to any country at his discretion had 
been scrapped in favor of a proposal for an impartial, man­
datory embargo on arms shipments to all belligerents. The 
Warren memorandum supported the impartial embargo 
idea, but opinion in the State Department was divided, with 
Hull, Phillips, and Joseph C. Green of the Division of West­
ern European Affairs favoring discriminatory embargoes. 
Roosevelt agreed to support a discriminatory arms embargo 
in a conversation with Phillips on July 21, but made no pub­
lic statement to that effect.87 He did not then or at any other 
time indicate, as Hull repeatedly did, that unless the em­
bargo proposal were of a discriminatory nature, he would 
86. Hull to Roosevelt, March 14, 1935, and Joseph C. Green Memoran­
dum, March 21, 1935, Foreign Relations, 1935, I, 318-23, 363-64; Divine, 
Illusion of Neutrality, p. 86. 
87. Hull, Memoirs, I, 410-11. 
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oppose all neutrality legislation. He did approve a resolution 
calling for presidential discretion in the application of the 
law, which the State Department had prepared for submis­
sion to Senator Key Pittman of Nevada, the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But the resolution was 
not sent after Pittman told presidential secretary Stephen 
Early that "if he wants this done, I will introduce it . .  . 
but he will be licked as sure as hell." In the absence of 
a firm stand on the part of the president, Congress passed 
the Neutrality Act on August 23, which, among other things, 
provided for a mandatory, nondiscriminatory arms embargo 
for a period of six months.88 
The Neutrality Act of 1935 was a victory for congressional 
isolationists and thus a defeat for the collective security 
principle. Its underlying premise was the belief that this 
country could preserve its security by insulating itself from 
the quarrels of others, and that this represented a safer 
course than the allegedly quixotic effort to keep peace 
everywhere through concerted international action. Roose­
velt and Hull doubted the effectiveness of this scheme for 
avoiding war and had a more realistic understanding of the 
complexity of international relations and of America's world 
role. The president realized, for example, that "the wholly 
inflexible provisions of Section I of this act might have ex­
actly the opposite effect from that which was intended,"89 
and he hoped that after expiration of the six-month measure 
more flexible provisions might be substituted. Moreover, he 
noted with some gratification that the Act would not inter­
fere with any future decision by the League of Nations to 
prohibit the sale of arms to Italy. But neither Roosevelt nor 
88. Key Pittman to Stephen Early, August 19, 1935, in Edgar B. Nixon, 
ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 
1969), II, 609; Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), 14370, 
14434. 
89. State Department, Peace and War, p. 272. 
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Hull envisaged genuine American participation in a collec­
tive security scheme at that time, or fully realized that their 
acquiescence in a restatement of American isolationism 
might have an adverse affect on the actions of those Euro­
pean powers seeking to preserve peace through the League 
of Nations. As Italy and Ethiopia moved toward war in the 
summer of 1935, the United States continued to repel the 
efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie to secure positive Ameri­
can support for his position. 
On July 3 the emperor called the American charge, 
George, to the palace in order to ask the American govern­
ment "to examine means of securing Italy's observance of 
engagements as signatory of the Kellogg Pact" in view of 
the unsatisfactory progress of the discussions at Geneva. 
Hull's reply, sent even before the official text of Haile Selas­
sie's request reached Washington, in effect rejected the em­
peror's request for American action. Hull expressed gratifica­
tion with what the League was doing, looked for "a decision 
satisfactory to both of the Governments directly concerned," 
and stated that the United States was 'loath to believe" that 
either Ethiopia or Italy would resort to other than pacific 
means to settle their dispute. Though Hull reaffirmed Amer­
ican support of the Kellogg Pact, his message was sufficiently 
ambiguous to leave the contrary impression with Haile Se-
lassie and with most of the world press, and to produce a 
headline in the New York Times that read, "President Re­
jects Ethiopia's Appeal for Peace Effort."90 This reaction 
caused Hull to issue a new statement on July 12, in which 
he clearly indicated the United States' continued support 
of the pact, without however suggesting that this country 
might seek to invoke it.81 
90. Harris, United States and Itah-Ethiopian Crisis, p i . 34-35; George 
to Hull, July 4, 1935, and Hull to George, July 5, 1935, Foreign Relations, 
1935, I, 723-24, 725. 
91. See Phillips to William E. Dodd, July 13, 1935, Foreign Relations, 
1935,1, 731-52. 
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There can be little doubt that the American government 
and the American public sympathized with the plight of 
Ethiopia,92 but it is equally apparent that neither was pre­
pared to pay more than lip service to the cause of peace. On 
July 31 Roosevelt expressed "the hope of the people and the 
Government of the United States that an amicable solution 
will be found" but once again laid the responsibility for 
maintaining peace on the League and gave no indication 
how the United States might aid that effort.93 Two weeks 
later Hull cabled the charge in London to keep him in­
formed of developments in order to determine "whether any 
further action . . . within the limits of . .  . established 
policy" would have a beneficial effect. A similiar communi­
cation to Paris brought back the suggestion that a direct, 
but unpublished, message to Mussolini might be in order. 
After some debate Hull sent a message on behalf of the 
president, expressing the American hope for a peaceful reso­
lution of the conflict and characterizing the possible failure 
of such a resolution as a calamity. Mussolini's response was 
to inform Roosevelt and Hull that it was too late to avoid 
an armed conflict.94 
Even after this development, the United States made no 
attempt to play a stronger role. When Haile Selassie, in a 
desperate move to involve the United States more directly 
in the dispute, granted an extensive oil concession to the 
African Exploration and Development Corporation, a sub­
sidiary of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company, the State De­
partment was aghast. On September 3, senior officers of the 
company were called to the Department and urged to termi­
nate the concession, which they agreed to do. When the 
92. Harris, United States and Halo-Ethiopian Crisis, pp. 38-42. 
93. Phillips to Robert W. Bingham, July 31, 1935, Foreign Relations, 
193S, 1,732-33. 
94. Hull to Roy Atherton, August 15, 1935; Theodore J. Marriner to 
Hull, August 17, 1935; Hull to Kirk, August 18, 1935; and Kirk to Hull,
August 19, 1935, Ibid., I, 732-33, 735, 735-36, 739, 739-42. 
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American charge in Addis Ababa suggested that he might 
try to explain to a disappointed emperor that the American 
action was intended to be helpful to Ethiopia, he was 
quickly informed by Hull to change that statement to "help­
ful in the cause of peace."95 A final request for American 
mediation made by Haile Selassie on September 10 pro­
duced a lengthy negative reply, which once again referred 
the matter to the League. The nature of the entire Ameri­
can approach was admirably summed up by Hull on the eve 
of the actual outbreak of war. "We have given our moral 
support," he cabled to Cornelius Van H. Engert in Addis 
Ababa, "to all the efforts that have been made to arrive at 
a peaceful settlement, and we shall continue this support by 
any action which we can properly take in the light of our 
limitations as occasions arise."96 The nature and extent of 
"our limitations" was clear. The United States would not, 
even indirectly, participate in the work of the League, and 
it would not, in the absence of League action, move to take 
the lead in efforts to find alternative solutions. On Septem­
ber 20 Hull informed Ray Atherton in London that the 
United States would not participate in the imposition of 
sanctions, and could decide its attitude toward collective 
actions that might be taken by the League only after careful 
study. A week later he asked Ambassador Bingham in Lon­
don to discourage British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel 
Hoare from calling even a consultative conference of the 
signers of the Kellogg Pact. Such a move, Hull insisted, 
would only bypass the League.97 
95. Cornelius Van H. Engert to Hull, August 30, 1935; Hull to Bingham,
September 3, 1935; Engert to Hull, September 4, 1935; and Hull to Engert,
September 5, 1935, ibid., I, 778, 781-82, 783, 784. 
96. Engert to Hull, September 11, 1935, and Hull to Engert, September 
12, 1935, Oiid., I, 744, 751-52. 
97. Hull to Atherton, September 20, 1935; Hull to Bingham, September 
27, 1935; ibid., I, 836, 767-68. 
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The Italian invasion of Ethiopia began on October 2, and 
the United States issued its Neutrality Proclamation on Oc­
tober 5, prohibiting the export of arms, ammunition, and 
implements of war to belligerents and forbidding Americans 
to travel on belligerent vessels. Roosevelt accompanied this 
proclamation with a statement that persons engaging in any 
transactions with belligerents henceforth did so at their own 
risk. The League Council did not decide that Italy had made 
war in disregard of the covenant until October 7, and did 
not impose the first sanctions, those on arms shipments, un­
til October 11. Although Hull had opposed proclaiming 
American neutrality before the League had decided there 
was a war,98 he used the argument of prior action to resist 
mounting pressures that the United States clarify its inten­
tions with regard to future actions of the League. In telegram 
after telegram Hull stated the American position. This coun­
try had taken independent action to limit arms shipments 
and had imposed credit restrictions before anyone else had 
acted. It had made its desire for peace clear on numerous 
occasions. It would not now serve with, or give advice to, 
the League committee charged with formulating the policy 
of sanctions, and it would not commit itself in advance to 
support any course the League might decide upon. "It must 
be clear to them by this time," he informed Prentiss Gilbert 
in Geneva, "that this Government is acting upon its own 
initiative and proceeding separately and independently of 
all other Governments or peace organizations." " This was 
hardly a ringing endorsement of the collective security prin­
ciple. In subsequent communications with the British and 
Italian ambassadors, Hull made it even clearer that Ameri­
98. Hull to Roosevelt, October 5, 1935, ibid., I, 798-800. 
99. Hull to Gilbert, October 17. 1935, ibid., I, 846-48. See also Hull's 
reply to Dr. Augusto de Vasconcellos, President of the Committee of Co­
ordination of the League, October 26, 1935, ibid., I, 852-54. 
286 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
can actions with regard to the Italo-Ethiopian War were 
"developed under our own separate, independent course and 
initiative and without the slightest relationship to sanctions 
or any other movements of other nations or peace agencies 
at Geneva," and were designed primarily to keep the United 
States out of war.100 
The League's initial decision to embargo arms to Italy 
did not test this position. But the subsequent move to ex­
tend the embargo to cover strategic materials, particularly 
oil, did so. The League had to obtain American cooperation 
if an oil embargo were to be effective, and the world's other 
oil-producing nations were understandably reluctant to com­
mit themselves to an embargo unless they were assured in 
advance that the United States would participate. 
Roosevelt's initial message of October 5 had attempted to 
discourage all trade with belligerents by withdrawing gov­
ernment protection from it. When this did not prevent the 
rapid increase of exports of strategic materials to Italy, Hull 
and Roosevelt pressed for this so-called moral embargo both 
in public and in private, most forcefully in a statement by 
Hull on November 15 that denounced the increasing trade 
in oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron, and scrap steel as 
"contrary to the policy of this Government" and "to the gen­
eral spirit of the recent neutrality act." Hull's careful ex­
planation that the moral embargo applied essentially to in­
creased exports and not to all trade lent further credence, 
however, to his oft-repeated assertion that American neu­
trality policy was designed to avoid entanglements and bore 
only a passive relation to collective schemes for punishing 
aggressors.101 In any event, the value of American exports of 
100. Hull Memorandum, December 2, 1935, ibid., I, 866-69. 
101. Hull Statement, October 10, 1935, ibid., I, 803-4; Hull, Memoirs, 
I, 435; State Department, Press Releases, XIII, 338-39 (November 2, 
1935). See also Herbert Feis, Seen from E.A.: Three International Episodes(New York, 1947), pp. 193 ff. 
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petroleum products to Italy and her African colonies rose 
from a monthly average $480,000 in 1932-34 to over a mil­
lion dollars in October, 1935, and to $2,674,000 in November, 
while discussion of a possible oil embargo was going on in 
Geneva.102 
The situation at Geneva was extraordinarily complex. The 
British, who in September had set in motion the machinery 
by which sanctions were initially imposed, had agreed 
with the French that sanctions were not to be pushed to a 
point that might force Mussolini to retaliate. They now 
feared that oil sanctions might have that effect, and found 
confirmation for their fears in an Italian message to the 
French that indicated Italy would regard an oil embargo 
as a military sanction and could not be responsible for any 
consequences.103 British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare 
and his French counterpart Pierre Laval therefore sought a 
means for settling the conflict before the League would 
have to act on the oil issue. The result of their deliberations, 
on December 7, was the Hoare-Laval Plan, which would 
have resolved the conflict by, in effect, handing control of 
Ethiopia over to Italy. The immediate rejection of this plan 
by the British government kept the oil issue before the 
League and left Britain and France with no alternative but 
to stall for time. 
In doing so, they repeatedly referred to the inability of 
the United States to control its oil shipments to Italy and 
pointed out the necessity of awaiting the outcome of the 
neutrality debate then raging in Congress. Only after the 
United States had reached a decision, Laval told the Cham­
ber of Deputies on December 28, could the League Council 
decide whether to act on the oil issue. "I cannot," he added, 
"prejudge the decision which will be taken by Congress, the 
102. Feis, Seen from E.A., p. 307. 
103. Harris, United States and Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, pp. 65-66, 103. 
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authority which will or will not be given to Roosevelt, the 
usage which Roosevelt will or will not make of his pow­
ers." Wi Although he was clearly using America's ambiguous 
position as an excuse for his own reluctance to act affirma­
tively, Laval's statement was given credibility by the Ameri­
can record. Had Congress proceeded to authorize the presi­
dent to embargo certain raw materials, that credibility 
would have been diminished and those League members 
actively supporting sanctions might have found further en­
couragement. Such was not to be the case, however. 
In his annual message to Congress on January 3, 1936, 
Roosevelt called for a "twofold neutrality" program, and bills 
incorporating the president's ideas were introduced the next 
day in both the House and Senate. They called for the con­
tinuance of the mandatory, nondiscriminatory arms em­
bargo, but also authorized the president to limit trade in 
strategic materials to any or all belligerents to prewar lev­
els.105 In hopes of winning quick congressional approval, 
Roosevelt thus sacrificed once again the idea of a discrimina­
tory arms embargo. Moreover, he sought no authority to 
prohibit strategic trade with belligerents, but merely a way 
to prevent its increase. Had Congress approved this scheme, 
the United States would have enacted into law the idea, al­
ready promulgated by Stimson at the beginning of the dec­
ade, that this country would not actively undermine or 
otherwise interfere with sanctions adopted by the League. 
But the United States would have continued, as indeed it 
did continue, to operate under legislation that made active 
participation in collective security arrangements impossible. 
Without the possibility of discriminating in its arms sales 
104. Quoted in ibid., p. 115. 
105. New York Times, Jan. 4, 1936; the text of the bill may be found in 
U.S. House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., American Neutrality 
Policy: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, 
1936), pp. 1-6. 
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or of withholding strategic materials from an aggressor, this 
country could not throw its full weight into the collective 
balance. Congress, as it turned out, was not even willing to 
keep the United States from interfering with the collective 
efforts of others. 
The trade quota proposal almost immediately ran afoul 
of those members of Congress who opposed presidential dis­
cretion in any form and of those who opposed restricting 
American trade in materials other than arms and ammuni­
tion on traditional international law grounds. In the con­
troversy that ensued, the administration bill was lost en­
tirely, and, when time for further discussion ran out, the Act 
of 1935 was simply extended until May 1, 1937. Roosevelt 
accepted this resolution of the problem at a cabinet meet­
ing on February 7.106 He also signed without comment the 
final bill, despite the fact that it made American neutrality 
policy even more rigid by adding a ban on loans to belliger­
ents and requiring extension of the arms embargo to any 
nation that might join a war already in progress. The United 
States thus refused to cooperate with possible sanctions 
through a trade embargo, while at the same time threaten­
ing the League powers with an arms embargo if they de­
cided to intervene in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. 
If the signing of the new American Neutrality Act on 
February 29 did nothing to encourage the proponents of oil 
sanctions at Geneva, the German march into the Rhineland 
on March 7 effectively ended all possibility of further action. 
The League turned from further consideration of sanctions 
to an appeal for conciliation, urging Italy on April 20 "to 
bring to the settlement of her dispute with Ethiopia that 
spirit which the League of Nations is entitled to expect from 
106. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols. (New York, 1953-54), 
I, 533; see also Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 175—82, and Divine, 
Illusion of Neutrality, chap. 5. 
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one of its original Members and a permanent Member of the 
Council." 107 The result was a foregone conclusion. 
During the entire course of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, 
the United States had gone to great pains to assure friend 
and foe, the nations of the world and the American public, 
that it was pursuing an independent policy wholly removed 
from any collective security arrangements. Its actions did 
nothing to call this assurance into question. American policy 
was undoubtedly popular at home, and the failure of the 
League in the crisis was used as further evidence of the 
wisdom of American "independence." It is unlikely that the 
League would have passed this, its most crucial test in any 
event, for none of the major powers were prepared to risk 
war for themselves in order to stop Italy. But there can be 
little doubt that the refusal of the United States to associate 
itself clearly with the efforts at collective action made the 
work at Geneva more difficult and contributed to the failure 
there. 
Though Roosevelt and Hull were certainly more inter­
nationalist-minded than the policy they accepted and car­
ried out might indicate, there is no evidence that either of 
them ever seriously contemplated anything beyond passive 
cooperation with whatever the League might decide to do. 
Their extreme caution may have been dictated by domestic 
political considerations, by the fear of offending both the 
isolationist majority in Congress and the general public. But 
the reluctance to exert effective leadership to overcome this 
opposition suggests strongly that the administration shared 
to a large degree the general belief that events in Europe 
did not immediately threaten the security of the United 
States and could probably best be handled by the European 
states themselves. The result was that any approach to col­
107. Albert E. Highley, The First Sanctions Experiment, Geneva Studies, 
Vol. IV, No. 4 (July, 1938), p. 118. 
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lective security remained low on the list of priorities of a 
president who believed it necessary to devote most of his 
energies to the continuing domestic crisis. That such an at­
titude further undermined the already precarious collective 
security structure within the League and thus gave tacit 
encouragement to Germany, Italy, and Japan was too little 
understood. 
The failure of the League to prevent the Italian conquest 
of Ethiopia effectively marked the end of efforts to preserve 
world peace through collective international action. Hitler 
began to implement his expansionist plans while the Italo-
Ethiopian conflict was still in progress and continued on the 
course that led directly to the invasion of Poland in Septem­
ber of 1939. Shortly thereafter, Japan began to resume its 
conquest of China, which ultimately led to Pearl Harbor and 
American involvement in war. At no point on this road to 
war was a concerted international effort made to prevent 
disaster, and at no point did the United States attempt to 
initiate such an effort. The major League powers, surveying 
the wreckage of the sanctions efforts of 1935-36, abandoned 
collective schemes for more traditional diplomacy, and even 
strong partisans of collective security had second thoughts. 
"Perhaps," concluded Albert Highley, "the ideal of collective 
security should be abandoned, for it is better not to have it 
at all than to have it fail."108 
For the United States there was nothing to abandon. 
Though the ideal was implicit in Woodrow Wilson's proposal 
for a League of Nations, it had been steadfastly rejected by 
the American people. And during the time when the League 
might have developed into an effective collective security 
organization, no American administration had given it suffi­
cient encouragement. Even Stimson, Hull, and Roosevelt 
108. Ibid., p. 127. 
292 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
never proposed anything more than an American policy that 
would not negate the collective efforts of others, and they 
were unsuccessful in establishing even this limited form of 
international cooperation as official policy. The actions taken 
by the United States during the Manchurian crisis were, 
without exception, taken unilaterally; and in the Italo-
Ethiopian conflict, no action was taken at all. In neither 
case did this country suggest by word or deed that it was 
willing to join, even indirectly, in a collective effort to pre­
serve world peace by bringing concerted economic and mili­
tary pressure to bear on potential or actual aggressors. 
In his Quarantine Speech of October 5, 1937, Roosevelt 
called for "positive endeavors to preserve peace." He never 
explained precisely what he had in mind, and his image of 
the peace-loving 90 percent of the world's nations who might 
somehow get together to stop the lawless 10 percent is as 
vague as the posse comitatus idea that Henry Cabot Lodge 
embraced in 1915. But there is much in the record of his 
first term of office to suggest that Roosevelt would have shied 
away from genuinely collective efforts to set up a quarantine 
much as Lodge had shied away from the obligations of the 
League Covenant. "We are looking for some way to peace," 
he told a press conference on October 6, "and by no means 
is it necessary that that way be contrary to the exercise of 
neutrality."109 If the way to peace was not contrary to the 
exercise of neutrality, collective security surely was. 
Not until the United States came to see a clear and present 
threat to its own security in the actions of Germany, Italy, 
and Japan did the American attitude undergo a significant 
change. For a few Americans, including Roosevelt, that 
109. State Department, Press Releases, XVII, 276-79 (October 9, 
1937); Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York, 1938-50), VI, 422-24. See also
Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech," Political Science 
Quarterly LXXII (1957), 405-33. 
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moment had come by the time Poland was conquered. For 
many others it came with the fall of France. For some, like 
Senator Vandenberg it did not come until the Japanese fi­
nally demonstrated at Pearl Harbor that collective action 
might be required to safeguard not only the peace of the 
world but the very existence of the United States. Only 
then did the threat to American sovereignty posed by its 
enemies come to seem greater than the threat to sovereignty 
inherent in collective security arrangements. And only then 
was the United States ready to set out on the course that 
Woodrow Wilson had proposed. 
The United States and the Atlantic 
Alliance: The First Generation 
LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN 
NATO HAS BEEN a phenomenon in international relations. 
Unlike most multinational organizations of the past, it has 
survived for a generation, thereby fulfilling at least the mini­
mal expectations of its founding fathers. Even more phenom­
enal for Americans has been the identification of the United 
States with an idea, a particular group of nations, and an 
organization that were all repugnant to a tradition that spe­
cifically isolated America from Europe. The origins of the 
North Atlantic Treaty are inextricably linked with the re­
discovery of Europe by the United States. 
No American tradition had older and more powerful roots 
than isolationism. The language of American foreign policy 
in the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twen­
tieth century repeated the words and echoed the emotions 
and preconceptions of Washington's Farewell Address, Jef­
ferson's First Inaugural Address, and the Monroe Doctrine. 
Even the verbiage of the Open Door at the turn of the twen­
tieth century and the circumstances of America's entrance 
in World War I suggested a Novo Ordo Seclorum, with the 
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implication in the former of a superiority of American 
methods and goals over Europe's in the Far East, and in the 
latter of a refusal to "ally" with the European cobelligerents 
in the war against the Central Powers. 
In the generation preceding World War II the United 
States had never appeared more resolute in its isolationism. 
The Western democracies that had betrayed America's faith 
in the Treaty of Versailles seemingly deserved the fate the 
Axis powers had in store for them. If most Americans did not 
look upon the destruction of Europe with satisfaction in the 
1930s, they certainly felt that they had no personal stake in 
the outcome of another European war, despite efforts of 
President Roosevelt to alert his countrymen to the Nazi peril. 
Both the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the United 
Nations convention at San Francisco appear at least super­
ficially to be suitable landmarks in the changing history of 
twentieth-century isolationism. Yet, neither the fears of 1941 
nor the hopes of 1945 ultimately served as sufficient cata­
lysts to shake the nation from its illusions about American 
autarchy in a chaotic world. Isolationism had always been 
more than a description of isolation; it had elements of ide­
ology that involved a state of mind and a course of action.1 
Historians have frequently claimed that the United States 
had never turned its back on the world, had always been 
concerned with external affairs, and had often exploited the 
troubles of the outside world for the advantage of special 
groups—Wall Street financial interests, missionaries in the 
Far East, or Franklin D. Roosevelt's political career.2 But 
1. See Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Re­
action (New York, 1957); Alexander DeConde, ed., Isolation and Security(Durham, N.C., 1957), particularly the editor's Chapter 1, "On Twentieth-
Century Isolationism." 
2. Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940: 
A Study in Responsibilities (New Haven, Conn., 1946): William Appleman 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland and New York, 
1959). 
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isolationism in the American tradition is specifically identi­
fied with Europe, notably with England and France, and is 
equated with revulsion from political connections with Eu­
rope. Washington's "great rule of conduct" in 1796 had pro­
nounced that America was a new society freed from the Old 
World's wars, corruption, and other social evils; and Amer­
ica's later history seemed to have vindicated his judgment 
that ties other than commercial would enmesh the United 
States in the snares of Europe. This identification was not to 
be found in 1945. 
On the contrary, the assumptions of Americans about the 
world continued to reflect the emotions of the isolationist 
tradition. Hence, the idea of war as a permanent institution 
in international society remained an un-American idea 
blamed on the European balance-of-power system and with­
out validity for the United States. The precipitate mass de­
mobilization of the war economy and military establishment 
was done with little more thought about its impact on the 
outside world than was the case in 1865 or in 1918. The war 
was over, and it followed that all wars would be irrelevant 
to the new world order.3 In this light the United Nations 
served as a surrogate foreign office of the United States be­
hind which Americans could withdraw to more important 
domestic matters. The Four or Five Policemen of the 
Security Council would provide a routine patrol for a world 
in which violence would come from smaller irresponsible 
powers. Such differences as existed among the Great Powers 
would be resolved on the basis of their common goal of main­
taining world peace. 
America's expectation of involvement without responsi­
bility did not last long. The Soviet Union's refusal to observe 
3. Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy (Cam­
bridce. Mass., 1951), particularly Chapter 5, "The American Attitude to­
ward War." 
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Western requirements for elections in Eastern Europe, its 
support of communist subversive groups in Greece, and its 
pressures on Turkey and Iran all pointed to Russian unwill­
ingness to endorse America's image of the postwar world. 
To cope with the Russian posture required not only a rec­
ognition that the Soviet Union was a powerful physical 
threat to Europe but also that no other power was available 
to subdue the threat. In understanding this problem, Ameri­
can policymakers also had to face the fact that the balance 
of power was a reality in 1946 and that American power was 
the vital element in the maintenance of the balance. 
The Truman administration's response to the unexpected 
pressures of the outside world resulted in an ambivalence 
toward the Soviet Union that reflected the understandable 
confusion of an inexperienced leadership. On the one hand, 
President Truman shared the eagerness of the nation to 
return to "normalcy" as fast as the soldiers could be returned 
to civilian life. To justify the hasty demobilization required 
a reasonably peaceful future for Americans and Russians, 
and the efforts of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to 
reach binding agreements with the Soviet Union bear wit­
ness to the importance the administration attached to fulfill­
ing the vision of a world without major conflicts of interests. 
On the other hand, policymakers if not politicians were 
forced to recognize within a year after the war's end that the 
differences with the Soviet Union over elections in Eastern 
Europe, over the future of atomic weapons, and over the 
ultimate disposition of the German problem represented 
more than a breakdown of communications between East 
and West. They were also a reflection of their respective in­
terpretations of history. To Americans, Russia's harnessing of 
Eastern Europe to the communist system was a betrayal of 
treaty promises and a cynical display of Soviet aggression 
rather than a means of ensuring security against future Ger­
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man resurgence abetted by the capitalist powers. To Rus­
sians, American attempts to force elections on Eastern Eu­
rope were simply the predictable acts of an imperialist power 
advancing its capitalist interests rather than an expression 
of an idealist reordering of Europe in the image of American 
democracy to avoid future wars. 
As early as February, 1946, George F. Kennan, charge 
d'affaires in Moscow, sent a cablegram to Washington that 
contained the seeds of his notable statement on containment 
in the July, 1947, issue of Foreign Affairs. In this message he 
observed that in the Soviet Union, "we have . .  . a political 
force committed fanatically to the belief that with us there 
can be no permanent modus vivendi." * Out of this kind of 
thinking emerged a reevaluation of Roosevelt's claim that 
Yalta "spells the end of the system of unilateral action, the 
exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence and balances of 
power and all other expedients which have been tried for 
centuries—and have always failed."6 In place of a universal 
organization like the United Nations, which was consistent 
with the spirit of isolationism, the United States was forced 
into a new consideration of the balance of power. 
What was needed in 1946 first was the acceptance of the 
balance of power as a rule of international life and secondly 
the assertion of leadership in maintaining the balance. Only 
an American presence in Europe could restrain the Soviet 
Union's impulse toward expansion, and this presence could 
better be expressed by diplomacy than by military weapons. 
In time, Kennan speculated, the United States can "force 
upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and 
4. Kennan's cablegram of February 22, 1946, from Moscow to Depart­
ment of State, in Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., The 
Truman Administration (New York, 1966), p. 209. 
5. Roosevelt's address to the Congress on Yalta, March 1, 1945, in 
Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York, 1938-1950), XIII, 586. 
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circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, 
and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventu­
ally find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet power."" 
When Kennan's message finally became the Truman pol­
icy, it was expressed, as Kennan was to point out later, in an 
unsophisticated and excessively military form.7 It was Brit­
ain's confession of inability to continue its assistance to 
Greece and Turkey in their struggle against communist pres­
sures that opened to the United States a channel along which 
American power might be brought to bear in behalf of ailing 
Europe. The alternative to immediate action appeared to 
have been the loss of Greece and Turkey, and perhaps even 
the loss of Europe itself, to communist subversion and ulti­
mate conquest. On this high ground of principle and in the 
customary Manichean language of American isolationism, 
President Truman observed that "the free peoples of the 
world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. 
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of 
the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our 
own Nation."8 The $400 million in emergency aid, which 
was all the British had anticipated in their approaches to 
the State Department, was dwarfed by the larger challenge 
implied in the Truman Doctrine, something that the Labour 
government had not quite anticipated when it laid down its 
burden in the Mediterranean.9 
8. George F. Kennan "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 
XXV (July, 1947), 582. 
7. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (New York, 1967), pp. 358­
59, in which he blames himself for ambiguities in the "X" article that 
permitted a misinterpretation of "containment." 
8. President's message to joint session of the Congress (Truman Doc­
trine), March 12, 1947, in Department of State Bulletin XVI (1947), 537. 
9. Elizabeth Lane Furdell, "The United Kingdom, the United States and
the Truman Doctrine," Ms., Seminar in American Diplomatic History, Kent
State University, 1967. 
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The presidential speech of March 12, 1947, was only a 
beginning. The supplies to Greece and Turkey represented 
an emergency military support. The administration then 
sought a form of assistance that would deal with the eco­
nomic chaos left in the wake of war. While the details of 
the Truman Doctrine were discussed and investigated, the 
new Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State exam­
ined ways of deepening and widening the channel of aid so 
that massive economic assistance might be provided to Eu­
rope as a preventive as much as a curative of the communist 
infection. The result was the Marshall Plan, organized by 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. 
Clayton, tried out in a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, by 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, and popularized by 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall at the Harvard Uni­
versity commencement exercises of June 5,1947. 
The contrast between American behavior after 1918 and 
after 1945 is instructive, and suggests that nations can learn 
some lessons, if not always the appropriate ones, from his­
tory. The United States joined rather than rejected a league 
of nations, it abandoned loans to Europe in favor of outright 
grants of aid, and it considered the consequences of with­
drawal from Europe in terms of its effect on the balance of 
power in the world. True, the European Economic Coopera­
tion Act, which in 1948 gave life to the European Recovery 
Program, met opposition in the Congress; but the opposing 
arguments went beyond familiar cries of criminal waste and 
ungrateful beneficiaries to unfamiliar alarms over the fate of 
the United Nations and the incompatibility between the 
military character of the Truman Doctrine and the economic 
function of the Marshall Plan.10 The ECA not only passed 
the scrutiny of the Congress but promised in its execution 
10. See Henry A. Wallace, "My Alternative for the Marshall Plan," New 
Republic XXXVIII (January 12, 1948), 13-14; Walter Lippmann. The Cold 
War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 1947), pp. 52-57. 
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to promote the building of a new Europe with a continental 
economy rather than merely national economies. The Amer­
ican image of the future was, of course, a United States of 
Europe. 
The very year in which the nation committed itself to a 
new view of Europe was also the year in which that conti­
nent felt itself to be in greater danger than ever before. The 
American commitment was to be strengthened by new crises. 
In February, 1948, Czechoslovakia, a Westernized country 
whose leaders Eduard Benes and Jan Masaryk had close 
ties with the United States, fell prey to a communist coup; 
and in June the Soviet Union used its presence in East Ger­
many to blockade Berlin, severing all land and water links 
to the West. Here was the crest of the communist westward 
wave, whether propelled by the winds of communist doc­
trine or by a reaction to American measures. What could the 
United States do to stem the tide? 
Europe's own answer was immediate though elliptical. 
In March, 1948, in the wake of Czechoslovakia's fall, five 
Western nations—the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—organized in Brussels 
the Western Union, pledged to mutual defense and to eco­
nomic cooperation. The significance of this pact was not 
lost on American planners. On one level, the Brussels treaty 
emphasized that economic recovery was impossible without 
military security. On another, it intimated that only the 
United States could provide that security. By emphasizing 
the principles of self-help and mutual aid, the Brussels Pact 
powers appealed to the sentiments that had already made 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation suc­
cessful: namely, that American assistance serve the ends of 
European unification—political, economic, or military. And 
the assistance they wanted on this occasion was American 
participation in the organization. 
The closest the United States would come to gratifying 
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this wish was the Vandenberg Resolution of June 11, 1948, 
when the Senate endorsed by an overwhelming majority of 
64 to 6 the "progressive development of regional and other 
collective arrangements for individual and collective self-
defense," and underlined this endorsement by associating 
the United States, "by constitutional process, with such re­
gional and other collective arrangements as are based on 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as 
affect its national security." If the Marshall Plan may be 
likened to enlightened application of World War I loans, 
then military aid to the Western Union would be an im­
proved version of World War II lend-lease, with the im­
portant distinction that weapons and supplies were intended 
to deter attack rather than to repel invasion after it had 
begun. 
Tailored though the Brussels Pact was to just such a re­
sponse as the Vandenberg Resolution provided, the member 
nations were not satisfied. No resolution would be meaning­
ful to them unless "association" was equated with member­
ship in the alliance, and embraced Article 4 of the Treaty: 
"If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object 
of an armed attack on Europe, the other High Contracting 
Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so 
attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in 
their power." Could this kind of assurance be granted? 
American planners were not at all sure in the spring of 
1948 that the nation would give such guarantees. To join a 
military alliance, particularly a European military alliance 
with a life span of fifty years, would pit an insecure admin­
istration squarely against a tradition that went back to 
Washington's warnings of 1796 and to the Convention of 
Mortefontaine of 1800, which terminated the last alliance 
with a European country. Such a relationship would be of a 
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different order from direct military assistance to a belea­
guered country and even from the carefully programmed 
economic support of a group of countries. It would openly 
depart from the profession of faith in the United Nations and 
professions of distaste for the balance of power made concur­
rently with the unilateral actions that underlay implemen­
tation of the containment plan. Senator Vandenberg at the 
time of the Senate's hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty 
made a point of observing that three of the six paragraphs 
in his resolution were designed to make the Charter of the 
United Nations more workable.11 
The problem of reconciling Europe's needs and demands 
with America's interests and political limitations had been 
the subject of discussion at an important meeting in Blair 
House on April 27, 1948, before introduction of the Vanden­
berg Resolution. Secretary of State Marshall, Undersecretary 
Lovett, Senator Vandenberg, and John Foster Dulles gath­
ered to examine the implications of the State Department's 
idea of having the Senate approve a resolution in favor of a 
North Atlantic regional pact, to be followed by the presi­
dent's calling for a convention of North Atlantic states "to 
frame some sort of regional compact under Article 52 and 
collective guarantee under Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter." They all expressed reservations about this maneu­
ver. Vandenberg in particular expressed concern about the 
effect of such a regional compact upon the United Nations 
and produced a preliminary draft of a resolution that would 
avoid a special conference on Charter revision. Dulles won­
dered if Article 51 of the Charter was not too brittle a base 
on which to build a new treaty. Additionally, he speculated 
on the dangers to which the United States would be exposed 
11. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty,
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, 81st Congress, 1st Session 
(1949), Part I, 242. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings. 
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if one of the allies fell under communist control or if any or 
all of them would use too firm an American commitment to 
reduce their own efforts toward economic recovery and 
military protection. They adjourned without resolving the 
question of compatibility with the United Nations, the 
danger of a permanent European dependency on the United 
States, or their unstated fears of a resurgent isolationism in 
America.12 In light of these deliberations the Vandenberg 
Resolution appears as a cautious compromise. 
It was also a compromise that could not last. There was 
no genuine alternative to alliance in which the United States 
was fully joined to Western Europe if the purposes of both 
the Marshall Plan and the Brussels Pact were to be served. 
And national reception of the Vandenberg Resolution en­
couraged continuation of negotiations with Europe. Indeed, 
military collaboration became increasingly important after 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin forced the United States to 
grapple with the problems of protecting "West Germany" 
from Soviet aggression and protecting Western Europe from 
the specter of a revived Germany. Could these problems be 
resolved without further American participation in the de­
fense of Europe? America's negative answer was reflected 
not merely in the Berlin airlift but also in military conversa­
tions between the United States and the United Kingdom 
during the summer of 1948. The special links forged in 
World War II could be used to bind a larger organization 
in the Cold War, but no action could be taken until the 
American presidential campaign had ended. Presumably, a 
potentially lame-duck president could not carry the nation 
into the alliance, and so the United States would be better 
12. Dulles's Memorandum of Conference at the Blair House—George C.
Marshall, Robert A. Lovett, Arthur H. Vandenberg, John Foster Dulles, 
April 27, 1948, in Dulles Papers, Princeton University. For a different view
of the conference, see Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of 
Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 406. 
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able to handle the issue after the fevers of campaign oratory 
had subsided. 
In his Inaugural Address of 1949, President Truman 
pointed the way out of the dilemma by stating clearly that 
the United States was "working out with a number of coun­
tries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security 
of the North Atlantic area. Such an agreement would take 
the form of a collective defense arrangement within the 
terms of the United Nations Charter." The Treaty quickly 
followed. After a year's debate in European and American 
councils, it is not surprising that a number of changes had 
been made in the framing of the document before it was 
brought to the attention of the public; but it is fair to judge 
that despite some carefully opaque language in the final 
form, the original intention of providing a credible deterrent 
to Soviet attack and a psychological prop to Western morale 
had been achieved. 
A significant difference between the ideas of 1948 and 
1949 appeared in the geographical boundaries of the al­
liance. In the April meeting at Blair House the area under 
consideration had been widened to include Scandinavia, 
Iceland, and Canada, the latter being of particular impor­
tance in identifying a "North Atlantic" character that could 
justify American adherence to a new pact. By January, 1949, 
Italy and Portugal had joined the group, despite misgivings 
in both cases; Italy was some distance from the Atlantic, 
and Portugal did not fit the image of a democracy. Sweden 
ultimately dropped out of the projected treaty, partly be­
cause of heavy Soviet pressure, partly because of the historic 
success of its neutral stance. But notwithstanding political 
factors that ultimately determined the result, by the winter 
of 1949 the five nations of Brussels had become the twelve 
nations of the North Atlantic Pact. 
The sensitive issue of the relationship between the Treaty 
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and the Charter was met obliquely. Under American en­
couragement the language of the Treaty conformed as best 
as it could to the letter of the Charter. The founding fathers 
of the Treaty sprinkled the text liberally with references to 
the Charter, and specifically to Article 51. By likening the 
Treaty to the Rio Pact, they claimed by inference a regional 
status that the framers wished to identify with the North 
Atlantic system without making a formal commitment to 
Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter. Had they done so they 
would have had to subject the deliberations of the new or­
ganization to the full scrutiny of the Soviet Union in the 
Security Council. But by avoiding explicit claims on regional 
status, the planners invited charges of duplicity for suggest­
ing functions that the new treaty could not possibly have 
included.13 
Still another difficulty for the treaty-makers was the issue 
of a military alliance implied in the Treaty, and with it pos­
sible entanglement in a future war as a consequence of ob­
ligations to the new allies. The strictures of the Founding 
Fathers were directed against permanent alliances with the 
very countries that would be the heart of the Atlantic al­
liance. Could a twenty-year alliance be fitted in the cate­
gory of Washington's "temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies"? Even if the answer was affirmative, the new 
relationship could run afoul of the constitutional power of 
the Congress to declare war. Senators Forrest Donnell of 
Missouri and Arthur Watkins of Utah repeatedly made the 
point in the hearings on the Treaty that Article 5, in which 
"the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all," could force the United States into 
13. "The North Atlantic Treaty," Department of State Publication, No. 
S462 (March, 1949); James Reston in New York Times, Apr. 22, 1949. 
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war without the approval of the Congress if Norway were 
invaded or Paris bombed. Even if the caveat in the wording 
of this article was truly sufficient to permit escape, would not 
Article 3 of the Treaty, calling for "continuous and effective 
self-help and mutual aid," be only a vehicle for unlimited 
shipments of material to Europe? " 
Behind these questions lay the habits of isolationist 
thought. The administration in handling them had to ask 
itself if the nation would accept the blunt truth that isola­
tionism was obsolete, that the Monroe Doctrine separating 
the Old from New Worlds was irrelevant, that military al­
liances were not necessarily evil, and that the balance of 
power had not only not disappeared but that the nation's 
survival depended upon its proper functioning. The familiar 
language of the past had not disappeared from the vocabu­
lary of the administration leaders themselves, as Secretary 
of Defense Louis Johnson discovered to his embarrassment. 
Shortly before assuming office and shortly after the signing 
of the Brussels Pact, he had identified that treaty as the per­
fect example of a European military alliance that illustrated 
the differences between the European and American out­
looks on the world. Or so it seemed to an appreciative audi­
ence of the Daughters of the American Revolution.15 
Given these circumstances, the administration decided 
against a direct assault on tradition. The eastern shores of 
the Atlantic merely became the new boundaries of the New 
World of the Monroe Doctrine; military alliance became 
"partnership for peace"; the balance of power became "pre­
ponderance of power for peace." In other words, the North 
Atlantic Treaty was semantically assimilated into the isola­
tionist past with the imagery of Washington's Farewell Ad­
14. See, for example, the exchange between Acheson and Senators 
Donnell and Watkins, Senate Hearings, Part 1, pp. 62-87. 
15. Ibid., pp. 146 ff. 
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dress, Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, and above all the 
Monroe Doctrine serving to blur distinctions. The Iron Cur­
tain, rather than the Atlantic Ocean, now separated the Old 
World from the New World.16 
Despite the impressive display of bipartisanship that 
united Vandenberg and Connally, and Dulles and Acheson, 
opponents of the Treaty vigorously rejected the idea of its 
compatibility either with the United Nations or the Monroe 
Doctrine, and many of them braved the wrath of an intimi­
dating chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Tom Connally, to say so. The voices of the Communist 
party, the Progressive party of Henry Wallace, pacifist de­
votees of the United Nations, conservative isolationists, and 
traditional Anglophobes, all warned the nation against the 
pact, and failed. 
Not even the intervention of Senator Robert A. Taft of 
Ohio, the most influential of all congressmen, could stir the 
public, although he stated his willingness to see the Monroe 
Doctrine extended to Europe provided it remained a uni­
lateral action on the part of the United States.17 
The administration won its gamble. By a vote of 82 to 13 
the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty on July 21, 
1949, a margin sufficient to suggest that the United States 
had abandoned its isolationist tradition. Given the apathetic 
response of public opinion to the arguments of the pact's 
enemies, it may be argued that the nation no longer needed 
the comforting language of isolationism to support the break 
with tradition. Probably it was prepared to accept NATO 
as it had accepted the Truman Doctrine or the Berlin airlift: 
namely, as part of the price for power in the postwar world. 
16. Ambassador Austin on the "Balance of Power," ibid., p. 97. See also 
Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of Isolationism," South 
Atlantic Quarterly LVIII (1958), 204-16. 
17. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), 9206. 
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The meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty in the year 
immediately after passage has yet to be fully comprehended 
or documented, but there are generalizations that may be 
reasonably made. Whether or not there was a causal connec­
tion between the new Atlantic alliance of April and the 
lifting of the Berlin blockade in May, it is reasonable to as­
sume that the Treaty underscored the failure of the Soviet 
action in Germany and accelerated the abandonment of the 
blockade. Important as this victory was, NATO performed 
an even more important and certainly a more demonstrable 
function in serving as midwife to the birth of the Federal 
Republic of Germany on May 8, 1949. Without the protec­
tion of the Treaty, it is questionable if even a partially sov­
ereign Germany would have been palatable to its former 
victims only four years after the end of World War II. 
The passage of the Treaty also assured the success of the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the beginnings of a 
massive transfusion of military supplies to the allies under 
color of Article 3. The Congress's objective, of course, was 
an integrated military defense system for Europe conforming 
to economic objectives of the Marshall Plan and underpin­
ning them.18 
How successful military aid was in the early days of 
NATO is open to the same kind of question that can be 
raised about NATO's contribution to the German problem. 
With respect to Germany, Berlin was saved and the Federal 
Republic was born, but the relations between the new Ger­
many and NATO were murky even though the allies knew 
that German manpower and German geography were fac­
tors military planners ordinarily would have taken into ac­
count. But Europe's visceral fears of a revived Germany 
made such calculations politically unacceptable. As for the 
18. William Adams Brown, Jr., and Redvers Opie, American Foreign 
Assistance (Washington, 1953), pp. 455ff. 
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product of military assistance, there was little evidence that 
anything more than lip service was given to the principle of 
integration. Indeed, the organization itself was only a paper 
affair in 1949 and 1950, with no organs to implement a co­
ordinated defense system. Perhaps the fact that only a few 
understaffed divisions confronted a powerful Soviet force of 
twenty-five divisions in Central Europe made military as­
sistance at best a morale factor to promote a sense of security 
among the beleaguered allies rather than cogs in a sophisti­
cated military machine. 
At any event, the organization that grew out of the Treaty 
in the summer and fall of 1949 was more shell than sub­
stance. Under Article 9 a North Atlantic Council was estab­
lished that was to "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be 
necessary; in particular it shall establish a defense commit­
tee which shall recommend measures for the implementa­
tion of Articles 3 and 5." At its first meeting in September, 
1949, the Defense Committee, made up of the defense 
ministers of each nation, was established along with a chain 
of command similar to that of the Western Union. Advising 
the committee would be a Military Committee represented 
by all the chiefs of staff, which in turn would be guided by 
the advice of its steering committee, the Standing Group, 
composed only of representatives of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France. Under this command would 
be five regional planning groups covering all the geographic 
areas of NATO. A month later the Council created two par­
allel groups: a Defense Financial and Economic Committee 
of finance ministers and a Military Production and Supply 
Board to support the Defense Committee's efforts to stand­
ardize weapons and equipment.19 
19. North Atlantic Council communique, Washington, September 17, 
1949, and November 18, 1949, in Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 
1951-1954 (Paris, 1954), pp. 173-82. 
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The flurry of activity in the wake of these acts of establish­
ment appeared more significant than it actually was. When 
one considers that most of these groups, including the Coun­
cil itself, were composed of such dignitaries as the secretary 
of state and the secretary of the treasury, the question of 
how much time and energy these busy men were able to 
devote to their NATO assignments inevitably arises. How 
much effect could these groups have had when they met 
infrequently at such diverse centers as London, Rome, Paris, 
and Washington, and lacked a focus of authority, a direct 
line of command, and even the means to bring together the 
results of their separate efforts. In partial recognition of this 
problem the North Atlantic Council, which was composed of 
three cabinet officers from each country, set up a Council 
of Deputies at its fourth session in May, 1950, that would 
meet in continuous session to formulate issues supervising 
the workings of subordinate bodies.20 
Actually, a year's experience was not necessary to inform 
NATO officials that its operation was inefficient. If they 
waited that long to make even a superficial change, the 
reason lay in the special services of the United States to the 
organization. The extraordinary functions of the United 
States were never fully articulated, but their outlines are 
clear. General Omar D. Bradley, chief of staff in 1949, ex­
pressed their spirit when he observed two days after the 
Treaty was signed that the military power of the United 
States was borne "on the wings of our bombers." The allies 
must be confident that this air power would be used in the 
event of an enemy attack.21 His Army Day speech contained 
the assumption that the defense of Europe rested not on any 
particular military structure the NATO Council might fab­
20. North Atlantic Council communique, London, September 15—18, 
1950, ibid., pp. 182-83. 
21. Cited in Senate Hearings, Part 1, p. 182. 
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ricate, and not on the amount of assistance the United States 
might offer to the military forces of the alliance individually 
or collectively. Rather, it rested on the credibility of Amer­
ican air power's promise to provide an immediate response 
to external aggression. NATO's security, therefore, depended 
upon the nuclear weapons of the American intercontinental 
bombers based in Omaha, Nebraska, with striking capabil­
ities that would deter hostilities. 
Although NATO's defense preparations were expected to 
advance beneath the shelter of American air power, the ma­
jor effects were psychological rather than military. If the 
various disparate organs of NATO were ever to collate their 
efforts and implement an integrated defense plan, the time 
would be in the relatively distant future. Not until January, 
1950, did the United States even complete bilateral agree­
ments with eight of the NATO allies, an inevitably slow 
process that demanded closer inspection of the economies of 
the recipient countries than the latter had anticipated or had 
wanted. Although the initial prediction of the secretary of 
state was that over 50 percent of the military aid program 
would be finished by the end of the fiscal year 1950, the first 
shipments were not made until March, 1950. Of the $1.3 
billion authorized, only $42 million had been obligated, and 
$3.5 million spent on Western Europe, according to the first 
semiannual report of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pro­
gram covering the period to April 6,1950.22 
The leisurely pace of the flow of aid came to a sudden 
and dramatic end with the Korean crisis of June, 1950. The 
North Korean invasion of the South and the United Nations 
response forced the United States either to transform NATO 
or to abandon it. The latter was a genuine alternative, for 
22. First Semiannual Report to Congress on Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program, October 6, 1949, to April 6, 1950, in Brown and Opie, American 
Foreign Assistance, pp. 481-83. 
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the explosion of war in the Far East called the nation's at­
tention to traditional American interests in Asia, which in 
turn could have awakened isolationist sentiment. Given the 
Asian content of so much of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's 
jingoistic rhetoric in this period, withdrawal from Europe 
might have been a logical concomitant. Such was not the 
case, partly because the fear of communism stimulated by 
McCarthy and the Soviet success with the atomic bomb in­
hibited retirement from the world scene despite the pleas of 
Herbert Hoover or Joseph Kennedy.23 Instead, NATO was 
throughly reorganized, with special recognition that the 
Strategic Air Command was an insufficient deterrent to ag­
gression if unaccompanied by effective ground troops pre­
pared to hold back the initial wave of the enemy's attack. 
What happened in Korea could happen in Europe, even 
though the latter, unlike the former, was formally enclosed 
within the American defense perimeter. So went the reason­
ing of NATO planners. 
Conceivably, NATO's structure might have been revised 
without the prodding of a Korean conflict. The Russian 
breaking of the American monopoly on atomic weapons in 
September, 1949, had serious implications for NATO's se­
curity. Still, changes probably would have been milder and 
more piecemeal than was the case in the last six months of 
1950 when the regional planning groups were swept away 
to be replaced by a Supreme Headquarters in Paris under a 
Supreme Allied Commander. As an American, he would 
symbolize American commitment to the defense of Europe 
and provide a deterrent against communist advance at the 
23. Herbert Hoover, "We Should Revise Our Foreign Policies," in 
Addresses upon the American Road, 1950-55 (Stanford, 1955), pp. 11-22 (broadcast February 9, 1951); Joseph P. Kennedy's speech before the Law
School Forum of the University of Virginia on December 12, 1958, in 
Manfred Jonas, ed., American Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century(New York, 1967), pp. 140-44. 
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border and not in Washington or in Omaha. So while Mac-
Arthur's forces were liberating South Korea in September, 
1950, the NATO Council in New York was trying to devise 
a defense system that would make liberation unnecessary. 
A major element in the reorganization of NATO would be 
the presence of American troops alongside Europeans un­
der the command of the charismatic figure of General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Such American soldiers as were al­
ready in Europe belonged to occupation forces with func­
tions that could eventually be fitted into the new defense 
scheme. Accordingly, the joint chiefs of staff recommended 
that six American divisions be assigned to Europe, including 
the two already there in occupation service, with the twofold 
function of serving as a deterrent against attack and as a 
spur to the morale of the allies. The European members 
would provide the bulk of the necessary ground forces with 
the full knowledge that the American presence in their midst 
would guarantee an American participation in the event of 
attack.24 
As attention moved toward practical considerations of 
defense problems, the NATO planners reassessed the geo­
graphical boundaries of NATO and found them too restric­
tive. Greece and Turkey, the original beneficiaries of Ameri­
can support, not only remained exposed to communist 
threats but in turn exposed the southeastern flank of Europe. 
The allies added a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty that 
admitted Greece and Turkey in October, 1951.25 
Far more serious to both the Americans and Europeans 
was the problem of Germany's relations with the alliance. 
24. Statement of Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, Hearings,
Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Do Duty in the 
European Area, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on
Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40. 
25. The Greece-Turkey Protocol, London, October 22, 1951, in Ismay, 
NATO, pp. 20-21. 
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From the beginning of the movement toward an Atlantic 
community Germany had been a problem, one that involved 
not only the defense of allied-occupied Germany from So­
viet threats but also the protection of Europeans from a new 
German menace. The memories of Nazism were still fresh 
in the minds of its former victims, and the trauma left in its 
passing was deeper and more disturbing than anything com­
munism might do to Europe. If Americans did not share 
these memories or sentiments, the Brussels Pact members 
did; Article 7 of that treaty called for the convocation of the 
Consultative Council whenever a threat to peace should 
arise, most specifically "in case of a renewal by Germany of 
an aggressive policy." No such notice was given of potential 
Soviet aggression in that document. Though the Atlantic 
Pact itself was free of such clearly expressed fears, Germany 
was consciously excluded from the alliance. As Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson observed, the absence of German sov­
ereignty automatically removed Germans from a position of 
significance beyond the obvious benefits derived from the 
fact that an attack on the occupational forces in Germany 
would call for a NATO response.26 
The Korean War raised again the German question, and 
might have provided Americans an occasion to claim that 
the Federal Republic, created after the signing of the Treaty, 
possessed attributes of sovereignty sufficient to permit a role 
in NATO. The imperatives of the time forced a confronta­
tion with the allies that revealed clearly that Americans, 
no matter how sympathetic to Europe's sufferings un­
der the Nazis, would see in them a barrier to German 
rearmament or to other forms of German assistance in the 
defense of Europe. To Americans, Germany was a source of 
wealth and manpower that should be exploited for the bene­
26. Senate Hearings, Part 1, p. 61. 
316 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
fit of the alliance. Since Germans would benefit from NATO, 
the least they should do is to offer a contribution toward its 
effectiveness. "A program for Western Europe which does 
not include the productive resources of all the countries of 
Western Europe," asserted Acheson in August, 1950, includ­
ing "Western Germany, as well as France, will not be effec­
tive in the long-range political sense."27 Given this American 
attitude, the omission of German collaboration from the 
communique of the NATO Council a month later reflected a 
schism within the alliance that might have had as serious 
consequences for the future of NATO as the Korean crisis 
itself. The most the United States was able to win from it's 
allies was a promise to end the technical state of war be­
tween the Federal Republic and the NATO allies of World 
War II.28 
But American pressures persisted. And from a military 
standpoint, Europe recognized that German materiel and 
troops were of vital importance to the common defense. 
Politically and economically, the involvement of Germany in 
its own defense as well as in the support of NATO would be 
a major step forward in the creation of a united Europe. 
Countering these benefits was the specter of a revived Ger­
many, militarily strong and willing to take advantage of the 
Cold War to resume the destructive objectives of Nazism. 
To blunt American importunities and to exorcise its own 
fears, France proposed a compromise to solve NATO's prob­
lems over Germany. This was the construction of a European 
Defense Community, a supranational body within NATO in 
27. Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for 1951, U.S. Senate Com­
mittee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), pp. 284-85. See also
Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and Adenauer's Germany: Uneasy Partner­
ship," International Organization XV (Autumn, 1961), 618-19. 
28. North Atlantic Council communique, New York, September 16-18, 
1950, in Ismay, NATO, pp. 185-86; communique of the Foreign Ministers
of the United Kingdom, France, by the United States, New York, Septem­
ber 19, 1950, Department of State Bulletin XXIII (1950), 530-32. 
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which Germany would abstain from acquiring some custom­
ary sovereign powers in return for the privilege of participa­
tion in the defense of Europe. 
The European Coal and Steel Community was a useful 
precedent. This functional unit within Western Europe, the 
work in large measure of two Frenchmen, Robert Schuman 
and Jean Monnet, joined Germany with France, Italy, and 
the Benelux countries in a plan to intertwine French and 
German industries in such a way that neither of the partners 
would be able to exploit their national economic power to 
the detriment of their neighbors without inflicting irrepara­
ble damage on their own economies. At the same time the 
Schuman Plan would accelerate the recovery and expansion 
of all Europe's economies. Here was a long stride toward 
European unity. A European army within NATO would be 
another. 
On October 24, 1950, Premier Rene Pleven presented the 
plan for a European Defense Community to the General 
Assembly of France. Such details as the size of national and 
multinational units had yet to be arranged, and the extent 
of German equality was not at all clear; but at least it pro­
vided a response to the American challenge. When the treaty 
establishing the EDC was finally signed in May, 1952, it 
stipulated that a council of ministers of the member nations 
would control a European army composed of national units 
of 13,000 to 15,000 men. Above this division level would be 
the multinational corps. What made this form of German 
militarism palatable to the French and other Europeans 
were two factors in the treaty designed to limit Germany's 
freedom of individual action. The first was the specific 
placement of the European army under the control of the 
Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower and his 
American successors. The second was the imposition of spe­
cific restrictions upon German membership in the EDC, 
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notably the implicit exclusion from NATO and the explicit 
prohibition of manufacture of "aircraft, atomic weapons, 
chemical weapons, biological weapons, heavy ships and 
other specified items in 'strategically exposed regions' with­
out the unanimous approval of the Council."29 
Despite the apparent European initiative in the EDC, 
most of the demands for new and more vigorous means of 
rearming Europe or of sacrificing traditional practices to the 
needs of the alliance came from the United States. The re­
sponse was primarily military. In Korea, General MacArthur 
led the United Nations forces; in Europe, General Eisen­
hower symbolized American willingness to do no less than 
the United States was doing in the Far East. It was Ameri­
can pressure that pushed the alliance by means of a Tem­
porary Council Committee established at the Ottawa con­
ference of September, 1951, to examine the precise extent 
to which each member might support the common effort. 
Escalation of the military program was climaxed at the 
Lisbon Conference in February, 1952, when the Council an­
nounced plans to produce fifty NATO divisions by the end 
of that year, 4,000 aircraft, and a firm recommendation that 
the German contribution to the alliance be quickly settled. 
At the same time the office of secretary general was estab­
lished to assist the Council by absorbing all existing civilian 
agencies.30 
The critical American presidential election of 1952 only 
served to underline the clear identification of Adenauer's 
Germany with NATO. Indeed, the new president and his 
29. Outline of the provisions of the treaty establishing the European
Defense Community, signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, in Chatham House
Study Group Report, Atlantic Alliance: NATO's Role in the Free World 
(London, 1952), p. 160. 
30. Ismay, NATO, pp. 41-48; North Atlantic Council communique, 
Lisbon, February 20-25, 1952, ibid., p. 191. Robert S. Jordan, The NATO 
International Staff/Secretariat, 1952-1957: A Study in International Admin­
istration (London, 1967), pp. 30-32. 
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secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had claimed that they 
would wage a more vigorous Cold War than the Democrats 
had conducted. Professing disturbance over the negative 
image projected by the Truman containment policies, Dulles 
attacked the Democrats not for undertaking the responsi­
bilities of world leadership, including the NATO role, but 
for their inability or their lack of desire to win the Cold War. 
Containment was insufficient. "We should be dynamic; we 
should use ideas as weapons; and these ideas should con­
form to moral principles. That we do this is right, for it is 
the inevitable expression of a faith—and I am confident that 
we still do have a faith. But it is also expedient in defending 
ourselves against an aggressive, imperialistic despotism. For 
even the present lines will not hold unless our purpose goes 
beyond confining Soviet Communism within its present 
orbit."31 
A prerequisite to rolling back Soviet forces in central Eu­
rope and to liberating the captive peoples was German co­
operation, a factor that promoted the mutual good will be­
tween Dulles and Adenauer. Equally important in this 
deepening German-American relationship was Dulles's re­
spect for Adenauer's commitment to a united Europe in 
which German militarism of the past would be forever 
buried.32 And while Germany was being reborn within the 
new Europe, NATO and EDC would be instruments in 
bringing together the East and West Germany. The Soviet 
Union would give partial recognition to the strength of the 
revived Europe by giving up its control of its occupied zone. 
Such were the hopes of Dulles in the early part of the Eisen­
31. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life XXXII (May 19, 
1952), 154. 
32. Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, vol. 17, The American Secre­
taries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel 
Flagg Bemis (New York, 1967), pp. 318-19; Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 
1945-1953, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago, 1965), pp. 435-37. 
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hower administration, hopes that if realized would be a re­
flection of the "virile" liberation policy of Republicans as 
opposed to the "sterile" containment policy of Democrats. 
The shelving of the EDC in 1954 brought an abrupt al­
though not permanent end to these hopes. It is true that 
Germany ratified the EDC, although only after soul-search­
ing by pacifists concerned with rearmament, by nationalists 
disturbed about the inferior role in the EDC, and by Ger­
mans everywhere fearful of a permanent division of Ger­
many as a result of NATO membership. But the other mem­
bers of Europe were even more reluctant to ratify the docu­
ment, and France never did ratify it. Long before the French 
Assembly effectively killed the EDC by demanding new res­
ervations in August, 1954, it was obvious that France had no 
intentions of implementing its objectives. France had pro­
posed the treaty and had signed it to deflect American plans 
from something even less palatable, and had managed to stall 
the proceedings for almost three years. Unfortunately, Amer­
ican tempers on the subject in Germany were shorter in 
1954 than they had been in 1951. By a vote of 88 to 0 on 
July 31, an angry Senate, anticipating the final evasion of 
France, had urged the president to grant Germany its sov­
ereignty unilaterally; and the Senate Armed Services Com­
mittee was prepared to cut off all aid to France if the EDC 
Treaty was not ratified by the end of the year. Secretary 
Dulles accused France of turning her back on "her own his­
torical proposal" when the French Assembly postponed in­
definitely debate on the EDC.33 
The consequence of this schism within the alliance might 
have been the dissolution of NATO. But before the United 
States could do more than verbalize its pique, Anthony Eden 
laid the ground for a satisfactory detente at conferences in 
33. New York Times, Aug. 1, July 15, Sept. 1, 1954. 
LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN 321 
London and Paris in September and October, 1954, at which 
the occupation status of Germany was ended, the Brussels 
Pact was converted into a Western European Union that 
would include Germany and Italy, and Germany was to be 
admitted in 1955 as the fifteenth member of NATO with its 
military forces directly under the Supreme Allied Com­
mander in Europe. The provisions in the aborted EDC 
barring Germany from production of biological, chemical, 
or atomic war materials were retained under the new dis­
pensation.*4 
For France the compromise offered guarantees of both 
British and American protection within the Western Union 
and NATO rubrics, respectively; for Germany it offered 
membership in the Atlantic and European communities on 
almost equal terms as well as a promise of ultimate reunifi­
cation of the divided nation. For Russia, German participa­
tion was a setback; but at the same time it stiffened the Iron 
Curtain by bringing into being in 1955 the Warsaw Pact, 
the Soviet counterpart of NATO. For the United States it of­
fered what most policymakers had wanted from the begin­
nings of NATO: full exploitation of German resources. 
With the temporary solution of the German problem to its 
credit, the NATO record in the mid-fifties gave reason for 
Americans to boast of success in their mission. First, the 
pervasive threat of Soviet military action against the West 
had failed to materialize. Though Soviet power still re­
mained, the fears that it inspired had diminished since 1948 
or 1950. Consequently, as the size of Europe's armies in­
creased and as the internal power of communist minorities 
34. Department of State Publication, no. 5659, "London and Paris Agree­
ments, September-October 1954" (Washington, 1954), pp. 9-20; Anthony 
Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle (Boston, 1960), pp. 168­
QA 
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in Western Europe shrank, the conditions of security that 
could make American assistance useful to the economies of 
Europe were now present. The result was the blossoming 
not only of the European gross national product and the 
standards of living of their peoples but also of the institu­
tions of unity. The European Economic Community, follow­
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, represented 
a functional implementation of the ideal of European unity. 
Perhaps the most intensive area of change was in the mili­
tary, often overlooked because new forms of integration 
were unexpected by-products of military developments. 
The fact of supranational leadership within NATO helped 
erode national sovereignties. When a German general could 
command the allied land forces of central Europe with 
troops from countries recently victimized by Nazi brutality, 
the idea of European unification had gone beyond the rhe­
torical stage. And even when the alliance was threatened by 
such serious challenges as the Suez crisis of 1956, which sep­
arated Fiance and England from the United States, and the 
periodic Cyprus crises inflaming Greece and Turkey, the 
process of military integration continued. While full stand­
ardization of weapons, an early dream of NATO fathers, 
languished, new modes of integration almost surreptitiously 
made themselves apparent. One of them was "infrastruc­
ture," a term borrowed from French railroaders to identify 
such prerequisites for military operations as fuel storage 
facilities, pipelines, port installations, and signal communi­
cations systems. Within a ten-year span NATO could take 
credit for the building or improving of 140 airfields, 5,000 
miles of fuel pipelines, and 15,000 miles of land telephone 
and telegraph lines. These facilities ran freely across the ter­
ritories of NATO nations and were the joint property of all 
the allies. Out of this growing interdependence a NATO 
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force emerged that meshed the various defense systems of 
the member nations and unwittingly undermined a major 
foundation of nationalism.35 
For Americans operating primarily in another continent, 
the effects of a common infrastructure were slight. American 
contingents were a relatively small portion of the NATO 
armies, and their major military contribution, nuclear weap­
ons, was outside the control of the allies. The principal chal­
lenge to American sovereignty came from another source; 
namely, from the difficulties of reconciling constitutional 
guarantees to American troops abroad with the very differ­
ent legal practices of countries in which they were stationed. 
The question stirred deep emotions in both hosts and guests. 
It was one thing for American soldiers and civilians to enjoy 
the privileges of extraterritoriality, notably the protection of 
American laws, when they were occupation forces in Ger­
many or liberators in France. It was quite another for them 
to enjoy these privileges when they were in Europe as 
equals, as guests in a host nation, as allies in a common 
cause. In the latter circumstances, whose jurisdiction should 
offenders fall under when the laws of the host country were 
violated outside the line of duty? If the old occupation status 
remained in force, the sensibilities of new allies would be 
ruffled; if Americans abroad were to be subject to a Euro­
pean court, constitutional rights to a trial by jury might be 
sacrificed. 
Risking political dangers, the United States and its allies 
signed a series of status-of-forces agreements that effectively 
placed Americans abroad on military and civilian missions 
under the authority of foreign courts. Such outcries as were 
made in the Congress were usually too exaggerated in their 
35. Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO Retrospect," Review of Politics XXIII 
(October, 1961), 452-53. 
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fears to win conviction.36 The logic of the situation de­
manded this concession. So did the host governments, which 
subsequently proved to be more lenient with wrongdoers 
than American military courts would have been with their 
wayward soldiers. 
But even as NATO's objectives appeared to meet success 
in a number of critical areas, new waves of discontent broke 
out in the late 1950s, most of it among European members. 
Ironically, much of the malaise concerned the very militari­
zation of the alliance that had seemed so necessary a few 
years before. European unhappiness was probably unavoida­
ble under any circumstance. The United States with its 
worldwide commitments inevitably pursued policies and 
took some actions that did not always satisfy the national 
or European aspirations of the allies. Hence the irritation or 
concern when the United States revived the economy and 
prolonged the life of Fascist Spain by placing missile bases 
on Spanish territory; when the United States seemed to join 
the Soviet Union in support of neutralist or hostile Arabs at 
the expense of England and France in 1956; when Ameri­
can troops left the NATO command to land in Lebanon in 
1957; when Dulles's brinkmanship over Formosa in 1958 
might have precipitated a world war in which the allies 
might have been committed without their approval. 
A more direct objection, but one difficult to satisfy, was 
the display of the American presence in Europe. Continuous 
affronts to European pride were made by the fact that Amer­
ican officers directed the organization—an American general 
in Paris, an American admiral in Norfolk, Virginia, an Amer­
ican chief of staff in Washington. Although the civilian 
counterparts of the military leaders were well represented 
36. Statement of Senator John W. Bricker, Supplementary Hearing, 
Status of Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), 
pp. 2-8. 
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by Europeans, few of them carried much authority, and 
most of them were unknown to the peoples of the Atlantic 
Community. The secretaries general, Europeans all—Ismay, 
Spaak, Stikker, and Brosio—lacked the power and the 
charisma of the American generals—Eisenhower, Ridgway, 
Gruenther, Norstad, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster. Given the 
nature of America's contribution to the alliance, it was un­
likely that the trappings of leadership could have been made 
invisible—or have gone unresented by Europeans. By the 
end of the decade a confident Europe, its economies flour­
ishing again and moving toward unity as well as toward 
prosperity, raised questions about the extent of America's 
power in Europe and about its wisdom in exercising it. 
Europe's major charge against the United States was its 
rigidity in clinging to ideas about the military challenge to 
NATO at a time when the challenge had changed character, 
when a new and more apparently moderate regime suc­
ceeded Stalin's in the years after 1953. If the Cold War 
could thereby be ended, the powerful, expensive, and 
American-dominated military organization would be an ob­
stacle to a detente with the Soviet Union. At Geneva in 1955 
the Soviet Union talked about disarmament and the unifica­
tion of Germany in a "spirit of Locarno" that implied a new 
relationship with the communist world. And within two 
years the military response to the Soviet Union seemed ob­
solescent since the development of new weapons of mass 
destruction made war too horrible to accept as a means of 
settling political differences. The Soviet Union not only pos­
sessed the hydrogen bomb but in the fall of 1957 had orbited 
an earth satellite that in perfected form would seem to have 
upset the balance of power NATO had effected. Therefore, 
from two somewhat contradictory sources came arguments 
against the established pattern of NATO defense: first, that 
the Soviet Union had abandoned the methods if not the in­
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tentions of Stalin's regime; second, that the United States 
and NATO lacked the will and power to protect Europeans 
in light of the Sputnik Revolution. Such were the fears of 
many NATO partners. 
Some Americans shared these reservations about the 
course of NATO, with George Kennan as the most articu­
late critic in 1957. Although retired from government serv­
ice as a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at 
Princeton, he maintained an active interest in public affairs 
and was particularly concerned about the continuing distor­
tion of his ideas about containment. But unhappy as he was 
over the way the concept was translated into NATO, he was 
more disturbed about immediate dangers posed by the con­
frontation of troops in central Europe. In his widely pub­
licized Reith lectures broadcast from London, he proposed 
a disengagement of forces that would leave Germany free of 
foreign troops, thereby reducing the level of tension be­
tween East and West. He did not suggest that NATO itself 
had no mission, but that "if there could be a general with­
drawal of American, British, and Russian armed power from 
the heart of the Continent, there would be at least a chance 
that Europe's fortunes might be worked out, and the com­
petition between two political philosophies carried forward, 
in a manner disastrous neither to the respective peoples 
themselves nor to the cause of world peace."3T 
In conformity with its new image in the West, the Soviet 
Union of Bulganin and Khrushchev provided a solution cal­
culated to annoy the United States and to cater to Europe's 
growing fear of impending nuclear destruction and to Ger­
many's growing disillusionment over the prospects of unifi­
cation. Adam Rapacki, Poland's foreign minister, presented 
a plan in February, 1958, only a few months after Sputnik's 
37. George F. Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the West (New York, 
1958), p. 61. 
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success, that would create a denuclearized zone in Central 
Europe, including both Germanies, where "nuclear weapons 
will neither be manufactured nor stockpiled." The four ma­
jor powers would undertake "not to maintain nuclear weap­
ons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the terri­
tories included in this zone." ss 
The United States rejected both the Rapacki plan and the 
Kennan proposals. The official answer to the Polish govern­
ment was couched in useful diplomatic phrases. Recogniz­
ing the good intentions of Rapacki, the Eisenhower adminis­
tration claimed that the plan was too limited in scope to 
reduce the danger of nuclear war or to provide a dependable 
basis for the security of Europe.39 In appropriately opaque 
language the United States communique complained that 
the Rapacki plan would implicitly remove the American 
presence from the Continent, while the Soviet Union would 
remain on the periphery to resume at will whatever disrup­
tive tactics it might wish to try next. 
The reply to Kennan was more blunt, and was most clearly 
expressed by Dean Acheson, who remained as firm in his 
support of military power in Europe as he had been during 
his tenure as secretary of state. Although now retired from 
public life and in the ranks of his Democratic opponents, 
Acheson shared Dulles's views on this problem. To both 
statesmen withdrawal would represent defeatism and timid­
ity that could draw down upon the heads of West the very 
dangers this new and supposedly more sophisticated appre­
ciation of the Soviet threat was designed to thwart. A neu­
tralized Germany would not only make the defense of 
Europe almost impossible to maintain but would breed re­
38. Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki to U.S. Ambassador to Poland Jacob
Beam, February 14, 1958, Department of State Bulletin XXXVIII (1958), 
822-23. 
39. Beam to Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Josef Winiewicz, May 3, 
1958, ibid., pp. 821-22. 
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sentments in Germany that could revive the ugly passions 
of the German past.40 
In his defense of a militant NATO Acheson did not hesi­
tate, however, to criticize the Eisenhower administration's 
excessive reliance on "massive retaliation" that tended to 
make the proposed defense seem as fearsome as the potential 
enemy's threat." Many Germans had never recovered, for 
example, from Operation Carte Blanche, a war game in 1955 
that hypothecated the decimation of much of Germany and 
the death of 1,700,000 people in atomic destruction before 
NATO armies would liberate the country. And de Gaulle's 
France would never be convinced that the United States, 
now exposed to atomic retaliation, would ever use the 
weapon in defense of Europe.42 Something better was 
needed to deter aggression. 
The answer, according to Henry Kissinger in his influen­
tial Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, was not merely 
the continuing presence of Americans in Europe but the 
arming of NATO forces with tactical atomic weapons that 
could both increase enormously the effectiveness of infantry 
troops and control the destructiveness of atomic warfare. 
This strategy had the additional virtue of compensating with 
increased firepower the lagging military contributions of the 
NATO partners.43 
40. Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," Foreign Affairs
XXXVI (April, 1958), 376-77; Dulles's "Remarks to U.S. Ambassadors to
Europe," Paris, May 9, 1958, NATO Ministerial Meeting, Conference Dos­
siers, Dulles Papers, cited in Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the 
Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York, 1967), p. 210. 
41. Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," p. 381. 
42. Speech of Erich Ollenhauer reported in Das Parliament (Bonn),
July 6, 1955, cited in Gordon Craig, "Germany and NATO: The Rearma­
ment Debate, 1950-1958," in Klaus Knorr, ed., NATO and American Secu­
rity, (Princeton, N.J., 1959), p. 240; see de Gaulle Press Conference on 
NATO, September 5, 1960, excerpts in New York Times, Sept. 6, 1960; 
Raymond Aron, Charles de Gaulle (Paris, 1964), pp. 253-55. 
43. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 
1958), pp. 306-15. 
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Despite the barrage of criticism from a number of direc­
tions, NATO survived the decade. It is unlikely that the 
prospect of the converting of atomic weapons from strategic 
to tactical instruments, as advocated by Professor Kissinger, 
accounted for the maintenance of a strong military posture. 
Nor was it a result of optimism over a German solution that 
in 1960 seemed farther away than in 1955. Still less was it a 
product of renewed confidence in American leadership, 
which since 1958 had been under increasing attack by the 
most difficult and most articulate of all NATO partners, 
Charles de Gaulle. Essentially, NATO's firmness was a con­
sequence of the erratic course of Soviet behavior under 
Khrushchev. 
The Berlin crises of 1958 and 1959, which the Russians 
precipitated, reminded the allies that Stalin's death had not 
removed the danger of war with the Soviet Union. For many 
Europeans the abrupt demand for a new status for Berlin 
nullified the good impression left by apparent Soviet inter­
est expressed at summit conferences in ending the Cold War, 
and was hard to reconcile with the homely peasant image 
of the Soviet premier. 
In November, 1958, Khrushchev announced that the So­
viet Union would end its occupation regime in Berlin and 
demanded that the allies withdraw their forces from West 
Berlin, which would then become a "free city." American, 
British, and French access to the city would be a matter of 
negotiation with the Soviet-sponsored German Democratic 
Republic. Should the West fail to respond to this proposal, 
the Soviet Union would turn over the supply routes to the 
city to the administration of the East Germans.44 
By these actions the Soviet Union was not only attempting 
to consolidate the division of Germany but also to split the 
44. U.S.S.R. note to U.S., November 27, 1958, in Department of State
Bulletin XL (1959), 81-89. 
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alliance at one of its most vulnerable seams: where the 
NATO promise of a united Germany coexisted with the 
NATO fear of a united Germany. Ten years after the sign­
ing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Russians had hopes of 
exposing NATO's ambivalent feelings about Germany, thus 
inflaming Germans against their allies, unveiling America's 
unreliability as a leader, and stampeding fearful members 
of the alliance into accommodation with the Soviet Union. 
Many of the Russian expectations were met. The alliance 
did indeed creak under the strains of reaction as the British 
and the Scandinavians pressed for negotiations over Berlin 
and even for recognition of East Germany, while the Ger­
mans and the French remained adamant against any change. 
Confidence in American leadership was more in question by 
1960 than ever before as the rigid certainties of Dulles's mili­
tant stance were replaced after his death by hesitant ges­
tures toward bilateral detente with the Soviet Union and by 
the confused responses to the U-2 spy plane incident of the 
last year of Eisenhower's presidency. Rejected in his attempt 
to reconstruct NATO as a triumviral operation, de Gaulle 
undertook an independent challenge to American hegemony 
in Europe and to the Anglo-American monopoly on atomic 
weapons. 
Yet, Khrushchev failed in the short run. Despite all his 
bluster, he retreated in the face of Dulles's firm position that 
the United States is "solemnly committed to hold West Ber­
lin if need by military force."45 It was a retreat, screened 
though it was by grins and scowls, delays and diversions, 
and finally by a wall around East Berlin. None of the prob­
lems relating to Berlin were settled in Geneva in May, 1959, 
at a conference in which the West attempted to tie the fate 
of Berlin to peace with a unified Germany. But the deadline 
45. News Conference of November 7, 1958, ibid. XXIX (1958), 813. 
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set by Khrushchev passed without further action. Nothing 
happened on that day beyond the funeral of the cancer-
stricken Secretary of State Dulles.46 
When finally a summit meeting was arranged for the fol­
lowing spring, the Soviet Union used the occasion of the 
U-2 incident—the capture of an American plane 1,200 miles 
inside the country—to denounce the United States for its in­
vasion of air space and for espionage, and to cancel peremp­
torily the Paris summit meeting. Although the president was 
personally humiliated by the experience, it is worth observ­
ing that the Soviet premier, having failed to budge the West 
on Berlin, had diverted world opinion from his failure. 
Khrushchev wavered at the brink of war. To this extent, 
Dulles won vindication for his brinkmanship a year after his 
death as well as on the day of his funeral. 
In 1960, NATO partners and enemies alike awaited the 
end of the Eisenhower administration, which after Novem­
ber would have a "lame duck" status no matter which party 
won the presidential election. That the situation in NATO 
remained perilous was understood in America as well as in 
Europe. It was equally clear that the major difficulties 
stemmed from internal rather than external problems; for 
example, oscillation of American leadership from threat of 
instant destruction to private agreements with the Russians 
at the expense of allied interests, and the increasing in­
transigency among all the allies over America's exclusive 
control over atomic weapons. Much of the difficulty 
stemmed from the very success of the alliance in providing 
the infrastructure for Europe's pride in its power. Europe 
was not the distraught continent of 1949; it was a strong, 
46. C. L. Sulzberger, "The Double Funeral at Arlington," New York 
Times, May 27,1959. 
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confident group of countries that as a unit could stand apart 
from both America and Russia. 
It was to this new Europe that President Kennedy ad­
dressed himself in 1961 as the new Democratic administra­
tion reviewed American foreign policy. Kennedy wanted to 
infuse the tired alliance with the vigor he had promised 
America. The New Frontier became the Grand Design of 
NATO, in which an old military alliance would be trans­
formed by a twofold reconstruction: first, a recognition of 
NATO as a genuine partnership in which Europe and Amer­
ica would meet as equals rather than one serving as a ward 
of the other; second, an effort to subordinate the dominant 
military emphasis of the alliance to political, economic, and 
cultural purposes, which had been promised in Article 2 of 
the Treaty and which unobtrusively had been implemented 
ever since the organization had formed. 
The foundation of Kennedy's reconstructed alliance was 
the idea of a broad community of interests embracing all 
aspects of Western civilization and resting on two great 
pillars standing astride the Atlantic, each indispensable to 
the other. "The future of the West," asserted Kennedy in 
1963, "lies in Atlantic partnership—a system of cooperation, 
interdependence, and harmony whose peoples can jointly 
meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world. 
Some say this is only a dream, but I do not agree." " 
The excitement engendered by this approach to NATO 
was reflected in the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations 
whose Declaration of Paris endorsed in 1962 the transforma­
tion of NATO into an Atlantic Community. This change was 
expected to lead to the end of the Cold War but not to the 
47. President Kennedy's Address at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, June 
25, 1963, in Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Wash­
ington, 1964), p. 517. 
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end of the American link with Europe.48 The vision still in­
formed the alliance even after France had expelled all 
NATO organs from its soil. The first major declaration of 
NATO in its Brussels headquarters, for example, was to re­
affirm the idea of NATO as a political community rather 
than simply as an alliance.49 
Yet the Grand Design was always too grandiose to be 
meaningful and too vague in its language to be translated 
into specific reforms. The old problems remained to disturb 
the organization, and not even the soaring rhetoric of Ken­
nedy could banish them. Apathy was one of them. The 
threat of war had diminished as the old fears of the Soviet 
Union receded into the background. The Communist parties 
of Italy and France had lost their vigor. Because of the res­
tiveness among the Warsaw Pact members, the rise of bour­
geois habits in the Soviet Union, and the increasing bitter­
ness of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Russia had become a paper 
tiger for many Europeans no matter how loudly Khrushchev 
roared. 
Counterbalancing the image of a stronger Europe and a 
weaker Russia was the division of Berlin, and with it the 
larger question of the future of Germany. The raising of the 
Berlin Wall, sealing East Berlin from the West in the sum­
mer of 1961, was a physical symbol of the continuing Cold 
War. Although the Soviet Union may have regarded the 
wall as a defensive measure and may have generally be­
haved as if this was its primary intention, neither NATO 
nor the Warsaw bloc could be certain that reactions against 
the wall on the part of the West Germans or the figurative 
extension of the wall on the part of the East Germans might 
not unleash the holocaust everyone feared. Such was the un­
48. Text of the Declaration of Paris in NATO Letter XI (June, 1963), 
13. 
49. New York Times, October 17, 1967. 
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spoken concern of Europeans in the spring of 1965, when 
the European press altered its accustomed anti-American 
tone to worry about the Federal Republic's decision, made 
independently of its allies, to hold a Bundesrat meeting in 
Berlin, thereby risking retaliation from the East Germans.60 
In this circumstance the existence of NATO with its Ameri­
can contingent was an important source of psychological se­
curity even if the military expression of NATO's power was 
less clear than it had been ten years before. 
Yet, coexisting with a continuing dependence upon Amer­
ica's military power was Europe's resentment of the atomic 
monopoly and its concurrent doubts about America's fitness 
for Western leadership. The Kennedy administration was 
sensitive to this sentiment, and felt it could employ a device 
that served the spirit of the Grand Design: namely, the es­
tablishment of a multilateral force (MLF) that would 
jointly possess atomic weapons. 
The idea of providing some allied involvement in nuclear 
matters had its origins in the Eisenhower administration 
when American planners tried to reconcile legitimate Euro­
pean demands for a role in their own security with congres­
sional requirements that had placed nuclear weaponry un­
der the exclusive control of American commanders. Part of 
the conflict was the obvious affront to European sensibilities; 
but, additionally, there were always the doubts about Amer­
ican leadership of the alliance, leading Europeans to ques­
tion America as a fit custodian of critical weapons. The 
periodic Russian-American meetings without allied involve­
ment fed European suspicions of American intentions to ar­
range a nuclear detente at the expense of the NATO allies. 
And the United States, for its part, was fearful of sharing its 
nuclear knowledge with its allies if by doing so it would 
50. See, for example, George Penchenier, "L'Irredentisme en AHemagne
Occidentale," Le Monde Diplomatique, March, 1965, pp. 9-12. 
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place the awesome power in the hands of fourteen, or at 
least thirteen, other nations. Would not this increase the risk 
of war? Would it also reawaken Europe's distrust of Ger­
mans if the Federal Republic, despite the treaty provisions, 
should share the control of nuclear arms? 
To resolve this conundrum, General Lauris Norstad, 
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
(SACEUR), proposed in 1960 that NATO be given its own 
nuclear force composed of land-based medium-range ballis­
tic missiles. The North Atlantic Council at its December 
meeting in 1960 responded to this counsel by approving a 
revised version of the MLF with a Polaris-armed flotilla of 
twenty-five ships, each ship armed with eight missiles and 
each ship manned by contingents of several allied nations.51 
Although the new Kennedy administration that assumed 
power the following month seized on the MLF as its con­
tribution to the principle of nuclear sharing, the plan failed 
to win the support of other powers and subsequently died 
without fanfare. The obituary was buried in the elliptical 
language of a joint communique that followed a meeting of 
President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of 
the United Kingdom in December, 1964.62 
The trouble with the MLF in 1950 or in 1964 is still the 
trouble with the alliance in 1970. Nuclear sharing merely 
dramatized one of the many fissures in the alliance that 
time has only served to widen. On the one hand, there was 
Europe's reluctance to expend the large amounts of money 
required to participate in the MLF at a time when Europe 
had lost its fears of a Soviet invasion. On the other hand, 
there was the undeniable fact that no matter how much 
51. North Atlantic Council communique, Paris, December 16-18, 1960, 
in NATO Letter IX (January, 1961), 13. 
52. Joint communique of President of the United States and Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, December 8, 1964, in Department of 
State Bulletin LI (1964), 903. 
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money each partner offered, the United States would still 
have an exclusive voice in the actual decision to use the Po­
laris missile; decision-making was not a matter of sharing. 
This knowledge deepened resentments and confirmed 
France in its intentions to perfect its own nuclear capabili­
ties. Germany, the only ally to display genuine interest in 
the plan, was angered by an anti-German element in Eu­
rope's coldness to the MLF. But many of the smaller mem­
bers of the alliance, such as Denmark, opposed the plan pri­
marily because it appeared to be an unwitting agent in 
reviving the Cold War. 
The most vociferous and most effective critic of the 
United States was France's President de Gaulle, and he 
struck a responsive chord in Europe. Although his preten­
sions to leadership of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals 
met with derision among most Europeans, and his vendetta 
against England agitated the European Economic Commu­
nity in 1963, and again in 1967 evoked strong protests in the 
Common Market, his anti-American diatribes won under­
standing if not agreement in the alliance. No other member 
removed itself from the alliance's organization as France did 
in 1967; and no other member openly championed the So­
viet Union as a counterpoise to American domination of 
Europe, as France did increasingly throughout the 1960s. 
But he may be said to have spoken for most of the members 
when he condemned the war in Vietnam, or when he urged 
resistance to America's economic presence in Europe in the 
form of petroleum, automobile, or electronics interests. In 
the spring of 1967 Harold Wilson, prime minister of the 
country with the putative "special relationship" with the 
United States, asserted that Britain was more effective than 
France in resisting the domination of American industrial 
power.63 And in the Federal Republic of Germany all parties 
53. Harold Wilson's Address on the Common Market, Vital Speeches of 
the Day XXXII (1967), 482-94. 
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could warm to that aspect of de Gaulle's complaints which 
involved the exclusion of Europe from the industrial bene­
fits that nuclear oligopoly had given the superpowers. 
American reactions to Europe's unhappiness were rela­
tively sluggish, perhaps because the nation's attention was 
drawn to the Far East rather than to Europe in the middle 
and late 1960s. Perhaps, too, there was a recognition among 
Americans that the burdens of leadership included a heavy 
weight of blame for all the wrongs of the world. If the part­
ners did not want the MLF, or the vague British alternative 
offered in 1964, it was not a matter of great moment. Public 
opinion supported the administration in leaving the issue of 
nuclear sharing alone as long as possible. But the aplomb 
with which the nation accepted criticism had certain limits, 
and the increasing complexity of the war in Vietnam com­
bined with the increasing stridency of European criticism of 
that war invited American retaliation. 
Such was an explanation for the pressure in 1966 and 1967 
to reduce the size of America's troop commitment to Europe 
from sources no less elevated than the level of Senator Mike 
Mansfield, majority leader of the Senate.64 By returning 
American troops, the dollar gap caused by American ex­
penditures abroad would be reduced, European nations 
would be encouraged to make more impressive contribu­
tions to the SHAPE armies, and the needs of other parts of 
the world would be recognized. From more conservative 
ranks came talk of raising tariff barriers against unfriendly 
allies, thereby undermining the painfully constructed foun­
dations of free trade that the United States had laid in the 
54. Text of Senator Mansfield's statement on resolution calling for a 
reduction of American troops in Western Europe, Congressional Record, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 20554-55; official Department of State re­
sponse, N.E.T. interview with Secretary of State Rusk, May 5, 1967, in 
Department of State Bulletin LVI (1967), 782-83; Mansfield's plans to 
revive campaign for troops reduction in Europe, New York Times, Jan. 11, 
1968. 
338 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Kennedy Round of GATT in 1967.55 Although the adminis­
tration combatted every specific attack on the nation's com­
mitment to NATO, President Johnson's proposed restrictions 
on the American dollar abroad in his New Year's Day news 
conference in 1968 was another revelation of the fissures 
splitting the Atlantic Alliance.56 
These problems were accentuated by the disenchantment 
of intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic who looked 
upon NATO as an ugly and unnecessary relic of the Cold 
War that should be dispatched as soon as possible. Ronald 
Steel, speaking for a new generation of foreign policy ana­
lysts in the mid-1960s, identified NATO with the blind anti­
communism of the McCarthy era and found it an unwitting 
means of expressing an American imperialism: "We ac­
quired an accidental empire, and have maintained—and 
ever expanded—it because we have found ourselves in a 
global struggle with an ideology." " In the Senate the elo­
quent voice of Senator J. William Fulbright in a series of 
addresses, beginning with his influential "Old Myths and 
New Realities" in 1964, gave authority to the idea that 
NATO and its purposes represented an old myth.58 If it was 
true that Europe's security had progressed to the point 
where the alliance was unnecessary or even provocative, the 
next step for America might be logically a return to isola­
tionism, or at least to a retirement from the Continent. 
Twenty years after the Treaty of Washington, this step 
55. Text of GATT Statement on Kennedy Round, May 15, 1967, in New 
York Times, May 16, 1967; Senator Percy's response to Senator Dirksen's
support of legislation to restrict tariff, Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 
lstSess. (1967), 15378. 
56. Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Do­
mestic Affairs, January 1, 1968, in New York Times, Jan. 2, 1968. 
57. Ronald Steel, "The American Empire," Commonweal LXXXVI 
(1967), 355. 
58. "Old Myths and New Realities," Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1944), 6227-29; "The Fatal Arrogance of Power," New York 
Times Magazine, May 15, 1966, pp. 29 ff. 
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has not been taken. Too many links have been forged and 
tightened over this period to have permitted an abrupt frac­
ture of the alliance, or even a purposeful atrophying of the 
association. Even the most audacious critic of the organiza­
tion, former French President de Gaulle, did not withdraw 
from the alliance, and France continues to supply the new 
headquarters at Brussels with its personnel. And few pun­
dits predict that the Treaty will not continue beyond 1970, 
or that fewer than the present fifteen members will com­
prise the alliance of the 1970s. 
More than the claims of habit or sentiment account for the 
survival of NATO. In many ways the problems of 1949 are 
the problems of 1970. The German question is unsolved, 
and Europe's trust in the new Germany as a NATO partner 
is less than complete. An alliance lacking an American mili­
tary component would leave Germany the most powerful 
member, a fact of political life that gave a special meaning 
to America's participation in NATO. But even if the per­
vasive distrust of Germans should dissolve, Berlin would 
remain a problem—a city divided, walled, and always 
vulnerable to Soviet pressure. The Soviet occupation of 
Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, exposed again the weakness 
of the Federal Republic's morale, as NATO readdressed it­
self to the Russian military threat against Western Europe. 
Talk of cuts in troop strength ended abruptly in the fall of 
1968, and George Kennan, erstwhile champion of a dis­
engagement in Germany, now urged the shipment of 100,­
000 additional American soldiers to West Germany until 
Russia evacuated Czechoslovakia.59 
In the Mediterranean the Russians had made their chal­
lenge to NATO clear for over a decade. The Soviet initiative 
in the Middle East, which stimulated Arab aggressiveness 
59. Endre Marton, Interview with George F. Kennan, New York Times, 
Sept. 22, 1968. 
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toward Israel, bore a major responsibility for the Arab-Israel 
conflict of June, 1967. Among the lessons for NATO in that 
war was the extent of Soviet interest in the Eastern Mediter­
ranean and its willingness to take some risks to advance its 
Middle Eastern objectives. Would those risks be made more 
freely and more frequently if there were no alliance in the 
way? Had the Soviet Union normalized its relations with 
the rest of the world in such a way as to make NATO un­
necessary in the late 1960s? 
With the exception of France, Europe's response to such 
questions left few doubts that NATO still had a role to play. 
Whether that role should be dominated by the military form 
that had characterized the organization since the Lisbon 
Conference of 1952 is another matter. NATO must respond 
to the end of the bipolar world of a generation ago beyond 
replacing "massive retaliation" with a "flexible response." 
Some observers were modest in their suggestions, such as 
former Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak, who supported 
"the idea of a non-aggression pact between the NATO Pact 
Powers and those of the Warsaw Pact."60 Anthony Eden, 
writing in October, 1967, urged NATO to move into the dip­
lomatic arena and leave the military behind. NATO, he 
felt, might assume some of the burdens American diplomacy 
alone had taken in the leadership of the West.81 Still another 
view is that of General Andre Beaufre, whose idea of reform 
—a French idea—envisaged NATO as an interim organiza­
tion whose mission was to give birth to a new all-European 
organization that would embrace the two Germanies, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the Soviet satellite nations.62 
60. Paul-Henri Spaak, "The Alliance Must Go On," NATO Letter XV (March, 1967), p. 6. Spaak reflected a hope for a detente with the Soviet
Bloc that was fully expressed in the findings of the Harmel Report at the
Reykjavik Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December, 1968. See 
report of the special study group, ibid. XVI (March, 1968), 10-13. 
61. New York Times, Oct. 14, 1967. 
62. Andr£ Beaufre, NATO and Europe (New York, 1966), pp. 158-59. 
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Of the three courses suggested above, the broadening of 
NATO's objectives to include diplomatic and political func­
tions has always been attractive to NATO critics. In fact, 
NATO has sporadically attempted to realize this objective, 
which was as old as the Charter itself. Article 2 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, emphasizing the "strengthening of free in­
stitutions" and the encouragement of "economic collabora­
tion between any and all of them," had been the vehicle for 
promoting the Atlantic Community, attracting such diverse 
groups as the federalists of the Atlantic Union Committee in 
1949 and the architects of the Grand Design of 1960 as well 
as the Atlantic diplomatists of 1967. NATO had always 
dabbled in diplomacy. It ranged from vague intentions to 
continue efforts at cooperation with Eastern Europe, offi­
cially announced in a Council communique in December, 
1966, to successful mediation between Greece and Turkey 
on the Cyprus problem in November, 1967, to which Secre­
tary General Manlio Brosio had made a NATO contribu­
tion.63 
Although it is unlikely that the NATO of the 1970s will 
become a fully integrated political community, still less is it 
likely that it will keep the military alliance of the 1950s and 
1960s intact. Its military function remains, but in many ways 
the uneasy balance of terror effected between the Soviet 
Union and the United States has returned the military deter­
rent to the posture of 1949, with the guarantee of American 
involvement through the Treaty inhibiting, or at least amel­
iorating, Soviet adventures in Europe. 
Such a guarantee was implicit in President Nixon's dra­
matic tour of Western Europe, including NATO headquar­
ters, at the beginning of his term of office. Equally implicit 
63. North Atlantic Council communique, Paris, December 16, 1966, in 
NATO Letter XV (January, 1967), 13; New York Times, Nov. 25, 30, 
1967. 
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was a recognition that the alliance of the 1970s will not have 
as large a military contribution from the United States as it 
had in the first generation of NATO; the recurrent congres­
sional demands for troop withdrawals are reflections of a 
sentiment that will be satisfied by the administration. But 
there is little reason to doubt that its response to these pres­
sures will take a form that will convince the world that dis­
engagement from Vietnam is not setting the stage for disen­
gagement from Europe or for the revival of American 
isolationism. For America, the maintenance of the alliance 
remains not only a major factor in its function as a world 
leader but also a symbol of its continuing rejection of the 
once powerful and always attractive isolationist tradition.64 
64. Portions of this chapter have appeared in Review of Politics XXXI 
(October, 1961), 210-22, and in NATO Letter, XVIII (June, 1970), 14-18. 
Canada in North America 
ROBERT CRAIG BROWN 
CANADA'S RELATIONS with the United States were in a 
state of bad repair in 1900. Two years before, after pro­
tracted negotiations between Great Britain and the United 
States, a Joint High Commission had been appointed to dis­
cuss, and hopefully to settle, a host of outstanding problems 
in Canadian-American relations. Many of those problems 
were of minor international importance, essentially "house­
keeping" issues common to amicable relations between 
bordering states, such as agreement on alien labor legisla­
tion, the conveyance of prisoners, and laws concerning the 
wreckage and salvage of ships. But the commissioners were 
also empowered to find solutions to a number of major dis­
putes between Great Britain and the United States that cen­
tered upon Canada. All of these were of long standing and 
were of such magnitude that they either had caused, or po­
tentially could cause in the future, an open break in Anglo-
American diplomacy. Canadian concern was thus twofold: 
the survival of the fledgling Canadian nation was in no small 
measure dependent upon Anglo-American friendship, and, 
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equally, in all of these major disputes it was Canadian in­
terests, commercial interests, that were threatened by the 
United States. 
The North Atlantic fisheries problem evolved out of the 
admittedly harsh provisions of the Anglo-American agree­
ment of 1818 that forbade the entrance of American fishing 
vessels into the inshore waters of British North America ex­
cept, as the agreement put it, "for the purpose of shelter and 
of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of 
obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever." In 
short, American fishermen could enter the inshore waters 
only if survival dictated their doing so; they could not fish 
in those waters for bait, nor could they enter Canadian har­
bors to transship their catch, to resupply, or to hire Canadian 
crews. At various times—under the Reciprocity Treaty of 
1854, the Washington Treaty of 1871, and, after 1888, under 
the licensing provisions of an Anglo-American modus vi­
vendi—these restrictions had been waived. But the provi­
sions of the modus vivendi were tenuous at best, and the 
Canadian government could refuse to issue licences and 
revert back to its exclusive privileges under the Convention 
of 1818. Then, too, the dispute was incredibly complex be­
cause the precise definition of Canadian inshore waters, 
especially in bays, was unclear and involved complicated 
questions of international maritime law. 
The second major issue faced by the Joint Commission 
of 1898-99 was the Bering Sea dispute. In the mid-1880s 
Canadian seal fishermen, shipping from British Columbia, 
began pelagic sealing in the open waters of Bering Sea, hunt­
ing on the high seas seals that had come to give birth to their 
young on the American-owned Pribilof Islands. In 1886 and 
in 1887 United States revenue cruisers had seized some of 
these Canadian vessels on the high seas and brought their 
masters to trial for violating American municipal law. By so 
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doing, the United States had explicitly, though dubiously, 
claimed property rights in the seals beyond the recognized 
three-mile limit around the Pribilofs and implicitly claimed 
the Bering Sea as a mare clausum, or closed sea. Again, com­
plicated questions of international law were at stake as well 
as Canadian commercial interests. The Canadians claimed 
that the Americans were violating the doctrine of freedom of 
the seas and threatening an important new Canadian indus­
try with extinction. 
A third major problem concerned the definition of the 
boundary between Canada and Alaska. Various attempts at 
a settlement had been made since the United States had 
purchased Alaska in 1867, and, in fact, by the time the Joint 
High Commission met, only the panhandle portion of the 
boundary was in dispute. But it was just in the panhandle— 
more precisely at two points along the panhandle, the head 
of Lynn Canal and the southernmost tip at Observatory Inlet 
—that Canadian and American interests were in conflict. 
Despite the confusing provisions of the Anglo-Russian 
Treaty of 1825 that attempted to define the panhandle 
boundary, or, perhaps, because of them, the United States 
exercised de facto control of the headwaters of Lynn Canal. 
This was of critical importance during the Yukon gold rush 
because the Americans could control the major access routes 
to the Canadian Yukon Territory and hence control the 
enormous trade in gold and supplies in the Yukon. The 
boundary at Observatory Inlet was only an area of potential 
conflict in 1898-99 but would be the main point of grievance 
of the Canadians in 1903 when the award of the Boundary 
Tribunal was announced. But as early as 1886, a Canadian 
who had been working on the boundary problem observed 
the source of trouble at Observatory Inlet. "The inlet," Colo­
nel D. R. Cameron reported, "is nearer to Japan and China 
than the present railway terminus [the Canadian Pacific 
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Railway's western terminus in Vancouver], and . .  . at 
no distant date one may reasonably expect this remarkable 
waterway to become the channel of a very large volume of 
trade."1 
These substantive problems considered by the Joint High 
Commission illustrated one side of Canada's role, and prob­
lem, in North America. What was of concern to Canada and 
the United States was the control of the resources of the 
British North American half of the continent. The rivalry 
went back to the American Revolution and the formation of 
the second British Empire. And the rivalry would continue 
to be the central issue in Canadian-American relations until 
the present day. For the Canadians, Canadian control of 
these resources would be the keystone of Canadian nation­
hood. 
The form of the Joint High Commission illustrated the 
other side of Canada's role and problem in North America. 
In 1898 Canada was, as Richard Jebb put it, a "colonial na­
tion" within the British Empire, decidedly more than a 
colony but not possessing all the attributes of nationhood. 
Technically, of course, Canada's voice in diplomacy was the 
British Foreign Office. But over the years, and especially 
since Confederation in 1867, the Canadians had won an 
increasingly important role of participation in diplomatic 
exchanges concerning their country. A very brief illustration 
will make the point. In 1854 the governor-general, Lord 
Elgin, had negotiated the Reciprocity Treaty. In 1871 Sir 
John A. Macdonald had served as one of the commissioners 
who negotiated the Treaty of Washington, and he took his 
instructions from London. In 1887-88 Sir Charles Tupper 
was one of the three British commissioners who negotiated 
the abortive Treaty of 1888, and all three were guided in 
1. D. R. Cameron to Colonial Office, October 29, 1886, Vol. 1, Macdonald 
Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter cited as P.A.C.). 
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their deliberations by instructions from both London and 
Ottawa. Finally, in 1898-99, there were four Canadian com­
missioners, and the British government's representative, 
Lord Herschell, was to accept the advice of the chief Cana­
dian commissioner, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The 
foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, observed that "several of 
the questions included in the list furnished by the Canadian 
Government for discussions are of a purely local character, 
about which this Department [the Foreign Office] at least, 
is without information on which any instructions to the Brit­
ish Representatives on the Commission could usefully be 
framed." "The direct representation of Her Majesty's Gov­
ernment," he added, "should take their instructions from 
the Dominion Government."2 The ultimate force of Cana­
dian diplomacy remained, of course, the willingness of the 
mother country to stand behind the Canadian position with 
her military might. But within those limits, the participa­
tion of Canada in the diplomatic process had become ever 
greater, and, apparently, her voice was now decisive. 
Just how decisive was revealed by the outcome of the 
deliberations of the Joint High Commission. The Cana­
dians insisted on a "package deal." They were willing to give 
the Americans a point on the Bering Sea or the North Atlan­
tic fisheries in return for an American tariff concession. But 
with a growing self-confidence about Canada's ability to "go 
it alone" in North America and a clear reluctance on the part 
of Laurier's ministers in Ottawa to accept any agreement 
that would appear to surrender Canadian interest to Ameri­
can power, Laurier and his colleagues demanded an accord 
on all issues before the Joint High Commission. And when 
the Commission could not resolve the Alaska boundary prob­
lem, the Canadians went home. There were assurances, in 
2. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, December 10, 1897, Colonial Office
Papers, CO. 42/854, P.A.C. 
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1900, that the Commission was only adjourned and pious 
pledges on both sides that it would reconvene. But it never 
did.3 
There was satisfaction in Ottawa with the abortive results. 
The Canadians had withstood pressure from both the United 
States and Great Britain to back down from a firmly held, if 
legally dubious and inherently weak, position on Alaska. 
(They demanded a Canadian harbor at the head of Lynn 
Canal and a Canadian corridor from there to the Yukon Ter­
ritory. ) Sir Wilfrid Laurier told a friend that "there is a ques­
tion of dignity involved which must make it incumbent upon 
us to refuse to negotiate on anything else, and this we will 
unless they [the United States] give way."4 Laurier's gov­
ernment certainly wanted to settle all outstanding problems 
with the United States, but the prime minister was also 
acutely aware that the confident mood of his country would 
not allow him to do so at the price of a sacrifice of Canadian 
"dignity." As one newspaper put it: 
Canada is capable of holding her place and her privileges in 
relation to the United States with dignified consciousness of 
a desire to maintain international friendliness and in a con­
fident knowledge at the same time that United States friend­
liness towards us is by no means essential to our well-being, 
whatever reasons may exist for courting it from an Imperial 
point of view.8 
Three years later, in October, 1903, the "Imperial point of 
view" prevailed, and the logjam of irresolution of Canadian-
American disputes was broken with the announcement of 
3. Canadian-American relations in the latter part of the nineteenth cen­
tury are discussed in detail in C. C. Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 
1875-1911(New Haven, Conn., 1943), and Robert Craig Brown, Canada's 
National Policy, 1883-1900 (Princeton, N.J., 1964). 
4. Sir Wilfrid Laurier to A. S. Hardy, February 16, 1899, Box 100, 
Laurier Papers, P.A.C. 
5. Regina Leader, Mar. 2, 1899. 
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the Alaska boundary award. The offense to Canadian dignity 
was beyond measure. The mother country had taken the 
diplomatic initiative on Alaska back from Canada; had con­
sciously surrendered to the bluster, the threats, and the de­
ception of President Theodore Roosevelt; had agreed to a 
"judicial tribunal" of the boundary over Canada's protest; 
had acquiesced in the appointment of Secretary of War 
Elihu Root and Senators Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachu­
setts and George Turner of Washington as America's "emi­
nent jurists"; and had accepted a boundary award that Ca­
nadians regarded as both unjust in form and dangerous to 
their interests in substance. Indeed, it was the matter as well 
as the manner of the award that offended Canadians. The 
American control of the headland at Lynn Canal was con­
firmed, and correctly so; but when Lord Alverston, the Brit­
ish jurist, agreed with the Americans that the tiny islands of 
Kannaghunut and Sitklan at the outlet of Observatory Inlet 
belonged to the United States, the Canadian jurists, Ayles­
worth and Jette, claimed that he had reversed his decision 
under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States 
and the Foreign Office in order to get a final decision the 
United States would accept. The "judicial" character of the 
decision was a farce. A diplomatic deal in the anterooms of 
the Foreign Office, the sacrifice of the Canadian lamb on 
the altar of Anglo-American friendship, was the only pos­
sible interpretation of the award in Ottawa. Moreover, the 
Canadians believed that the islands so awarded to the 
United States controlled the shipping lanes to Port Simpson 
in Observatory Inlet. And in 1903 Colonel Cameron's pre­
diction was coming true: Port Simpson was the projected 
western terminus of the Canadian government's recently 
charted second continental railway.8 
Fearful of further British surrenders to American diplo­
6. See Craig Brown, "The Nationalism of the National Policy," in Peter
Russell, ed., Nationalism inCanada (Toronto, 1966), p. 161. 
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macy in the interest of the mother country's strategic neces­
sities and in the name of Anglo-American friendship, and 
suspicious of any further dealings with an untrustworthy 
American government, the Canadians withdrew within 
themselves. When asked in the spring of 1904 about the 
possibility of reconvening the Joint High Commission, Lau­
rier replied that "we are always ready to . .  . negotiate 
with them on fair terms, but we shall not take the initiative 
for new negotiations. If new negotiations are to be made, 
it must be on their initiative."T 
The Americans did take the initiative. In 1906 Secretary 
of State Elihu Root made tentative overtures to the Cana­
dians about settling outstanding problems, and in January, 
1907, he made his first "pilgrimage" to Ottawa. Root came 
away from the visit aware of the extreme sensitivity of the 
Canadians, even of their hostility to "cleaning the slate." 
Moreover, he was convinced that another Joint High Com­
mission was not an appropriate method of settlement; it 
was at once too formal and too cumbersome, and issues 
became confused in a maze of concessions and countercon­
cessions. Fortunately, Root's desire was heartily seconded 
by the governor-general of Canada, Lord Grey, and by the 
British ambassador in Washington, James Bryce. This trio, 
working hand-in-hand with Laurier over the next few years, 
accomplished the remarkable feat of disposing of nearly all 
important Canadian-American problems. The new attitude 
in Ottawa was reflected in Laurier's statement to the House 
of Commons that 
we have come to this position in our relations with the people 
of the United States: we can never conceive of war between 
us, or of war between Great Britain and the United States. 
7. Quoted in A. C. Gluek, Jr., "Pilgrimages to Ottawa: Canadian-
American Diplomacy, 1903-13" (Paper presented to the Canadian Histori­
cal Association, Calgary, June, 1968), p. 5. 
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We mean to settle all our difficulties with that nation by 
peaceful means, by diplomatic action, by negotiations, but 
never by war.8 
In part, Laurier was simply stating the cold strategic 
reality of Canada's place in North America. For some time 
the British government had based its military and naval 
planning on the assumption of the improbability if not the 
impossibility of war with the United States,9 and it was most 
unlikely that British military or naval might would be used 
to buttress any Canadian position in difficulties with the 
United States. But Laurier was also saying that given an 
appropriate mood in Washington and appropriate negotia­
tions, a more desirable state of Canadian-American relations 
was within reach. Quietly and relatively quickly, solutions 
were found. The North Atlantic fisheries dispute was re­
ferred to the Hague Tribunal in 1909, which found the case 
in Canada's favor. And in 1911 an agreement between the 
United States, Russia, Japan, and Great Britain (signing 
for Canada) provided for effective international regulation 
of the exploitation of fur seals in the North Pacific ocean. 
As important as the settlement of problems held over from 
the nineteenth century was the provision of guidelines for 
the resolution of the disputes of the new century. Perhaps 
most notable of all the agreements reached by Root, Bryce, 
Grey, and Laurier was the signing of the Boundary Waters 
Treaty in 1909. Four years earlier the Americans had been 
anxious to reach an agreement with Canada regulating the 
diversion of water for hydroelectric power from the Niagara 
River to minimize the danger of this diversion to Niagara 
8. T. C. Hopkins, ed., The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 
1907 (Toronto, 1908), p. 401. 
9. Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 
1815-1908 (London, 1967), chap. 10, and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "British 
Strategic Withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere, 1904-1906," Canadian 
Historical Review XLIX (1968), 335-56. 
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Falls. Through their respective representatives on the Inter­
national Waterways Commission, established in 1905, the 
two governments carried on extensive negotiations, Canada 
taking the position that it would not "consent to a Treaty 
for Niagara Falls alone, to the exclusion of all other points of 
contention of the International Waterways between the two 
countries."10 The resultant treaty embodied the Canadian 
principle of referring all such problems to the International 
Joint Commission, the successor body to the International 
Waterways Commission. The treaty was a recognition of the 
growing urbanization and industrialization along the Great 
Lakes water boundary, and it anticipated the inevitable 
conflicts that would arise over shared water resources in the 
future. It further provided a vehicle, in the I.J.C., for the 
discussion and resolution of highly technical problems in an 
atmosphere relatively free from political pressure. Finally, 
in method it foreshadowed the creation of similar expert 
commissions to settle complex technical and economic prob­
lems during and after World War II.11 
Laurier's government wished to put a fitting end to "clean­
ing the slate" by settling the most persistent of all Canadian-
American problems, the trade question. In the spring of 1911 
the government announced the completion of a comprehen­
sive reciprocity agreement to be implemented by concurrent 
legislation. Robert Borden's Conservative opposition, aided 
and abetted by the extremely powerful transcontinental 
railways, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, and a 
10. George Gibbons to G. Clinton, April 6, 1906, quoted in A. O. Gib­
bons, "Sir George Gibbons and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909," 
Canadian Historical Review XXXIV (1953), 126. 
11. A side-effect of this intense and varied period of negotiation was the
creation, in 1909, of the Department of External Affairs of the Canadian 
government, urged especially T>y Bryce and Grey to bring order and consist­
ency to Canadian negotiations. See James Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's
Department of External Affairs," in Hugh L. Keenleyside et al., The Growth 
of Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham, N.C., 1960), pp. 14-32. 
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number of entrenched Conservative Provincial governments, 
forced Sir Wilfrid's Liberals into an election and defeat of 
the government and its reciprocity program. Echoes of mis­
trust of the United States after the Alaska boundary award 
punctuated the Conservative campaign. Reciprocity was 
pictured as the "thin edge of the wedge" of annexation. Bor­
rowing a singularly unfortunate phrase from President Taft's 
assessment of the reciprocity agreement and wrenching it 
from its intended context, Borden agreed that Canada was 
"at the parting of the ways. This compact made in secret 
and without mandate points, indeed, to a new path. We 
must decide whether the spirit of Canadianism or of Con­
tinentalism shall prevail on the northern half of this conti­
nent." Appealing to the traditional arguments of his party, 
Borden easily equated the Conservatives' protectionist sym­
pathies with "Canadianism" and charged the apparently 
free-trader Liberals with lack of patriotism and dangerously 
adopting a "continentalist" or annexationist policy. 
Borden's campaign was significantly strengthened by the 
aid of Canadian manufacturing and railway interests. Their 
opposition to the reciprocity agreement was summarized in 
a manifesto of eighteen Toronto businessmen who bolted 
from Laurier's Liberal party over reciprocity because, inter 
alia, 
the present unexampled prosperity of Canada is the result of 
the policy which has been pursued in the development of her 
trade and of her natural resources; because this has involved 
the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars upon rail­
ways, canals, steamships, and other means of transportation 
between East and West and West and East and the obliga­
tion to incur further great expenditure for the same purpose; 
and because further development along the same lines would 
be seriously checked by the proposed Reciprocity agreement 
and the benefits of the expenditures referred to would be to 
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a great extent lost; [and] because as a result of the proposed 
Agreement the freedom of action possessed by Canada with 
reference to her tariffs and channels of trade would be 
greatly curtailed, and she would be hampered in developing 
her own resources in her own way and by her own people.12 
Safely in office with what he regarded as a mandate for 
"Canadianism," Borden quickly reassured Bryce that of the 
many questions facing his new cabinet, 
those which concern the relations of Canada with the United 
States are among the most important. . .  . It is needless to 
say that we are most desirous of maintaining relations of the 
most friendly character with the Government and people 
of the United States, and to dissipate any suspicion of un­
friendliness which may have arisen out of the result of the 
recent elections.13 
Good direct relations with Washington, the establishment 
of mutual trust and confidence, were doubtless of great im­
portance to Borden. But of even greater urgency, in view of 
the increasing danger of war in Europe, was the part that 
Canada might play in maintaining friendly relations be­
tween the United States and Great Britain. Again, just after 
assuming the prime ministership, in November, 1911, he 
put Canada's relations with the United States in this larger 
context before a Halifax audience. 
Canada is an autonomous nation within the British Empire 
and is closely and inseparably united to that Empire by ties 
of kinship, of sentiment, and of fealty, by historic association 
12. Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, 2 vols. (To­
ronto, 1938), I, 327-28; J. C. Hopkins, ed., The Canadian Annual Review 
of Public Affairs, 1911 (Toronto, 1912), pp. 48-49. 
13. Robert L. Borden to James Bryce, October 14, 1911, no. 4315, OC 
104, Borden Papers, P.A.C. 
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and tradition, by the character of its institutions, and by the 
free will of its people. By like ties of kinship, by constant 
social and commercial intercourses, by proximity and mutual 
respect, and good-will, this country is closely associated with 
the United States. Canada's voice and influence should al­
ways be for harmony and not for discord between our Em­
pire and the great Republic and I believe that she will always 
be a bond of abiding friendship between them.14 
This concept of Canadian-American relations successfully 
met the test of World War I. Unlike the United States, Can­
ada was committed to a full war effort from the beginning; 
and in several speeches in the United States in the early war 
years, Borden took special care to explain British and Cana­
dian war aims. There was, of course, much distress in both 
government and business circles in Canada that so many war 
orders from Britain were being filled in the United States 
and so few in Canada in the early years. Canada had entered 
the war with her government under severe financial stress 
and with high unemployment throughout the country. The 
war effort put an even greater burden upon her economy and 
made the acquisition of substantial orders from Great Britain 
all the more necessary. In November of 1914 the prime mini­
ster advised his high commissioner in London that "a very 
painful and even bitter feeling is being aroused throughout 
the Dominion. Men are going without bread in Canada 
while those across the line are receiving wages for work that 
could be done as efficiently and as cheaply in this country."15 
Indeed, throughout the war the Canadian government ap­
peared to be in sharper conflict with the mother country 
than with its neighbor to the south. In the procurement of 
war materials, the deployment of Canadian troops, and the 
determination of war policy, at least until 1917, the British 
14. Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 295. 
15. Borden to G. Perley, November 27, 1914, Box 2, Perley Papers, P.A.C. 
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government seemed to regard Canada less as "an autono­
mous nation within the British Empire" than as a crown 
colony whose manpower and resources could be used with­
out consulation.16 
Canadian-American business increased throughout the 
war and especially after the United States entered the con­
flict. The "changed relations" that American participation 
brought about led the Canadian government to cable to Bor­
den in London suggesting the appointment of a "permanent 
representative at Washington . . . having regard disposi­
tion nickel as well as vital commercial materials such as 
coal, railway cars, boats, such representative . . . necessary 
at least while war continues." " By October, 1917, Borden 
had decided to make the appointment, noting that "in mat­
ters that may concern the whole Empire he will of course 
consult with the [British] Embassy but in matters solely 
touching our own affairs he would communicate direct with 
the United States Government and its various commis­
sions." 18 
The British government countered Borden's decision with 
the suggestion of an appointment of a Canadian subordinate 
to the British ambassador. When the prime minister replied 
that he had in mind the appointment of one of his cabinet 
ministers as "an important representative to the Government 
[of the United States] who, in respect of matters directly 
and solely concerning Canadian interests should have recog­
nized diplomatic status," the colonial secretary informed the 
governor-general that such a proposal would "raise a grave 
16. For one instance of the high-handed British use of Canadian war 
production facilities, see Gaddis Smith, Britain's Clandestine Submarines, 
1914-1915 (New Haven, Conn., 1964). See also Gaddis Smith, "Canadian
External Affairs during World War I," in Keenleyside, The Growth of Cana­
dian Policies in External Affairs, pp. 33-58. 
17. Arthur Meighen to Borden, April 14, 1917 (telegram), no. 45807,
OC 440, Borden Papers. 
18. Borden to Perley, October 13, 1917, no. 58137, OC 534, ibid. 
 357 ROBERT CRAIG BROWN
constitutional issue," and Borden backed down.19 In January, 
1918, the prime minister established a compromise Canadian 
War Mission in Washington, headed by the Canadian repre­
sentative on the Imperial Munitions Board there, Lloyd 
Harris.20 The Canadian, American, and British governments 
all finally agreed on the appointment of a Canadian minister 
in Washington in 1920, and the first appointment, after much 
delay, was made in 1926.21 
Routine business between Canada and the United States 
was handled by the Canadian War Mission for the remainder 
of the war. More important questions of policy were resolved 
by frequent visits to Washington by Sir Joseph Pope 22 and 
Loring Christie of the Department of External Affairs, var­
ious cabinet ministers, or Borden himself. In February, 1918, 
President Wilson suggested to Borden the establishment of 
direct telegraphic communication between Washington and 
Ottawa.23 Later in the same month the prime minister visited 
the president and requested the placing of American war 
materiel orders in Canada to help offset Canada's unfavor­
able balance of trade with the United States. Wilson, Ber­
nard Baruch of the War Industries Board, and Secretary of 
the Treasury William G. McAdoo were willing to meet the 
request, McAdoo suggesting that Canada should be singled 
19. Governor General to Colonial Secretary, October 18, 1917, no. 58145;
Colonial Secretary to Governor General, October 24, 1917, no. 58149; Gov­
ernor General to Colonial Secretary, November 5, 1917, no. 58155, OC 534;
ibid. 
20. J. W. Flavelle to Borden, November 9, 1917, no. 45853; Borden to 
Flavelle, November 10, 1917, no. 45854, OC 440; Diary of Sir Robert Laird
Borden, January 19, 20, 24, 26, 31, 1918; ibid. 
21. See John S. Galbraith, The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic 
Status at Washington (Berkeley, Calif., 1951), passim; H. Blair Neatby, 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932: The Lonely Heights (Toronto, 
1963), pp. 192-93, and What's Past Is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right 
Honourable Vincent Massey (Toronto, 1963), pp. 109-70. 
22. Cecil Spring-Rice to Borden, January 21, 1918, no. 13078-9, OC 169, 
Borden Papers. 
23. Borden Diary, February 22, 1918, ibid. 
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out "for distinctive assistance" and that "we shd. pool our 
resources and our endeavours."24 
The opening of the Imperial War Cabinet to dominion 
representatives in the latter years of the war gave the domin­
ions a voice in the planning of war policy and later, through 
the British Empire delegation at Paris, the peace-making 
policy of the empire. It also provided the Canadians with a 
forum in which to urge strengthening of Anglo-American 
cooperation. Two issues were of particular interest to the 
Canadian prime minister, the disposition of captured Ger­
man colonies and the future foreign policy of the empire. 
Both, Borden believed, were potential causes of Anglo-
American discord. 
During a discussion of the captured colonies problem in 
December, 1918, Borden said that "one of the most impor­
tant assets that we could get out of the war would be assured 
good will and a clear understanding between Great Britain 
and the United States." Borden quoted from some of Wil­
son's speeches on the question and added that "so far as 
Canada was concerned, she did not go into the war in order 
to add to the territory of the British Empire." He would 
agree to the territorial ambitions of South Africa, Australia, 
and New Zealand, but "on one consideration, and one only, 
and that was that their acquisition was necessary for the 
future security of the Empire. As regards the remaining 
conquered territories, he was in favour of entrusting their 
control and dominion to whichever State was appointed as 
mandatory for that purpose by the League of Nations. 
. . ."
25
 And Borden was even more blunt about the future 
foreign policy of the Empire. A few days later he told the Im­
perial War Cabinet: 
24. Ihid., February 27, 28, 1918. 
25. Imperial War Cabinet 44, Minutes . . . December 20, 1918, Vol. 
45, File 79, Foster Papers, P.A.C. 
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Future good relations between ourselves and the United 
States were, as he had said before, the best asset we could 
bring home from the war. . . . He wished . .  . to make 
clear that if the future policy of the British Empire meant 
working in co-operation with some European nation as 
against the United States, that policy could not reckon on the 
approval or the support of Canada. Canada's view was that 
as an empire we should keep clear, as far as possible, of 
European complications and alliances. This feeling had been 
immensely strengthened by the experience of the war, into 
which we had been drawn by old-standing pledges and more 
recent understandings, of which the dominions had not even 
been aware. . . , 26 
Borden deliberately brought the point of view of North 
America to the councils of the empire, a point of view that 
reflected the growing identity of Canadian and American 
interests. He feared that with the conclusion of the war the 
United States would withdraw within itself; he hoped that 
Canada's neighbor would assume a major responsibility for 
world order—at one point he urged American control of the 
captured German colonies27—and more particularly for "a 
league of the two great English-speaking Commonwealths" 
as the foundation stone of the postwar peace settlement.28 
Borden, like so many Americans, and like Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King in later years, distrusted "European com­
plications and alliances" and was particularly unsympathetic 
to Article X of the League Covenant. His successor, Arthur 
Meighen, advised by Loring Christie, carried the Borden 
policy of interpreting North America to the empire to its 
logical conclusion when he led the fight in the Imperial Con­
ference of 1921 against the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and in favor of the resulting Washington Con­
26. Imperial War Cabinet 47, Minutes . . . December 30, 1918, ihid. 
27. Imperial War Cabinet 44, Minutes . . . December 20, 1918, ibid. 
28. Imperial War Cabinet 38, Minutes . . . November 26, 1918, ibid. 
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ference. Canada, alone among the Imperial Conference 
members, opposed renewal of the alliance while, for obvious 
security reasons, the Australians led the argument for re­
newal. In one sense, direct Canadian interests were not in­
volved. But the renewal of the alliance was vigorously op­
posed by the United States: renewal would jeopardize 
Anglo-American relations, and this could result in greater 
difficulties for Canada in its relations with the United States. 
The Canadian argument, skillfully formulated by Christie, 
eventually won out in London and led to the more general 
agreement for security in the Pacific adopted in Washing­
ton.29 
The clearly growing emphasis upon the North American 
character of the country was partly a corollary to Canada's 
evolving status both in empire-commonwealth and in inter­
national affairs. Full membership in the League of Nations, 
the power to appoint diplomatic missions in foreign capitals, 
and the ability to sign treaties with foreign governments 
without an additional signature from the British ambassador 
—the first instance was the Halibut Treaty with the United 
States in 1923—all signaled the weakening of the old im­
perial ties. North Americanism, in this connection, was part 
of the search for a new identity; more importantly, however, 
it was a recognition of the importance of Canada's ties with 
the United States in the development of Canada itself. 
Canada's most important trading partner, despite the pro­
tective tariffs on both sides of the border, was the United 
States. As Professor Brebner once noted, "Common sense and 
real dependence . . . triumphed substantially over the ex­
29. See John Bartlett Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and
the Washington Conference," Political Science Quarterly L (1935), 45-57; 
J. S. Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington 
Conference," Canadian Historical Review XXIX (1948), 143-52: and M. G.
Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance," Journal of Modern History XXXIX (1967), 46-64. 
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travagance of economic nationalism when it became ap­
parent that Canadians would have some American products 
at almost any cost and Americans vice versa."30 Ever since 
the adoption of the National Policy tariff of 1879, American 
investment in Canada had played a major role in the devel­
opment of Canadian industry, and by 1926 the United States 
had replaced Great Britain as Canada's principal source of 
foreign capital.31 Hundreds of thousands of American far­
mers had shared in the opening of the "last best West" at 
the turn of the century. Both before and after World War I 
they drew inspiration from, and gave inspiration to, their 
counterparts in the United States in the agrarian protest 
movements that swept across the Great Plains. 
It was not surprising, then, that the similarity of Canadian 
and American interests was especially evident in the inter­
war years. Isolationism was a North American rather than 
an American attitude toward international affairs, as effec­
tively pursued under Mackenzie King's doctrine of "Parlia­
ment will decide" as by any government in Washington.32 
The Canadian government even reexamined its own defense 
policy and declared, through the Canadian Defence Quar­
terly in 1924, that 
the history of the United States and Canada, the common 
civilization of the two countries, the intimacy of their eco­
nomic and social ties, and the impossibility of making ade­
30. John Bartlett Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, Carleton Library 
No. 30 (Toronto, 1966), p. 248. 
31. See Hugh G. J. Aitken, "The Changing Structure of the Canadian 
Economy, with Particular Reference to the Influence of the United States,"
in Hugh G. J. Aitken et al., The American Economic Impact on Canada (Durham, N.C., 1959), pp. 3-35. 
32. See James Eayrs, " 'A Low Dishonest Decade': Aspects of Canadian 
External Policy, 1931-1939," in Keenleyside, The Growth of Canadian 
Policies in External Affairs, pp. 59-80; and K. W. McNaught, "Canadian 
Foreign Policy and the Whig Interpretation: 1936-1939," in Canadian His­
torical Association, Report of the Annual Meeting, 1957 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 
43-54. 
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quate preparation for the defence of the border, all make 
war with the United States too remote a possibility for serious 
consideration.33 
Canadian and American scholars pooled their resources to 
produce the mammoth "Canadian-American Relations" se­
ries of volumes, initiated by Canadian scholars in the 
United States and financed by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. A Canadian adviser to the project 
sounded the typical cliche of the era concerning Canadian-
American relations: "Nowhere else in the world does there 
exist so peculiar a relationship as that between your country 
and Canada."3i 
But similarity of Canadian and American interests was 
not to be confused with identity of interests; North Ameri­
canism was an expression of Canadian nationalism, not con­
tinentalism; of Canada's growing confidence in herself as a 
separate nation on the North American continent. That was 
the point made by John W. Dafoe, editor of the Winnipeg 
Free Press, in his lectures at Columbia University in 1933, 
and later published under the revealing title Canada an 
American Nation.35 That was also the point of the Report of 
the Royal Commission on Broadcasting (1929)—"Canadian 
radio listeners want Canadian broadcasting"—and the es­
tablishment of the CRBC (forerunner of the CBC) in 1932. 
Public broadcasting in Canada was essential to counter the 
influence of American programming. As Prime Minister 
Richard B. Bennett explained, 
33. Quoted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 2 vols. (Toronto, 
1964), 1,75. 
34. Borden to James C. Shotwell, October 1, 1932, no. 147582-83, Post 
1921 Series, Folder 51, Borden Papers. Equally typical of Canadians was 
Borden's next observation that "in each country, but especially in the United 
States, there is a lack of understanding with respect to the ideals, institutions 
and outlook of the other." (Italics added.) 
35. Ramsay Cook, The Politics of John W. Dafoe and the Free Press 
(Toronto, 1963), pp. 289-90. 
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this country must be assured of complete Canadian control 
of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign 
interference or influence. Without such control radio broad­
casting can never become a great agency for the communica­
tion of matters of national concern and for the diffusion of 
national thought and ideals, and without such control it can 
never be the agency by which national consciousness may 
be fostered and sustained and national unity still further 
strengthened.36 
The immediate response of both Canada and the United 
States to the depression decade was to isolate themselves 
from each other. The Hawley-Smoot tariff in the United 
States was matched in Canada by Bennett's successful elec­
toral campaign in 1930 with its promise to "blast" Canada's 
way into world markets with higher protective tariff rates. 
In 1932, at the Imperial Conference in Ottawa, Imperial 
Preferential Trade Agreements were signed by Great Britain 
and the dominions. These agreements, for Canada, placed 
even further restrictions upon Canadian-American trade 
(though they also further stimulated United States capital 
investment in Canada). Even so, the Canadian government 
refused to enter into fiscal or monetary agreements with its 
Commonwealth partners because Canada's commercial and 
credit relations with the United States were "more impor­
tant" than corresponding ties with the Empire.37 
By November, 1934, it was clear that protectionism was 
not working, and the Canadian government dropped, if ever 
so slightly, its policy of reciprocity of tariffs with the United 
States and edged toward a policy of reciprocity of trade. 
"The time has come for definite action," the Canadian minis­
ter in Washington wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. 
36. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, May 18, 1932, 
3035. 
37. Memorandums on "Monetary and Financial Questions, Reed for file
Sept 20/32," no. 112587-607, Bennett Papers, P.A.C. 
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"The declared desire of both governments to improve con­
ditions of trade between the two countries should now be 
carried into effect by the negotiation of a comprehensive 
trade agreement."3S Immediately after the 1935 election, the 
new prime minister, Mackenzie King, traveled to Washing­
ton for talks with Hull and President Roosevelt and the 
signing of the Canadian-American reciprocity agreement.39 
Canada extended most-favored-nation treatment to the 
United States and reduced the duties on a number of Ameri­
can goods imported into Canada. The United States gave a 
number of Canadian natural products free entry and reduced 
the duties on many more, as well as placing Canadian im­
ports on a most-favored-nation basis. 
For Mackenzie King the 1935 trade agreement was some­
thing more than just the beginnings of lowering tariff bar­
riers between Canada and the United States. It was true that 
substantial obstacles remained. Canada was still committed 
to the Imperial Preferential Agreements of 1932, which were 
of five years duration, and before further progress could be 
made, tripartite revisions between Canada and Great Britain 
and the United States would be necessary. But more than 
freer trade was at stake. For King, like Cordell Hull in Wash­
ington, multilateral freer trading relations was the essential 
condition for maintaining peace in an increasingly war-
minded world; in Hull's terms, freer trade was "the spear 
point of the approach to peace." The secretary of state re­
garded the 1935 agreement as the first chink in the armor of 
the Ottawa agreements of 1932, and he ceaselessly cam­
paigned to get the British government itself to give up the 
restrictive and discriminatory agreements. Taking the op­
38. W. D. Herridge to Cordell Hull, November 14, 1934, in W. A. Rid-
dell, ed., Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 1917-1939 (Toronto, 
1962), p. 633. 
39. See Richard N. Kottman, "The Canadian-American Trade Agreement 
of 1935," Journal of American History LII (1965), 275-96. 
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portunity of having a like-minded colleague in Ottawa who 
had influence in London, Hull pressed King, in a conversa­
tion in March, 1937, to carry the gospel of freer trade to the 
forthcoming Imperial Conference. "I wanted action rather 
than a policy of waiting," he later wrote; "I knew that Mac­
kenzie King would faithfully interpret to the British Govern­
ment what I said." *° A long discussion with the president 
later in the day followed similar if somewhat broader lines, 
Roosevelt also seeing peace being maintained by alleviating 
world economic rivalry and proposing a "Permanent Con­
ference on Economic and Social Problems." " 
The judgment of the Americans was correct; in King they 
found a ready and sympathetic interpreter. "The bringing 
together of hostile nations in round table conference," the 
prime minister wrote to Roosevelt, 
and gaining their acceptance of the principle of investigation 
before resort to hostilities, would, I believe, mark the dawn 
of a new era in the history of the world. It would give a 
fresh impetus to round table conference in industrial as well 
as international relations. 
Only the substitution of an enlightened public opinion as 
more fruitful of justice than an appeal to force, can save the 
world today from internal and international strife.42 
King assured Hull that he was anxious to inform the Im­
perial Conference of the 1935 agreement and urge an Anglo-
American agreement and Anglo-Canadian and further Cana­
dian-American agreements along the same lines. 
I shall be greatly surprised if I do not find, in London, fairly 
general agreement that the most effective measures that 
40. Cordell Hull, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York, 1948), I, 528. 
41. W. L. Mackenzie King to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 8, 1937, 
King Papers, P.A.C. 
42. King to Roosevelt, March 17, 1937, ibid. 
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nations can take for the preservation of peace lie in the field 
of economic collaboration. . . . 
. .  . I am hopeful, as I explained to Mr. Armour [United 
States minister to Canada] in the course of a conversation, 
in which he impressed me with the importance that you 
and the Government of the United States attach to the atti­
tude of the countries of the British Commonwealth in the 
matter, that there will be an opportunity during the forth­
coming Conference to explore the possibilities of more active 
collaboration in the work for economic and international 
43 peace, 
By 1938 the series of agreements between Canada, the 
United States, and Great Britain had been signed further 
reducing tariff barriers, and Mackenzie King was justifiably 
proud of the important part he had played in their comple­
tion. 
But the effort was both too little and too late. By 1938 it 
was becoming clear that Canadian-American cooperation 
to wage war would take priority over efforts to preserve 
peace. In February the chiefs of staff of the two countries 
met in Washington to discuss mutual defense of the Pacific 
coast. In August, at Kingston, the president spoke of Canada 
as "part of the sisterhood of the British Empire" and pledged 
that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by 
if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other 
Empire." And three days later, at Woodbridge, King cited 
Canada's "obligations as a good friendly neighbour" that 
"should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces would not be 
able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the 
43. King to Hull, April 23, 1937, ibid. I am grateful to Professor Donald
Forster, executive assistant to the president, University of Toronto, and to
Professor H. Blair Neatby, the biographer of William Lyon Mackenzie King,
for allowing me to read the memorandums prepared by Professor Forster on
the trade agreements, 1937-1938, and for bringing to my attention the ma­
terial cited in this and the two previous footnotes. 
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United States, across Canadian territory." In October the 
president suggested cooperation in problems of defense 
production to the prime minister. And in August, 1939, a 
few days before the beginning of hostilities, Canadian offi­
cials, including the chairman of the Canadian Defence Pro­
duction Board, were in Washington to confer about avoiding 
as many problems as possible when the president was forced 
to invoke the neutrality legislation of the United States." 
The cooperation between Canada and the United States 
during World War II was unparalleled. From the beginning 
of the war the chief concern was the defense of North Amer­
ica, and at Ogdensburg in October, 1940, the prime minister 
and the president agreed to establish the Permanent Joint 
Board on Defense to achieve that end. The work of the 
Board resulted in the plans for American direction of Cana­
dian forces in eastern Canada in the event of the collapse of 
Britain and in the building of the Alaska highway by United 
States armed forces using Canadian contractors and ma­
terial. As in World War I, war production again caused a 
serious balance-of-payments problem with the United States 
for Canada. The Roosevelt-King Hyde Park Agreement of 
April, 1941, provided an answer to the problem by establish­
ing greater North American integration of defense produc­
tion. The agreement was supplemented by numerous joint 
committees charged to eliminate wasteful production and 
to allocate resource use on a continental basis. Of great sig­
nificance was the fact that neither agreement was regarded 
by either party as a strictly wartime measure. The Joint 
Board on Defense was "Permanent," and a directive to one 
of the committees established under the 1941 agreement to 
plan for "reducing the probable post-war economic disloca­
44. W. R. Riddell to King, August 28, 29, 1939, ibid. 
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tion consequent upon the changes which the economy in 
each country is presently undergoing" assumed continued 
economic cooperation after the war.45 
At the beginning of the war Canada's role of interpreter 
between the United States and Great Britain was of great 
importance. As Mackenzie King put it during a visit to 
Roosevelt at Warm Springs in April, 1940: "Just now, with 
the world situation as it was, Ottawa was a very important 
centre even as between Britain and the United States. That 
much could be done there by conference in different ways 
that would be helpful in furthering mutual interests."48 
Within a month of the visit Hugh Keenleyside of the De­
partment of External Affairs came to Washington, at Roose­
velt's request, to hear of the president's concern over the 
possible loss of the British fleet to Germany and of his sug­
gestion that, in the event of a British defeat, the fleet be 
moved to the dominions and the king reside in Bermuda, 
both pieces of information to be passed through Mackenzie 
King to Churchill.47 
But as the role of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense 
declined after the entry of the United States into the war 
in favor of direct contact between respective staff officers, 
so too did King's "lynch-pin" function decline after personal 
contact between Churchill and Roosevelt was firmly estab­
lished. Despite the crucial role King portrayed for himself 
in his diary at the time of the first Quebec Conference, for 
example, a more accurate picture was probably given in a 
later letter of recollection: "I was, as you recall, not so much 
45. Edgar W. Mclnnis, The Unguarded Frontier: A History of American-
Canadian Relations (New York, 1942), p. 363. See also Gerald M. Craig,
The United States and Canada (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), chap. 15, and 
Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations between the United States and 
Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington, 1959). 
46. Diary, April 24, 1940, as in J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King 
Record, Vol. 1,1939-1944 (Toronto, I960), p. 111. 
47. Ibid., pp. 117 ff. 
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a participant in any of the discussions as a sort of general 
host, whose task at the Citadel was similar to that of the 
General Manager of the Chateau Frontenac." " 
Canada emerged from World War II as the world's fourth-
ranking power and committed to a continuing active role in 
international affairs. She also emerged from the war more 
intimately linked to the United States than ever before in 
both military and economic terms. By 1945 American capital 
invested in Canada had risen to $4.99 billions, and the Amer­
ican capital commitment to postwar development would 
skyrocket to $20.48 billions by 1963.49 It was just because 
of the influence of the United States upon Canada that Can­
ada's own definition of her new role in international affairs 
as a "middle power" was so important to Canadians, suggest­
ing, as it did, the nation's determination to pursue a course 
in international relations that would be at once in coopera­
tion with the United States but decidedly independent of 
American domination. "Middlepowermanship" became ele­
vated to the heady realms of ideology to guide the diplomats 
from External Affairs and found its most practical focus in 
unwavering Canadian support for, and commitment to, the 
United Nations.90 From it followed the commitment of the 
third largest national force to the Korean War and what 
Canadians would come to regard as a role peculiarly suited 
to themselves, peacekeeping, most notably at the Gaza Strip 
and in Cyprus. From it also followed a continued and un­
precedented Canadian military presence in Europe after the 
48. King to Lord Moran, June 9, 1950, quoted in Churchill: Taken from 
the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965 (Boston, 
1966), p. 117 n. 3. 
49. By contrast, British investment, expressed in millions of dollars, was
1,750 in 1945 and 3,331 in 1963. That from other countries was 352 in 
1945 and 2,384 in 1963. See Craig, The United States and Canada, p. 354. 
50. See Paul Painchaud, "Middlepowermanship As an Ideology," in 
J. King Gordon, ed., Canada's Role As a Middle Power (Toronto, 1966), 
pp. 29-35. 
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war through the multilateral North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
tion. "We in Canada," Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent ex­
plained to the House of Commons during the debate on the 
NATO treaty, 
recognize that there is neither peace nor security for Canada 
if western Europe, quite as much as any part of this hemi­
sphere, is in danger; but we feel that, by uniting our efforts, 
by making our peaceful intentions clear, by making our 
preparations serious, and by forcing the totalitarian rulers of 
the communist states to realize that we mean business, we 
are not contracting our strength but expanding it. We will 
create a situation which will enable us to speak in the only 
language they recognize, the only language they understand 
—the language that speaks from strength.61 
Moreover, "middlepowermanship" meant a much more ac­
tive participation in Commonwealth affairs than had been 
the case before the war; it meant Canadian initiative to clear 
the path of obstacles to the admission of new Asian and 
African states to membership, and it meant the focusing of 
Canadian foreign aid on the Colombo Plan. In sum, as his­
torian William Kilbourn has observed, "middlepowerman­
ship" for Canada 
was not so much a matter of her physical strength vis h vis 
the great powers—a relatively small quantity can hardly be 
compared to something like the absolute—but rather a mat­
ter of function. There was a series of jobs to be done that no 
great power, especially one with an imperial past or present, 
could possibly perform.62 
51. House of Commons Debates, March 29,1949, 2064. 
52. William Kilbourn, "The 1950s," in J. M. S. Careless and R. Craig 
Brown, eds., The Canadians, 1867-1967 (Toronto, 1967), p. 331. A less 
favorable view of "middlepowermanship," pointing out the problems it 
raises for Canadian military policy, has been made by James Eayrs: "I will 
contend . . . that the main and overriding motive for the maintainence of
a Canadian military establishment since the Second World War has had little 
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But in the 1960s "middlepowermanship" appeared to 
many Canadians to be a decreasingly effective functional 
counterweight to American influence in Canadian military 
policy and in Canadian diplomacy. NATO's image became 
increasingly one of token "multilateralism" and real sub­
servience to the United States. Similarly, the preponderance 
of American influence in North American defense was more 
and more apparent. In North America the wartime partner­
ship for common defense, a Canadian general recalled, was 
continued upon American initiative and "expanded to in­
clude exchange of information in the fields of intelligence, 
weapons, research and development. Joint defence plans 
were prepared for the approval of the Chiefs of Staffs of both 
countries. Air defence was to be a joint effort."63 The joint 
efforts took the form of the building of the various radar 
networks in the 1950s, the creation of NORAD in 1958 with 
a Canadian deputy commander at Colorado Springs, and, 
after the controversial 1963 election and the victory of Les­
ter B. Pearson's Liberal party, the acceptance of nuclear 
warheads for Bomarc missiles in Canada and for Canadian 
army and air force units in Europe. 
The placement of two Bomarc bases in eastern Canada 
and a defense production-sharing agreement with the 
United States were the main elements of the defense policy 
that the Diefenbaker government provided after its decision, 
to do with our national security as such; that it has had everything to do
with underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating positions vis a vis various
international organizations and other countries. That what is required in the
way of military expenditure and military equipment for the performance of
this nonmilitary function is, to say the least, difficult to calculate. That, as
a consequence, our military policies have been marked by uncertainty and
disarray. That we have made grave mistakes in the past, are making grave
mistakes right now [1965], and will probably be making grave mistakes ten
years from now" (James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The 
Canadian Experience," Gordon, ed., Canada's Role As a Middle Power, p. 
70). 
53. Quoted in Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957­
1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore, 1967), p. 9. 
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in 1959, to scrap the Canadian-built CF 105 Arrow fighter. 
The Arrow had been the last Canadian attempt to produce 
wholly Canadian weapons. Henceforth, the government hav­
ing decided that "the independent development of major 
military systems by Canada" was simply too expensive, the 
pretense of an independent role in defense production was 
given up. The defense industry in Canada thrived on Ameri­
can subcontracts, and the Canadian forces relied increas­
ingly on American production of sophisticated military 
hardware.54 
The reaction to the Arrow decision and the resultant 
further dependence upon the United States for defense of 
Canada was decidedly hostile. Clearly implied in these de­
cisions was the suggestion that Canada had surrendered her 
"middle power" status to become a satellite of the United 
States. As the influential Toronto Globe and Mail put it, 
we may drift into a condition uncomfortably like that of 
certain Middle Eastern and Latin American countries which 
draw their entire supply of modern weapons from one of 
the Great Powers, and in consequence find themselves bound 
to support the policies of their armorer on pain of being sud­
denly left defenceless. A nation in that position may be in­
dependent in name, but it has no real independence in fact.56 
That, indeed, was the message of the chief correspondent 
of the CBC in Washington, James Minifie, in his best-selling 
book Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, in which he advo­
cated Canadian withdrawal from NORAD and NATO. And 
there is no doubt that withdrawal from NORAD or NATO, 
or both, were acceptable alternatives to American dominance 
54. James Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues," in John Sloan 
Dickey, ed., The United States and Canada (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), 
p. 67, and McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy, pp. 60-84. 
55. Quoted in McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy, p. 88. 
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in military and foreign policy for a growing number of Ca­
nadians. 
There was, of course, another side to the argument over 
American influence in Canadian foreign policy. James Eayrs 
has pointed out that "a distinctive, if not the dominant in­
gredient in Canada's response to its unenviable positioning 
along the route to holocaust has been an irrational anger," 
adding that 
though much was done, much more might have been done. 
There was no invitation to the United States to treat the 
territory of northern North America as a possible home for 
whatever bombers or missiles its defence authorities might 
have wanted to base there; no offer of Canadian airfields as 
forward bases for United States interceptor aircraft; no carte 
blanche for S.A.C. overflights (the United States command 
deemed it expedient to route its aerial alert force around 
Canada rather than over it).68 
Canadian concern over the preponderant influence of the 
United States was expressed over the whole compass of Ca­
nadian life during the 1950s and 1960s. A measure of the 
intensity of this concern was the number of Royal Commis­
sions established by the Canadian government to study the 
problem and recommend policies to protect the Canadian 
identity. The reports of these bodies were sufficiently and 
perhaps predictably alarming enough to force at least a 
modicum of government action. The Royal Commission on 
the National Development in the Arts and Letters and Sci­
ence, chaired by the former minister to the United States and 
later governor general, Vincent Massey, concluded that 
American culture was stifling Canadian creativity and com­
pared the seriousness of the threat with military defense. In 
the realm of identity, cultural defense was equally impor­
56. Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues," pp. 62, 64. 
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tant; the Commission gravely noted that "the two cannot be 
separated."67 The response to the Massey Commission was 
the establishment by the government of the Canada Council 
in 1957 to assist financially Canadian cultural endeavors, or 
to put it in less favorable light, to establish "cultural pro­
tectionism." 68 Similar concern was expressed by the Royal 
Commission on Broadcasting (1957), and the government 
replied by imposing minimum "Canadian content" regula­
tions for both the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and 
privately owned stations. Again, in 1961, the Royal Commis­
sion on Publications found that 
the tremendous expansion of communications in the United 
States has given that nation the world's most penetrating and 
effective apparatus for the transmission of ideas. Canada, 
more than any other country, is naked to that force, exposed 
unceasingly to a vast network of communications which 
reaches to every corner of our land; American words, images 
and print—the good, the bad, the indifferent—batter un­
relentingly at our eyes and ears.69 
And again the government answer was tax measures to en­
courage advertising revenue away from so-called Canadian 
editions and toward Canadian publications. (Time and 
Reader's Digest, the main objects of the Royal Commission's 
attack, were eventually exempted from these penalties.) 
More important for Americans was the Report of the 
Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, chaired 
by Walter Gordon, at the end of the 1950s. It warned of the 
control the enormous postwar American capital investment 
57. Craig, The United States and Canada, p. 301. 
58. One Canadian author, Mordecai Richler, acidly remarked that the
end product of such concern for Canadian culture would be the creation of
literary figures "world famous in Canada and deservedly unknown just 
about everywhere else" (Gerald Clark, Canada: The Uneasy Neighbor [New 
York, 1965], p. 360). 
59. Quoted in Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues" p. 89. 
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had purchased over Canadian industries and resources, of 
the control of Canadian labor by American-based unions, 
and of the inevitable loss of Canadian political independ­
ence if economic integration continued. In 1961 Mr. Gordon 
carried on his campaign with the publication of his book 
Troubled Canada. Two years later, as minister of finance, he 
brought down his first budget, including proposals (later 
withdrawn) to give tax benefits to Canadian companies that 
increased the Canadian share of their ownership and to tax 
by 30 percent the sale to foreigners of shares of Canadian 
companies in excess of $50,000. Mr. Gordon resigned from 
the cabinet in 1965 but was reinstated by Mr. Pearson two 
years later and was responsible for the report "Foreign 
Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry," pub­
lished by the government in 1968. The report recognized the 
benefits to Canadian development from foreign investment 
but expressed concern "about the implications of foreign 
control for Canada's long-run prospects for national inde­
pendence and economic growth." It concluded with a plea 
for "A New National Policy." 
The old National Policy served Canada in its day, as an 
instrument of nation-building and a means of facilitating 
economic growth. The challenges have changed and a new 
National Policy is required. The nation has been built, but 
its sovereignty must be protected and its independence main­
tained. A diversified economy has been created, but its effi­
ciency must be improved and its capacity for autonomous 
growth increased.60 
The economic historian Harold Adams Innis regretfully 
observed in 1948 that Canada had "moved from colony to 
60. Canada, Privy Council Office, Foreign Ownership and the Structure 
of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian 
Industry (Ottawa, 1968), pp. 1, 415. 
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nation to colony." 61 That proposition is at the heart of the 
postwar Canadian debate over Canada's role in North Amer­
ica. Evidence has been, is, and will continue to be marshaled 
in the press, the universities, and Parliament, from Canadian 
history and cultural life, from contemporary economic and 
foreign policy, to prove or disprove the last two words of the 
proposition. What is undisputed is the recognition by Cana­
dians of the enormous influence of the United States, its life­
style and the policies of its government, upon Canada. What 
is disputed, and long will be, is what can or should be done 
about it. Perhaps the last word in this brief survey of Cana­
dian-American relations in the twentieth century should go 
to a Canadian scholar who rejected Innis's judgment and 
the emotionalism surrounding it and made a plea for realistic 
assessment of the Canadian-American relationship. If that 
relationship, James Eayrs told the American Assembly in 
1964, 
is to flourish to the mutual benefit of its partners, it will be 
because statesmen of both countries resist the temptation, 
to which they have yielded in the past, of believing their 
politics to be neighbourly rather than international. They 
must realize that the two nations of North America are of 
the states-system, not beyond and above it, and shape their 
policies accordingly. President Johnson, with the best inten­
tions in the world, observed in his first official reference to 
the Canadian-American relationship that "Canada is such a 
close neighbor and such a good neighbor that we always 
have plenty of problems there. They are kind of like prob­
lems in the hometown." They are kind of not like that at all. 
They are the problems not of neighbours but of friendly 
foreign powers. 
What is really required is a certain reserve, a sense of live 
and let live, even of aloofness on occasion, in the treatment 
61. Harold Adams Innis, "Great Britain, the United States and Canada," 
in Essays in Canadian Economic History (Toronto, 1956), p. 405. 
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of the smaller country by the larger. "Good fences," American 
leaders are fond of quoting on their Canadian visits, "make 
good neighbors." They could usefully remember that good 
neighbours make good fences.62 
62. Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues" pp. 95-94. 
Recent United States-Mexican 





DURING the past century and a half, relations between the 
United States and Mexico have featured periods of harmony 
and times of conflict.1 Although the United States welcomed 
Mexico's independence from Spain and received the first 
Mexican diplomat in 1822, many Americans coveted Texas 
and other territories to the south and west. The struggle by 
English-speaking Texans for independence and the subse­
quent annexation of Texas by the United States in 1845 re­
sulted in the Mexican War of 1846-48. As a result of Mex­
ico's defeat, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo conferred 
upon the victor more than half of Mexico's territory; thus 
Upper California and New Mexico, along with Texas, were 
brought within the United States. 
Although the United States was prepared to encroach 
upon the sovereignty of her southern neighbor, similar ac­
1. For detailed accounts of United States-Mexican relations, see J. Lloyd
Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations (Boston, 
1965), pp. 342-81; and two works by Howard F. Cline: The United States 
and Mexico, rev. ed. (New York, 1963) and Mexico, Revolution to Evolu­
tion: 1940-1960 (New York, 1963). 
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tion by another power was not to be allowed. When French 
forces entered Mexico in 1861, strong protests were made by 
the Lincoln administration; however, preoccupation with 
the Civil War prevented effective action against France. With 
the end of that war, United States pressure was exerted; 
and in the spring of 1867 the last French troops sailed from 
Veracruz, leaving Emperor Maximilian to be captured and 
executed by the regime of President Benito Juarez. 
In the years that followed, border incidents involving 
raids on United States territory by lawless Mexican elements 
created minor problems that marred relations between the 
two countries. But during the thirty-five years that General 
Porfirio Diaz dominated Mexico (1876-1911), outlaws were 
suppressed and the International Boundary Commission was 
established to deal with problems caused by the shifting 
course of the Rio Grande. Under Diaz, Mexico became a 
magnet for foreign capital; and United States citizens in­
vested millions of dollars in Mexican land, railroads, oil, and 
mines. By 1910 most of Mexico's land, industry, and com­
merce was in the hands of foreign investors and a relatively 
few wealthy Mexicans. 
With the outbreak of the Revolution of 1910 and the over­
throw of Diaz in the following year, United States-Mexican 
relations entered a troubled decade that culminated in the 
United States naval bombardment and occupation of Vera­
cruz and General John J. Pershing's punitive expedition into 
northern Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa. During the 
1920s civil strife declined in Mexico, but application of pro­
visions of the Constitution of 1917 adversely affected the in­
terests of American landowners and oil men in that country. 
Meanwhile, American presidents granted or withheld recog­
nition of Mexican governments as a means of seeking protec­
tion for the lives and properties of United States citizens in 
Mexico. During the Cristero Rebellion (1926-29) many 
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Americans called for intervention to protect the Catholic 
church against repressive policies of the Mexican govern­
ment. Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow played a leading 
role in terminating that religious conflict and in causing the 
Mexican government to adopt a more conciliatory attitude 
toward United States interests, but the election of President 
Lazaro Cardenas in 1934 led to new difficulties. 
Cardenas launched a sweeping land reform program that 
divested many United States citizens of their rural estates, 
and his support of militant labor unions resulted in strikes 
that were costly for American business interests. A labor dis­
pute in the petroleum industry finally provoked expropria­
tion of foreign-owned oil properties in March, 1938. This ac­
tion caused powerful business groups to demand United 
States intervention, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
more concerned about promotion of the Good Neighbor pol­
icy than protection of his country's oil companies. Subse­
quently, war clouds gathered in Europe; and in 1940 Mexi­
can voters elected President Manuel Avila Camacho. Under 
the new president the Mexican government toned down the 
revolutionary zeal that had inspired policies detrimental to 
United States interests; also, Mexico entered World War II 
against the Axis powers and supplied vital raw materials 
and agricultural laborers to support the United States war 
effort. During the war American investors became interested 
in manufacturing opportunities south of the Rio Grande; at 
the same time the United States government began provid­
ing financial assistance for the purpose of speeding Mexico's 
industrial development. 
Because post-World War II problems have been rooted 
in the international politics of the past, it is against this his­
torical background that United States-Mexican relations 
since 1945 must be analyzed. In surveying significant devel­
opments in the relations of these two nations over the past 
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quarter of a century, attention has been focused on a variety 
of problems. Some are old, and some are new: disease and 
insects harmful to livestock, control and protection of alien 
contract labor, long-standing arbitration controversies, salin­
ity of international rivers, fishing rights in coastal waters, 
interventionism in the Americas, and means of financing 
economic development. Some of these problems have been 
resolved fully; others have been resolved in part; still others 
remain unresolved and constitute challenges to the presi­
dents and lawmakers, to the businessmen and diplomats, 
and to the concerned citizens of both countries. In general, 
it is apparent that a spirit of compromise and cooperation has 
prevailed in United States-Mexican relations during the 
post-World War II era. This contrasts sharply with the pat­
tern of crisis and conflict in earlier decades. The objectives 
of this study are to determine how and why such a transfor­
mation has come to pass. 
Foot-and-mouth Disease and the Screwworm Fly 
Although not as dramatic as international problems in­
volving recognition policy or charges of "imperialism," 
threats of disease to the livestock herds of the United States 
and Mexico have prompted cooperation that has become in­
creasingly characteristic of relations between these two na­
tions since World War II. Through joint efforts over a period 
of seven years, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (or 
aftosa, as it is known in Mexico) was checked and then 
eradicated; more recently the Mexican government has co­
operated to a limited extent with American efforts to free 
this country of screwworm flies and to make possible the 
eradication of the harmful insect from Mexican territory as 
well. 
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Although mainly a disease of cattle and swine, foot-and­
mouth disease affects all cloven-footed animals. Prior to 1930 
both the United States and Mexico suffered repeated costly 
outbreaks of the disease.2 In that year a convention, signed 
by representatives of the two countries, became effective. It 
committed the United States and Mexican governments to 
take precautions against importation of "domestic ruminants 
or swine" under conditions involving a risk of introducing 
animals infected with foot-and-mouth disease or rinderpest.3 
For a period of sixteen years no outbreaks of the former oc­
curred in either country. Then in 1946, despite American 
protests, Mexico permitted the landing of two shipments of 
Zebu bulls from Brazil. The United States reaction was to 
close its borders to importation of all cloven-footed animals 
from Mexico. Later, when a survey by United States Depart­
ment of Agriculture personnel revealed no evidence of foot-
and-mouth disease in areas where the Brazilian cattle were 
located, the quarantine was lifted. In December, 1946, an 
outbreak of the disease was confirmed in the State of Vera­
cruz; consequently, the quarantine was reimposed. The fact 
that the controversial Zebu bulls had been brought to the 
area where this outbreak occurred provided strong circum­
stantial evidence that earlier protests by United State au­
thorities had been fully justified.* 
Mexican efforts to check the spread of foot-and-mouth 
2. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, 
A n i m a l H e a l t h D i v i s i o n , Foot-and-Mouth Disease . . . A Menace t  o North 
American Livestock, ARS-91-58 (Hyattsville, Md., 1967), pp. 4-6. 
3. U.S. Department of State, Convention between the United States and 
Mexico: Safeguarding Livestock Interests through the Prevention of Infec­
tious and Contagious Diseases, Treaty Series No. 808 (Washington, 1930). 
4. See Early B. Shaw, "Mexico's Foot-and-Mouth Disease Problem," 
Economic Geography XXV (1949), 1-3; John A. Hopkins, "The Joint Cam­
paign against Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Mexico," U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin XVI (1947), 711; and Guillermo Quesada Bravo, La Verdad Sobre 
el Ganado Cebu Brasilefio, y la Cuarentena en la Isla de Sacrificios, Vera­
cruz (Mexico, D.F., 1946), passim. 
 383 BROWN AND WILKIE
disease were to no avail; thus United States assistance was 
requested. Realizing that neither charges against Mexico of 
convention violation nor quarantine efforts at the border 
would protect American livestock from the northward-
advancing plague, Washington responded positively to the 
request for aid. Signed by President Truman on February 28, 
1947, Public Law 80-8 authorized the Department of Agri­
culture to cooperate with Mexican authorities for the pur­
pose of eradicating foot-and-mouth disease from that coun­
try.6 This prompt response could be cited as an example of 
the Good Neighbor policy in action, but it was dictated as 
much by the interests of the United States as by the needs 
of Mexico. 
Directed by the Mexican-United States Commission for 
the Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, an intensive 
campaign was waged to free Mexico from the disease 
through slaughter of all infected or exposed cattle, sheep, 
goats, and swine. Finally, after some incidents involving 
armed violence by angry owners of condemned livestock, 
the Commission agreed to discontinue the slaughter method 
alone and to carry out a program combining quarantine, vac­
cination, and, "when necessary," slaughter. Subsequently, 
an effective vaccine was developed; and by December, 1954, 
authorities of both countries were convinced that Mexico 
was definitely free from foot-and-mouth disease.6 
During the 1947-54 period, United States expenditures in 
combatting this threat to its multibillion-dollar livestock in­
5. See Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1070-72, 
1305-19, 1345-46; and U.S. Department of State Bulletin XVI (1947), 454. 
6. For a scholarly account of the Commission's work, see Manuel A. 
Machado, Jr., An Industry in Crisis: Mexican-United States Cooperation in 
the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968). 
For informal descriptions of experiences by United States personnel, see 
Fred Gipson and Bill Leftwich, The "Cow Killers": With the Aftosa Com­
mission in Mexico (Austin, Tex., 1956); and James A. Porter, Doctor, Spare 
My Cow (Ames, Iowa, 1956). 
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dustry amounted to $136 million. Mexico's direct expendi­
tures were lower, but the Mexican government supplied the 
indispensable services of large numbers of military and 
civilian personnel.7 Since 1954 there has been no recurrence 
of foot-and-mouth disease in either country; and the Com­
mission for the Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease has 
been converted into the Commission for the Prevention of 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease. In addition to its preventive re­
sponsibility, the Commission is currently involved in re­
search and planning activities that promise to lead to eradi­
cation of yet another threat to livestock herds of both 
countries: the screwworm fly. 
A female screwworm fly lays her eggs at the edges of 
wounds of warmblooded animals or of people. When the 
eggs hatch, tiny white worms enter the wound and feed on 
live flesh. An untreated infestation usually results in death 
for animals and even for humans. Research by United States 
Department of Agriculture scientists has resulted in develop­
ment of a technique whereby man-reared sterile flies are 
produced from pupae exposed to cobalt-60 radiation; when 
released, sterile male flies mate with fertile females, which 
then lay infertile eggs. Since the female screwworm fly mates 
only once, continued release of large numbers of sterile flies 
can free an area of this insect within a few months. In this 
manner United States territory east of the Mississippi River 
was cleared of the screwworm in 1958-59 at a cost of slightly 
more than $10 million.8 
Because the screwworm fly is capable of traveling nearly 
two hundred miles, and perhaps farther, and since this in­
7. See Edward G. Miller, Jr., "Achievements of Inter-American Coopera­
tion," U.S. Department of State Bulletin XXVII (1952), 703; and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Foot-and-Mouth Disease, p. 8. 
8. See Edward F. Knipling, "The Eradication of the Screw-worm Fly," 
Scientific American CCIII (1960), 54-61. 
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sect is no respecter of international boundaries, permanent 
eradication of the pest in the Southwest is dependent on 
eradication in Mexico also. Beginning in 1962, with the con­
sent of Mexican authorities, sterile flies have been air­
dropped by American planes in northern Mexico so as to 
create a sterile-fly barrier.9 But recognizing the fact that an 
extension of the barrier farther southward would be even 
more advantageous to livestock raisers of both countries, the 
United States Congress in 1966 amended Public Law 80-8 
to authorize the Department of Agriculture to cooperate 
with the Mexican government in carrying out screwworm 
eradication measures throughout Mexico. It was expected 
that such cooperation would be conducted on a cost-sharing 
basis and that the expense of establishing a barrier at the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec or at the Guatemalan border would 
be much less than the $5 million per year that the United 
States spends in maintaining the present barrier in northern 
Mexico.10 As he signed the measure on July 27, 1966, Presi­
dent Johnson described it as "another example of the spirit 
of cooperation and warm friendship which exists between 
the people of Mexico and the United States."u To date, 
however, arrangements have not been made for implement­
ing a jointly financed eradication program. Meanwhile, some 
Mexican flies succeed in penetrating the existing barrier. As 
a result, stockmen in the Southwest continue to suffer ani­
mal losses from sporadic outbreaks of screwworm infesta­
tion; and in 1968 a resident of San Antonio, Texas, died from 
9. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Facts 
about the Screwworm Barrier Program, ARS 91-64 (Hyattsville, Md., 
1967), pp. 7-8. 
10. For example, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Eradication of Screwworms 
in Mexico, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry of the United States Senate on S. 3325 and H.R. 14888, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1966), passim. 
11. U.S. Department of State Bulletin LV (1966), 232. 
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this cause.12 Thus the screwworm fly problem has been re­
solved only in part; however, one agricultural problem that 
once provoked heated controversy was laid to rest at the 
end of 1964. This was the contract farm labor problem. 
Farm Labor 
From the days of World War II until the mid-1960s, mil­
lions of Mexican citizens came to the United States to per­
form farm labor in border states from Texas to California 
and, to a lesser extent, in other agricultural areas of the coun­
try. Those who crossed the border illegally, sometimes 
swimming or wading the Rio Grande, were called "wet­
backs"; braceros entered the United States legally as con­
tract laborers. Related problems of halting the stream of 
wetbacks and of guaranteeing equitable treatment for 
braceros figured prominently in United States-Mexican re­
lations for over two decades. 
According to the terms of notes exchanged on August 4, 
1942, it was agreed that the United States government would 
serve as the primary contractor for bracero labor. This meant 
that a contract would be signed by the worker and a repre­
sentative of the Farm Security Administration, with supervi­
sion by the Mexican government. American farmers, in turn, 
were required to subcontract with the Farm Security Ad­
ministration for workers to fill their particular labor needs. 
Mexican officials were convinced that such an arrangement 
would best protect the braceros from unfair treatment.13 In 
12. See "Bleak Outlook for Screwworm Program," Farm Journal, Febru­
ary, 1969, p. 42; "Screwworm Situation Described Critical," Sheep and Coat 
Raiser, September, 1968, pp. 10-11; and Mary K. Mahoney, "Screwworm 
Buildup Critical," Cattleman, October, 1968, pp. 23, 186. 
13. Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement 
of 1942," Agricultural History XXXIV (1960), 147-49. 
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view of widespread social discrimination against Mexicans 
in Texas, the Mexican government refused to allow the re­
cruitment of braceros for employment in that state. Never­
theless, desperate wetbacks crossed the Rio Grande in large 
numbers, and the United States authorities made only lim­
ited efforts to deny Texas employers the labor supply that 
was deemed necessary. At the end of 1947 the United States 
government ceased to contract for braceros; and although 
arrangements were made for continuation of the bracero 
program, contracting was carried out directly between 
braceros and farmers or farm associations, with contract su­
pervision entirely in the hands of the Mexican authorities.14 
Unsatisfied with arrangements for bracero contracting and 
with the failure of United States authorities to curb employ­
ment of wetbacks, the Mexican government early in 1951 
called for a review of the farm labor problem. In view of the 
American labor shortage caused by the Korean conflict, 
Mexico was in a strong bargaining position.15 During discus­
sions held in Mexico City from January 26 to February 3, 
Mexican officials insisted that the contracting of braceros 
should be carried out by a United States government agency, 
as had been the case between 1942 and 1947. Department of 
State representatives agreed to this demand;16 and in June 
the United States Congress enacted Public Law 78, which 
authorized the secretary of labor to recruit braceros, operate 
14. For a candid account of exploitation of wetback labor in Texas, see
John McBride, Vanishing Bracero: Valley Revolution (San Antonio, 1963):
also see two articles by Otey M. Scruggs: "The United States, Mexico, and
the Wetbacks, 1942-1947," Pacific Historical Review XXX (1961), 149-64, 
and "Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947," ibid., XXXII (1963), 
251-64. 
15. U.S. Department of State Bulletin XXIV (1951), 188. For a sum­
mary of United States—Mexican farm labor agreements between 1947 and 
1951, see George O. Coalson, "Mexican Contract Labor in American Agri­
culture," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly XXXIII (1952), 231-35. 
16. U.S. Department of State Bulletin XXIV (1951), 300. 
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reception centers, provide for transportation from the re­
cruitment centers in Mexico to the reception centers, provide 
subsistence and medical care during transportation and 
while at reception centers, assist braceros and their employ­
ers in negotiating contracts, and guarantee fulfillment of 
contract terms by employers.17 
Following enactment of Public Law 78, diplomatic notes 
were exchanged on August 11, 1951, putting into effect a 
new Migrant Labor Agreement.18 Periodically amended and 
extended, this agreement served as the basis for the bracero 
program until the expiration of Public Law 78 at the end of 
1964. During the intervening thirteen years the Mexican 
government pressed for higher wages and greater protection 
for braceros, but within Mexico some employers insisted 
that they were adversely affected by the labor drain that the 
bracero program produced. Other protests came from ele­
ments whose national pride was wounded by the spectacle 
of their countrymen traveling long distances to another 
country in search of better employment opportunities than 
could be found at home.19 In view of the unemployment 
problem prevailing in many areas of rural Mexico, and ap­
preciating the fact that braceros returned with badly needed 
dollars that could be used to pay for imports from the United 
States, the Mexican government saw more good than evil in 
the program.20 Within the United States, however, labor un­
ions and other social action groups charged that Mexican 
contract labor had the effect of holding wages for farm la­
17. See Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), 7519-26, 
7538-42. 
18. U.S. Department of State Bulletin XXV (1951), 336. 
19. See S. W. Coombs, "Bracero's Journey," Americas XV (1963), 7-11. 
20. For a study of the impact of the bracero program on a Mexican state
that supplied a large number of contract laborers, see Richard H. Hancock,
The Role of the Bracero in the Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico: 
A Case Study of Chihuahua (Stanford, Calif., 1959). 
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borers at low levels and of displacing native workers who 
could not compete with cheap foreign labor.21 
When the House of Representatives voted on May 29, 
1963, to reject a bill authorizing extension of the bracero 
agreement due to expire at the end of that year, Ambassador 
Antonio Carrillo Flores addressed a note to Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk in which he argued that termination of the 
bracero program would result in illegal but unavoidable em­
ployment of wetbacks. At the same time, he denied that 
utilization of braceros by some American employers had a 
harmful effect on employment opportunities for native work­
ers. Perhaps of greatest significance, however, was the am­
bassador's expressed concern for the impact that termina­
tion of the bracero program would have on Mexico's 
employment situation.22 
Although the House of Representatives reversed its action 
and extended Public Law 78 for another year, with the end 
of 1964 the bracero program was terminated.23 Thus some 
United States farmers, who for over twenty years had de­
pended on foreign labor to harvest their crops, were faced 
with the necessity of offering wages that would attract 
American citizens to the fields or of investing in new ma­
chinery that would replace hand labor. At the same time, 
thousands of Mexican farm laborers were forced to seek 
other types of employment.24 In a sense the bracero program 
had served as an escape valve for Mexico's rapidly growing 
21. For example, see Ruth Graves, "Research Summary on Effects of the 
Bracero Program," report submitted to the Texas Committee on Migrant 
Farm Workers, Austin, Texas, January 11, 1961. 
22. Dated June 21, 1963, the letter was first made public by Senator J. 
William Fulbright during the course of debate over extension of Public 
Law 78. See Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), 23172-73. 
23. Ibid., p. 23223. 
24. For statements concerning problems of adjustment resulting from
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rural population; with the expiration of Public Law 78 this 
escape valve was closed. By its failure to extend Public Law 
78, the United States government unilaterally liquidated the 
contract farm labor problem. This was a simple solution to a 
complex problem that involved Mexican national pride as 
well as economic interests. But if Mexico suffered econom­
ically as a result of the loss of dollars previously earned by 
braceros, in the future the proud nation would be spared the 
indignity of seeing tens of thousands of her best workers trek 
northward periodically in search of higher-paying employ­
ment on foreign soil. 
El Chamizal and the Pious Fund 
Also affecting Mexican national pride were two unsettled 
arbitration cases that had been subjects of widespread con­
cern in Mexico for several decades, although most citizens 
of the United States were completely unaware of the dis­
putes. Both cases had their origins in events that transpired 
over one hundred years ago, and both cases involved arbi­
tration awards handed down in the early years of the twen­
tieth century. 
Under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
(1848) and the Gadsden Treaty (1853), the international 
boundary was established along the deepest channel of the 
Rio Grande; but subsequent to the Emory-Salazar survey of 
the 1852-53, the river moved southward at El Paso until 
some 600 acres of former Mexican territory known as the 
Chamizal tract had been added to the north bank. In 1895 
the Mexican government placed before the International 
Boundary Commission the case of a Mexican citizen who 
claimed ownership of Chamizal land. When the commis­
sioners failed to agree as to whether the river's movement 
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had involved accretion (slow erosion resulting in loss of title 
to the disputed Mexican territory and a change in location 
of the international boundary) or avulsion (sudden shift in 
the river channel that would affect neither property owner­
ship nor boundary location), they recommended that a neu­
tral commissioner should be appointed to act as an arbiter.25 
Subsequently, in 1910 an arrangement was made for the 
Honorable Eugene Lafleur, a Canadian jurist, to sit with the 
commissioners. When the case was heard in 1911, Lafleur 
ruled that the disputed Chamizal area should be divided be­
tween Mexico and the United States along the boundary 
that had been marked by the river's deepest channel in 1864. 
Insisting that the 1864 boundary could not be located and 
that the Commission must determine whether title to the 
whole Chamizal tract was held by the United States or by 
Mexico, United States Commissioner Anson Mills refused to 
accept the ruling and was supported in this action by the 
Department of State.26 
In the half-century that followed, repeated attempts were 
made to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the Chamizal 
dispute.27 Few American citizens were aware of the unre­
solved problem; but within Mexico the matter was the sub­
ject of continued public discussion and was greatly exploited 
by anti-United States elements who appealed to Mexican 
nationalist sentiment.28 Then in June, 1962, President John 
25. See U.S. Department of State, Proceedings of the International 
(Water) Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico. Treaties of 
1884 and 1888. Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande 2 
vols. (Washington, 1903), I, 42-100. 
26. For documents concerning the arbitration proceeding, see U.S. State
Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 (Washington, 
1918), pp. 287-99. 
27. For detailed coverage of the Chamizal case from its origin, see Gladys
Gregory, "The Chamizal Settlement: A View from El Paso," Southwestern 
Studies I (1963), 5-38; and Sheldon Liss, A Century of Disagreement: The 
Chamizal Conflict, 1864-1964 (Washington, 1965). 
28. For example, see Mario Gil, Nuestros Buenos Vecinos (Mexico, D.F., 
1957), pp. 135-39. 
392 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
F. Kennedy visited Mexico and conferred with President 
Adolfo Lopez Mateos on various matters, including the 
Chamizal controversy. As a result, in a communique issued 
on June 30, they announced that instructions had been given 
to United States and Mexican officials "to recommend a com­
plete solution to this problem."29 Over a year later, on Au­
gust 29, 1963, United States Ambassador Thomas C. Mann 
and Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello signed in Mex­
ico City a convention providing for relocation of the river 
channel so as to satisfy, for the most part, Mexico's claim.30 
By a vote of 79 to 1 the convention was approved by the 
United States Senate on December 17, 1963.31 Then four 
years later, on October 28, 1967, Presidents Lyndon B. John­
son and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz traveled to Ciudad Juarez, 
where they participated in public ceremonies officially rec­
ognizing the boundary change and where they jointly de­
clared, "We thus lay to rest a century-old dispute."32 
For most American citizens, this resolution of an old prob­
lem passed almost without notice. The war in Vietnam, the 
approaching presidential election of 1968, and other more 
pressing matters held their attention. In Mexico, however, 
the boundary change was treated as a matter of the greatest 
national importance. Although probably few Mexicans had 
a factual understanding of the legal aspects of the arbitra­
tion question, there was a conviction that Mexico's cause 
was just and that a major diplomatic victory had been scored 
over a more powerful neighbor.33 From the standpoint of the 
United States government, the loss of a few acres of terri­
tory and the expenditure of a few million dollars required 
29. U.S. Department of State Bulletin XLVII (1962), 137. 
30. See U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements, XV, Part 1 (1964), 21-36. 
31. See Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 24850-73. 
32. U.S. Department of State Bulletin LVII (1967), 684. 
33. For examples of the extensive press coverage given to the Chamizal
settlement, see Hispano-Americano, November 6, 1967, pp. 3-34; and El 
Dia, October 29, 1967. 
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for relocation of the boundary constituted a small price to be 
paid for removal of a source of irritation that for so many 
years had affected adversely relations with one of Latin 
America's leading states. 
Even before the formal boundary change, announcement 
of a diplomatic settlement of the Pious Fund claim gave 
evidence of the beneficial influence of the Chamizal agree­
ment on attempts to resolve another long-standing problem. 
The Pious Fund had its origin in gifts entrusted to the So­
ciety of Jesus for the purpose of spreading Catholicism in 
Upper and Lower California. With the expulsion of the 
Jesuits in 1767, the Spanish crown took over administration 
of the fund; and after the termination of Spanish rule, the 
Mexican government continued to administer it. In 1842 
President Santa Anna directed that Pious Fund properties 
should be sold and that the money obtained thereby should 
be placed in the national treasury; an annual interest of 6 
percent was to be paid by the government in support of mis­
sionary activities in the Californias. 
After Upper California became part of the United States 
under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the 
Mexican government refused to give the bishop of Monterey 
and the archbishop of San Francisco any further share of 
interest derived from the fund. On behalf of the two Cali­
fornia prelates, the United States government sought a set­
tlement before the United States-Mexican Claims Commis­
sion. Eventually payment was obtained of annuities due 
during the 1848-69 period. Then in 1902 a five-member 
Hague tribunal directed the Mexican government to make 
payments to cover unpaid annuities from 1869 to 1902; also, 
that tribunal declared that Mexico was obligated to pay per­
petually an annuity of 43,050.99 pesos. Payments ceased 
with the overthrow of the conservative regime of General 
Victoriano Huerta in 1914; and during the half-century that 
followed, American diplomats failed in their attempts to ob­
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tain resumption of Pious Fund payments for the benefit of 
the Catholic church.34 
In response to a United States note of December 4, 1964, 
discussions on the Pious Fund problem were renewed; and 
in April, 1966, a payment of 43,050.99 pesos was made as a 
token of good will. Then on August 1, 1967, a final settle­
ment was effected through an exchange of notes in Mexico 
City. Under the terms of this settlement, Mexico agreed to 
pay the peso equivalent of $662,099 to cover annuities that 
had accrued since 1914. The exchange rate of Mexico's peso 
in terms of United States dollars in effect on each annuity 
date was taken into account in arriving at this total. Also, 
in order to relieve itself of the obligation to pay future an­
nuities, Mexico agreed to make a lump sum payment, equiv­
alent to $57,447. As explained in the Mexican note, "This 
amount has been determined by taking into account the fact 
that, at 6 percent per year, it would produce an annuity 
equal to the one fixed by the arbitral award of October 14, 
1902."35 Thus another arbitral case was finally disposed of; 
and, whereas the Chamizal settlement had been more favor­
able to Mexico, the Pious Fund settlement satisfied an Amer­
ican claim. Without doubt, the latter could not have been 
obtained had the United States not agreed to the former at 
an earlier date. 
Rio Grande and Colorado River Waters 
While negotiations concerning the arbitration cases were 
being conducted, United States and Mexican diplomats 
34. See "The Pious Fund Case between Mexico and the United States" 
in James Brown Scott, ed., The Hague Court Reports (New York, 1916), 
pp. 1-54; and Francis J. Weber, "The Pious Fund of the Californias," His­
panic American Historical Review XLII (1963), 78-94. 
35. U.S. Department of State, Settlement of the Pious Fund Claim, TIAS 
6420 (Washington, 1968), p. 5. 
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were confronted with two new and related problems: in­
creasing salinity of the Rio Grande and the Colorado River. 
This development brought heavy financial losses to certain 
fanners utilizing the waters of these international streams 
for irrigation purposes; consequently, agricultural interests 
demanded remedial action, which required new programs 
involving United States-Mexican cooperation. 
With headwaters in the snow-fed streams of Wyoming 
and Colorado, the Colorado River winds in a southwesterly 
direction through 1,300 miles of United States territory, then 
forms the United States-Mexican boundary for eighteen 
miles, and finally cuts through Mexico for 100 miles before 
emptying into the Gulf of California. Rising in the state of 
Colorado, the Rio Grande flows southward, bisecting New 
Mexico; then for a distance of 1,200 miles, from El Paso to 
Brownsville, it separates Texas from northern Mexico be­
fore reaching the Gulf of Mexico. Both international streams 
traverse arid regions with millions of acres of fertile lands 
capable of producing abundant crops if properly irrigated. 
When the present United States-Mexican boundary was 
outlined by the treaties of 1848 and 1853, this border area 
was sparsely populated; but in later years, as population in­
creased on both sides of the boundary and as irrigation 
projects were developed along the two rivers, disputes arose 
over division of limited water supplies. 
Allocation of Upper Rio Grande water was arranged un­
der the terms of a 1906 treaty, but repeated attempts to 
reach agreement on division of Lower Rio Grande and 
Colorado River waters were unsuccessful.38 Finally, after 
lengthy formal negotiations begun in 1943, the Mexican Wa­
36. See Charles A. Timm, The International Boundary Commission, 
United States and Mexico (Austin, 1941), pp. 175 ff.; and Norris Hundley, 
Jr., Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy Between the United
States and Mexico (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 17-96. 
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ter Treaty was signed in 1944 and duly proclaimed by the 
presidents of both countries in November, 1945. Article 10 
guarantees annual delivery to Mexico of 1,500,000 acre-feet 
of Colorado River water "from any and all sources." " Qual­
ity of irrigation water is as important as quantity; thus it is 
not surprising that later this provision was to become the 
subject of troublesome dispute. 
Within sixteen years the Mexican government was com­
plaining about the high degree of salinity of the Colorado 
River water received. In part this was due to decreased pre­
cipitation in the Rocky Mountain region and to increased 
American usage of Colorado River waters; but the principal 
cause was construction of the Wellton-Mohawk drainage 
channel to carry highly saline ground water pumped from 
Arizona farmland along the Gila River. Channeled for a dis­
tance of fifty miles to a point near the junction of the Gila 
and Colorado rivers, the Wellton-Mohawk drainage caused 
the Colorado River to reach a salt content of 2,700 parts per 
1,000,000 parts of water during the last months of 1961. 
Since such water was unsuitable for irrigation purposes, 
Mexican fanners in the Mexicali area of Baja California re­
fused to accept delivery; and the Mexican government pro­
tested to Washington concerning resulting crop losses.38 
A Department of State press release dated December 21, 
1961, took the legalistic position: "The United States con­
siders that it is fully complying with its obligations under 
37. For authoritative analyses of the treaty, see Charles A. Timm, "Water
Treaty between the United States and Mexico," U.S. Department of State 
Bulletin X (1944), 282-92; Charles J. Meyers and Richard L. Noble, "The
Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico," Stanford Law Review XIX 
(1967), 367-419; and Roberto Cruz Miramontes, "La Doctrina Harmon, el 
Tratado de Aguas de 1944 y Algunos Problemas Derivados de su Apli­
cacion," Foro Intemacional VI (1965-66), 49-120. 
38. See Norris Hundley, Jr., "The Colorado Waters Dispute," Foreign 
Affairs XLII (1963-64), 495-500; Hundley, Dividing the Waters, pp. 
172-75; and Don C. Piper, "A Justiciable Controversy Concerning Water 
Rights," American Journal of International Law LVI (1962), 1019-22. 
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the treaty, which placed no obligation on the United States 
to deliver any specified quality of water." Nevertheless, the 
State Department announced eight days later that "both 
Governments . . . will enter at once into intensive discus­
sions seeking to resolve all questions at issue and to explore 
every possibility of removing the basic problem for the fu­
ture." 39 Later, on March 16, Presidents Kennedy and Lopez 
Mateos released similar statements concerning the urgent 
need for a satisfactory solution to the salinity problem. They 
revealed that United States and Mexican members of the 
International Boundary and Water Commission had been 
given forty-five days in which to formulate recommendations 
concerning remedial measures that should be taken. Quali­
fied soil and water scientists were to be consulted by the 
commissioners.40 Then at the end of Kennedy's state visit to 
Mexico in June, the joint communique summing up results 
of the Mexico City talks reported that the two presidents 
were determined "to reach a permanent and effective solu­
tion at the earliest possible time with the aim of preventing 
the recurrence of this salinity problem after October, 1963.41 
Subsequently, American and Mexican scientists engaged 
in study and discussion; the Mexicali Valley's fall cotton 
crop was badly damaged by saline irrigation waters; leftist 
political agitators capitalized on resulting economic prob­
lems in Baja California; and some persons speculated on the 
possibility of taking Mexico's case before the International 
Court of Justice.42 Nevertheless, the month of October, 1963, 
passed, and no solution acceptable to Mexico had been 
reached. Few American citizens were even aware of the ex­
39. U.S. Department of State Bulletin XLVI (1962), 144. 
40. Ibid., p. 542. 
41. Ibid., XLVII( 1962), 135. 
42. See Hispanic American Report XV (1962), 207-28, 887, 989-90­
XVI (1963), 234, 657. 
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istence of the problem; but for the people of Mexico, espe­
cially residents of the Mexicali area, it was a matter of great 
importance. Therefore, after conferring with President John­
son at Palm Beach in February, 1964, President Lopez 
Mateos told reporters, "The main issue of my talks with 
President Johnson was precisely the excess of salt in the wa­
ters that Mexico receives from the Colorado River."43 The 
importance of this matter was underscored further in the 
presidents' joint communique of February 22, which re­
ported: "President Lopez Mateos observed that the govern­
ment of Mexico and Mexican public opinion consider that 
this problem is the only serious one between the two coun­
tries and emphasized the importance of finding a permanent 
solution as soon as possible." " 
Another year passed. Finally, on March 22, 1965, Presi­
dent Johnson announced that the United States and Mexico 
had reached an agreement on measures to be taken for re­
solving the Colorado River salinity problem. Formulated by 
the International Boundary and Water Commission, the 
agreement obligated the United States to construct and 
maintain at its expense a bypass channel for the purpose of 
carrying Wellton-Mohawk drainage to a point on the Colo­
rado River below Mexico's Morelos Dam diversion facilities, 
which direct irrigation water to the Mexicali Valley. At 
times when Mexico receives large water deliveries, it will 
be possible to discharge above the Morelos Dam if requested 
by Mexican authorities. Regardless of whether the drainage 
is diluted with better quality water and utilized for irrigation 
purposes, or whether it is conveyed to the Colorado River 
at a point below the dam and allowed to pass unused into 
43. Ibid., XVII (1964), 113. 
44. U.S. Department of State Bulletin L (1964), 396. 
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the Gulf of California, the agreement still specifies that 
drainage is to be charged against Mexico as part of the 
guaranteed annual delivery of 1,500,000 acre-feet of water 
"from any and all sources."45 Built at a cost of $2.5 million, 
the 13-mile bypass was completed in November, 1965.46 
In much the same way that the Wellton-Mohawk drain­
age canal produced a Colorado River salinity problem for 
the Mexicali Valley of Baja California, Mexico's El Morillo 
canal was carrying in the summer of 1962 a flow of 11,900 
parts of salt drainage to the Rio Grande at a point near Mis­
sion, Texas.47 This drainage had an adverse effect on crops 
of citrus, vegetables, seedlings, and cotton grown on 780,000 
acres of irrigated Texas land and on similar crops produced 
on a smaller Mexican acreage. When Mexico failed to resolve 
the salinity problem, the International Boundary and Water 
Commission recommended construction of a conveyance 
channel to carry El Morillo drainage to the Gulf of Mexico.48 
On December 30, 1965, Presidents Johnson and Diaz Or­
daz announced their support of the recommendation.49 Sub­
sequently, the United States Congress enacted Public Law 
89-584, which authorized the Department of State to enter 
into an agreement whereby both countries share equally in 
construction, maintenance, and operating costs of a diver­
sion channel to be built and managed by Mexico under su­
pervision of the International Boundary and Water Com­
mission. The act imposed ceilings of $690,000 for total 
United States construction costs and $20,000 for this coun­
45. Ibid., LII (1965), 555-57. 
46. Hundley, Dividing the Waters, p. 179. 
47. Ibid., pp. 219-20. 
48. See excerpt from Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report 
No. 1485 printed in Congressional Record, 89th Cone., 2d Sess. (1966) 
20180-81. 
49. U.S. Department of State Bulletin LIV (1966), 118. 
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try's share of annual operation and maintenance costs; also, 
it stipulated: 
Before concluding the agreement or agreements, the Secre­
tary of State shall receive satisfactory assurance from private 
citizens or a responsible group that they will pay the United 
States Treasury one-half of the actual United States costs of 
such construction, including costs of design and right-of-way, 
and one-half of the actual costs of operation and mainte­
60 nance.
On September 19, 1966, at the time that he signed the act, 
President Johnson stated that nearly 90 percent of the re­
quired contribution had been raised and placed on deposit 
in the United States Treasury by Texans benefitting most 
directly from the drainage diversion project. Then on Feb­
ruary 10 he announced that Mexico had begun initial con­
struction work and that the channel would be completed in 
1968.61 Actually, the project, which involved constructing a 
new channel of 24.6 miles and improving an old drainage 
facility fifty miles in length, was not completed until June 
30, 1969.52 
From the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, the arid 
borderlands have serious water supply and utilization prob­
lems. Neither American nor Mexican citizens can live and 
prosper in this area without adequate amounts of fresh wa­
ter of good quality. As long as water is the key to life and 
prosperity in the Rio Grande and Colorado River basins, it 
is probable that international disputes over water rights will 
50. Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 21894-95. 
51. U.S. Department of State Bulletin LV (1966), 686; LVI (1967), 
428-29. 
52. See the International Boundary and Water Commission's brochure 
and map entitled The Morillo Drain Diversion Canal: A Joint International 
Project of the United States and Mexico for Improvement of the Quality of 
Water of the Lower Rio Grande (July, 1960). 
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arise; however, both the Water Treaty of 1944 and the recent 
experiences in dealing with salinity problems suggest that 
important steps have been taken toward developing a tradi­
tion of United States-Mexican cooperation in resolving such 
issues. 
Coastal Fisheries 
Not only have Mexico and the United States engaged in 
disputes involving the waters of international rivers, but 
they also have differed sharply over the issue of fishing rights 
in their coastal waters. Thus, an agreement establishing the 
width of those coastal waters wherein exclusive fishing rights 
are to be recognized represents another significant achieve­
ment in United States-Mexican relations since World 
War II. 
On October 27, 1967, during the course of President Diaz 
Ordaz's state visit to Washington, Secretary of Foreign Re­
lations Antonio Carrillo Flores and Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk met in the United States capital and exchanged notes 
for the purpose of effecting an agreement concerning fishing 
rights in the coastal waters of their countries. Earlier, at the 
Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea held in 1958 and 
1960, Mexico had contributed to the defeat of United States 
proposals designed to establish for all nations the breadth 
of the territorial sea and the zone of exclusive fishing rights. 
Therefore, the 1967 exchange of diplomatic notes repre­
sented an attempt to deal on a bilateral basis with a portion 
of the greater problem that had been left unresolved at 
Geneva. 
Territorial waters are defined as a maritime zone adjacent 
to a state's territory over which it exercises, or has the right 
to exercise, jurisdiction. During the eighteenth and nine­
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teenth centuries, the United States and leading European 
naval powers were in general agreement that the width of 
this zone was limited to three nautical miles and that a lit­
toral state might reserve fisheries therein for the exclusive 
use of its citizens.53 At the Hague Codification Conference 
of 1930, however, several states insisted on wider belts of 
territorial waters; and although three miles was recognized 
as a minimum width, no agreement was reached on the max­
imum width.54 On August 29, 1935, President Cardenas is­
sued a decree proclaiming the breadth of Mexico's territorial 
waters to be nine nautical miles. Later, in response to United 
States protests, Secretary of Foreign Relations Eduardo Hay 
insisted that there was no fixed rule of international law re­
garding the subject.55 
Although the United States continued to insist on the 
three-mile rule in regard to territorial waters and exclusive 
fishing rights, this position was undermined by an increas­
ing number of more extensive claims advanced by other na­
tions. Several Latin American countries came to share Mex­
ico's disregard for the three-mile rule and advanced claims 
to territorial seas of six, twelve, and even two hundred miles 
in breadth.56 Eventually, the United States was prepared to 
abandon the three-mile rule also. At the 1960 Geneva Con­
ference, the United States joined Canada in sponsoring a 
proposal for a six-mile territorial sea plus an additional six-
mile zone where a littoral state would enjoy exclusive fish­
53. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Interna­
tional Law of Peace, ed. Sir Humphrey Waldock, 6th ed. (New York and 
Oxford, 1963), p. 203. 
54. See Jesse S. Reeves, "The Codification of the Law of Territorial 
Waters," American Journal of International Law XXIV (1930), 486-99. 
55. See U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1936, 5 vols. (Washington, 1953-54), V, 758-70. 
56. See C. Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter-American Di­
plomacy (New York, 1963), pp. 106-25. 
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ing rights subject only to the limitation that historic fishing 
rights of other states would be recognized for ten years be­
ginning on October 31,1961. Strongly opposed by the Soviet 
Union and Mexico, this United States-Canadian proposal 
failed by a margin of one vote to obtain the necessary two-
thirds majority of states present and voting. Had Mexico 
voted in favor of the measure, or even abstained from vot­
ing, the United States would have won a significant diplo­
matic victory, and the community of nations would have 
achieved the long-sought goal of adopting a badly needed 
rule for delimiting territorial waters and coastal fishing 
zones. Mexico was interested primarily in excluding Ameri­
can shrimp and tuna fishermen from her coastal waters in 
the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean; and since these 
areas had been the scene of American fishing operations for 
many years, the Mexican government was strongly opposed 
to any arrangement that would recognize historic fishing 
rights." 
In the aftermath of the failure of the 1960 Geneva Con­
ference, several states proceeded through unilateral and 
multilateral actions to extend their territorial seas and ex­
clusive fishing zones. Consequently, some American officials 
reached the conclusion that the time had arrived for the 
United States to enlarge its exclusive fishing zone even 
though no changes were made in regard to the width of the 
territorial sea. Complaints by American fishermen that So­
viet fishing fleets were taking increasingly large catches 
57. For a detailed and authoritative account of the 1960 conference 
written by the chairman of the U.S. delegation, see Arthur H. Dean, "The
Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom
of the Seas," American Journal of International Law LIV (I960), 751-89.
For criticism of Dean's article and for further explanation of Mexico's posi­
tion, see Alfonso Garcia Robles, "The Second United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea—A Reply," ibid., LV (1961), 669-75; Dean's re­
sponse is printed on pages 675-80. 
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within the 3- to 12-mile coastal area spurred members of 
Congress to introduce bills for the purpose of establishing a 
12-mile exclusive fishing zone. Significantly, Douglas Mac-
Arthur II, the assistant secretary of state for congressional 
relations, when queried by Senator Warren G. Magnuson, 
replied that his department was not opposed "to establish­
ing a 12-mile exclusive fisheries zone subject to the contin­
uation of such traditional fishing by foreign states as may 
be recognized by the U.S. government." Also, he com­
mented that such action "would make it more difficult, from 
the standpoint of international law, to extend the zone be­
yond 12 miles in the future."58 Thereafter, Public Law 89­
658 was passed early in October, 1966. It established exclu­
sive United States fishing rights within the 12-mile coastal 
zone, but authorized recognition of historic fishing rights of 
foreign states.59 
Thus the way was paved for negotiations between United 
States and Mexican governments regarding a problem that 
had been the source of friction for several years. Frequently, 
Mexico had complained about American fishermen en­
croaching upon her waters, and in some instances United 
States vessels had been seized and fishermen had been 
fined; but as long as the United States refused to recognize 
the 9-mile territorial sea limit, American diplomatic officials 
disregarded such complaints.60 An end to this controversy, 
58. This document is printed in International Legal Materials V (1966), 
61&-17. 
59. For congressional debate on the measure, see Congressional Record, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 13606-12, 24859-69, 25291. 
60. Under terms of Public Law 680 (68 Stat. 883), owners of U.S. 
vessels "seized by a foreign country on the basis of rights or claims in ter­
ritorial waters or on the high seas which are not recognized by the United
States" are to be reimbursed by the secretary of the treasury for fines paid
to secure release of a vessel and crew. For an account of the seizure of 
two U.S. fishing vessels by the Mexican government in February and April,
1962, see "State Responsibility and International Claims," American Jour­
nal of International Law LVII (1963), 899-902. 
 405 BROWN AND WILKIE
and a step toward resolution of differences that had divided 
United States and Mexican delegations at the Geneva Con­
ferences, was suggested in a Department of State announce­
ment on May 25, 1967, which stated that "informal and 
exploratory conversations . .  . on fishery questions of mu­
tual interest" had been concluded in Washington that date.61 
Further discussions took place in Mexico City from Septem­
ber 11 to 19, and on September 21 a Department of State 
press release disclosed that "the delegations agreed on rec­
ommendations to their Governments which would regulate 
the fisheries of each country operating within the contiguous 
fishery zone of the other."62 Then on October 27, when Presi­
dent Diaz Ordaz was in Washington and at a time when the 
Chamizal settlement had brought United States-Mexican 
relations to a high point of harmony and good will, Secretary 
of State Rusk and Minister of Foreign Relations Carrillo 
Flores exchanged notes providing for reciprocal fishing 
rights during the 1968-73 period within 9- to 12-mile zones 
where Mexican and United States vessels had carried on 
fishing operations for shrimp and various species of fish 
"during the five years immediately preceding January 1, 
1968." The agreement, however, stipulated that fishing in 
these zones is to be continued in such a manner that the total 
catch by American and Mexican vessels will not exceed the 
levels of the five years prior to that date. Concerning the 
matter of territorial waters, it is specified that the fisheries 
agreement 
does not imply a change of position or an abandonment of 
the positions maintained by each Government regarding the 
breadth of the territorial sea, this matter not being the object 
of this agreement, nor does it limit their freedom to continue 
61. U.S. Department of State Bulletin LVI (1967), 919. 
62. Ibid., LVII (1967), 475. 
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defending them in the international forum or in any of the 
ways recognized by international law.63 
The United States-Mexican coastal fishery agreement 
represents a compromise. Mexico has recognized American 
historic fishing rights in the 9- to 12-mile zone of Mexican 
coastal waters, although the Mexican delegation at the 
Geneva Conferences opposed recognition of any historic 
fishing rights. At the same time, while not recognizing 
Mexico's claim to a 9-mile territorial sea, the United States 
has accepted the Mexican claim to exclusive fishing rights 
within that area; and though American fishing vessels are to 
be allowed to operate in the 9- to 12-mile zone until the end 
of 1973, after that time it is agreed that American fishermen 
will be denied access to those waters also. Since relatively 
few Mexican vessels have fished in United States coastal 
waters as compared with the number of American vessels 
that historically have fished off Mexico's coasts, the agree­
ment of 1967 represents an especially good bargain for Mex­
ico. There may be reason to doubt, however, whether Mexico 
will be able to develop a fishing industry large enough to 
exploit fully the 12-mile coastal zone from which all Ameri­
can fishermen are to be excluded at the beginning of 1974. 
But regardless of what Mexico's fishermen may be able to 
achieve in the coastal waters that they will monopolize, a 
troublesome controversy has been settled. 
Interventionism in the Americas 
Unfortunately, there are other problems that have not 
been resolved. Prominent among the latter is the sharp dis­
63. U.S. Department of State, Agreement between the United States of 
America and the United Mexican States on Traditional Fishing in the Ex­
clusive Fishery Zones Contiguous to the Territorial Seas of Both Countries.
TIAS 6359 (Washington, 1968). 
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agreement between the United States and Mexico concern­
ing diplomatic recognition and a related matter—inter­
ventionism. 
Mexico's post-World War II policy of diplomatic recogni­
tion has been influenced by the Estrada Doctrine, which was 
spelled out by that country's minister of foreign relations on 
September 27, 1930. Condemning recognition practice 
"which allows foreign governments to decide on the legiti­
macy or illegitimacy of another regime," Genaro Estrada 
asserted that 
the Mexican Government limits itself to maintain or recall 
its diplomatic agents, as it may deem advisable, and to con­
tinue to accept, also as it may deem advisable, similar dip­
lomatic agents which the respective nations have accredited 
in Mexico, without judging, hastily or a posteriori, the right 
which foreign nations have to accept, maintain or substitute 
their governments or authorities.64 
Though the Estrada Doctrine pertained to recognition, in 
reality it enunciated the principle of nonintervention.65 This 
policy reflected Mexico's long-standing opposition to United 
States intervention in Mexican affairs and seemed to offer a 
diplomatic way to avoid intervention in any other country's 
internal affairs.68 
64. Translated by Edna Monz6n de Wilkie from text given in Luis G. 
Franco, Glosa del Periodo de Gobierno del C. Gral. e Ing. Pascual Ortiz 
Rubio, 1930-1932; Relaciones Exteriores . . . (Mexico, D.F., 1947), pp. 
189-90. 
65. Ann Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention: The Law and 
Its Import in the Americas (Dallas, 1956), p. 50. For comments by three
prominent Mexican political figures (Marte R. Gomez, Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, Emilio Portes Gil), see James W. Wilkie and Edna Monz6n de 
Wilkie, MSxico Visto en el Siglo XX: Entrevistas de Historia Oral (Mexico, 
D.F., 1969), pp. 137-38, 396-97, 525-26. 
66. As early as 1918, for example, President Venustiano Carranza stated
in his message to Congress: "No country should intervene in any form or
for any reason in the internal affairs of another"; see quotation and discus­
sion in Peggy Fenn, "Mexico, la no Intervenci6n y la Autodeterminaci6n 
en el Caso de Cuba," Foro Internadonal IV (1963-64), 1-19. 
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The Estrada Doctrine has taken on a special importance 
in the Cold War era. Citing Estrada's principle of noninter­
vention, Mexico has refused to sanction an international 
hemispheric police force for the Organization of American 
States (OAS). Also, at the Tenth Inter-American Confer­
ence in Caracas (1954), the doctrine provided a rationale 
for Mexico's abstention from voting on the United States 
plan to censure implicitly "Communism in Guatemala." 
More recently it has been used to justify Mexico's refusal to 
support collective police action by the OAS against Cuban-
sponsored guerrilla activity directed at other Latin American 
governments. For example, when Fidel Castro sought to ex­
port violence to Venezuela by sponsoring insurrection and 
political assassination, Mexico declined to vote for, or to 
honor, the OAS resolution to break diplomatic and economic 
relations with Cuba.67 
Having experienced United States intervention during the 
earlier years of this century, Mexico has reacted by formulat­
ing a general rule that precludes unilateral or multilateral 
intervention in any country's internal affairs.68 Thus it may 
appear that Mexican foreign policy encourages guerrilla 
invasions by opposing collective intervention designed to 
deal with such actions. Actually Mexico is simply caught in 
a series of contradictions inherited from a traditional fear of 
American power. As for Mexico's Cuban policy during the 
past ten years, probably it can be explained best in terms of 
67. See Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Mexico en la OEA," Foro Interna­
tional VI (1965-66), 288-302; and Javier Rondero, "Mexico at Punta del 
Este," in Carlos A. Astiz, ed., Latin American International Politics: Ambi­
tions, Capabilities and the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil and Argen­
tina (Notre Dame, Ind., 1969), pp. 111-36. 
68. See, for example, Foreign Minister Manuel Tello's outline of Mexi­
can history in his speech at the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers, San
Jose, Costa Rica, 1960. Here Tello insists that once a revolution is underway,
it must take its course without foreign intervention if a people are to learn
from their experience. A summary of this discourse is given in Politico, 
September 1, 1960, pp. 32-36. 
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a Mexican nationalism that is sensitive to all suggestions that 
Mexico's foreign policy should be subject to United States 
direction in any way. Because of a desire to see Latin 
America free of nuclear weapons, however, Mexico backed 
President Kennedy in the crisis of October, 1962, by asking 
Castro to remove offensive missiles from Cuban soil.69 Also, 
in January of that same year, Mexico abstained and did not 
vote against Cuba's expulsion from the OAS or against pro­
hibiting the sale of arms to Cuba, because, as her minister of 
foreign relations noted, "it seems without doubt that there 
exists a deep-rooted incompatibility between membership 
in the Organization of American States and a Marxist-
Leninist political belief."70 
United States Investment in Mexico 
Closely akin to Mexico's sensitivity concerning United 
States influence over her foreign policy is Mexico's preoccu­
pation with a fear of "economic imperialism." In other words, 
Mexico is on guard against economic as well as political con­
trols that might be exercised by her northern neighbor. Thus, 
in recent years, American private investors have been 
viewed by many Mexicans as dangerous instruments of 
imperialism. 
Writing in 1952, Howard F. Cline described the period of 
United States-Mexican relations since 1940 as an "Era of 
Good Feeling" in which economic matters rather than 
political affairs had been emphasized; and he commented, 
"The flow of capital, goods, ideas, and men from the northern 
republic to the southern has been an important element in 
69. See the Mexican Foreign Office declaration reprinted in Politica,
November 1, 1962, p. 3. 
70. See Politica, February 1, 1961, pp. 34-38, especially p. 38. 
410 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
the economic and industrial revolution taking place in Mex­
ico."71 Cline's description of United States-Mexican rela­
tions extends into the 1970s. At the same time, one must 
recognize that the heritage of American intervention and in­
fluence in Mexico and other Latin American countries has 
continued to affect United States-Mexican economic rela­
tions. Despite denials from American businessmen and dip­
lomats, some Mexicans are convinced that United States 
interests have conspired to dominate Mexico through eco­
nomic means. 
An example of this thinking is found in a book by Jos6 
Luis Cecena, a Mexican Marxist whose anti-United States 
ideas are rather typical of those frequently expressed in 
Mexico's intellectual circles. Cecena charges that a very 
significant part of Mexico's economy is "controlled by four 
super groups [i.e., financial groups] that act as one monopo­
listic bloc making them the most important factor in the 
decisions of the [Mexican] private sector." He insists that 
the interlocking directorates of these four financial empires 
(Morgan Guaranty, First National Bank of New York, Du 
Pont-Chemical Bank, and the Chase-Rockefeller interests) 
not only control the economic life of the United States 
(along with the Mellon interests) but also dominate Mex­
ico's most important economic activities. Cecena claims that 
since the early 1960s foreign interests (83 percent United 
States and 17 percent other countries) have controlled 28 
percent of the 2,000 largest companies in Mexico and have 
greatly influenced another 14 percent. "Control," according 
to Cecena, involves ownership of over 50 percent of an 
enterprise's stock; influence refers to stock ownership rang­
ing between 25 and 50 percent. Thus he insists that "only 
colonial territories and some countries cultivating a single 
71. Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 387. 
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crop present a situation of greater dependency than Mex­
ico." Regarding this "economic occupation" of Mexico, espe­
cially by United States "monopolies," he is particularly con­
cerned that United States capital has controlled or heavily 
influenced at least 69 percent of the capital in 10 of Mexico's 
20 most important economic sectors. Noting that in the 
early 1960s 26 of the 40 most popular television programs 
were produced north of the border and sponsored by Ameri­
can firms, he sees evidence of both cultural and economic 
imperialism. Cecena believes that Mexico is dependent on 
foreign capital (which makes Mexican development sub­
servient to the international money market) and is exploited 
by "decapitalization" (which means that the remittance of 
profits abroad puts a brake on capital accumulation in Mex­
ico). In order to cure these abuses, Cecena would make the 
state the motor of development, nationalize banking and in­
surance operations, and limit foreign investment.72 
Although the Mexican government has not seen fit to go to 
the extremes advocated by Cecena and others of his persua­
sion, in this decade it has taken some steps to curb American 
influence within certain areas of the nation's economy. For 
example, the government purchased outright the foreign-
owned light and power companies in 1960 and, in conjunc­
tion with private Mexican interests, obtained control of the 
Pan American Sulphur Company in 1967. Also, a new mining 
law of 1961 limits all new mining concessions to a maximum 
of 34 percent foreign capital; and, in order to encourage 
"Mexicanization" of concessions already granted, the govern­
ment has offered a 50 percent tax reduction to mining com­
72. Jose Luis Cecena, El Capital Monopolista y la Econdmia de MSxico,(Mexico, D. F., 1963), pp. 108-9, 145-46, 155, 172-74, 177-78, 196-98. 
For another work that condemns United States foreign investment, see Pablo
Gonzalez Casanova, ha Ideologia Norteamericana Sobre Inversiones Ex­
tranieras (Mexico, D.F., 1955). In contrast, see Manuel Gomez Morin in 
Wilkie and Wilkie, Mexico Visto en el Siglo XX, pp. 208-9. 
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panies limited to 49 percent foreign capital.73 In view of 
these actions by the Mexican government, American diplo­
mats and investors are quite aware that continuing pressures 
and restrictions on foreign capital can be expected in the 
future. 
Can such actions against foreign capital be attributed to a 
dramatic expansion of American investment activity in that 
country that has had a detrimental effect on Mexican busi­
nessmen? In order to answer this question, comparisons will 
be made between American direct investment since World 
War II and Mexican public and private investment during 
this period. First, however, it seems important to point out 
that between 1940 and 1946, United States direct invest­
ment decreased from $358 million (1,970 million pesos at 
the exchange rate of 5.504) to $316 million (1,534 million 
pesos at the exchange rate of 4.855); at the same time, total 
Mexican public and private investment increased from 793 
million pesos to 3,287 million pesos. After 1946 American 
direct investment increased, but at a much lower rate than 
Mexican public and private investment; and by 1967 the 
former stood at $1,342 million (16,755 million pesos at the 
exchange rate of 12.5) while the latter had reached 50,600 
million pesos. Thus, the ratio of American direct investment 
to Mexican public and private investment reveals the follow­
ing decline: in 1940, 2.5; in 1946, .5; in 1967, .3. Such a de­
clining ratio suggests that the influence of American invest­
ment in Mexico has been reduced significantly since World 
War II and that complaints by Mexican nationalists against 
alleged domination by United States capital are rooted more 
in history than in present-day fact. Though some Mexicans 
73. In El Nacionalismo Mexicano y la InversiSn Extranjera (Mexico, 
D.F., 1967), Miguel S. Wionczek discusses nationalization of the electric 
power industry (especially pp. 138 ff.); the mining law of 1961 is discussed
cogently on pages 245—48. 
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claim that American investment is harmful to Mexico be­
cause it causes a "decapitalization" by which profits are re­
mitted abroad, this view is contradicted by current official 
United States policy that seeks to limit American private in­
vestment in foreign countries because it in effect "decapital­
izes" the United States and produces a negative balance of 
payments. Without attempting to analyze in detail the con­
troversial matter of repatriation of profits, it can be shown 
that income from American direct investment in Mexico has 
been relatively low. (The authors define income as the sum 
of dividends, interest, and branch profits paid to owners in 
the United States, after foreign taxes but before payment of 
any United States taxes.) At no time since 1950 has income 
as a percentage of book value for American direct invest­
ments in Mexico exceeded 9.7 percent; and in 13 of the 18 
years between 1950 and 1967, income amounted to 6 per­
cent or less. For example, in 1967 income on American direct 
investment totaling $1,342 million amounted to $62 million, 
which represents a 4.6 percent return. By any standards, this 
is a low return on invested capital.74 
Though one may argue that American capital may control 
certain Mexican industries, obviously American investors 
have not stifled the growth of Mexican national investment, 
as Cecefia would have us believe, nor has it "displaced, 
absorbed, or subordinated national investment."75 Rather, 
74. "Direct investment" includes all business enterprises in which U.S.
investors have a controlling interest or an important voice in management(usually a 25 percent minimum of voting stock); and this investment ex­
cludes miscellaneous holdings of those stocks and bonds issued by foreign
corporations or governments, which ordinarily are termed "portfolio invest­
ments." See U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics,
Direct Private Foreign Investment of the United States: Census of 1950
(Washington, D.C., 1953), pp. 4, 27, 36-42. Data on U.S. investment has
been developed from various sources and set forth in detail by the authors
in their "United States-Mexican Relations Since 1940," a manuscript cur­
rently in preparation. 
75. Cecena, El Capital Monopolista, p. 177. 
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American investment undoubtedly has influenced Mexico's 
economic growth by encouraging establishment of industries 
that otherwise might not have been developed. In this 
process Mexican capital has developed supply and support 
industries and has organized competing companies. 
The rapidly growing influence of American customs and 
styles on Mexican life cannot be attributed simply to Ameri­
can investment and advertising in Mexico; instead, such 
changes must be explained in terms of a common desire for 
peoples of the world, regardless of class or nationality, to be 
consumers as well as workers. But increased consumption 
in Mexico must await expansion of production facilities; this 
development, in turn, depends on a continued flow of 
capital into the country. Since the supply of Mexican capital 
is not sufficient, and since private foreign investment is not 
welcomed on an unrestricted basis, financial assistance must 
be obtained from other sources. 
United States Financial Assistance to Mexico 
Mexico's successful economic development since World 
War II has been predicated to a great extent upon extensive 
international financial assistance. Out of a total of $1,954.1 
million committed to Mexico during the 1946-67 period, 53 
percent ($1,033.5 million) took the form of United States 
grants and loans. The World Bank supplied 32 percent, and 
the International Development Bank provided about 10 
percent. Lesser amounts were obtained from the Interna­
tional Finance Corporation and UN agencies; Alliance for 
Progress loans to Mexico from the Social Progress Trust 
Fund amounted to only $35.5 million by 1967. Three-fourths 
of United States financial assistance for the 1946-47 period 
($776.3 million) was made available through the Export­
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Import Bank for the purpose of financing United States ex­
ports to Mexico. Military assistance totaled a mere $10.3 
million, or about 1 percent. Of the $1,033.5 million com­
mitted to Mexico by the United States over the 22-year 
period under discussion, about 87 percent took the form of 
loans, and the remainder was represented by grants. In only 
2 of the 12 years between 1956 and 1967 did loans fall below 
86 percent of the United States' net financial commitment. 
Mexico's position in relation to total international aid 
($1,954.1 million from all sources) may be summarized by 
noting that over 91 percent has consisted of loans that must 
be repaid at various rates of interest. Indeed, this is a tre­
mendous burden.78 
As has been pointed out in an earlier study, Mexico ap­
pears to have discovered a key to development that involves 
devoting up to 36 percent of federal expenditures (1961) 
for amortization of, and interest on, the public debt.77 Provid­
ing that the United States and the rest of the Western world 
continue to enjoy economic prosperity, Mexico may expect 
to obtain large loans that can be repaid with new loans. 
Should circumstances develop under which this financial 
assistance is no longer forthcoming, Mexico may experience 
painful financial difficulties. In this regard it must be em­
phasized that the United States exercises a strong influence 
over international lending agencies and that this country 
76. Financial assistance data is based on information provided in the 
following U.S. Agency for International Development sources: USAID/ 
Washington, Statistics and Reports Division, "Worksheet," January 10, 
1969; U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International 
Organizations: (Special Report Prepared for the House Foreign Affairs
Committee), Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945—June 30,
1967, pp. 47, 163. Mexico's situation is in sharp contrast to that of Bolivia,
which until 1963 depended on large grants rather than loans from the U.S. 
and international agencies. See James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution 
and U.S. Aid Since 1952: Financial Background and Context of Political
Decisions (Los Angeles, 1969). 
77. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, p. 279. 
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supplied slightly over half of the grants and loans received 
by Mexico during the 1946-67 period. In some years the 
United States supplied all financial assistance for Mexico, 
and in 1967 the United States share amounted to 67.4 per­
cent.78 Certainly, Mexican government leaders are very much 
aware that their nation's financial health depends in a large 
measure on the availability of new loans from the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank; and to an 
even greater degree is Mexico dependent on the ability and 
the willingness of her northern neighbor to supply loans and 
grants. 
Conclusion 
In view of the crises and conflicts that were so prominent 
in relations between the United States and Mexico during 
the three decades between the outbreak of the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910 and the end of the Cardenas administra­
tion in 1940, the achievements of more recent years are 
truly impressive. How can one account for this turn of 
events? First, it is apparent that Mexican presidents since 
Cardenas have followed policies of moderation that have 
provoked fewer conflicts with the northern neighbor. Sec­
ond, and more important, is the fact that the United States 
has displayed greater readiness to make concessions to 
Mexican demands. While engaged in the Cold War struggle 
with the Soviet Union and Communist China, both the 
United States Congress and the White House occupants— 
especially under the administrations of Kennedy and 
Johnson—have shown great concern for maintaining cordial 
relations with nations of the Western Hemisphere. Given a 
78. USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants . . . July 1, 1945—June 
30, 1967, pp. 47, 163. 
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strong United States desire to minimize friction with Mexico 
while contending with the Communist powers in Europe 
and Asia, the Mexican government has been able to protect 
and advance its national interests through successful nego­
tiations with the more powerful northern neighbor. Operat­
ing in the hostile and often violent atmosphere of the mid-
twentieth-century world, policy-makers in Washington 
have found a friendly neighbor and a secure southern border 
much to be desired, especially if the cost is not excessive. 
In regard to problems that have been fully or partially re­
solved, Mexico has been able to secure agreements on terms 
that have tested the ability of the United States to be a "good 
neighbor." Thus, after more than half a century of contro­
versy, Mexico obtained most of the Chamizal territory 
claimed under the disputed arbitral decision of 1911. Sub­
sequently, the Pious Fund dispute was resolved by an 
arrangement that allowed Mexico to make a lump sum pay­
ment to terminate what had been a perpetual annuity obliga­
tion. Negotiations relative to the Colorado River salinity 
problem resulted in payment by the United States of the 
entire cost of constructing a canal needed for the purpose of 
carrying Wellton-Mohawk drainage; on the other hand, 
when a similar problem developed in the Rio Grande Valley, 
the United States paid half the cost of constructing a canal 
needed for diverting El Morillo drainage through Mexican 
territory to the Gulf of Mexico. In the case of the 1946 foot-
and-mouth disease outbreak, which appears to have resulted 
from Mexico's importation of Zebu cattle in spite of conven­
tion restrictions and protests from the United States govern­
ment, the disease was checked and then eradicated through 
joint United States-Mexican efforts. Although the United 
States made a large direct financial contribution to the foot-
and-mouth disease eradication program, in later years Mex­
ico has not responded in a similar manner to United States 
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efforts to protect both countries from screwworm fly infesta­
tion. Scientists have developed a technique for eradicating 
the screwworm fly, and the United States Congress has 
authorized necessary cooperation with the Mexican govern­
ment; to date, however, Mexico has not seen fit to enter into 
a large-scale eradication campaign conducted on the cost-
sharing basis envisioned by American authorities. As for the 
coastal fisheries problem, through a 1967 bilateral agreement 
Mexico has obtained an arrangement whereby American 
fishermen will be excluded from waters within twelve miles 
of Mexico's coasts by 1974, despite the fact that American 
shrimp and tuna fishermen have fished for many years in a 
portion of this coastal zone. Probably the only settlement 
with which the Mexican government was not completely 
satisfied concerned the matter of contract farm labor. Here, 
as a result of political pressures exerted by American labor 
and other interests, Congress ended the bracero program 
that had been an important source of dollar exchange for 
Mexico and had provided employment for large numbers of 
Mexican rural laborers. 
Major unresolved problems in the field of United States-
Mexican relations concern the issue of interventionism in the 
Americas (particularly as related to Cuba and the OAS) and 
the means of financing Mexico's economic development. In 
regard to the former, the principal difficulty stems from 
Mexico's attachment to the antiquated Estrada Doctrine 
and a deep-seated fear of United States intervention in her 
internal affairs. As for the latter, Mexico has a strong prefer­
ence for grants and loans from international agencies and 
foreign governments. Where direct foreign investment is 
allowed, restrictions have been imposed that are designed 
to ensure that certain private enterprises will be under Mexi­
can majority control. 
In recent years Mexico has come to rely less and less on 
 419 BROWN AND WILKIE
direct American investment; however, at the same time 
Mexico has become heavily dependent on loans from the 
United States government and from international agencies 
greatly influenced by the United States. To date, United 
States and Mexican foreign policy differences regarding 
Cuba have not affected Mexico's supply of vital financial 
assistance. There is no guarantee, however, that the future 
may not bring a change. Certainly there is much irony in 
the fact that Mexico's increased freedom from the influence 
of American private capital has been accompanied by 
greater dependence on United States government loans. 
Only the future will reveal whether this situation will con­
tinue, and if so, whether it will promote cooperation or con­
flict. 
The United States and Cuba: The 
Uncomfortable "Abrazo," 1898-1968 
ALLAN R. MILLETT 
REFLECTING on the American influence on Cuban poli­
tics, Enrique Jose Varona in 1906 sadly concluded that his 
homeland needed to be pushed some thousand miles out into 
the Atlantic. Nothing less would sever the ties of ideology, 
economics, sentiment, and security that bound the two na­
tions. Varona despaired for the life of the Cuban republic, 
for Cuba and the United States seemed linked in an unequal 
embrace in which intervention was the norm and only the 
modes changed.1 
Intervention has so characterized the interplay of Cuban 
and American politics that it is difficult to escape the term. 
What is crucial is a discriminating understanding of what 
intervention has meant to the two nations. For Cuban na­
tionalists, intervention has meant any American commercial 
or diplomatic act that has influenced Cuban history; this 
1. Enrique Jose Varona to El Comercio (Havana), December 3, 1906,
in Case 1943/40, Numerical File, 1906-1910, General Records of the De­
partment of State (Record Group 59), National Archives. 
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definition includes advice to successive Cuban administra­
tions. For the United States, intervention has been military 
action to protect the physical security of the United States, 
to safeguard American lives and investments, and to satisfy 
a desire to foster democratic government abroad. Such inter­
vention has been episodic and marked by the ebb and flow 
of crisis.2 
Clearly this description does not exhaust the range of 
Cuban-American relations. The most obvious alternative 
theme has been extragovernmental: the continuous role of 
American business in shaping sugar monoculture and lati­
fundia in Cuba. It has been, moreover, but a step to seeing 
Cuban-American diplomacy as economic imperialism, with 
American power either broadly supporting the security of 
private capital and the class that holds it or narrowly pro­
2. Historical interpretations of Cuban-American relations proliferate like
a tropical rain forest. American scholarship follows two broad paths: the 
security-ideological apologists and the economic-ideological anti-imperial­
ists. Among the first are Charles Chapman, Russell Fitzgibbon, Dana G. 
Munro, Dexter Perkins, Samuel Flagg Bemis, and David A. Lockmiller, who 
are sympathetic to American policy-makers because of their security-
consciousness and liberal imputes. The economic determinists are not 
crudely so, emphasizing the psychological motivations behind American 
global enterprise. The most recent decriers of America's "anti-revolutionary
imperialism'—Philip Foner, David Zeitlin, Robert F. Smith, and Walter 
LaFeber—take their cue from William A. Williams; but this genre begins
with the exposes of Albert G. Robinson, Leland Jenks, and Carlton Beals. 
A common flaw in both groups is a tendency to overemphasize American 
influence on Cuba's domestic development. Cuban accounts of American 
diplomacy almost all uniformly deplore American influence, and with de­
creasing gentility after the 1920s. The best scholars—Rafael Martinez 
Ortiz, Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, Fernando Ortiz, Emilio Roig de Leuchsen­
ring, and Herminio Portell Vila—feel that Cuba never developed the sense
of cultural independence and social cohesion it needed because of sugar 
monoculture and the threat of annexation and occupation, both American 
imports. 
For a recent discussion of Cuban-American relations, see Lester D. 
Langley, The Cuban Policy of the United States (New York, 1968), 
which argues that American diplomats used nineteenth-century ideals to justify twentieth-century policies. For a review of contemporary issues, see
the essays in John Plank, ed., Cuba and the United States: Long Range 
Perspectives (Washington, 1967). 
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tecting American investments from destruction or expropria­
tion.3 
There is another thread of consistency that ties the domes­
tic concerns of Americans, the interventions of their presi­
dents, and the unhappy history of the Republic of Cuba: it is 
the twentieth-century American abhorrence of violence as a 
means of political expression. As much a sentimental vision 
as a reality in American history, this abhorrence was more 
than a continuing fear of property loss; it was the product of 
the Civil War and the class and ethnic conflicts of a complex, 
industrializing society. Whatever the causes, American 
politics has been a "game" seldom played with submachine 
guns, mobs, prisons, guerrillas, and torches. It is the Ameri­
can vision of the happy society that conditioned relations 
with Cuba: a unified people, secure, stable, affluent, tolerant, 
wanting consensual change if change be necessary. It was 
the American willingness to universalize on its own experi­
ence, to prefer unstable peace to violent social and political 
change, that triggered intervention. This cultural imperial­
ism—the moral stand on political violence and the universal 
efficacy of democracy—was as important a factor in Cuban-
American relations as the biggest loan and the most vulner­
able sugar central. 
Violence has been and is an inextricable part of Latin 
American politics, and it has been a norteamericano di­
lemma how to deal with the bewildering range of coercion 
with which Latins wield power. Political violence has not 
been the monopoly of the feudal Latin American countries, 
but characterizes the modernizing ones as well. Frustrated 
3. See Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar (New 
York, 1928); Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba: Business and 
Diplomacy, 1917-1960 (New York, 1960); Fernando Ortiz, Cuban Counter­
point: Tobacco and Sugar (New York, 1947); Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez,
Sugar and Society in the Caribbean (New Haven, Conn., 1964). 
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expectation as well as grinding poverty bring violence. Force 
is not the peasant's tool; it is sanctioned by the middle sec­
tors and technically advanced military officers. Violence may 
be the product of urbanization and industrialization as well 
as caudilloism. It may be preferred to free and unpredictable 
elections. It is a real factor in Latin American political be­
havior, and democratic political processes, as alternatives to 
coercion, have not had the legitimacy they enjoy in North 
America.4 
Cuba's history as a colony and republic has been rife with 
political violence. The acceptability of violence was perva­
sive in Cuban society, a corollary to heroic, manly behavior, 
the clannishness of family and ethnic group, and the des­
perate need of high-status public employment of the non­
working-class elite.5 The Cuban acceptance of violence, 
furthermore, seems directly related to the thirty-year guer­
rilla war against Spain rather than being only the product of 
an authoritarian cultural tradition. Violence and politics 
were by 1898 synonymous in Cuban minds; Antonio Maceo 
preached that liberty could best be secured by the cutting 
edge of a machete long before Mao Tse-tung discovered 
that political power grew out of the barrel of a gun. 
Defeating Spain, the Cubans lost their battle with them­
4. Robert F. Smith, "The United States and Latin American Revolu­
tions," Journal of Inter-American Studies IV (1962), 89-104; William H. 
Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western 
Political Quarterly V (1952), 445-68; K. H. Silvert, "Political Change in 
Latin America," in Herbert L. Matthews, ed., The United States and Latin 
America (New York, 1959), pp. 59-80; Roberto Ortigueira, "La Dis­
integraci6n Estado Normal de Paises en Desarrollo," Journal of Inter-
American Studies V (1963), 471-94; Seymor Martin Lipset, "Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legiti­
macy," American Political Science Review LIII (1959), 69-105; Arthur P. 
Whitaker et al., "The Pathology of Democracy in Latin American," Ameri­
can Political Science Review XLIV (1950), 100-49. 
5. Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Bamett, Cuba (New Haven, Conn., 
1962), pp. 90-103; Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis, 1950), pp. 
139-61, 174-200. 
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selves for a more secure, democratic, and pacific society.8 
Instead, the animosities of race, class, national origin, and 
economic status that fragmented Cuban society found free 
rein in the electoral process, which, however liberal in 
theory, was notoriously undemocratic in operation.7 Political 
violence was a sign of patriotic fervor rather than a crime 
against the community.8 
Cuban-American relations after 1898, then, were condi­
tioned by two widely different attitudes about the way man 
handles his ambitions and desires in his social environment. 
On one side was the fundamental American disapproval of 
violence; on the other, the Cuban conviction that coercion 
was an equally fundamental attribute of individual liberty 
and political action. The result was seventy years of inter­
vention and cultural imperialism by the United States and 
seventy years of exploitation of American public opinion by 
Cuba's political leaders. 
From its involvement in the Cuban revolt against Spain 
until the rise of the Machado dictatorship, the United States 
6. Enrique Jose Varona, Mirando en torno (Havana, 1910) and "Nuestra 
indisciplina," Cuba contemporanea IV (1914), 12—16; Carlos Marquez 
Sterling, Alrededor de nuestra psicologia (Havana, 1906); Fernando Ortiz, 
"La decadencia cubana," Revista bimestre cubana XIX (1924), 17—45; 
and, in fiction, Carlos Loveira, Generates y doctores, ed. Shasta M. Bryant 
and J. Riis Owre (New York, 1965), and J. Riis Owre, "Generates y 
doctores-Aftev Forty-Five Years," Journal of Inter-American Studies VIII 
(1966), 371-85. 
7. Mario Riera Hernandez, Cuba politico, 1899-1955 (Havana, 1955); 
Russell H. Fitzgibbon, " 'Continuismo' in Central America and the Carrib­
bean," Inter-American Quarterly XI (1940), 55-74. 
8. Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic (New York, 
1927), pp. 526-46; Manuel Secades y Japon and Horacio Diaz Pardo, eds.,
La justicia en Cuba: los veteranos y los indultos (Havana, 1908) and La 
justicia en Cuba: patriotas y traidores, 2 vols. (Havana, 1912, 1914). 
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government played the role of impartial arbiter in Cuban 
elections, at the same time attempting to eliminate the causes 
of political violence with periodic intervention, "interfer­
ence," and private capital. The Platt Amendment was both 
the symbol and active force of this self-assumed stewardship. 
Throughout the period there was, behind the screen of party 
labels, essential policy continuity in both countries. In the 
United States the policy-makers were committed to the 
belief that a nation should concentrate on economic self-
improvement in a reformed capitalist system while adjust­
ing controversies non-violently through a democratic politi­
cal system. In Cuba the political leadership was dominated 
by the insurgent elite of guerrilla officers, lawyers, doctors, 
and intellectuals. Rapacious but idealistic, practical oli­
garchs but rhetorical republicans, masters of coercion and 
deception whose patriotism was not so strong as to seriously 
challenge American political supervision or Cuba's colonial 
economy, these Cuban politicos were revolutionaries with­
out a revolution, without national purpose. Although they 
could claim some American collusion in their inability to at­
tack Cuba's problems, their weaknesses lay within them­
selves and their society.9 
When revolt against Spain broke out once more in 1895, 
Cuban society was already deep in the process of funda­
mental change. The mechanization of the sugar industry and 
its rapid growth, the influx of foreign capital, and the end of 
slavery were altering rural Cuba. Political divisions between 
Spaniard, Loyalist, Cuban autonomist, and Cuban republi­
9. Cuban-American relations for 1898-1935 are best surveyed in Russell 
H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935 (Menasha, Wis., 
1935) and Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the 
Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, N.J., 1964). Valuable Cuban studies 
covering the same period include Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, et al., Historia 
de la Nacion Cubana 7 vols. (Havana, 1952), Vols. VII and VIII, and 
Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, El intervencionismo, mal de males de Cuba 
republicana (San Jose de Costa Rica, 1931) and Historia de la Enmienda 
Platt, 2 vols. (Havana, 1935). 
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can were wide. The uncommitted masses, los pacificos, were 
already wedded to a life of survival. Economic activity was 
increasingly vulnerable to the seasonal rhythms of sugar 
growing and the not so predictable influences of the world 
market for foodstuffs, finance capital, and American tariffs. 
Guerrilla war, accompanied by vast destruction, death, and 
population resettlement, further fragmented what might 
have been a Cuban nation. 
In their attempt to end Spanish rule the Cuban insurgents 
knew their cause would be materially advanced if they 
could count on the United States as a sanctuary and source 
of money, men, and supplies. The Cuban Revolutionary 
party, lead by Jose Marti and Tomas Estrada Palma, 
counted on American public sympathy to blunt President 
Grover Cleveland's official neutrality, though Marti feared 
that American expansionism might endanger Cuban inde­
pendence. Consequently, the Cuban junta launched a suc­
cessful effort to align Americans with their cause. Their most 
useful tool was to publicize the barbarity of Spanish actions 
against the rebels. Through the formation of a Cuban 
League, through mass meetings, doctored press releases, 
able lobbying, and with the assistance of the American press, 
the junta had by 1896 created widespread sentiment for the 
recognition of Cuban belligerency and independence. In the 
election of that year Republicans, Democrats, and Populists 
all called for support of the Cubans. American statesmen 
found rational reasons for such aid in strategic theory, the 
Monroe Doctrine, and economic gain; but the public was 
most moved by emotional appeals about liberty, democracy, 
and the sanctity of person and property. Such sentiments 
moved Presidence William McKinley to accuse Spain of 
genocide in his inaugural address, led Senator Shelby 
Cullom to call Cuba a "charnel house of ruin," and Hearst 
and Pulitzer to call in their newspapers for a crusade to end 
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the bloodbath in the "new Armenia" within eighty miles of 
the American coast. That the war involved "uncivilized" 
methods on both sides generally escaped notice; it was 
"Butcher" Weyler, not "Butcher" Gomez or Maceo.10 
Before the wreck of the Maine had settled in the mud of 
Havana harbor, the McKinley administration found itself 
committed to act as well as talk about Cuba's future. The 
congressional debate preceding intervention had produced 
two crucial political decisions: to seek no other permanent 
relationship other than Cuban independence and to disavow 
the insurgent generals as leaders of the Cuban people. In­
stead, McKinley searched for a politically acceptable tute­
lary relationship and for "responsible" Cubans while the 
U.S. Army attempted the pacification and reconstruction of 
the ravaged island.11 
For the first year of military occupation, weak guidance 
from Washington and the benign conservatism of General 
John R. Brooke, the military governor, left American policy 
unclear and placed the political initiative with two of 
10. For American reaction to the revolt, see Ernest R. May, Imperial
Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York, 
1961), and Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston, 1931). On the press 
and public opinion: Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the 
New York Press (1895-1898) (New York, 1934); M. M. Wilkerson, Pub­
lic Opinion and the Spanish-American War (Baton Rouge, 1932); George
W. Auxier, "Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta," Hispanic American 
Historical Review XIX (1939), 286-305, and "Middle Western Newspa­
pers and the Spanish-American War," Mississippi Valley Historical Review
XXVI (1940), 523-34; Raymond A. Detter, "The Cuban Junta and Michi­
gan, 1895-1898," Michigan History XLVIII (1964), 35-46; William J. 
Schellings, "Florida and the Cuban Revolution, 1895-1898," Florida His­
torical Quarterly XXXIX (1960), 175-86. For a scholarly Cuban account 
that emphasizes annexationism rather than altruism, see Herminio Portell 
Vila, Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y Espaiia, 
4 vols. (Havana, 1938—41). On the conduct of the insurgency: Lawrence R.
Nichols, "The Bronze Titan: The Mulatto Hero of Cuban Independence, 
Antonio Maceo," (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1954). 
11. I have based the discussion of the 1898-1902 occupation on two 
recent scholarly studies: David F. Healy, The United States in Cuha, 1898­
1902 (Madison, Wis., 1963) and Tames H. Hitchman, "Leonard Wood and
the Cuban Ouestion, 1898-1902, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Cali­
fornia, Berkeley, 1965). See also Portell Vila, Historia de Cuba, IV, 13-290. 
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Brooke's subordinates, James H. Wilson and Leonard Wood. 
Although Wilson had greater faith in the politicos than 
Wood had and urged a major governmental role in agricul­
tural reform, the two generals were agreed that continued 
American supervision was necessary. Both hoped for even­
tual voluntary annexation to the United States, though 
Wilson favored immediate independence and free trade as 
the vehicle. Wood, a secular messiah for good citizenship, 
advocated continued tutelage. Both recognized the frag­
mented nature of Cuban society and the island's economic 
vulnerability, views common throughout the military gov­
ernment.12 
By 1900, however, despite Wood's rise to the governor­
ship, the McKinley administration began to plan for the end 
of the occupation. McKinley and his able secretary of war, 
Elihu Root, saw the limits of moral suasion more clearly 
than Wood and feared the domestic reaction to the shooting 
"pacification" in the Philippines. The violent reform of 
colonial peoples was a policy unlikely to win favor with the 
American electorate, however correct Wood's assessment 
that immediately transplanting democratic government was 
impossible.13 
12. Leonard Wood to William McKinley, April 12, 1900, and to Theo­
dore Roosevelt, July 12, August 18, 1899, Wood Papers, Library of Con­
gress; Leonard Wood, "The Existing Conditions and Needs in Cuba," 
North American Review CLXVIII (1899), 593-601; James H. Wilson to 
Joseph B. Foraker, June 29, July 24, 1899, and to Elihu Root, November 3,
1899, Wilson Papers, Library of Congress; Col. T. H. Bliss to Col. C. R. 
Edwards, Chief, Division of Insular Affairs, April 23, 1901, Bliss Papers, 
Library of Congress; Capt. F. S. Foltz to Inspector General, Division of 
Cuba, March 19, 1900, File 1670, Letters Received, 1900, Records of the 
Military Government of Cuba, Record Group 140, National Archives; Hugh
L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York, 1928), 234-35; Maj. J. E. 
Runcie, "American Misgovernment in Cuba," North American Review 
CLXX (1900), 284-94. 
13. Elihu Root, "The Principles of Colonial Policy," extract from the 
Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, in Robert Bacon and James 
Brown Scott, eds., The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States(Cambridge, Mass., 1916), p. 162; Root to C. W. Eiiot, May 4, 1900, Root 
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Root, however, saw that Cuba's strategic importance and 
economic potential (to benefit both countries) made some 
tutelage essential, and Wood's strident condemnation of the 
politicos had its impact. Altruism and self-interest both, the 
general wrote, cried for continued supervision; to do other­
wise was to sanction the violence and instability endemic to 
the Caribbean.14 To a large degree this was also the conclu­
sion of the congressional majority: the Cubans should be 
saved from themselves—but with minimal American respon­
sibility for the politicos' behavior after independence.15 
Root found the Cuban problem perplexing; rebellion 
and institutional change and collapse had made Cuba a 
republic unfit to intelligently and pacifically govern itself. 
Still, he sought some way: 
1. To secure a conservative and thoughtful control of 
Cuba by Cubans during the formative period, and avoid the 
kind of control which leads to the perpetual revolutions of 
Central America and the other West India Islands. 
2. To make the suffrage respected so there will be acqui­
escence in its results. 
3. To stimulate the people to thrift and education. 
I do not believe any people, three-fourths of whom are 
contented to remain unable to read and write, can for any 
very long period maintain free government.16 
Papers, Library of Congress; Root to Roosevelt, December 18, 1901, Wood
Papers; Foraker to Wilson, November 20, December 15, 1899, Wilson 
Papers. 
14. Wood to Root, February 16, 1900, Root Papers; Wood to Root, Janu­
ary 19, 1901, Wood Papers; Wood to Root, February 19, 27, 1901, Frank R.
McCoy Papers, Library of Congress; "Report of the Military Governor," 
Civil Report of Brigadier General Leonard Wood, Military Governor of 
Cuba, 1902, 6 vols. (Washington, 1902), I, 12. 
15. Orville H. Platt "The Pacification of Cuba," Independent LII 
(1901), 1464-68, and Our Relation to the People of Cuba and Puerto 
Rica," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
XVIII (July, 1901), 145-59; Albert J. Beveridge, "Cuba and Congress," 
North American Review CLXXII (1901), 535-50; Foraker to Wilson 
February 5, 1900, Wilson Papers. 
16. Root to Paul Dana, January 16, 1900, Root Papers. 
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With the imperialism issue muted by McKinley's reelec­
tion in 1900 and Wood's government scoring superficially 
impressive gains in Cuba, Root began to work out the details 
of American supervision, the political and legal restraints of 
the Platt Amendment. As Root mulled over the importance 
of a free Cuba to American security, he recognized that 
Cuban society would have to become politically pacific to 
avoid foreign interference. In the letters that provided the 
genesis of the Platt Amendment, he decided that only re­
straints imposed by the United States could accomplish this 
task.17 As adopted in 1902 by Congress and 1903 (reluctantly 
by the politicos) by constitution and treaty, the Platt 
Amendment provided the United States with future justifica­
tion for adjudicating Cuban politics. Pressed by a delegation 
from Havana, Root emphasized that Article III, the major 
provision for intervention, was to guard Cuba from external 
assault only. It did not sanction "intermeddling or interven­
tion in any manner" in internal affairs. Root added, however, 
that intervention might occur "when there may exist a true 
state of anarchy within the Republic." Asked to be more 
specific by Domingo Mendez Capote, Root explained "an­
archy" as an "absence of government."18 
For the next thirty years the Platt Amendment conditioned 
Cuban-American relations; only the successive sugar tariffs 
and trade agreements had equal importance in the diplo­
matic exchanges. Whatever the wisdom of its provisions for 
naval bases and yellow fever control and its admonitions on 
17. Root to Wood, January 9, 1901, Wood Papers; Root to John Hay,
January 11, 1901, Root Papers. For a scholarly reconstruction of the draft­
ing of the Platt Amendment and later interpretations, see Lejeune Cum­
mins, "The Formation of the Platt Amendment," Americas XXIII (1967), 
370-89, and James H. Hitchman, "The Platt Amendment Revisited: A 
Bibliography Survey," ibid., 343-69. 
18. "Report of the Committee Appointed to Confer with the Govern­
ment of the United States, Giving an Account of Its Labors," Repiiblica de
Cuba, Sentado, Memoria, 1902-1904, No. 72, Document M, Copy in Cuba 
subject file, Root Papers. 
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the importance of treaty-respecting and fiscal responsibility, 
it was, nonetheless, an overcommitment. The English politi­
cal observer James Bryce pointed out that Cuban internal 
politics could easily distort the amendment. Senator Joseph 
B. Foraker went further, pointing out that the pledge of in­
tervention was an invitation to internal revolt since the "ins" 
and "outs" could compete for American support.19 
It was just such a situation that precipitated armed inter­
vention in 1906, four years after the Roosevelt administration 
had presided over the election of Tomas Estrada Palma and 
withdrawn the military government. After 1902 Estrada 
Palma, a seventy-year-old former exile of great probity, had 
become increasingly a captive of the politicos, finally align­
ing himself with the immoderate Moderates. They pro­
ceeded to dominate the elections of 1905 and 1906 by co­
ercion. In August, 1906, the opposition faction, the Liberals, 
took to the hills in open revolt.20 
This civil war found Theodore Roosevelt and Root, now 
secretary of state, attempting to soften Latin criticism of the 
seizure of the Canal Zone and intervention in the Dominican 
Republic. Neither had relinquished, however, his moral op­
position to violent politics at home or abroad. Roosevelt, in 
fact, in a letter read by Root to the Cuban Society of New 
York, had warned that nonviolence was the sine qua non for 
avoiding American intervention in the Caribbean, a stand 
shortly embodied in the Roosevelt Corollary.21 Roosevelt, 
19. James Bryce, "Some Reflections on the State of Cuba," North 
American Review CLXXIV (1902), 449-56; Congressional Record, 56th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1901), 3151. 
20. For Estrada Palma's unhappy tenure: Carlos Manuel Trelles y
Govin, El Progreso (1902-1905) IJ el rrtroceso (1906-1922) de Republica 
de Cuba (Havana, 1923); Rafael Martinez Ortiz, Cuba: los primeros anos 
de independencia, 2 vols. (Paris, 1921); Carlos Marquez Sterling, Don 
Tomds: biografia de una epoca (Havana, 1953). 
21. Roosevelt to Root, May 20, 1904, in Elting E. Morison, ed., The 
Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-54), IV 
801. 
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responding to Estrada Palma's request for troops and the 
Liberals' threats to destroy foreign property, offered to 
mediate; he erroneously assumed that any Cuban patriot 
would do all he could to avoid another occupation. Such 
was not the case, for the warring factions explicitly said they 
preferred an American administration to that of their op­
ponents.22 This position, coupled with Roosevelt's reluctance 
to accept a rebel government or to fight a Philippine-style 
pacification campaign, ended in another period of War 
Department administration until the spring of 1909. 
The second intervention was like the first: peaceful, 
reformist and temporary in impact. The provisional gover­
nor, Charles E. Magoon, and the Army officers of his staff 
were aware that they were doing little more than liquidating 
the intervention, not its causes. The officials of the provi­
sional government recognized that violence was endemic to 
Cuban politics, and that nothing short of a long occupa­
tion or true revolution would change this political behavior. 
Indeed, the Army officers, lead by Colonel Enoch H. 
Crowder, favored longer direct supervision and the virtual 
elimination of Cuban party politics and elections.23 Roosevelt 
and Root vetoed continuing American control, created the 
Cuban Army advocated by the politicos, and eventually 
elected away the occupation. None of the observers of the 
occupation thought that it had changed a thing, except that 
the politicos now had a precedent to further encourage them 
to manipulate American interests to their own advantage 
with little fear of annexation.24 
22. Allan R. Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupa­
tion of Cuba, 1906-1909 (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), pp. 59-119. 
23. Ibid., pp. 192-270. 
24. Lord James Bryce, British Ambassador to the United States, to Sir
Edward Grey, January 15, January 22, March 9, 1908, FO 371-446, Public
Record Office, London; C. E. Magoon to Theodore Roosevelt, April 16, 
1908, Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; Frank M. Steinhart to Capt. 
F. R. McCoy, November 23, 1908, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Library of Con­
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William Howard Taft, fully aware of the dangers of mili­
tary occupation after his service as governor of the Philip­
pines and mediator in Cuba in 1906, turned to a more con­
genial diplomatic policy: reducing the likelihood of violence 
by encouraging economic progress in Cuba with foreign 
capital. Unfortunately, the American investments supposed 
to "replace insecurity and devastation by stability and peace­
ful self-development" created new hostages for the rebel.25 
Dollar diplomacy, whether loans to underwrite the Cuban 
government or private investment, exacerbated the condi­
tions that encouraged intervention. However alluring its 
pacifism, dollar diplomacy did not, in the opinion of Ameri­
can minister John B. Jackson, conform with Cuban realities. 
Jackson pointed out that no Cuban government could pre­
vent political violence, but a revolt had little chance of suc­
cess without intervention. There were only two ways a rebel 
might change the government: assassination or forcing medi­
ation and compromise by burning foreign property. The 
alternative was to sponsor reform by putting "honorable 
and capable" Cubans in power and keeping them there. If 
the United States could not do this, it should rule out inter­
vention absolutely at times of crisis.28 
gress; Maj. H. J. Slocum to Wood, November 25, 1907, and Capt. J. W. 
Wright to Wood, December 31, 1908, Wood Papers; Dr. Juan Guiteras to
Maj. Jefferson R. Kean, March 6, 1908, Kean Papers, University of Virginia
Library; Portell Vila, Historia de Cuba, IV, 561. 
25. For the purpose of "Dollar Diplomacy," see Philander C. Knox's ad­
dress to the National Civic Federation, December 11, 1911, quoted in 
Herbert F. Wright, "Philander C. Knox," in Samuel F. Bemis and Robert H.
Ferrell, eds., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 16 
vols. to date (New York, 1927-), IX, 327-28, and speech by Assistant
Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, May 4, 1911, quoted in W. H. Call­
cott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore, 
1942), p. 309. 
26. John B. Jackson to Philander C. Knox, August 30, 1910, 837.00/425;
memo, "Political Conditions in Cuba," April 27, 1911, 837.00/480, in the 
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The Taft administration, however, could not resist inter­
meddling when threats of revolt and actual violence began 
again—a reaction predicted in Cuba. When a group of vet­
erans pressed President Jose Miguel Gomez to purge any 
bureaucrat who had served the Spanish, Secretary of State 
Philander C. Knox rattled the Platt Amendment to silence 
the veteranistas.21 No sooner had this crisis passed than an 
outlawed, all-Negro political party asked Taft to intercede 
in its behalf and force Gomez to give it jobs and recognition. 
Rebuffed, the Negroes, in May, 1912, went "to the field" in 
Oriente province and threatened to destroy foreign property. 
The State Department pushed Gomez to quash the revolt 
and guard foreign property, tasks he had neither the troops 
nor the will to accomplish. The American government then 
sent ships and marines to Cuba "to protect American lives 
and property by rendering moral support or assistance to the 
Cuban government," a move Gomez welcomed privately 
but condemned publicly. The arrival of marines sparked 
racial violence outside Oriente and brought more pleas from 
the rebels. Hounded by the Cuban army and increasingly 
desperate, the Negro guerrillas actually burned some cane-
fields five weeks after their first threats. Only five more 
months of fighting, marked by massacres and looting, 
brought the revolt to a close; but "the impression still seems 
to prevail . . . among the ignorant classes and even among 
the large part of the more intelligent, that all a discontented 
party need do is to take to the woods for a brief sojourn, burn 
Decimal File, Records of the Department of State, included in Records of
the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Cuba, 1910-1933, 
in the National Archives of the United States (Microfilm Collection No. 
488) (hereafter cited by 837 number). 
27. Jackson to Knox, November 10, 1911, 837.00/502; Minister A. M.
Beaupre to Knox, January 10, 1912, 837.00/539; Knox to Beaupre, January
16, 1912, 837.00/541; Beaupre to Knox, January 18, 1912, 837.00/546. 
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a few canefields and railroad culverts and bring about Amer­
ican intervention."2S 
The Taft administration, however, denied that its military 
acts had established a precedent for supporting incumbent 
governments, and it rejected a congressional attempt to com­
mit American troops by law behind every Cuban regime. 
Rather, it preferred an interpretation of the Platt Amend­
ment that would allow the president to intervene before 
violence began, recognizing that a Cuban government might 
be guilty of acts justifying revolt.29 
By the time Woodrow Wilson and his associates were con­
fronted with a "Cuban problem," they had already seen how 
bloody democracy, self-determination, and constitutionalism 
could get in Haiti, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. 
Although the Wilsonians tried to curb economic imperialism, 
they had not, however, abandoned the belief that those who 
seized power by force begot further violence and were not 
fit for American recognition. Even after successive Carib­
bean occupations, Wilson did not question the righteousness 
of his decisions: 
So long as the power of recognition rests with me the 
Government of the United States will refuse to extend the 
hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power . .  . by 
28. William H. Taft to Jose Miguel G6mez, May 27, 1912, 837.00/614;
Knox to Beaupre, May 23, 1912, 837.00/598A; Beaupre to Knox, May 24,
1912, 837.00/637; November 7, 1912, 837.00/949. 
29. Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), 7891-92. In in­
troducing SB 7075, Senator A. O. Bacon said that the United States could
deter revolt by formally supporting the Cuban government. The Taft ad­
ministration thought this dangerous. Taft to Senator C. S. Page, May 30, 
1912, 711.37/41; Knox to Root, August 12, 1912, 711.37/42; Henry L. 
Stimson to Knox, August 9, 1912, 711.37/42; Brig. Gen. E. H. Crowder, 
"Memorandum for the Secretary of War," August 6, 1912, 711.37/42, Rec­
ords of the Department of State Relating to the Political Relations of the
United States and Cuba, 1910-1929 (Microfilm Collection No. 509). 
Hereafter cited by 711.37 number. 
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treachery and violence. No permanency can be given the af­
fairs of any republic by a title based upon intrigue and 
assassination. . .  . I am more interested in the fortunes of 
oppressed men and pitiful women and children than in any 
property rights whatever. Mistakes I have no doubt made in 
this perplexing business, but not in purpose or object.30 
Wilson, Bryan, and Lansing were in essential agreement 
that American security and economic growth would be 
served best in the Caribbean by applying the ideals of de­
mocracy, believing that in so doing they were making a 
sharp break with past policy. Their error was in assuming 
that "Dollar Diplomacy" had been conceived as economic 
imperialism and that Republican interventions had been to 
protect American investments. 
They themselves consistently reinforced the impression 
that the United States government would not tolerate any 
acts that violated American preconceptions of how a society 
should be governed.31 And Cuba, for the Wilsonians, seemed 
to vindicate the wisdom of condemning violence. The Platt 
Amendment was for them a wise tool to restrain illiberal 
behavior and protect Cuban self-determination. William E. 
Gonzales, their man in Havana, wondered if they understood 
that such a position only encouraged Cuban politicians to 
appeal for American intervention. He himself could not 
30. Speech accepting the Democratic nomination, September 2, 1916, 
at Shadow Lawn, N.J., reprinted in Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1916), Appendix, 1984-87. 
31. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-15 (Princeton, N.J., 1960), pp. 495-550; Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wil­
son: Life and Letters, 8 vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1927-39), V, 73-75; 
Statement to the press by Wilson, March 11, 1913, U.S. State Department,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), p. 7 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations); Robert Lansing, "Present Nature 
and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and Its Need for Restatement," June 11, 
1914, U.S. State Department, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, 2 vols. (Washington, 1939), II, 460-65; Selig Adler, "Bryan and Wilsonian Carib­
bean Penetration," Hispanic American Historical Review XX (1940), 198­
226. 
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make up his mind whether the United States should un­
equivocally support an incumbent regime to deter revolt 
or simply refuse to interfere under any circumstances, how­
ever fearful. That violence was an intrinsic part of Cuban 
politics and the electoral process he had no doubt.32 
In 1916 the Cuban president, Mario G. Menocal, reversed 
an earlier pledge and began to engineer his own reelection. 
His opponents, the Liberals, concluded that the elections 
would be stolen and planned a revolt, 1906 style. Anticipat­
ing such an act, Gonzales urged the State Department to 
back Menocal in order to eliminate Cuban confusion about 
what Wilson meant by self-determination; the politicos 
thought it included the right of rebellion. The elections 
were, in fact, stolen, but the State Department hoped that 
the Liberals might be appeased without American inter­
ference as an example to the world of Cuban democracy.33 
The plea for constitutionalism was too late, for in Feb­
ruary, 1917, the Liberals started a widespread revolt and 
army mutiny against Menocal, designed to force American 
intervention.34 The State Department's reaction, however, 
was to condemn violent solutions to political grievances; 
this position was explicit in an open diplomatic note pub­
32. For an account based on manuscript sources, see George Baker, "The
Wilson Administration and Cuba, 1913-1921," Mid-America XLVI (1964), 
48-63; William Jennings Bryan to Robert Lansing, June 20, 1915, reprinted
in Paola E. Coletta, ed., "Bryan Briefs Lansing," Pacific Historical Review 
XXVII (1958), 383-86; W. E. Gonzales to Bryan, November 3, 1914, 
837.00/1012; Gonzales to Division of Latin American Affairs, November 9, 
1916, 837.00/1045. 
33. Gonzales to Lansing, January 21, 1916, 837.00/1021; Alfredo Zayas, 
"A Statement on the Elections in Cuba Held November 1, 1916," 
837.00/1253; Lansing to Gonzales, February 10, 1917, 837.00/1059. 
34. Orestes Ferrara and Raimundo Cabrera to Lansing, February 10 and 
12, 1917, 837.00/1066-69; Diary of John R. Bullard, Jobabo, Cuba, Febru­
ary 12 to March 10, 1917, 837.00/1472; Gonzales to Lansing, February 25,
1917, 837.00/1138; Gaston Schmutz, American consul-general, to Lansing,
February 26, 1917, 837.00/1165; Ferrara to Lansing, March 6, 1917, 
837.00/1177; Memo, Lt. Col. Edmund Wittenmyer, military attache, to 
Secretary, War College Division, War Department General Staff, February 
28, 1917, 837.00/1196. 
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lished in Cuba. The Wilson government then committed 
ships and marines to Menocal's campaign to defeat the 
rebels. Support of a regime whose electoral frauds were 
well known was justified in several ways: that with Ameri­
can entry into the World War a rebellion that endangered 
the sugar crop or suggested German intrigue could not be 
tolerated and that American lives and property were en­
dangered. But the long-term interpretation of Wilson's inter­
vention, decisive to the rebel defeat, was that the United 
States had formally outlawed rebellion as a form of political 
action, however undemocratic the character of the de jure 
government.35 
By 1920 the consensus in the State Department was that 
political parties and honest elections (despite the adoption 
of a new electoral code drafted by Major General Enoch H. 
Crowder in 1919) were beyond Cuba's capacity and that 
only American supervision could guarantee a peaceful trans­
fer of government. Some officials thought that more active 
tutelage, not armed intervention after violence occurred, 
would be a preferable policy. This view was also held by 
Jose Miguel Gomez, the Liberal leader of the 1917 revolt 
and his party's presidential candidate in 1920.36 As it became 
increasingly clear that Menocal was going to see that his 
35. Leo J. Meyer, "The United States and the Cuban Revolution of 
1917," Hispanic American Historical Review X (1930), 138-66; Entry, 
February 27, 1917, in E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Jo­
sephus Daniels, 1913-1921 (Lincoln, Neb., 1963), p. 106; Robert Lansing, 
War Memoirs (Indianapolis, 1938), pp. 311, 313-14; Lansing to Gonzalez,
February 1, 1917, 837.00/1101; Lansing to Newton D. Baker, May 10, 1917,
837.00/1347a; J. M. Walcott, American consul in Santiago, to Lansing,
April 20, 1917, 837.00/1374; Maj. Rigoberto Fernandez to Lansing, July 9,
1917, 837.00/1393; Roberto Mendez, Rogerio Zayas Bazan, and Elisee 
Figueroa to Woodrow Wilson, January 16, 1918, 837.00/1456. 
36. Enoch H. Crowder to Acting Secretary Frank L. Polk, May 8, 1919,
837.00/1549; Gonzales to Lansing, November 7, 1919, 837.00/1549; Jose
Miguel G6mez to Manuel Marquez Sterling, January 13, 1919, 837.00/1505;
Jose Miguel G6mez to the Secretary of State, July 15, 1920, 837.00/1700;
Crowder to Secretary of State, August 30, 1919, Foreign Relations, 1919, 
2 vols. (Washington, 1934), II, 29-77; Quarterly Report No. 1, American
Legation, Havana, May 1, 1919, 837.00/1551. 
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candidate, the Liberal apostate Alfredo Zayas, would win 
the presidency, the Wilson administration again had to face 
the possibility of revolt. The State Department proposed 
to send American electoral supervisors to Cuba under Gen­
eral Crowder, reinforce the marines in Cuba, and continue 
its notes to Menocal on the democratic process.37 
Wilson and his third secretary of state, Bainbridge Colby, 
however, rejected any American attempt to influence the 
election. Only armed insurrection justified such an infringe­
ment of Cuban sovereignty. Colby made clear that the 
United States would not supervise the election to ensure 
its honesty, but was opposed to fraud and intimidation as 
well as "any attempt to substitute violence and revolution 
for the processes of government."38 Though they rejected 
sanctions as the evidence of Menocal's coercion mounted, 
Wilson and Colby did allow State Department agents to 
collect evidence of fraud in Cuba and, as a last attempt to 
save Cuban democracy, they intended, even before the 
election, to send a special envoy to Cuba to press the new 
president "to undertake a definite and thorough going pro­
gram of reform."39 But faced with the specter of military 
occupation, Wilson and Colby acquiesced to another Cuban 
election dominated by intimidation.40 
37. "Minutes of a Conference on the Cuban Electoral Situation, Held at 
the Department of State on July 14, 1920," 837.00/1701 (Among those
present: Leo S. Rowe, Crowder, and Sumner Welles); Assistant Secretary
of State Norman H. Davis to Woodrow Wilson, August 21, 1920, 837.00/
1860a; Memo, Division of Latin American Affairs, to the Under Secretary
of State, August 27, 1920, 837.00/1764; Boaz Long, Minister to Cuba, to
Colby, September 16, 1920, 837.00/1766. 
38. Colby to Francis White, charge d'affaires, Havana, August 25, 1920, 
837.00/1737. 
39. Colby to Wilson, July 28, 1920, 837.00/1860a with notation "Ap­
proved. Woodrow Wilson." See also Wilson to Davis, October 18, 1920, 
837.00/2117; Colby to Long, October 20, 1920, 837.00/1809; Daniel M. 
Smith, "Bainbridge Colby and the Good Neighbor Policy, 1920-1921," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review L (1963), pp. 56-78. 
40. The election of 1920 provides a case study for political practices in
the Cuban republic. See Long to Davis, October 8, November 3, November
5 (2 letters), 1920, 837.00/1819, 1858, 1869 and 1870; for eyewitness ac­
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From January, 1921, until January, 1923, the United 
States, through money and moral suasion, made its last effort 
to make Cuba a liberal, democratic republic. Two conditions 
precipitated this exercise in nation-building: a financial 
crisis and uncertainty about the victor of the 1920 election. 
The financial crisis was caused by the collapse of the sugar 
market, which caught the Cuban banks and the Menocal 
government badly overextended. The usual rapacity of the 
politicos and bankers obstructed reform, and only the inter­
vention of foreign credit and American financial experts 
restored Cuba's financial system—at the price of another 
foreign loan and increased foreign banking control. The 
financial crisis, however, was but a short-range concern 
and quickly adjusted. The disputed election seemed more 
fraught with peril, and military intervention was a possibil­
ity. To resolve the electoral crisis, the State Department 
dispatched its one-man crusade to reform Cuba, Major Gen­
eral Enoch H. Crowder.41 
Using the promise of American financial aid as a lever on 
the Menocal government, Crowder was instructed to settle 
the electoral dispute without violence.42 His arrival alarmed 
the Menocal-Zayas forces and encouraged the Miguelistas 
until it became obvious that the United States would not 
supervise the partial elections of March, 1921, upon which 
counts, see Mai. N. W. Campanole, USA., "In Regard to Threatened Up­
rising in Cuba, October 5, 1920, 837.00/1799, and Dr. H. J. Spinden, "The
Evils of the Present Electoral Situation in Cuba," October 22, 1920, 837.00/
1835, and "Shall the United States Intervene in Cuba," World's Work XLI 
(1921), 465-83. 
41. For scholarly, sympathetic accounts of Crowder's mission: David A.
Lockmiller, Enoch H. Crowder: Soldier, Lawyer, Statesman (Columbia, 
Mo., 1955), pp. 217—46; Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, pp. 
413-49. 
42. Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis to Maj. Gen. E. H. 
Crowder, December 31, 1920, 837.00/1952b; Davis to Long, December 31, 
1920, 837.00/1947a, and January 4, 1921, 837.00/1949; Crowder to Davis,
January 17, 1921, 837.00/1967; Entries for January 1 and 4, 1921 in 
Cronon, ed., Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp. 583, 585. 
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the presidency depended. Instead, fearing an army mutiny 
and hoping that Menocal would seize this last chance to 
foster Cuban democracy, Crowder restricted his influence 
to issuing admonitions; this was all the departing Wilsonians 
or the new Harding administration would allow. Without 
American supervision, coercion was again widespread, and 
to save their honor the Liberals boycotted the polls. They 
insisted that the American position on political violence 
gave them no other recourse but symbolic protest.43 
The resolution of the presidential dispute did not end 
Crowder's mission, for the general believed that one more 
attempt should be made to reform Cuban public life and 
that Alfredo Zayas, the new president, could be pressured 
to make changes. Despite Zayas's unsavory reputation, 
Crowder thought his malleability and the financial straits 
of his regime would make persuasion work. Zayas's desire 
for a favorable change of the sugar tariff and his need for a 
large foreign loan could be exploited, while, Crowder 
thought, pressure from Havana's businessmen and profes­
sionals of all nationalities was at last forcing the government 
to curb corruption and increase its efficiency. With the State 
Department's approval, Crowder approached Zayas and 
found him willing to appoint honest ministers, cut the bud­
get, purge the bureaucracy, and check peculation, but only 
if these reforms were forced on him "more or less in terms 
of an ultimatum" with the United States clearly bearing 
the onus for their enactment. The risks seemed worth it, for 
43. Long to Davis, January 28, 1921, 837.00/1986; Juan Gualberto 
G6mez to Crowder, January 7, 1921, and Crowder to Philander C. Knox, 
February 7, 1921, Crowder Papers, Western Historical Manuscripts Collec­
tion, University of Missouri Library; Crowder to Menocal, February 3, 
1921, 837.00/1994; Warren G. Harding to Crowder, February 20, 1921,
837.00/2207; Charles E. Hughes to Crowder, March 5, 1921, 837.00/2016a;
Faustino Guerra, President, Liberal Party, to Hughes, March 14, 1920, 
837.00/2029; Crowder to Hughes, March 12, 1921, 837.00/2080; Jose 
Miguel G6mez, "Memorandum on Cuban Elections," March 31, 1921. 
837.00/2095. 
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Crowder feared that without reform another occupation 
was inevitable.44 
From February, 1922, until January, 1923, Crowder at­
tempted, through Zayas, to create a Cuban progressive 
movement. Counting on support from the State Department 
and a group of Havana business-professional associations, he 
persuaded Zayas to appoint efficient and honest cabinet offi­
cers and presented a legislative program in the famous "Fif­
teen Memoranda," designed "to foster and promote in every 
way possible the welfare and prosperity of the Cuban peo­
ple." 45 From February until July, Crowder periodically pre­
sented his reforms, suggesting that compliance would not 
only encourage the United States to approve another loan 
and make tariff concessions but that such reform would 
obviate later American interference by making Cuba a pros­
perous and peaceful nation.46 Crowder's "moralization pro­
gram" urged balanced and limited budgets, legislative con­
trol of finances, constitutional reforms to make democratic 
processes a reality at the polls and in the courts, and the 
elimination of nepotism, graft, and corruption in the govern­
ment. 
The Crowder reform program was short-lived, for the 
44. Crowder to Hughes, March 24, 1921, 837.00/2049; Hughes to 
Crowder, March 28, 1921, 837.00/2049; Crowder to Hughes, April 28, 
1921, 837.00/2093; Crowder to Hughes, May 21, 1921, 837.00/2210;
Harding to Hughes, June 8, 1921, 837.00/2211; Crowder to Hughes, Au­
gust 21, 1921, 837.00/2158. 
45. Crowder to Zayas, February 9, 1922, Crowder Papers. On Cuban 
support: Cord Meyer, "Memorandum," January 24, 1922, 837.00/2196.
Crowder later observed: "When I returned from Cuba to Chicago and wit­
nessed the corruption of municipal politics in that city, I felt a sense of 
shame in recalling the memorandum which I found necessary to send to 
President Zayas." Quoted in H. F. Guggenheim, The United States and 
Cuba (New York, 1934), p. 157. 
46. The Fifteen Memoranda are scattered throughout the 837.00 file of
the State Department's Decimal File, but they are easily accessible in the 
Crowder Papers. They are numbered 1A (February 24, 1922), 1 to 13 (March 6-July 21, 1922), and enclosure 1 to Dispatch 205 (July 14, 1923).
They are located in Files 308-314 and File 339 in the Crowder Papers. On
the "Honest Cabinet," see Crowder to Hughes, June 19, 1922, 837.002/53. 
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forces working against it were more than the elderly, right­
eous, self-effacing general could control. Zayas had the 
subsidized Havana press charge Crowder with destroying 
Cuban national identity. Other politicos, a few radical intel­
lectuals, and Zayas's business favorites made the protests a 
chorus. The death blow came, however, from the State De­
partment. Crowder found Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes's approval of the "moralization program" did not 
include charging Cuba with violating the Permanent Treaty 
or allowing the memos to "carry any kind of threat of inter­
vention."47 Moreover, although Hughes understood that 
only Zayas's hope for a loan made him a reformer, Crowder 
found the secretary increasingly reluctant to use this carrot 
to keep Zayas on the path to "large reconstruction and 
reform."48 Instead, Hughes became apprehensive that 
Crowder's militancy was being read in Cuba as a threat of 
intervention and that the general's zeal was deepening 
Zayas's need for State Department support as the reforms 
destroyed his political following.49 The major factor, how­
ever, that ended the "moralization program" was the State 
Department's approval of a $50 million loan to Zayas. With 
the ink hardly dry on the contract, Zayas, despite his assur­
ances that moralization would continue, forced the four 
most reformist secretaries from his cabinet. By the summer 
of 1923 he had abandoned the Crowder reforms and smaller 
budgets as the general helplessly watched. Despite some 
spread-eagle rhetoric about the Permanent Treaty in the 
loan contract, Crowder knew that even verbal coercion was 
47. Crowder to Francis White, Chief of the Latin American Division, 
May 4, 1922, Crowder Papers. 
48. Crowder to Hughes, August 21, 1922, 837.00/2234, and Crowder to
Hughes, June 23, 1922, Crowder Papers. 
49. Hughes to Harding, September 17, 1922, 837.00/2263; Zayas's inter­
view with Mr. Clarence Marine, Superior Bank Liquidating Commission, 
July 11, 1922, 837.00/2234. 
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out of the question. Only a complete breakdown of the Cu­
ban government, Hughes told him, justified American inter­
vention.50 The general assumed that though he could con­
tinue to give advice, Hughes approved of this activity only 
"for the purpose of passing up to the Zayas administration 
one hundred percent responsibility for failure." Francis 
White, chief of the Latin American Division, agreed that 
this was indeed the secretary's policy.51 
By the spring of 1923, then, Crowder had lost the leverage 
of State Department support for reform; but his program 
did not completely die, for in Cuba "moralization" gained 
other champions. Disillusioned by the fall of the "Honest 
Cabinet" and Zayas's rapacity, a group of Havana intellec­
tuals, professionals, and businessmen formed the Cuban 
Committee of National and Civic Renovation in March, 
1923. The moving spirit of the group, Dr. Fernando Ortiz, 
renowned anthropologist and historian, went so far as to 
solicit Crowder's thoughts on an American-backed coup. 
Ortiz proposed that a provisional government be established, 
corruptionists jailed, the traditional political parties be dis­
solved, and the constitution rewritten in order to wrest polit­
ical power from the politicos and their illiterate followers.62 
Ortiz warned Crowder, too, that if the United States would 
not assist the intellectual-economic elite to seize power and 
purify the government, then it would have to accept politi­
50. Hughes to Crowder, March 31, 1923, 837.002/60a; Hughes to 
Crowder, April 3, 1923, 837.002/62; Hughes to Crowder, April 4, 1923, 
837.002/62 Suppl. 
51. Crowder to White, April 4, 1923, and White to Crowder, April 11, 
1923, Crowder Papers. 
52. Fernando Ortiz, memo, "The Cuban Crisis," March 17, 1923, File 
1264, Crowder Papers. For a description of the Committee's leadership, see
Ortiz memo, "Cuban Renovation," March (?), 1923, File, 1263, Crowder 
Papers. The central directorate was Ortiz, Luis Morales, Ramiro Guerra y
Sanchez, Martinez Inclan, Felipe Pazos, Gonzalo Freyre de Andrade, Raul
de Cardenas, Oscar Barcelo, Luciano R. Martinez, Jose A. Cosculluela and 
Jose Grau San Martin. 
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cal violence. Ortiz feared that Cuba was heading for increas­
ingly oligarchical government and that the public wanted 
radical change, now. The political system was bankrupt, 
financially and morally, and "the North American Govern­
ment must think seriously of giving us, in the end, a definite 
and radical solution." 63 
Crowder communicated Ortiz's bleak predictions and his 
own concern to the State Department, but Hughes was un­
receptive. The general emphasized that his "moralization 
program" had so heartened the "responsible non-political 
elements of Cuba" that he sensed a growing disapproval of 
corrupt government, at least among the urban elite. Not 
coincidentally, he also felt a growing tide of anti-American­
ism, stimulated not only by Zayas but also by reformers who 
saw American interference as the source of Cuba's ills. The 
general believed that popular frustration was mounting so 
rapidly that peaceful elections in 1924 were unlikely." 
Although aware that Harding and Hughes were no longer 
interested in Cuban reform or in jeopardizing the hope for 
Pan-Americanism, Crowder continued to warn the State 
Department that United States influence was waning in 
Cuba. Zayas had returned to a bacchanalia of graft in order 
to solidify his political support and appease his business 
favorites. Crowder despaired that democratic processes 
would ever flourish without tutelage and felt the chance to 
exercise that guidance was decreasing unless the United 
States acted to check the rising anti-Americanism: 
53. Ortiz memos, June 26, 1923, and March 20, 1923, Crowder Papers.
Ortiz, a member of the House of Representatives, also provided Crowder
with massive documentation of the Cuban government's corruption. Another
source of confidential information was Dr. Gonzalo Freyre de Andrade, an­
other congressman, later killed by Machado's gunmen. 
54. E. H. Crowder, "Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Recent 
Cabinet Crisis," April 21, 1923, 837.002/85; Crowder to White, April 26, 
1923, 837.00/2610; Crowder to White, June 21, 1923, 837.00/2312; 
Crowder to Hughes, July 12, 1923, 837.00/2318. 
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The people argue, with some force, that as no relief 
against corrupt government can come through corrupt elec­
tions, and as the right of armed revolt against such a Gov­
ernment has been denied them by the policy of the United 
States here and elsewhere in Latin America, the responsibil­
ity for the continuance of corrupt government here lies with 
the United States, and that relief can come only through a 
much more aggressive attitude of our Government.55 
The reform movement that Ambassador Crowder pre­
dicted became an active force in Cuban politics in Au­
gust, 1923. Although labeled the Veterans and Patriots 
Movement, the reformers were an amalgam of groups com­
mitted to national reconstruction. The Veterans and Patriots 
Association, a group of ex-guerrillas led by politicos Carlos 
Garcia Velez, Tomas Recio, Domingo Mendez Capote, and 
Carlos Mendieta, lent its prestige, but was the least reformist 
of the movement's constituent parts; its goals were power 
for the leaders and pensions for the rank and file. The other 
groups, however, represented new forces in Cuban politics, 
an alliance of reform interests that should have warmed the 
hearts of American progressives: the Committee of One 
Hundred, the Good Government Association, the Havana 
Stock Exchange, the Association of Sugar Mill Owners and 
Planters, the Industrial Association, the National Federation 
of Economic Corporations, the Women's Club of Cuba, the 
Rotary Clubs of Cuba, and the Association of University 
Students. Gathered in congress in Havana, the reformers 
in a series of manifestoes challenged Zayas to purify the 
government and parties, but their interests were even 
55. Quote from Crowder to Hughes, July 15, 1923, Crowder Papers. On
the failure of Cuban government, see Crowder's memos to the Secretary of
State, "Cuban Electoral Frauds and Legislation Remedial Thereof (July 
14, 1923) and "The Cuban Congress" (July 17, 1923), ibid. On the end of 
Crowder's reforms, see Harding to Hughes, May 9, 1923, 837.002/93. 
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broader than administrative reform. The assembly, which 
included labor leaders, intellectuals, and student radicals, 
offered a program of sweeping change: the "nationalization" 
of the working class, the end of corporate privileges, sweep­
ing social reform, women's suffrage, and an end to the Platt 
Amendment. As one State Department analyst noted: "An 
interesting element of a socialistic nature was introduced 
by the demand that the people should participate in the 
exploitation of agriculture, the industries, and commerce." 
Moreover, the movement seemed to be reaching people out­
side the parties by creating committees of propaganda at 
the provincial and municipal level, thus stimulating an in­
terest of "alarming proportions." Part of the army was 
thought to be sympathetic.56 
The reformers, however, could not decide on how to bring 
about change. They were divided on whether they should 
curry American intervention; equally divisive was the issue 
of armed revolt. The latter prospect alarmed the "economic 
corporations" and seemed hopeless in the face of American 
intransigence on political violence. Torn with discord, the 
Veterans and Patriots Movement began to unravel internally 
by the end of September, assisted by Zayas and the State 
Department. The Cuban president arrested or scattered the 
movement's most ambitious leaders, bought off others, and 
dramatically pledged himself to the assembly's reforms. The 
State Department remained mute to pleas for support from 
both Zayas and the assembly. Within six months all that re­
mained of the movement was increased anti-Americanism 
56. Latin American Division, Department of State, "The Veterans' Move­
ment in Cuba," September 12, 1923, 837.00/2350; W. S. Howell, charge 
d'affaires, to Hughes, August 20, 1923, 837.00/2327; Howell to Hughes, 
August 27, 1923, 837.00/2337; Howell to Hughes, October 13, 1923, 
837.00/2383; Latin American Subsection (M. I. 2-a), Military Intelligence 
Division, War Department General Staff, "Survey of the Political Situation
in Cuba," September 19, 1923, 837.00/2375. 
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and a brief rural revolt near Cienfuegos, quickly halted by 
Zayas and an American arms embargo.57 
With another Cuban presidential election approaching in 
1924, the State Department and Crowder continued to insist 
that political violence was incompatible with reform, how­
ever grievous the corruption of the Zayas regime. Hughes 
believed that a public statement on Cuban politics would 
only feed anti-Americanism. As the election approached, it 
also seemed possible that the prospective winner, Liberal 
politico and millionaire businessman Gerardo Machado, 
might be an improvement over Zayas. Crowder, after several 
conversations with Machado, was convinced that the Liberal 
candidate sincerely wanted to fulfill that treaty commitment 
of 1903 "in such a way that no question could arise under 
the Platt Amendment." Machado might even sponsor a re­
form administration since he was already wealthy. He was, 
however, airily unconcerned about the increasing violence 
of the campaign, which, Crowder warned, might occasion 
intervention.68 Machado knew the strength of his position, 
for he assumed that Crowder could not get Hughes to use 
any diplomatic tool that might lead to American interven­
tion.69 Indeed, the only thing Crowder could do as Machado 
swept to victory (with Zayas's help) was to persuade the 
loser, Mario G. Menocal, to accept defeat gracefully and 
not stage a revolt. 
57. Howell to Hughes, October 26, 1923, 837.00/2400, and December 
4, 1923, 837.00/2453; Crowder to White, January 14, 1924; Maj. W. H.
Shutan, attache, "The Cuban Political Situation," March 24, 1924; Dr. 
Charles E. Chapman to Crowder, June 25, 1924, all in Crowder Papers. 
58. Crowder to Dwight Morrow, August 26, 1926, Crowder Papers;
Crowder to Hughes, August 25, August 26, and September 5, 1924, 837.00/
2541, 2544, 2547. 
59. Crowder to White, September 19, 1924, Crowder Papers; Crowder 
to Hughes, September 26, 1924, 837.00/2557; Hughes to Crowder, Octo­
ber 8,1924, 837.00/2555; Hughes to Crowder, November 24,1924, Crowder 
Papers. 
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III

Gerardo Machado entered office a reformer; it was his 
commitment to overdue economic and political change, not 
corruption, that eventually turned his government to ter­
rorism and repression. Machado was a positivist, a moderni­
zer. He saw his mission as bringing Cuba into the twentieth 
century, a task that called for governmental intervention 
in all phases of Cuban life. "The government of our nation 
must be the great motor of social life," he said, ensuring 
equal justice, improved wages and employment, better 
roads, education, and public works, and an end to crime and 
immorality. As he told the faculty of the University of Ha­
vana, the masses of the world wanted economic improve­
ment, not abstract liberties, parties, parliaments, and theo­
ries; since the World War, only centralized authority could 
cope with the problems of modernization. Machado was 
determined that if the politicos stood in the way of honest 
and efficient government, then force would be used to sub­
due them, but it was vital that Cuba rescue itself from its 
economic distress and corrupt government.60 
The Machado administration concentrated upon ending 
Cuba's economic stagnation by raising sugar prices. Begin­
ning with the Verdeja Act of 1927 and culminating with the 
Chadbourne Plan of 1930, the Cuban government attempted 
to assist the planters by setting domestic crop quotas, estab­
lishing central marketing agencies, and agreeing upon mar­
60. Manifesto by Gerardo Machado, Diario de la Marina (Havana), 
September 10, 1924, 837.00/2549; Speech to the faculty of the National 
University, reprinted in El Mundo (Havana), June 1, 1926; Crowder to 
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on Machado address to the staff of the
National Military Academy, August 25, 1925, 837.00/2597; Machado 
speech to the Cuban Exhibition, New York City, November 16, 1925, 
711.37/80; Crowder to Kellogg on Machado address to Liberal Party offi­
cials, November 11, 1926, 837.00/2619. 
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keting quotas with other international producers. Although 
Machado's efforts were backed by American business in­
terests in Cuba, the United States government remained 
adamant that Cuban sugar was already receiving preference 
in the American market. No new reciprocity treaty was ne­
gotiated. Without a change in this policy, sugar prices re­
mained low; Cuban agriculture entered its Great Depression 
long before 1929.61 
Machado believed that Cuba's economic plight was so 
desperate that the government could no longer tolerate 
party factionalism and administrative corruption. As his 
sugar policies faltered, he increasingly turned to public 
works spending to stimulate the economy, a program for 
which he needed foreign loans and, thus, demonstrated 
fiscal restraint. Although his public speeches were appro­
priately anti-yanqui, Machado turned to Cuba's nonpoliti­
cal business associations for support. At the same time, he 
begged, bought, and coerced the three traditional parties 
into a docile pro-Machado front and initiated an effective 
police attack on crime and political dissent. So sure was 
Machado of his power and his mission of modernization 
that he decided to run for reelection in 1928 despite a one-
term pledge.62 
61. Alberto Martinez-Piedra, "Land Reform in Cuba, 1933-1958," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1962), pp. 37-52; James R. 
O'Connor, "The Political Economy of Pre-Revolutionary Cuba," (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1964); Crowder to Dwight Morrow, 
March 25, 1925, Crowder Papers; Stokely W. Morgan, Chief, Division of 
Latin American Affairs, memo of conversation with Cuban ambassador 
Orestes Ferrara, February 20, 1927, 711.37/101; Crowder to Kellogg, De­
cember 6, 1926, 837.00/2623; on reciprocity, see U.S. Tariff Commission,
"Operation of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902 Between the United States 
and Cuba," June 12, 1926, Crowder Papers. 
62. Francis V. Jackman, "America's Cuban Policy during the Period of
the Machado Regime," (Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University, 1964), pp. 
7-21; Crowder to Kellogg, October 25, 1926 (837.00/2616) and February 
14, 1927 (837.00/2627); Dwight Morrow to Carlos Miguel de Cespedes,
March 31, 1926, and Crowder to Dr. Charles E. Chapman, Crowder 
Papers. 
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The State Department knew that Machado was creating 
an opposition to his regime; both Crowder and Noble B. 
Judah, his replacement as ambassador, reported growing 
dissatisfaction. The sources of discontent, however, did 
nothing to persuade Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg 
that the United States should express concern, for the most 
prominent critics were ambitious politicos like Menocal, 
Carlos Mendieta, and Mariano Miguel Gomez, son of Jose 
Miguel and former mayor of Havana, or disgruntled Amer­
ican speculators. Kellogg and his ministers agreed that 
Machado was indeed modernizing Cuba and that he en­
joyed the support of Cuba's economic elite, native and for­
eign. Furthermore, there was no desire to resort to "inter­
meddling" for to do so risked occupation and increased 
anti-Americanism in Latin America. Despite its awareness 
that Cuba's political parties, elections, and constitutional 
democracy might disappear, the State Department was not 
convinced that such sacrifices were altogether bad.63 Still 
smarting from an electoral intervention in Nicaragua and 
impressed by Machado's messianic zeal in creating peace, 
prosperity, and passive politicos, the State Department made 
no effort to keep Machado from another term. Aware that he 
quite probably had had some critics killed and was drifting 
into a military-backed dictatorship, the department was 
satisfied that Machado would remain in control and was not 
injuring American strategic and commercial interests.64 
63. Crowder to Kellogg, March 19, 1927, 837.00/2633; Kellogg to 
Crowder, May 13, 1927, 837.00/2646; memo, "Amendments to the Cuban
Constitution,' June 17, 1927, synopsis of conference of Kellogg, Crowder, 
Francis White, and Orestes Ferrara, 837.00/2675; Stokely W. Morgan, 
"Memorandum of Conversations between the President of Cuba and the 
Chief of Latin American Affairs," April 25, 1927, 837.00/2655; Noble B.
Judah to Kellogg, June 26, 1928, 837.00/2703. 
64. C. B. Curtis, charge d'affaires, to Kellogg, October 29, 1928, 837.00/ 
2714; Curtis to Henry L. Stimson, June 13, 1929, 837.001/M18/42; H. C. 
Lakin to Machado, January 26, 1929, Crowder Papers; Crowder to Ma­
452 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
The State Department knew that Machado was becoming 
increasingly unpopular, but there seemed to be little con­
nection between the active critics—old-line party politicians, 
liberal intellectuals, and a handful of student and labor 
radicals—and what it viewed as Cuba's gravest problem, 
its economic depression. At least until 1931 the State De­
partment was substantially correct in believing that Ma­
chado's most powerful opponents were the same breed as 
the president himself, that Cuba's poverty and violence were 
chronic but not at the heart of the opposition, and that the 
critics were playing for American intervention. Although it 
may have underestimated the economic insecurity of the 
elite, the State Department did not think that the Cuban 
upper class was really revolutionary. Whenever United 
States officials generalized on the sources of unrest they 
invariably blamed the collapse of sugar prices.65 As long as 
American policy was attuned to Machado's economic poli­
cies, the State Department could not justify intervention, 
however arbitrary the regime. No government had been a 
model democracy. When the Congress in 1928 investigated 
charges against Machado, the State Department had no 
difficulty convincing the Senate Foreign Relations Com­
mittee of Cuba's generous treatment of American business; 
chado, January 26, 1929, Crowder Papers; Manifesto of June 21, 1928, 
Declarations of General Gerardo Machado y Morales (Havana, 1928), 
Crowder Papers; Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy 
(New York, 1961), pp. 48-117. 
65. Crowder to Kellogg, May 13, 1927, 837.00/2659; Stokley W. Mor­
gan, memo of conversation with Dr. Fernando Ortiz, "Political Situation in
Cuba," May 3, 1927, 837.00/2657; Curtis to Stimson, November 20, 1929,
837.00/2776; Memo, Division of Latin American Affairs, to Assistant Secre­
tary Francis White, September 16, 1929, 837.00/2759 1/2. For economics 
and the elite, see Henry C. Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export 
Economy: The Cuban Experience, 1914-1947 (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), 
p. 200. For contemporary economic explanations of Cuban instability, see
Philip G. Wright, The Cuban Situation and Our Treaty Relations (Wash­
ington, 1931), and Fernando Ortiz, "La responsabilidad de los Estados 
Unidos," Revista bimestre cubana XXIV (1929), 484-90. 
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the violence revealed to the Congress was habitual. Although 
there was private concern about Machado's desire to per­
petuate his regime, State Department officials saw little 
reason to interfere.66 
That Machado was by 1929 a dictator is undeniable, but 
his most vocal opponents until 1931 were politicos whose 
goal was intervention under the Platt Amendment. Both 
Machado and the State Department were wary; both be­
lieved that economic recovery or public works spending 
would curb mass unrest. Although the American embassy 
reported growing anti-Machado sentiment among university 
students, labor leaders, intellectuals, and professional men, 
these groups were considered pawns of Mendieta's Union 
Nacionalista and Menocal's Opposition Conservatives. The 
State Department, fearing a repeat of past interventions, 
insisted that threats or acts of violence would not bring 
American troops running, but that political liberalization 
might assist economic recovery and the negotiation of an­
other loan.67 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson and Ambassador 
Harry F. Guggenheim were correct enough in identifying 
the Opposition's spokesmen as "outs," but they underesti­
mated the depth of feeling in the Cuban intelligentsia that 
the crux of Cuba's problems was the alien nature of its polit­
ical system. By 1930 the idea was common among Opposi­
tion radicals that Cuba had to be redeemed from American 
66. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928), 6591; Judah to
Stimson, May 10, 1929, 837.00/2747; Senator William E. Borah to Stim­
son, September 12, 1929, 711.37/131 1/2; Memo, Undersecretary of State
J. Ruben Clark to Stimson, April 26, 1929, 837.00/2749. 
67. Stimson to Judah, April 23, 1929, 837.00/2730; H. F. Guggenheim 
to Stimson, July 15, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, 3 vols. (Washington, 
1945), II 650-51; Guggenheim to Stimson, October 23 to December 13, 
1930, ibid., 667-80; "Memorandum of Conference by the Secretary of State 
with the Press on October 2, 1930," ibid., 662-65; William E. Walling, 
"President Machado's Administration of Cuba," Current History XXXII 
(1930), 257-63. 
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cultural domination. Though the island's economic system 
was part of the problem, it was secondary to the belief that 
the constitution of 1901, the Platt Amendment, the Crowder 
Code of 1919, the traditional political parties, the electoral 
interventions, and now Machado were all part of a bankrupt 
political system that could only be broken by fundamental 
revolution, free of American influence. The United States 
became the source of every menace to Cuba: poverty, cor­
ruption, crime, political oppression, the influx of Haitian 
and Jamaican workers, illiteracy, disease, the degradation 
of Hispanic culture, and the materialism of Cuban life. 
Angry, frustrated, as yet politically impotent, the "Genera­
tion of 1930" assaulted Machado not only for what he was 
but also as a symbol of American domination.68 
In 1931 the Machado regime and American policy weath­
ered a traditional rural uprising designed to bring United 
States intervention. Machado by now had had his own term 
of office and that of the incumbent congress extended by 
constitutional amendment. He had made it impossible for 
new political parties to organize and had gotten a favorable 
supreme court decision on the constitutionality of his regime. 
He had secured a multimillion dollar loan from the Chase 
Bank. The army and police remained loyal. Thus far the 
radical oppositionists were small, fractious gangs severely 
harried by the Havana police. The major threat was the fac­
tions of Mendieta, Menocal, and Mariano Miguel Gomez; 
but when this coalition staged a revolt, it was quickly broken 
68. For the development of Cuban nationalism, see Federico G. Gil, 
"Antecedents of the Cuban Revolution," Centennial Review of Arts and 
Science VI (1962), 373-93; C. A. M. Hennessy, "The Roots of Cuban Na­
tionalism," International Affairs XXXIX (1963), 345-59; Cosme de la Tor­
riente, "The Platt Amendment," Foreign Affairs VIII (1930), 364-78; Ray­
mond L. Buell, Cuba and the Platt Amendment (New York, 1929); 
Robert F. Smith, "Twentieth-Century Cuban Historiography," Hispanic
American Historical Review XLIV (1964), 44-73; Duvon C. Corbitt, 
"Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba's Struggle for Independence," 
ibid., XLIII (1963), 395-104. 
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up by the Cuban army. Machado began to talk compromise 
with the politicos, at the urging of Guggenheim and Army 
Chief of Staff Alberto Herrera, and by year's end promises of 
political liberalization appeared to have ended the crisis.69 
The Opposition, however, no longer drew its strength 
from the politicos. Resistance to Machado now became ur­
ban guerrilla warfare in Havana, waged against the regime 
by the "ABC," a secret society of professional men and intel­
lectuals, and the young radicals of the Student Directorate. 
Their campaign of bombings and assassination was a new 
phenomenon in Cuban political violence. Machado immedi­
ately recognized the threat and unleashed his own terrorists, 
"La Porra," on the Oppositionists. For the next year a tide 
of murder, torture, mutilation, and execution ebbed and 
flowed in the capital. Though the rebels were never a co­
herent single unit nor were they agreed on a post-Machado 
policy, many were now committed to the new idea that no 
American interference of any kind could be permitted in the 
reconstruction of Cuban life. In the meantime, the State 
Department insisted that the Cubans must determine their 
own government, hopefully through constitutional means, 
a position that bolstered the Machado regime and helped 
keep the army loyal. The killings went on into 1933.™ 
Stimson and Guggenheim found themselves in a most 
69. Francis White, "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State," 
April 10, 1931, Foreign Relations, 1931, 3 vols. (Washington, 1946), II, 
51-54; Guggenheim to Stimson, August 10-September 9, 1931, ibid., 67-76; 
Guggenheim to Stimson, December 24, 1931, ibid., 80-82; Jackman, 
"America's Cuban Policy during the Period of the Machado Regime," pp. 
21-29. 
70. Guggenheim to Stimson, January 25, 1932, Foreign Relations, 1932, 
5 vols. (Washington, 1948), V, 533-38; E. L. Reed, charge d'affaires, to 
Stimson, May 25, 1932, ibid., 548-50; Guggenheim to Stimson, July 25, 
1932, ibid., 552-54; Guggenheim to Stimson, January 5, 1933, Foreign
Relations, 1933, 5 vols. (Washington, 1950-52), V, 270-74. For detailed 
descriptions of the Havana terrorism, see Ruby Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island 
of Paradox (New York, 1959), pp. 3-94, and Carleton Beals, The Crime of 
Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933), pp. 239-399. 
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annoying dilemma. Both adhered to the conservative Root 
interpretation of the Platt Amendment; both believed that 
the drift to intermeddling after 1902 had been the basic 
flaw in Cuban-American relations. In 1932 there was no 
threat of foreign intervention and, as yet, no loss of American 
lives and little property damage. Yet the State Department 
was being urged by Cuban exiles, assorted congressmen, and 
American liberals to end Machado's inhumanity against 
Cuba's "best people." Stimson, however, thought that there 
was little public taste for armed intervention and that spon­
soring impartial elections was a policy that moved Americans 
but had little meaning in the Caribbean. Yet no interference 
was interpreted as approval of Machado and steadily in­
creased the chance of a revolution of unforeseeable dimen­
sions.71 
Upon taking office in the gloomy spring of 1933, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Assistant 
Secretary Sumner Welles thought the Cuban insurgency too 
important to be ignored. Cuba, as well as the United States, 
needed a New Deal; and as committed Wilsonians, the ad­
ministration's policymakers believed that only the tactics 
of Wilsonian idealism, not its assumptions, needed change. 
Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles were not against interfering in 
the cause of democracy, social harmony, and constitution­
alism; they only wanted to avoid military occupation. More 
positively, they wanted to stimulate Latin American prog­
ress by lowering tariff barriers and to make Wilsonianism 
71. Stimson quoted in New York Times, Feb. 7, 1931; Stimson to Gug­
genheim, March 26, 1932, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 543^17; Wood, 
Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, pp. 52-59; Henry Stimson, "Bases of
American Foreign Policy during the Past Four Years," Foreign Affairs XI 
(1933), 383-96. Ambassador Guggenheim, counseled in Havana by Root's
biographer, Philip C. Tessup, went further, advocating a new treaty to re­
place the Platt Amendment. (Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, 
pp. 231-50). For public and congressional opinion: Congressional Record, 
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 7874, and 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), 
2891-93; Literary Digest CXV (February 25, 1933), 10. 
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multilateral through Pan-American diplomacy. Such Good 
Neighborliness was also clearly in America's interest, too, 
because it insured the strategic security of the hemisphere 
and promised wider markets for a prostrate economy. Thus 
liberal idealism, Pan-Americanism, hemispheric security, 
and economic recovery blended in happy harmony in the 
New Deal for Cuba.72 
For the Opposition, Roosevelt's inauguration was a signal 
to step up resistance to Machado. United in their assault, 
they were, however, organizationally and ideologically frag­
mented. The Union Nacionalista, the Marianistas, and the 
Menocalistas envisioned a restoration of the pre-Machado 
political system by free elections. For the "Generation of 
1930" (the core of the ABC, the ABC Radical, the Organi­
zaci6n Celular Radical Revolucionaria (OCRR), and organ­
ized labor) restoration was not enough. There must be 
sweeping reform: a wholesale purge of the machadistas, a 
new constitution, a parliamentary government, limited suf­
frage, redistribution of wealth by law, and an end of Amer­
ican tutelage. More radical still, the Student Directorate, 
with its faculty and intellectual companions, questioned 
whether democracy or capitalism was worth saving, espe­
cially if the price was the continued American imperialism 
of loans, investments, and elections. The differences in the 
political prescriptions of the Opposition were basic; adding 
the fearful maneuverings of the "cooperating" parties, the 
72. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs VI 
(1928), 573-86; "From Now On, War by Government Shall Be Changed
to Peace by Peoples," Address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 
December 28, 1933, in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York, 1938-50), II, 
544-19; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York, 1948), I, 308-13; 
Charles C. Griffin, ed., "Welles to Roosevelt: A Memorandum on Inter-
American Relations, 1933," Hispanic American Historical Review XXXIV 
<1954), 190-92; Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 1944), 
pp. 191-94; E. David Cronon, "Interpreting the New Good Neighbor 
Policy: The Cuban Crisis of 1933," Hispanic American Historical Review 
XXXIX (1959), 538-67. 
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army, and the business community, the political climate of 
Cuba was for the first time truly revolutionary.73 
To deal with a political elite disillusioned with consensual 
reform, constitutionalism, and aggregate economic progress, 
Franklin Roosevelt sent a personal representative who 
viewed all three as holy writ, Sumner Welles. Career diplo­
mat, Wilsonian reformer of Caribbean nations, Welles was 
dispatched to Havana to mediate away the Machado regime 
without a military occupation, without violence, and without 
antagonizing the rest of Latin America. Welles's instructions, 
by emphasizing the essentialness of constitutionalism in 
settling the Cuban insurgency, asked him to restore the order 
and social harmony that Cuban politics had never had. Feel­
ing it "obligatory" not to let Cuba dissolve in anarchy and 
ruin, Roosevelt reverted to the "preventive policy," sending 
Welles to give "friendly advice" on political compromise 
and to begin negotiations on a new trade agreement and, 
perhaps, modification of the Treaty of 1903. But Cuba must 
first return to the path of constitutionalism.74 
Appalled by Machado's complacent acceptance of the 
violence in Havana ("he never gave the slightest indication 
that these acts of barbaric cruelty were anything but justi­
fied"), Welles remained convinced that a Cuban solution 
73. For the fall of Machado, see Jackman, \yood, and Cronon, previ­
ously cited, and K. Duff, "Relations between Cuba and the United States, 
1898-1934," in Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 
1933 (London, 1934), pp. 361-93; Charles A. Thomson, "The Cuban 
Revolution: Fall of Machado," Foreign Policy Reports XI (1935), 250-60; 
Hubert C. Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History XXXIX 
(1933), pp. 14-24; Charles W. Hackett, "Guerrilla Warfare in Cuba," 
ibid., XXXVIII (1933), 469-71. 
74. "Statement of Mr. Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State," 
April 24, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 278-79; Hull to Welles (Instruc­
tion No. 1), May 1, 1933, ibid., pp. 279-86; Welles to Roosevelt, May 18, 
1933, quoted in Cronon, "Interpreting the Good Neighbor Policy," p. 540. 
For a Cuban reaction by a key figure in the Conservative Opposition, see 
Horacio Ferrer, Con el rifle athombro (Havana, 1950), pp. 297-98, 300, 
302, 313, 336. Ferrer, working to replace Machado through the army, 
thought a coup would mean immediate occupation. 
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"must" be based on maintaining the "structure of constitu­
tional government" if peace, prosperity, Good Neighbor­
liness, and nonoccupation were to flow from his mediation. 
His first contacts with the Union Nacionalista, the Meno­
calistas, and the Marianistas impressed him that he had 
found in these Opposition politicos equal devotees to the 
democratic process. They, too, wanted no revolution, pre­
ferring to phase out the "Machadato" through a constitu­
tional succession and elections.75 
Through June and July, 1933, Welles labored to find a 
peaceful and graceful way to remove Machado; but though 
he was able to draft a plan, he was unable to find either a 
provisional president or a Cuban political consensus. Ini­
tially he conducted his mediation with Opposition repre­
sentatives (either "extremely radical" or "decidedly conser­
vative") from among the Union Nacionalista, Marianistas, 
Menocalistas, the OCRR, the ABC, the university and insti­
tute professors, and the "women of the Opposition." The 
Student Directorate, author of much of Havana's terrorism 
and prime target of La Porra, resisted Welles's call to com­
promise, but curtailed its raids and bombings. Machado, 
then, in the name of a constitutional settlement, had Welles 
add representatives from the "cooperating" political parties. 
The talks went on. By mid-July Welles had his formula: the 
Opposition and government would agree on basic reforms to 
purify Cuban politics, the Congress would pass the reforms, 
a constitutional assembly would be elected and changes 
made to restore the vice-presidency, elect a vice-president, 
and have Machado retire. To the Cuban radicals the plan 
was a betrayal, an impression reinforced by two amnesties 
75. Welles, Time for Decision, pp. 195-96; Welles to Hull, May 13, 
1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 287-90; Welles to Hull, ibid., 295-96; 
Welles to Acting Secretary of State William Phillips, June 2, 1933, ibid., 
299-301; Welles to Hull, June 21, 1933, 837.00/3555, quoted in Jackman, 
'Machado Regime," p. 101. 
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Machado arranged for the porristas. Another warning was 
Welles's growing ties with the "Generation of '95" and his 
commitment to their most popular leader, Carlos Mendieta. 
On July 26, when the first open talks began with Machado's 
own ministers, the ABC abandoned the mediation.76 
Cuban politics were beyond constitutional solution. On 
August 5 the ABC, Student Directorate, and assorted labor 
leaders turned a transport workers walkout into a city-wide 
general strike. Panic-stricken, Machado and his coterie sent 
the police and porristas on a rampage, denounced Welles's 
mediation, and tried to rally support by accusing the United 
States of planning imminent invasion. The Machadato saw 
itself on the brink of revolutionary extermination. The threat 
of occupation, however, persuaded the officers of Havana's 
garrisons to abandon Machado; though Welles had hinted 
such action to General Herrera, he was converted by his 
subordinates, not by Welles. The bloodshed and paralyza­
tion in Havana mounted and spread to a few other towns. 
On August 11 Machado fled. His police and political ap­
paratus dissolved in mob reprisal. Welles's mediation had 
fallen, with Machado, to an army coup, but there had been 
no occupation." 
Encouraged by Welles and the army, the constitutionalist 
Opposition formed a cabinet, named Dr. Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes president, and restored successively the constitu­
tions of 1928 and 1901. Although the cabinet included lead­
ers of the ABC, OCRR, and the university professors, the 
76. Jackman, "Machado Regime," pp. 104-10; Thomson, "Cuban Revo­
lution," pp. 253, 252-54; Duff, "Cuban-American Relations," p. 377; Welles 
to Phillips, July 11, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 317; "Presidential 
Message to Delegates of Opposing Factions in Cuba, July 1, 1933," Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, II, 263; Welles to 
Roosevelt, July 17, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 323-25; La Celula 
Directriz del ABC, El ABC en la Mediacidn (Havana, 1934). 
77. Ferrer, Cin el rifle al hombro, pp. 320-37; William Phillips, "Mem­
orandum by the Acting Secretary of State," August 2, 1933, Foreign Rela­
tions, 1933, V, 331-32; Welles to Phillips, August 2-7, 1933, ibid., 332-37, 
and Welles to Hull, August 8-11, 1933, ibid., 340^16, 355-56. 
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rank-and-file radicals, especially the students, saw the 
Cespedes government as a Welles-sponsored restoration of 
the politicos. Welles himself recognized the increasing pres­
sure for purges, for rapid, extralegal economic and political 
reforms, and for his own recall, but he and Roosevelt stoutly 
insisted that the United States could only lend "feasible aid" 
through "constitutional government." 78 Welles saw "a gen­
eral process of disintegration going on," and despite his plea 
for elections and the promise of American economic aid, 
"none of the real leaders of public opinion" were satisfied 
with the Cespedes regime. Neither elections nor trade trea­
ties seemed to move the radicals. As Welles recognized, the 
demoralized Cuban army now held the balance of power.79 
On the night of September 4, an army mutiny organized 
by a group of sergeants and student radicals toppled the 
Cespedes government. Although the mutiny probably began 
as a reaction to the threat of restricted promotions and re­
duced pay, it quickly became a political movement that re­
jected the constitutional nostrums of the American embassy 
and the conservatism of the Cespedes restoration. The new 
insurgents proposed, rather, to create a "modern democracy" 
of "pure national sovereignty" responsive to the masses' 
needs, but free of the political sins of the old Republic. The 
insurgents, however, swore that they recognized the sanc­
tity of lives, property, and international obligations.80 In the 
78. Roosevelt's statement of August 13, 1933, Public Papers and Ad­
dresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, II, 322-23; Welles to Hull, August 14, 
15, and 30, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 363-67, and 376-78. 
79. Welles to Hull, August 19, 22, and 24, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, 
V, 367—73. The matter or foreign loan payments does not appear to have
concerned Welles. He and a panel of experts led by A. A. Berle, Jr., warned
the State Department that any Cuban government would probably have to
call a moratorium on debt payment in order to meet its payroll, a matter of
highest importance in quieting Havana. Welles to Hull, August 20, 1933, 
ibid., 587-80, and "Preliminary Report on Cuban Finances Prepared by 
American Financial Experts," September 5, 1933, ibid., 583-88. 
80. La Agrupaci6n Revolucionaria de Cuba, "Proclama al Pueblo de 
Cuba," September 4, 1933, reprinted in Ferrer, Con el rifle al hombro, pp. 
354-55; Welles to Hull, September 5, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V 
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crisis Welles threw his support to the Cespedes regime and 
its constituents. He argued by phone and cable that sup­
porting a constitutional regime toppled by an army mutiny 
was the essence of Good Neighborliness. He thought a mili­
tary demonstration would fell the insurgents, which could 
be followed by the "elections which the Cuban people unan­
imously desire." Roosevelt shied away from landing troops, 
but agreed that the new government should not be recog­
nized.81 
Acting thereafter on Welles's advice, the Roosevelt admin­
istration refused to recognize the insurgent government of 
Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin. The State Department knew 
that it ran the risk of an occupation and hemispheric dis­
approval, but it accepted Welles's obiter dicta that not only 
were the radicals a minority but that the ousted factions 
spoke for "the enormous majority of the Cuban people." To 
receive recognition, the new regime must not only end vio­
lence but also offer "conclusive evidence" of its own stability 
and majority support, which for Welles meant appeasing the 
organized factions, army officers, and business and commer­
cial groups. This he thought was impossible, and without 
American recognition, his judgment became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.82 
Until Grau left office, the American position was that elec­
tions and civil order had to precede reform. Supported by his 
381—83; J. M. Puig Casauranc, Mexican minister of foreign affairs, to Hull,
September 7, 1933, ibid., 394-95; Jorge Mafiach, "Revolution in Cuba," 
Foreign Affairs XII (1933), 4&-56. 
81. Memoranda of four telephone conversations, September 5 and 6, 
1933, between Welles, Hull, and Assistant Secretary of State Jefferson 
Caffery, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 380, 385-86, 389-90; Welles to Hull, 
September 7, 1933, ibid., 390-92, 396-98. For events in Havana, see 
Hubert C. Herring, "Can Cuba Save Herself," Current History XXXIX 
(1933), 151-58, and Charles A. Thomson, "The Cuban Revolution: Reform 
and Reaction," Foreign Policy Reports XI (1936), 262-76. 
82. Welles to Hull, September 8-12, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 
405-7, 416-18, 422-26; Welles, Time for Decision, p. 198. 
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conviction that Grau had only academic visionaries, imma­
ture students, and ignorant soldiers with which to govern, 
Welles consistently rejected granting recognition. To have 
done so, he thought, would have been to sanction a govern­
ment that did not have "the confidence of all." If the United 
States did not continue to support a compromise satisfactory 
to the displaced factions and businessmen, large and small, 
the alternatives were widespread violence or a more radical 
government that "would assume completely dictatorial pow­
ers and abandon the program for the reestablishment of con­
stitutional government as the result of national elections." m 
Conversely, when the Grau government passed popular eco­
nomic decrees that struck against two foreign companies and 
ruthlessly crushed two countercoups, Welles did not equate 
its capacity for survival with true stability. He persisted not 
only in picturing the insurgent government as a beleagured 
clique (which it was) but also in attributing mass support to 
its opponents (which they did not have). Recognition of 
such a regime, said a public statement written for Roosevelt 
by Welles, would be "an obstacle to the free and untram­
meled determination by the Cuban people of their own 
destinies." " 
Spokesmen and sympathizers of the insurgent regime in­
sisted that nonrecognition was the source of Cuban violence 
and that Grau's government was embarked on a program of 
political and psychological regeneration, not revolution. 
They challenged the existence of any Cuban consensus and 
pointed out the failures of every preceding regime. Even 
the army shared the revolutionary ideal: "not only a change 
83. Welles to Hull, September 25, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 
457-58. 
84. Quote from Phillips to Roosevelt, November 23, 1933, ibid., 525-26. 
See also Welles to Hull, October 16, 1933, ibid., 487-91; Welles to Hull 
November 10, 1933, ibid., 519-20; Welles to Phillips, December 7, 1933, (bid., 533-36. 
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of leaders but a change of system."85 Finally, the State De­
partment conceded that by a tally of arms and raw numbers 
Grau had supporters, but they were only "the army and ig­
norant masses who have been misled by Utopian promises." m 
Aware that Roosevelt would not be easily persuaded to 
land troops (though naval vessels patrolled the coastline), 
Welles looked among the Cuban factions for a force for or­
der and constitutionalism. As early as September 21, he 
found his man in Colonel Fulgencio Batista, Grau's parvenu 
army chief of staff. Welles found Batista sympathetic to the 
ambassador's views: reform could come only after peace was 
restored and after it had "the consent of a majority of the 
Cuban people through the medium of a constituted govern­
ment." 87 The question was Batista's control of the army, a 
matter not decided until December. His grip on the army 
firm, Batista deserted the radicals and ousted Grau San 
Martin. 
With Machado and Grau in exile, the Roosevelt adminis­
tration quickly acted to please its Cuban and domestic con­
stituents. It recognized the provisional government of Carlos 
Mendieta and within the year negotiated a new reciprocity 
treaty and replaced the Treaty of 1903 with a new agree­
ment purged of tutelary responsibility. In a nationally 
broadcast address in March, 1934, Sumner Welles an­
nounced that in a crisis American policy had met the liberal 
85. H. F. Matthews, charge d'affaires, to Phillips, December 14, 1933, 
on meeting with representatives of the Student Directorate and Colonel 
Fulgencio Batista, ibid., 541-42; two cables, Josephus Daniels, U.S. am­
bassador to Mexico, to Hull, September 9, 1933, ibid., 413-15; address of 
Dr. Angel Giraudy, chairman of the Cuban delegation, December 4, 
1933, in Department of State, Report of the Delegates of the United States 
of America to the Seventh International Conference of American States 
(Washington, 1934), pp. 107-12; Secretary to President Roosevelt (Steve 
Early) to Phillips, November 22, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 524. 
86. Jefferson Caffery to Phillips, January 10, 1934, Foreign Relations, 
1934, 5 vols. (Washington, 1951-52), V, 95-96. 
87. Welles to Hull, October 1, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 461-62. 
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test: it had not been shaped by corporate business and was 
democratic, resting "solely upon our sincere desire to pursue 
a policy of justice and fairness to Cuba and to the Cuban 
people."88 Moreover, Welles's diplomacy had been a victory 
for constitutionalism and Good Neighborliness, having re­
moved the odious provisions of the Platt Amendment and 
freeing Cuba to full comity in the family of nations.89 Para­
lyzed equally by its fear of an American military occupation 
and of an insurgent regime that did not meet its Wilsonian 
standards of conduct, the Roosevelt administration turned 
over the task of modernizing Cuba to Fulgencio Batista's 
army. 
To more dispassionate observers, the administration's di­
plomacy did not appear enlightened. For Josephus Daniels, 
Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Hubert C. Herring, and a special 
Commission on Cuban Affairs led by Raymond Leslie Buell, 
the legacy of Welles's mission was almost immediately dis­
cernible. American policy had, they agreed, frustrated the 
first really democratic political movement in Cuban history. 
Instead of preserving a sympathy for constitutionalism, 
peaceful reform, and other American political values, the 
State Department had instead alienated Cuba's most effec­
tive mass political leaders and had given them a cause—the 
Frustrated Revolution—with potential mass support.90 
88. Address by Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State, "Relations
Between the United States and Cuba," March 21-29, 1934, Department of 
State, Latin American Series, No. 7 (Washington, 1934), 12, 16. 
89. Hull to Caffery, March 4, 1935, Foreign Relations, 1935, 4 vols., (Washington, 1953), V, 476-77; Hull, Memoirs, I, 342-44; "The President 
Offers a Toast at the State Dinner for the President of Cuba," December 8, 
1942, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, XI, 530-31. 
90. Daniels to Hull, July 10, 24, 1934, quoted in Cronon, "Interpreting
the Good Neighbor Policy," p. 564; Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Cuban Elections
of 1936," American Political Science Review XXX (1936), 724-35; Hubert 
C. Herring, "Another Chance for Cuba," Current History XXXIX (1934), 
656-60; Raymond Leslie Buell, et al., Problems of the New Cuba (New 
York, 1935), pp. 492-500. 
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IV

The fall of Grau San Martin did not restore order or resur­
rect liberal constitutionalism in Cuba, but the renunciation 
of the Platt Amendment, the establishment of the sugar 
quota system, and the continuing competition of Fulgencio 
Batista and the "Generation of 1930" for control of the 
"Revolution" shaped Cuban-American relations for the next 
thirty-eight years. After the Welles Mission, the Roosevelt 
administration and its successors concentrated on economic 
issues and hemispheric defense in their diplomacy, having 
relinquished the role as poder moderado to die Cuban Army. 
Despite the facade of economic diversification and prog­
ress, neither Batista nor Grau San Martin's Cuban Revolu­
tionary Party (Autentico) was able to transform the growing 
demands of Cuba's organized interest groups into consensual 
reform. The economic and professional elite preferred court 
politics or withdrawal; the radicals remained committed to 
conspiracy and violence. Both Batista and the Autenticos 
pledged themselves to Cuban nationalism and to basic insti­
tutional change, engineered by the state, but both com­
promised the social and economic goals set for the state by 
the Constitution of 1940. Neither was able to stir a stagnant 
economy, a corrupt national administration, or a demoralized 
society still marked by insecurity and disorder. As the years 
went by, their will to make changes also waned. Institu­
tionally, Cuba remained a fragmented, poverty-ridden, and 
class-conscious nation, despite a veneer of modernization in 
Havana and the growth of a technical-managerial middle 
class.91 
91. Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, et al., Historia de la Nacidn Cubana (Havana, 1952), VIII, 81-95, 99-176, 340-65; Economic and Technical
Mission to Cuba, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Report on Cuba (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 9-12, 58-60, 358-75, 424-29, 
454-55; William S. Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, 
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Ironically, by 1952, Cuban elections and party organiza­
tion had begun to show signs of both free choice and civic 
awareness when Batista arranged his last barracks revolt. 
Batista's justification was that political violence and corrup­
tion were endangering the government's programs for eco­
nomic diversification, social welfare, and the evolutionary 
improvement of rural life; he raised the specter of commu­
nism, although the Partido Socialista Popular had been his 
ally. Only the order provided by his control of the army, 
Batista contended, could ensure the long-range economic 
development Cuba needed. To this end, and for his own 
political and financial renaissance, Batista prevented the 
probable electoral victory of the reformist Party of the Cu­
ban People (Ortodoxo).92 
Batista's rule after 1952 did bring increased aggregate 
prosperity and did satisfy the organized urbanites and busi­
nessmen who placed highest priority on economic growth; 
Batista, too, was supported by those who saw radical reform 
as a threat to their own religious, racial, economic, and social 
privileges. Like Nuri al-Said and Ngo Dinh Diem, Batista 
counted on tacit American approval (especially of his anti­
communism) and long-range economic progress to obscure 
the illegitimate and authoritarian character of his rule. But 
the army coup and the rigged elections that followed either 
alienated or demoralized the Autentico-Ortodoxo constitu­
tionalists and delivered the initiative in the anti-Batista op­
1940-47," Journal of Politics XI (1949), 335-64, and "The 'Cuban Rev­
olution' and the Presidential Elections of 1948," Hispanic American Histori­
cal Review XXXI (1951), 37-79; Hugh Thomas, "The Origins of the Cuban
Revolution," World Today XIX (1963), 448-60. 
92. William S. Stokes, "National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics," 
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly XXXIV (1953), 57-63; Robert F. 
Smith, "Castro's Revolution: Domestic Sources and Consequences," in John
Plank, ed., Cuba and the United States: Long Range Perspectives (Washing­
ton, 1967), pp. 45-68; William Appleman Williams, The United States, 
Cuba, and Castro (New York, 1962), pp. 55-79; Fulgencio Batista, The 
Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic (New York, 1964). 
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position to young "action groups" committed to terrorism 
and guerrilla warfare. Pitted against armed forces riven with 
dissension and mentally and professionally ill-equipped for 
counterinsurgent operations, drawing on the sympathy 
abroad created by Batista's terrorism, the Opposition, spe­
cifically the 26 of July Movement, shot and talked its way to 
93 power.
As most students of Cuban history concede, Fidel Castro 
dominates the Revolution and has, as much as any leader 
can, decided his country's course since January 1, 1959. To 
the radicals and previously powerless Cuban rural poor, he 
is an amalgam of Santa Claus, Christ, and Liborio, the Cu­
ban cartoon Everyman who has struggled against "monopo­
lists" and politicos for three generations. Given the Cold War 
context of the Cuban Revolution, Cuba's military and eco­
nomic ties with the Soviet Union, and the conversion of the 
Maximum Leader and his revolutionary elite to Marxism-
Leninism, it is understandable why the debate about Castro-
ism has concerned itself with the communist nature of the 
Revolution and the megalomania and charisma of Castro 
himself.94 But there is another conceivable view of the Revo­
lution and Fidel: it and he are the first national "in-power" 
expression of nineteenth-century anarchism, and the rejec­
tion of all Cuba's pre-1959 institutions is rooted in the revo­
93. Harold R. Aaron, "The Seizure of Political Power in Cuba, 1956­
1959," (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1964); Loree Wilkerson, 
Fidel Castro's Political Programs from Reformism to "Marxism-Leninism," 
(Gainesville, Fla., 1965); Information Department, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Cuba: A Brief Political and Economic Survey (Oxford, 
1958). 
94. Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New 
York, 1962), and Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York, 1965); 
Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967); Ward M. Morton, Castro as Charismatic Hero (Lawrence, 
Kans., 1965); Boris Goldenberg, "The Cuban Revolution: An Analysis," 
Problems of Communism XII (September-October, 1963), 1-9; Richard R. 
Fagen, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro, 
Western Political Quarterly XVIII (1965), 275-84; Ernst Halperin, "The 
Castro Regime in Cuba," Current History LI (1966), 354-59. 
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lutionaries' view of the interrelationship of Cuban domestic 
development and Cuban-American relations since 1898. 
For the Fidelistas their revolution is to free man from un­
just, exploitive institutions, to return him to an Adamic state 
of nature best achieved through nationalism, rural living, 
hard work, and selflessness. In essence the Fidelistas want 
all Cubans to go through the spiritual purification of their 
own lives in the Sierra Maestra; Cubans all must go through 
the hell of survival, violence, and moral regeneration that the 
Fidelistas say they experienced as guerrillas. Only this na­
tional social trauma will cleanse Cuba of its past corruptions 
and sins. The United States, to the Fidelistas a combination 
of Miami and Mississippi run by the CIA, had been for Cuba 
the wellspring of poisoning institutions: standing armies, 
powerful churches, cities, economic and racially-determined 
classes, banks, corporations, courts, electoral political par­
ties, and bureaucracy. These institutions were yanqui inven­
tions, unwittingly accepted in Cuba after 1898, which had 
for sixty years corrupted individuals and oppressed "the 
masses." Only a rapid, violent disembowelment of the Cuban 
republic (indeed, of all non-European nations) could move 
"the people" to social, political, and economic equality, an 
equality characterized by minimal institutional restraint and 
maximal shared hardship.95 
95. In addition to the above sources, see C. Wright Mills, Listen, Yankee (New York, 1960); Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Vintage Books edition (New York, 1968); Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, Grove 
Press edition (New York, 1967); Luis E. Aguilar, "Regis Debray: Where 
Logic Failed," The Reporter XXXVII (December 28, 1967), 31-32; Philip 
W. Bonsai, "Cuba, Castro, and the United States," Foreign Affairs XLIV 
(1967), 260-76; Edward B. Glick, "Cuba and the Fifteenth UN General 
Assembly: A Study of Regional Disassociation," Journal of Inter-American 
Studies VI (1964), 235-48; Irving P. Pflaum, "Castro Cuba in Mid-1960:
Fidel of Cuba, By Voice and Violence," American Universities Field Staff, 
Reports Service, Mexico and Caribbean Area Studies (New York, 1960), 
V, No. 1-13: Dudley Sears, et al., Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolu­
tion (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1964); Leslie Dewart, Christianity and Revolution: 
The Lesson of Cuba (New York, 1963). Both Draper and Williams see 
"populist" influences in the Fidelista rhetoric; both, sympathetic to Castro 
ana socialism, shrink from the characterization of the Castro regime as 
"anarchical." 
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Castro's uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union for eco­
nomic and military assistance reflects his determination to 
break the abrazo of the United States and "counterrevolu­
tion." The Fidelistas' pathological hatred of America goes 
deeper, however, than trade embargoes and Playa Giron. 
Since its first objections to the execution of batistiano ter­
rorists to the bombing of North Vietnam, the United States, 
in the Fidelista view, has continued to impose hypocritical, 
"reactionary" standards of behavior on the rest of the world. 
As Fidel himself has said, American imperialism is "its desire 
to impose outside its frontiers the kind of government sys­
tem it thinks other states and peoples should have." "* 
Still joined in the uncomfortable abrazo, Cuba will per­
haps learn that coercion, contempt for liberal institutions, 
and unchecked personal power are unjust answers to the 
ills of modern nations, and the United States can ponder 
whether political change is really ever consensual and non­
violent. 
96. Quoted by Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel (New York, 
1967), p. 188. For the American reaction to Castroite violence and the 
decision to support the Cuban exiles, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A 
Thousand Days (New York, 1965), pp. 215-97; Theodore Sorenson, 
Kennedy (New York, 1965), pp. 291-309; U.S., Congress, Senate, Com­
mittee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of
the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Hearings: 
Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean, 86th Con­
gress, 1st Session (Washington, 1959), and 90th Congress, 1st Session 
(Washington, 1967), 18 parts. 
The United States and Great Britain: 
Uneasy Allies 
A. E. CAMPBELL 
THE PHRASE "uneasy allies" applied to Britain and the 
United States is worth a moment's reflection.1 It states both 
that the two countries are allies and that their cooperation is 
not so cordial as that of allies should be. Yet Britain and the 
United States were not formal allies till 1941, and they have 
been allies only when each has had many other allies also. 
Since 1941 it is by no means obvious that their cooperation 
has been worse or more difficult than that of other allies. 
Why, then, does a phrase like "uneasy allies" come so read­
ily to mind? It does so because of the belief that Britain and 
the United States are in some sense natural or preordained 
allies, and that they "ought" to find it easier to work together 
effectively than do other states. It rests, in short, on the im­
plicit hypothesis that there is a special Anglo-American rela­
1. It would be pointless to develop an essay from the analysis of a phrase
if the phrase were merely the author s invention. The title of this essay was
independently suggested by the editors; and I believe that many students
of politics naturally think of Anglo-American relations in some such terms.
The phrase itself, of course, appears in the title of Leon D. Epstein, 
Britain—Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954). 
472 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
tionship.2 Anglo-American cooperation is tested by standards 
unusually severe; only against those standards does the per­
formance appear inadequate. 
The nature of the relationship between Britain and Amer­
ica has been a subject of debate since the time of the Ameri­
can Revolution and before. As the quarrel between Britain 
and the thirteen colonies developed, some Britons argued 
that the colonies must not be allowed to gain independence. 
The political tie was essential. If it were broken, Britain 
would lose at once a large part of her strength; the defection 
of the mainland colonies would be inevitably followed by 
that of other parts of the empire; and, worse still, the colo­
nies would move naturally into hostility to Britain and alli­
ance with any European foe.3 The same blow that reduced 
British power would enlarge the threat that it had to meet. 
Others in Britain rejected this whole contention. They in­
sisted that the basis of the connection between Britain and 
the colonies had been the common interest of both. To this 
the political tie had contributed nothing. If it were broken 
—and there was no point in trying to maintain it—the force 
of self-interest would continue to act as before. There was 
no reason to expect that an independent United States 
would be either more hostile or less useful to Britain than 
the colonies had been—rather, the reverse. Still a third 
2. Belief in, and hostility toward, a special relationship between Britain
and the United States is, of course, widespread on the continent of Europe.
It seems to me beyond dispute that the relationship is in many ways special,
and will remain so; but we should not conclude without further inquiry 
that it is politically effective. It is not surprising that men excluded from a
relationship should think it sinister. What is surprising is that they should
so readily suppose it effective enough to be dangerous. 
3. This is a view that could still find an echo in the twentieth century.
"The English-speaking nations have either got to brine themselves under 
one sovereignty or they will drift into antagonism" (Philip Kerr, later elev­
enth marquess of Lothian, to Lionel Curtis, September 2, 1927, quoted in
Max Beloff, "The Special Relationship: an Anglo-American Myth," in 
Martin Gilbert, ed., A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. 
Taylor [London, 1966], p. 161 n. 2). 
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school, more influential after it was clear that independence 
must be granted than before, took a middle course, re­
gretting the breaking of the political tie, which they as­
cribed to British folly, but hoping that a better substitute 
might be created, a tie based on common language, tradi­
tions, culture, and race, which would ensure the friendship 
of the two countries.4 
These three attitudes—modified, of course, to meet the 
circumstances of American independence—have been the 
basic British attitudes to the Anglo-American relationship 
ever since. They are, so to speak, the primary colors of the 
relationship. They can be blended, they can be used to paint 
various pictures, and each of them has a complementary 
color. Through most of the nineteenth century, in the heyday 
of British power, the second attitude seemed the most plausi­
ble. By "interest" was meant essentially private economic in­
terests, which had full play while government activity was 
minimal and while the economies of the two countries were 
still largely complementary. As the activity of governments 
has grown, and as rivalry in trade has overshadowed bene­
ficent exchange, this school of thought may have weakened. 
But the notion is with us yet that if one can only get the 
economies of two countries thoroughly entangled, they will 
not be able to afford hostility. The third attitude is a more 
mystical one. It readily slips from the hope that ties of lan­
guage and the like may be helpful into the belief that they 
must be so, into supposing that a special relationship exists 
whatever the outward appearances may suggest; and this is 
natural enough for, by contrast with the first two schools, 
there is little that either individuals or governments can do 
to reinforce ties whose origin is in the past. 
4. For an excellent analysis of the theme of this paragraph, see Vincent
T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793, 2 vols. (London, 1952-64), I, chap. 5. 
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Whichever view they took, almost all Britons who looked 
across the Atlantic at the time of the Revolution underesti­
mated American nationalism, the force of the simple desire 
to have independence and to be seen to have independence. 
When, after the War of 1812, Americans were persuaded 
that their independence was acknowledged, most saw no 
particular reason to concern themselves with Anglo-Ameri­
can relations. If they had a world view, there was no special 
place for Britain in it. Not until the end of the nineteenth 
century, when immigration had already made it much less 
plausible, did some Americans briefly come to share the 
British view that there was a racial link between the two 
countries. It is paradoxical that this sympathy in the field of 
ideas should have developed at a time when the two coun­
tries were engaged in a whole range of diplomatic disputes; 
and it is paradoxical also that when the disputes were set­
tled the ideas should have been abandoned. Before World 
War I most Americans had reverted to the traditional pos­
ture—a wary suspicion of European states and, among oth­
ers, of Britain as the great imperial power that clung to ter­
ritory not her own and to unjustifiable pretensions. 
The most obvious thing about all these attitudes, British 
and American, is how general they are. They all attempt to 
relate Anglo-American relations to some grand conception 
of how the world operates. That this should have been so at 
the time of their origin is not surprising. The British ideas 
were developed when an empire was breaking up. It was 
natural to peer into the future, to try to find explanations 
for the upheaval, and to devise generalizations that would 
justify either resistance or acquiescence. Equally, the last 
decade of the nineteenth century was a period in which 
Americans were concerned to reconsider the course that the 
world was taking and the place of their country in it. But 
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not all periods are so portentous as the 1770s, or seem so 
portentous as the 1890s, yet the Anglo-American relation­
ship retains the sweeping character given to it first in George 
Ill's reign. None of the attitudes sketched above gives much 
weight to specific, temporary events. They do not emphasize 
that relations between two countries, and so between the 
United States and Britain, may be now good, now bad; may 
be good over one issue, bad over another; may be good in 
one part of the world while bad elsewhere. They do not al­
low that often it does not matter much whether relations are 
good or bad—they may be merely indifferent—and that they 
may sometimes be bad without posing any serious threat 
of war. 
Almost equally remarkable is that these attitudes, British 
and American alike, require judgments about the domestic 
politics of the other country. At the time of the Revolution, 
much British discussion turned on different analyses of how 
many Loyalists there were in the colonies and how they 
might be strengthened. In later years the question was how 
many Americans there were who felt some affection for 
Britain, or at least sympathy for British purposes, and how 
they might be encouraged. Conversely, it was thought im­
portant not to give color to the malicious fictions of Britain's 
enemies, Irish-American, German-American, or whatever 
they might be. Perhaps most striking is that British analyses 
of American domestic politics tended to cast Britain's op­
ponents into two groups—those opposed to Britain by rea­
son of their racial origin, and those opposed to Britain from 
ignorance or parochialism. Little was made of the possibil­
ity that men who disliked Britain's domestic politics might 
deduce that her international purposes were equally offen­
sive, as, for example, many Populists did. Yet this was the 
more important stream in American thinking. Most Ameri­
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cans who were ready in the 1890s to suppose some commu­
nity of purpose between the two countries did so for ideolog­
ical rather than for merely racial reasons.6 
Here a difficulty developed almost at once. In the early 
years, when Americans were acutely conscious of the gulf 
between their republican institutions and the monarchical 
institutions of Europe, the sympathy of most Americans was 
with British radicals, men in the nature of things almost al­
ways in opposition. There was little scope for governmental 
cooperation. As time passed and Britain became more demo­
cratic, this difficulty disappeared. The sympathy of the 
1890s probably owed more to a similarity of social outlook 
among important groups in the two countries than to any 
other factor.6 But the difficulty was soon to be replaced by 
another. The natural community of social outlook was be­
tween Americans and British Conservatives, both upholders 
of the capitalist system. But Conservatives were also the 
most ardent defenders of the British empire, to most Ameri­
cans a dangerous anachronism. The British Labour party, 
which seemed more ready to move toward self-determina­
tion and the abandonment of empire, became more and 
more committed to dogmatic socialism. Most Britons were 
either right on domestic matters but wrong in foreign affairs, 
or right in foreign affairs and wrong on domestic matters. 
5. One characteristic quality of the thought of the 1890s was the supposi­
tion that race and ideology were in some way connected, and especially that
some peoples were politically more talented than others. This theme is one
that is almost always mentioned in writing on the period, but one that still
lacks, to the best of my knowledge, a full analysis, though Bradford Perkins, 
The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 
(New York, 1968), has much of interest to say on the subject. Even today
this belief contributes to one school of thought on the special relationship. 
6. D. C. Watt, "America and the British Foreign-Policy-Making Elite,
from Joseph Chamberlain to Anthony Eden, 1895-1956," Review of Politics 
XXV (1963), reprinted in Personalities and Policies (London, 1965); 
Cushing Strout, The American Image of the Old World (New York, 1963), 
chap. 8. 
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Where were Americans of good will to find their natural 
allies?7 
For observers in Britain there were thus good, or at least 
right-thinking, Americans, and those that were ill-disposed 
or foolish; American observers similarly divided Britons into 
categories. The bad were to be frustrated and the good en­
couraged. There is nothing unusual in this. It is almost cer­
tain that within any country, some groups will advocate a 
policy more favorable to another country than will others. 
But it is noticeable in Anglo-American relations how little 
these attitudes had to do with policy. They were not short-
term and specific attitudes, as those determined by policy 
are. They were persistent and long-term. They survived spe­
cific policy issues because they were detached from them. 
One supported friends and discouraged opponents in the 
other country, less by policy than by adding credibility to a 
general picture of one's own country and its place in the 
world.8 
The reason for this may be suggested by an analogy with 
domestic politics. In domestic politics active men attach 
themselves to a party or a cause, which they then abandon 
with great reluctance if at all. They may often be grieved or 
outraged by the folly of their own side, or by its capture by 
the wrong elements; but they show great resilience and in­
genuity in clinging to it nevertheless. They regard these 
lapses as temporary. To move over to the other party is a 
7. In 1945 Representative Celler (Democrat, New York) felt both horns
of the dilemma. See his opinion that the loan to Britain "would promote too
much damned Socialism at home and too much damned Imperialism 
abroad" (quoted in Richard W. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy [Ox­
ford, 1956], p. 237; and D. G. Watt, "American Aid to Britain and the 
Problem of Socialism, 1945-51," American Review II (1963), reprinted in 
Personalities and Policies, p. 61). 
8. A specific policy of one country may often be damaging to another
without making relations much worse. What is important is that the policy
should not be judged inevitable, part of some larger hostile plan. 
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last resort, usually undertaken in some much more funda­
mental disillusionment. This attachment to a chosen group 
is not blind loyalty, mere stubbornness or obscurantism. It 
follows naturally from the fact that the group was chosen 
in the first place because it seemed to embody some vision 
of the large, long-term political good, a fundamental predic­
tion about the course of future progress. Such commitments 
cannot be, and should not be, lightly abandoned. In particu­
lar they should not be abandoned by reason of some dispute 
about policy. A policy, after all, may usually be changed. It 
seldom determines the foreseeable future. 
Similarly, very few specific issues that arise between two 
countries can be regarded as having fundamental impor­
tance. Since men are quarrelsome animals, they probably 
give too much importance to most issues; and, of course, 
those most important capture the attention of historians as 
of contemporaries. But most are hard-fought at the time 
and forgotten when settled or overtaken by some new con­
cern. Issues that imperatively require a recasting of one's 
world view are fortunately few. They have been few in 
Anglo-American relations. A whole range of specific issues 
has arisen between the two countries from independence to 
the present. In settling these the United States has, inevita­
bly, been generally successful. What is important is that at 
no time have most Britons been driven to the conclusion 
that this or that American success threatened any fundamen­
tal British vision of the future. One of the established atti­
tudes toward the United States could always be modified to 
take account of American progress.8 On the other side, 
progress was for most Americans in the nineteenth century 
an article of faith. It could be relied on to solve most prob­
9. I have tried myself to explore this theme for one short but important
period in Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (London, 1960), 
especially chap. 7. 
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lems, including those of Anglo-American relations. After in­
dependence had been won, any later threat must seem triv­
ial by comparison. If Britain were foolish enough to oppose 
the legitimate aspirations of the United States—and to 
Americans they were all legitimate—these should be firmly 
defended, but American progress would ensure that any is­
sue could be reopened later if that should be necessary, with 
better hope of success. No settlement need be regarded as 
final.10 
In terms of national power, American progress was a fact. 
According to some theories of international relations at 
least, the very great change in the relative power of the two 
countries ought to dominate the relationship. In the first 
years of American independence, Britain was unquestion­
ably the major power. It is true that one British attitude de­
rived from a sense of weakness, from the belief that Britain, 
shorn of the thirteen colonies, would not long be a match 
for France. But twenty years served to renew British con­
fidence, and for much of the nineteenth century she was, 
both in British estimation and in fact, the greatest of the 
powers. During those years the speed of American advance 
served to give the United States a confidence that greater 
British power did not daunt and that even the Civil War 
hardly called into question. It is not difficult to suppose that 
a sense of rough equality between the two countries may 
have developed shortly after 1814 and survived perhaps till 
World War I. Thereafter, of course, the picture is en­
tirely different. The United States has advanced till she is, 
by any test, the greatest of the powers; Britain has settled 
10. For much of the nineteenth century there was little occasion for 
Americans to determine their attitude to other states. Their confidence that 
their expansion could be limited only by themselves is, however, a quality
that no historian has been able to overlook. Manifest destiny was more often
assumed than debated. It has received its most consistent and persuasive 
exposition in R. W. Van Alstyne's admirable study, The Rising American 
Empire (Oxford, 1960). 
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into a group of secondary powers. If power plays a dominant 
part in the formation of national attitudes, it seems unlikely 
that ideas appropriate to the earlier period would be appro­
priate to the later. In a sense, they are not; and it is the 
thesis of this essay that they are beginning to give way. But 
they have been remarkably durable and have begun to give 
way much later than one might have expected from calcula­
tions of mere power. 
For this there have been a number of explanations. Those 
who believe in the force of the special relationship insist 
that the ideas survive because they are valid and true. They 
were never based on calculations of relative power, and they 
are not, therefore, invalidated when power relationships 
change.11 Those who discount the force of the special rela­
tionship argue rather that it is a cozy British myth, whose 
purpose is simply that of shoring up British self-esteem and 
sparing Britons the necessity of coming to terms with the 
world. As it once enabled Britons to accept the loss of the 
American colonies, so it now enables them to accept their 
loss of world power. Meanwhile, Americans have long lost 
any interest they had in the relationship. They do not dis­
cuss it, and if, from time to time, one catches an echo of old 
phrases and modes of thought in American public discourse, 
it is no more than an echo. Old cliches will do because the 
subject is not important enough to require new thought." 
11. The leading exponent of this view is H. C. Allen. See The Anglo-
American Relationship since 1783 (London, 1959), and The Anglo-
American Predicament: The British Commonwealth, the United States and 
European Unity (London, I960). 
12. "In the last fifteen years . . . practically all the debate has been in
Britain. This is not surprising: since die war America has in the nature of
things loomed enormously larger on the British horizon than Britain has on
the American horizon" (Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in 
Anglo-American Relations [London, 1964], p. 1). Max Beloff, "The Special
Relationship," gives most of his space to the analysis of British attitudes. It
is worth emphasizing that the terms of the British debate have often been
quite unrealistic. 
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Both lines of explanation lead to the same dilemma. If the 
Anglo-American special relationship is permanently valid, 
why should it be now breaking down? If the Anglo-Ameri­
can special relationship had long lost all practical relevance, 
why should we now recognize the fact, when it was not 
necessary to recognize it earlier? 13 
The difficulty arises because neither account of the Anglo-
American relationship refers to the real world at the level 
at which political attitudes are formed. One is too general, 
the other too specific. The fault of the first school—dubbed 
"sentimental" by its opponents—is not sentimentality but 
simply that its doctrine is one that no event or chain of 
events could confirm or disprove. The fault of the rival doc­
trine is that it seeks disproof or confirmation at the wrong 
level of political activity—a level too limited and too paro­
chial. Though politicians may try to make what use of the 
relationship they can, for analysts it is the course of events 
that must determine the nature of the relationship, and not 
the other way about. It follows therefore that the relation­
ship must be fitted into place among the other concerns of 
both British and Americans. It is not merely the direct rela­
tionship between the two powers that has changed. The 
world preoccupations of both have also changed. To say so 
is a truism. It is almost equally a truism to suggest that this 
change must have affected their view of each other. It is 
perhaps less of a truism to emphasize how recently these 
changes have become of dominant importance. 
Both the attitudes set out above are unhistorical. The first 
—that Britain and the United States are connected by a 
whole network of cultural ties that are politically significant 
13. See Lord Chalfont's television address of October 9, 1967, as re­
ported in the Times, October 10, 1967, under the headline, "Britain Drops
Special Link with U.S." Among other things he said that "everyone should
remember that unless Britain could help to strengthen Europe 'we are 
going to be taken over by America.' " 
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—is indeed historical in origin; but once formed, it is not 
open to modification by other historical events. The second 
—that cultural ties do not have any important effect on in­
ternational relations—is not even historical in origin. It is 
an a priori belief, which cannot be affected by historical 
evidence. Yet Anglo-American relations are a historical phe­
nomenon, and they have not been equally good at all times. 
In the effort to take account of that fact, two further lines of 
inquiry have been developed. One is to consider the groups 
actually responsible for the conduct of the relations, in the 
attempt to discover how far sympathy or lack of sympathy 
between them can be correlated with good or bad relations." 
Such an inquiry is a natural extension of traditional diplo­
matic history. A more elaborate approach has applied tech­
niques of modern political science to the analysis of a whole 
complex of links between the two countries in the effort to 
discover how changes in these have affected intergovern­
mental relations.15 This attempt rests on more precisely 
stated conceptual foundations than the other, but it is much 
less satisfactory. For it must inevitably neglect changes in 
the relationship that it is designed to elucidate—changes in 
the interests, purposes, and international standing of the two 
states. 
To say this is to imply that states have interests—it is 
hardly too much to say, personalities—that are more than 
the mechanical resultants of the interests of their citizens. 
For convenience historians, of course, constantly write as if 
they accepted the implication, writing of "Britain" or "the 
United States/' "London" or "Washington," as if a single 
entity were in question. This convention would not be use­
ful unless, more often than not, it was largely true. Patriotism 
14. Watt, "America and the British Foreign-Policy-Making Elite." 
15. Bruce M. Russett, Community and Contention: Britain and America 
in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). 
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is an autonomous force. Men often support their country not 
to further their private interests but in spite of them. On 
many occasions their commitments to their country domi­
nate or override their other commitments to other groups. 
Naturally, it is these occasions that are of most concern to 
the student of international relations. When they arise, men's 
attitudes are no doubt affected by beliefs formed in other 
circumstances and for other reasons. There will usually be 
some scope for domestic debate as to just what the national 
interest requires.16 But attitudes are not determined by such 
prior beliefs. Equally important—or rather, more important 
—is some more or less formed view of the national purpose 
and the national interest. It will hardly be disputed that men 
of different nations, whose outlook, background, and private 
interests are in every respect very similar, and who take the 
same view of public issues in which their countries are 
neutral, may differ very sharply when their countries and 
their countries' interests seem to differ." 
If this is conceded, it follows that we ought to try to dis­
cover what function one country serves for another, what 
use it is to the other. Hence we must discover what common 
purpose, if any, a nation has. Since a nation is immortal, its 
fundamental purposes must be distant and, because distant, 
imprecise. (There may be critical periods in its history, when 
immediate interests are dominant, but these are important 
just because, if they are safely passed, the nation has an in­
definite future.) To determine what the fundamental pur­
pose of a nation is, is difficult; and the attempt invites attack 
from several directions. Statements cannot be precisely 
documented: they are therefore suspect to the diplomatic 
16. The American domestic debate on the Vietnam war has become 
unusually violent. But then, the war has been unusually unsuccessful. 
17. For some discussion of this, see K. E. Boulding, "National Images 
and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution III (1959). 
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historian. They cannot be buttressed by statistical or quanti­
tative evidence: they are therefore virtually meaningless to 
one school at least of political scientists. We are entering 
"the marshy fields of intellectual and social history"18 where 
that venture has traditionally been most disapproved. Any 
statement made can at best be persuasive. Yet enthusiasts 
for the special relationship, to whom such a general approach 
might be appealing, are likely to be alienated because the 
presumptions from which it starts are not theirs. 
It will be the contention of this paper that the special 
relationship rested on a common interest in the maintenance 
of peace. That is, Britain valued American prosperity and 
power chiefly as making the maintenance of peace more 
likely; and the United States valued British prosperity and 
power for the same reason. This common interest in turn 
derived from the fact that Britain and the United States were 
the chief beneficiaries of the international system established 
in 1815 and shored up, or patched up, till 1945. In interna­
tional affairs the governments of both countries were highly 
conservative, and because conservative, peaceable. (To say 
that a shared interest in peace rested on shared conservatism 
is not to deny that it had a moral element also; nor, on the 
other hand, need we deny that the two nations had interests 
that were sometimes opposed.) As a basis for cooperation 
this was inadequate, for conservative states find it easiest to 
cooperate when their cooperation is least needed; yet it ex­
plains the underlying stability of Anglo-American relations, 
stability that superficial difficulties barely disturbed. 
Anglo-American relations can best be studied in the two 
areas in which they have been of importance—Europe and 
the Far East. Until very recently the Middle East was not an 
area in which the United States took an interest. Even to 
18. The phrase is Herbert Butterfield's; see Man on His Past (Cambridge, 
1955), p. xvi. 
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Britain, in spite of the British love affair with the desert, it 
was of interest chiefly as one route to the Far East. The Brit­
ish interest in the Middle East was quite simply strategic; 
and the Middle East was strategically important because 
Britain lay on one side and her Far Eastern interests on the 
other. In a manner equally simple, geography determined 
that the United States had no interest in the Middle East. 
Oil might have made a difference—ought to have made a 
difference, one might say. But though oil gave the Middle 
East an independent value for both countries, it had re­
markably little impact on their relations. The rivalries of oil 
companies in the area affected neither governmental rela­
tions to any significant extent nor the attitudes of the two 
peoples. The chief explanation for this was that the politics 
of the area were reasonably stable till World War II. After 
the war, of course, many more significant changes were also 
at work.19 Europe and the Far East remain, then, the areas 
in which Anglo-American relations were formed, were po­
tentially significant, and can be tested. 
It is the essence of the special relationship that it is unique. 
That is, the links between Britain and America are of a kind 
that neither state can have with any third power. Good 
relations between Britain and other powers, between Amer­
ica and other powers, will be of a different and, it is implied, 
a less significant kind. For Britain such a relationship was for 
long plausible enough. As a powerful, Western, non-
European state, the United States stood alone. There could 
be no similar relationship with any other power, for there 
was no similar power. The relationship—if it existed—did 
not conflict with any other British commitment or with any 
19. For a revealing account of the Anglo-American rivalry over the oil
of the Middle East that developed in the later years of the war, and of its
part in the general relations of the two countries, see Gabriel Kolko, The 
Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-1945 
(London, 1969), chap. 12, especially pp. 294-313. 
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British prejudice. At worst it sometimes jarred awkwardly 
against certain concepts of empire, though never against 
those most generally held. Above all, it had no particular 
consequences for the conduct of British relations with Euro­
pean states. Nothing in the special relationship dictated one 
set of European alignments rather than another. On the 
question of how Britain should order her relations with 
Europe, the Anglo-American relationship gave no guidance. 
Had the United States been in Europe—per impossibile— 
it is hard to envisage any special relationship developing. 
For Americans the problem was more difficult. Britain 
was in Europe, one major power among others. Why should 
one develop, how should one justify, a special relationship 
with one of those powers as against the others? More and 
more Americans had their roots in continental Europe, and 
to take sides in European controversies was, besides, to 
abandon a political tradition that went back to the origin of 
the country. The dilemma is a familiar one. On the level of 
policy it was not resolved, nor could it be resolved. But on 
the level of political ideology it gave almost as little trouble 
as did British relations with America. Americans were look­
ing to the distant future, and saw Britain as the example of 
an ideology. Whatever defects Britain might have in Ameri­
can eyes—and they were many—other European states had 
in equal or greater measure; and, still more important, 
Britain was usually thought the country most likely to im­
prove. This did not call for positive support of Britain; 
rather, the reverse. Keeping out of the struggles of Europe 
would usually be the most educative as well as the most in­
expensive policy. The advance of Britain in terms of power 
was not necessary or desirable. But neither was the decline 
of Britain if that decline implied also a decline in the values 
for which America was thought to stand. Insofar as calcula­
tions of power determined the American attitude, they were 
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calculations not so much of British power relative to the 
United States as of British power relative to other European 
nations. 
This suggests the purpose of the special relationship for 
Americans, a purpose that determines its proper limits. 
Britain is seen not as the stock from which America sprang 
but rather as a country on the same side, valued as sharing 
the same values. This identification is not always equally 
strong. When Britain is secure and confident, points of con­
troversy between Britain and America come to the fore, and 
common interests can be left to take care of themselves. It 
once again becomes apparent to Americans that, though 
the two countries may be engaged in some common enter­
prise, Americans must form their own judgments of what 
that enterprise is. They cannot merely follow a British lead. 
Familiar American doubts revive as to whether Britain 
really is committed to virtue. Yet when Britain is weak or in 
danger, another dilemma presents itself. Not Britain per se 
but Britain as an ally in the cause is what is valuable. How 
much effort should be put into saving an ally; how many 
risks can properly be run for him? Might not the cause be 
better served by independent action? Does not British 
weakness itself indicate internal flaws that cast doubt on 
Britain's value to the cause?20 For Americans the special 
relationship places Britain not in a special category that no 
other nation can enter but rather in a class. Britain is top of 
the class, but that is a position that can be lost; and it can be 
lost, let us note, by a failure in performance no less than by a 
change in purpose. 
20. Gabriel Kolko, discussing Anglo-American relations during World
War II, has an admirable phrase that might be given wider application. The
American object, he says, was to ensure that Britain would be "neither too
strong nor too weak to cooperate" (The Politics of War, p. 290). Though 
American opportunity to further it was greater in wartime, the object was
not a new one. It may well be the only sensible object of any nation dealing
with another, at any time. 
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When American attention—or for that matter, British 
attention—was concentrated on the Far East, it was Britain 
active and imperial that Americans saw. In the late nine­
teenth century Britain was anxious for her position there, 
which seemed threatened, immediately in China and more 
remotely in India, by Russian expansion. Her efforts, how­
ever, to develop cooperation with the United States were un­
availing. Their basis was the supposition that Russian 
activities, if they limited trade in China or hastened the 
break-up of that empire, were as offensive to the United 
States as to Britain. So indeed they were; but because the 
interests of both Britain and America in China were com­
paratively slight, and because the two countries were them­
selves rivals, mutual distrust prevented cooperation. What 
both countries expected and were willing to accept was that 
the independent activity of each would benefit the other 
also. When, after the Russo-Japanese War and World War I 
the Russian threat in the Far East was removed, cooperation 
between the two countries was still more difficult. The 
ambitions of Japan seemed to threaten the interests of both, 
yet they could not agree on any policy either to check or to 
come to terms with Japan. The reason is straightforward 
enough—American dislike of Britain's Far Eastern empire. 
In the Far East Americans feared that any action of theirs 
would benefit Britain more than themselves; their devices 
were designed to limit Britain hardly less than Japan. Brit­
ain, increasingly preoccupied in Europe, could not act ef­
fectively in the Far East. Americans were reluctant to 
undergo expense for the advantage of Britain, even if they 
had been able to devise a policy. Yet had Britain been 
stronger and more active, it is hardly likely that her policy 
would have been pleasing to the United States or have solved 
any American dilemma. While any sort of equality between 
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the two countries survived, they were bound to be, in the 
Far East, either ineffective or rivals, and most usually both.21 
In Europe, by contrast, Britain was for most Americans 
the exemplar of virtue, the country that came closest to 
sharing their ideals.22 Britain was not an equal, of course, 
and suffered from a whole range of political vices. Neverthe­
less, Britain had attained the only position necessary and 
possible. There was no reason to prefer any other European 
state to Britain, and some reason to prefer Britain to other 
states. It is notable that those very Americans who were 
outraged by almost any British activity in the Western 
Hemisphere, and mistrustful of British activity in the wider 
world, were entirely content to see Britain powerful and 
active in Europe. Britain-in-Europe and Britain-elsewhere 
were almost two separate entities. 
Part of the explanation of this is a shared interest in the 
balance of power in Europe. From that balance (including 
Britain-in-Europe) the United States was the chief benefi­
ciary, as Britain was of the continental balance. It was desir­
able that the balance should be as fine as possible, for any 
spare energy of the powers would be given to activity in the 
wider world that would be disadvantageous to the United 
States. This explanation will hardly suffice, though there is 
something in it. It is very doubtful whether most Americans 
thought of the balance of power in this way. Their thinking, 
then as later, was much more inclined to the idea of a Euro­
21. For Anglo-American relations in the Far East in two different 
periods, see Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, chap. 6, and 
H. G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States (London, 1963), chap. 6. It
is arguable that the defense of a common interest is never an adequate basis
for an alliance. 
22. The exceptions to this generalization were the German-Americans 
and the Irish-Americans. It was because they so obviously had special rea­
sons for being out of line that the idea of "hyphenated Americans had some 
plausibility. 
490 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
pean concert.23 Second, no theory of the balance of power 
will explain why it was desirable that Britain should retain 
her position. Why should a small shift, bringing Germany, 
for example, into the position previously held by Britain, be 
a matter of any concern to the United States? What the 
United States wanted in Europe was not a balance of power 
but peace and quiet; and, in Europe, the continuing strength 
of Britain was a guarantee of peace and quiet, for Britain 
was the chief satiated power. It is hardly too much to say 
that in American eyes the role of Britain was to keep Europe 
quiet. Since in American eyes Britain was fully the equal in 
virtue of other European states, and the superior of most, 
quiet did not mean merely uneasy peace under effective 
tyranny. It was satisfactory in the present, and offered hope 
for the future. 
In such circumstances the future becomes the distant 
future. Change is, in principle, acceptable; but the weight of 
conservatism is thrown against it. When force is then in­
voked to bring about change, the attempt to use force 
identifies a wrongdoer. In practice, the demand that change 
must be brought about peacefully usually conceals the 
determination that it shall not be brought about at all. For 
Europe this determination was shared by Britain and the 
United States; or, rather, while it was a British determina­
tion, and while Britain could make it good, the United 
States was relieved of the need to take an interest in Euro­
pean politics. The shared interest, however, survived only 
in peacetime. When World War I broke out, it was a wide­
spread American belief that among the powers Britain at 
least had been forced into war. So far the belief in 
British virtue was reinforced. But British treatment of Amer­
23. In this matter, to take only one example, Woodrow Wilson's critics
and his supporters had much in common. Only peace in Europe enables 
Americans to avoid taking sides. 
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ican shipping quickly called it into question.24 Indeed, Brit­
ish participation in the war revealed the limits of the shared 
interest. Both powers had hoped to continue business as 
usual, standing aside from the quarrels of Europe. Once 
Britain, rightly or wrongly, was drawn in, the community of 
interest disappeared. It is not an accident that American 
entry into the war did not restore cordiality between the two 
countries. The suspicion that developed at the peace con­
ference was not merely the result of temperamental differ­
ences between Wilson and Lloyd George. It reflected differ­
ences of interest that were bound to arise whenever activity 
by either power was in question.25 They could agree only in 
preferring inactivity. 
The interwar years demonstrated that World War I had 
settled very little. Germany's bid for a larger share in the 
affairs of Europe had been frustrated only by American in­
tervention. That intervention had not been determined by 
any clear conception of its purposes, and was withdrawn at 
the war's end. As the European powers began to recover, the 
imbalance that had been the underlying cause of World 
War I was seen to have survived it. After a period of uncer­
tainty, the problem for Britain was again identified as that of 
checking the ambitions of Germany, now, under Hitler, more 
aggressive than ever. It might be supposed that American 
aid in accomplishing this would be welcome and would be 
offered. Here, if ever, a common interest in stability should 
24. The best discussion of this problem is in Arthur S. Link, Wihon: The 
Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, N.J., 1960), especially 
chaps. 4, 6, and 10; and Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Prince­
ton, N.J., 1964), passim. 
25. Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Con­ference of 1919 (Princeton, N.J., 1961). See also Arthur S. Link, President 
WUson and his English Critics (Oxford, 1959), and Harold I. Nelson, Land 
and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers, 1916-19 (London, 1963). Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: 
Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (London, 
1968), massive in learning, is disappointing in that the theme suggested by
the subtitle is lost in detail. 
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be discernible. But cooperation between Britain and the 
United States proved impossible to arrange. The final and 
best-known episode is the rejection of President Roosevelt's 
offer to call an international conference in Washington 
early in 1938.2S For this historians have tended to blame 
Chamberlain. Roosevelt in those years gets a better verdict. 
So far as he failed, it was due to preoccupation with domes­
tic matters and to the force of isolationist sentiment.27 Prob­
ably the general verdict calls for modification. If we in­
quire just what Britain and the United States were to co­
operate to do, we get no precise answer. Chamberlain, who 
overestimated his powers of negotiation, had decided on a 
policy of appeasement. Was he to be induced to turn to a 
policy of resistance by a promise of American support? If so, 
what form could that American support take? It is highly un­
likely that Roosevelt could have given any undertaking of 
military support, or that he would have tried. Failing that, 
what had he to offer? If his idea was that Hitler might be 
induced to give way by the prospect of gaining American 
good will as well as British, it was hardly a realistic one. 
American inactivity was all that Hitler desired; he already 
had it. It is hard not to think that Roosevelt, like Chamber­
lain, exaggerated the part that his personality could play. 
This fault, however, was not simply one of personality. It 
was one forced on both Chamberlain and Roosevelt by the 
circumstances in which they found themselves. Both wanted 
stability in Europe, and stability without fighting for it. 
26. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1938, 5 vols. (Washington, 1954-56), I, 115-32. For discussions see William
L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 
(London, 1952), pp. 24-32, and Nicholas, Britain and the United States, 
pp. 24-28. 
27. We should remember that there is another school of historians that 
has accused Roosevelt of paying too little heed to public opinion and of
dragging the United States toward war. See, for example, Charles Callan 
Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 
(Chicago, 1952). 
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There is nothing discreditable in that. Inevitably, however, 
it placed them at the mercy of the restraint, or lack of it, of 
other statesmen. Faced with a man who wanted to overturn 
the old order and who had no objection to war, they were 
helpless. They ceased to be so only when they took the 
decision to resist, but it was precisely over the nature, the 
timing, the method, and the conditions of that decision that 
they were bound to disagree, for each hoped that the other 
would do the main work. Americans hoped that if Britain 
took a firm line, Hitler would recognize the limits of German 
expansion, and stability without cost would be again at­
tained. The British were of two minds. They wanted to 
limit Hitler, but they saw well the risks they ran. Too in­
transigent a policy would not only bring on a war but would 
lose them American sympathy as well. Too feeble a policy 
would lose the objective and again would lose American sym­
pathy. Yet any middle course also held dangers. They might 
have American support, but the brunt would fall on Britain; 
and while American forces were not committed, as they 
might well not be, there was danger of American withdrawal 
at some awkward moment. The experience of World War I 
suggested to Europeans no less than to Americans that 
Europe should settle its own affairs. 
It is thus hardly too much to say that the function of 
Britain, in American eyes, was to maintain the peace and 
stability of Europe. When she was seen as doing that, she 
was good; when some other British activity came to the fore­
front of American attention, she was bad. The function was 
one that Britain became less and less able to fulfill. Ameri­
cans therefore had to reconsider their position. It was as well 
for Anglo-American relations that the Nazi regime in Ger­
many was so degraded that accommodation with it was 
offensive to most Americans. Hitler destroyed the case of 
those who were disposed to seek agreement with him. The 
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course of World War II had two main effects. It gave many 
Americans an emotional sympathy for Britain—an emotional 
devotion to Sir Winston Churchill—that survived the war; 
and it gave many Americans an exaggerated impression of 
British power. The United States was the stronger partner 
in the alliance, of course; but the British performance was 
more than respectable, and it largely concealed the cost in 
national exhaustion at which it had been made. At the war's 
end, when the alliance with the Soviet Union began to break 
up, there remained a relationship between Britain and the 
United States that was genuinely "special"—that of the two 
Western world powers that had fought the war together. It 
was symbolized by the continuance, or revival, of coopera­
tion in atomic matters. 
Gar Alperovitz has recently expounded the thesis that the 
United States early identified the Soviet Union as her post­
war opponent, and valued the atomic bomb chiefly as a 
diplomatic weapon against her.28 He concentrates his analy­
sis on the period immediately before and immediately after 
the Potsdam conference, and especially on the period— 
which came to an end at Hiroshima—when a handful of 
officials had knowledge that no one else had. Much of his 
argument is persuasive, but the importance of that short 
period can be exaggerated. It was thought vital to achieve 
the "right" settlement with the Soviet Union just because it 
was hoped that the settlement, once achieved, would be 
largely self-sustaining. There is evidence to suggest that 
Americans hoped, and to some extent expected, that Britain 
would once again take up her old and "proper" task as the 
guardian of European stability. This hope was based on 
the failure to realize just how hard-hit Britain had been by 
the war. The loan to Britain, for example, was justified 
28. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (Lon­
don, 1966). 
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largely by Britain's special place in world trade, a place she 
was expected to resume. To help Britain would be the best, 
indeed the only, way of restoring world trade quickly. It 
would not be followed by demands for similar loans to other 
countries—or, if it was, the demands could be rejected as 
lacking similar justification—but was rather the best way of 
ensuring that other loans would not be needed.29 Again, the 
history of the settlement in Poland and southeastern Europe 
is now being revised. But there is no reason as yet to aban­
don the belief that the object of American policy was a 
settlement in Europe that would largely sustain itself and 
that, for the rest, would be sustained by Britain. American 
efforts to push Britain forward in Europe, and a certain wary 
British resistance, have been continuing elements in Anglo-
American relations almost from that day to this. Nothing else 
was to be expected. 
Had Britain been equal to the task allotted to her, Anglo-
American relations in the postwar years might have taken a 
different course. Since the Soviet regime had no attraction 
for Americans, their sympathies, if not their support, would 
presumably have been with Britain. Russia could have 
exerted no pull such as Germany from time to time exerted 
in earlier years. Yet a divided Germany would have been 
able to appeal powerfully to American prejudices. We need 
spend no time on the might-have-beens. It quickly became 
clear that Britain could not oppose an equal force to Russia 
in Europe, and almost as quickly the United States decided 
to supply the force herself. Here was the end of the old 
Anglo-American relationship, for, permanently involved in 
Europe, the United States was bound to develop a European 
29. At the time of the negotiation of the British loan, the State Depart­
ment kept a close watch both on press comment and on expressions of
congressional opinion. I am indebted to Mr. H. Schuyler Foster, director of
the Public Opinion Studies Staff, for access to some of the material then 
collected, and for his hospitality. 
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policy of her own and to form links with other European 
states, most obviously France and Germany. Nothing in that 
precluded good relations with Britain also; what it did pre­
clude was the idea of a special, unique relationship. Such 
elements as served to preserve the relationship—memories 
of the wartime alliance, or Britain's possession of atomic 
power—became less and less important as time passed, and 
remained important for Britons rather than for Americans. 
American eagerness for Britain to join the Common Market is 
indicative of this. For America, Britain had ceased to fulfill 
her proper function. New arrangements therefore had to be 
made. 
Britain proved reluctant to recognize the change. For this 
there were various reasons, straightforward enough. One was 
simple insular complacency, which survived the war and was 
as strong in the Labour party as among Conservatives. More 
than anything else this underlay the various detailed objec­
tions that were raised to British adherence to the Treaty of 
Rome. Another was the belief that Britain, like the United 
States and the Soviet Union, was a world power, and that no 
other Western European state was. It was this assumption 
that General de Gaulle was most furiously to challenge. But 
coupled with these, intimately interwoven with them, was 
the belief in the special relationship with the United States. 
It nourished both the sense of Britain's superiority to Europe 
and the belief in Britain's world responsibilities; they were 
essential to it. For, if Americans had observed that Britain 
could no longer take the part they had assigned her, and if 
they were gradually to accept the consequences of that, it 
was by no means true that the United States was unable to 
play the part assigned her by Britain. Stronger than ever, 
her economy stimulated rather than damaged by the war, 
she was now exercising the world power that the special 
relationship made, so to say, an extension of British power. 
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The chief British charges against the United States had been 
isolationism and complacency. Now that these were being 
abandoned, the special relationship might well be more 
fruitful for Britain than ever before. There were, of course, 
those who saw that a special relationship was appropriate 
only between equals or near-equals; but Britain suffered 
from a belief in her capacity to recover that has only begun 
to crack in the last decade. 
Events in Europe thus began to erode the special relation­
ship by weakening American interest or belief in it. Events 
in the Far East appeared for a time to be strengthening it. 
In the Far East, as we have seen, American distrust of British 
imperialism was the chief bar to cooperation, which com­
mon fear of Russian expansion was never great enough to 
overcome. Still less was this so after the Japanese victory in 
the Russo-Japanese War, when the renewal and extension of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance seemed to most Americans a 
mischievous step. World War I reduced Russian power in 
the Far East still further, but it also set in train the slow 
British withdrawal from the area. The Anglo-Japanese alli­
ance was ended, partly, indeed, in response to the knowledge 
that the United States disliked it; but we should note how 
little resistance there was in Britain to its ending. The threat 
it had been designed to meet, and had met with surprising 
effectiveness, no longer existed. In consequence the alliance 
lost its value. The interwar years were years in which the 
chief threat to the existing order in the Far East was clearly 
Japan, and in which British opposition was as clearly feeble. 
American opposition was hardly more effective. What is 
worth emphasizing for our purpose is that in the Far East a 
more vigorous British policy would have earned American 
censure. 
After World War II the process of dismantling the colonial 
empires began. Here the British record was a good one. 
498 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Britain was not blamed for the upheavals that followed her 
withdrawal from India, but rather was given credit for the 
good grace with which the decision to withdraw had been 
taken. It contrasted, in particular, with the French efforts to 
hang on to their possessions, and the churlish manner in 
which the Dutch abandoned theirs. The old American pic­
ture of Britain as a grasping colonial power began to fade. It 
did not follow that cooperation was easy. When Indonesia 
and Malaya came into conflict, the American tendency, till 
late, was to suppose that Indonesia was right and Britain 
wrong. Moreover, the situation was dominated, from an 
early stage, by American identification of Communist China 
as the Far Eastern enemy. Largely as a legacy of World 
War II, the United States was now more active than Britain 
in the Far East. There was room for dispute about the best 
way to respond to communism in China; but more important, 
there was room also for dispute about how to treat the inde­
pendent states of the Far East so as to render them useful in 
the anticommunist struggle. The British thought Americans 
needlessly inflexible in their anticommunism. The Ameri­
cans suspected the British of hankering after the empire they 
had lost. As so often in the past each country welcomed in 
principle the activity of the other, but in practice supposed 
that activity ill-judged. 
Yet there was nothing in this Far Eastern situation to dis­
turb the special relationship. Americans distrusted British 
activity in the Far East, and did so the more because it dis­
tracted British attention from Europe. British insistence 
that Britain still had a world role seemed to Americans both 
unrealistic and damaging to the recovery and advance of 
Europe. Nevertheless, they supposed that British withdrawal 
would inevitably continue in spite of British nostalgia for an 
irrecoverable past. From time to time—as, for example, over 
the question of aid to India during the Chinese attack of 
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1962—they found it possible to work conveniently with 
Britain; at other times they found no difficulty in being 
reasonably tactful. The basic proposition—that the Far East 
was an area that the United States could handle, and in 
which British activity was less desirable than British in­
activity—did not conflict with the notion of a special rela­
tionship. Nor did the British find any more difficulty. They 
might consider that many specific American actions were 
ill-judged. They could maintain their hope that with more 
experience and a little gentle British prodding Americans 
would learn subtlety and tact. These qualities were all that 
was needed. There was no objection in principle to having 
the United States control an area in which Britain felt she 
had responsibilities rather than valuable interests. What 
both powers wanted, as ever, was inexpensive stability. 
While that seemed attainable, there was no cause for either 
to rethink its position. 
What has altered the position, and may have altered it 
permanently, is the war in Vietnam. Just as Britain's mani­
fest inability to maintain peaceful stability in Europe dis­
illusioned Americans with the idea of a special relationship, 
so America's failure to hold the line peacefully in the Far 
East has disillusioned many Britons. It has not stimulated 
anti-Americanism except among those who were anti-
American already. It has made people reconsider their 
views who would otherwise have left them complacently 
unexamined. The problem is not simply that the United 
States seems to have been drawn into a struggle in which 
victory is unlikely and which, so critics on both sides of the 
Atlantic contend, is immoral as well. That would be no more 
than a temporary setback to Anglo-American relations: it is 
safe to say that Vietnam will not engage our attention for­
ever. What has been called in question is the assumption that 
the wealth, power, and influence of the United States 
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ordinarily serve British purposes as well as American. This 
does not suggest an immediate change of policy or, still less, 
hostility to the United States. Rather, it suggests a sort of 
British Gaullism.30 There seems no point in being the lesser 
part of an Anglo-American partnership. It has inhibited Brit­
ish independence, it has not influenced the United States, 
and, most important, it has not kept the peace. The proper 
British course is one of more determined independence. 
It was argued above that Americans finally lost interest in 
the special relationship when Britain became too weak to 
maintain European stability and when, in consequence, the 
United States intervened directly in European politics. The 
present situation in the Far East seems to offer no parallel. 
There is no decline in American power, absolute or relative; 
and it would be wholly unrealistic to suppose that British 
action, whether independent or in support of the United 
States, could achieve a result that United States action can­
not. Yet there are points of similarity. First, what is under 
consideration is not some absolute standard of power but 
effective power, power that, given Anglo-American assump­
tions, is properly measured, and can only be measured, by 
the capacity to maintain peace. It is just this capacity, of 
course, that the Vietnam war has called into question. Sec­
ond, since the subject of this analysis is the Anglo-American 
relationship, not the alternative policies open to either 
nation, the great and obvious difference between British 
and American power may be a distraction. Before World 
War I, and again before World War II, when the balance in 
Europe was clearly unstable, recognition of that fact 
strengthened American determination to remain aloof if 
possible, determination that any sense of a special relation­
30. It is often remarked that the British were Gaullists before de Gaulle. 
The comment refers to British aloofness from other European states and 
insistence on a world role, not to British independence of the United States. 
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ship could do little to counteract. Similarly, if a political 
struggle is now to develop in Asia, with the United States 
and China as protagonists, the British disposition will be to 
stand aside, maintaining so far as possible connections with 
both. 
Britain and the United States have long differed in their 
attitude to Communist China. While peace in Asia, however 
fragile, could be maintained, the differences were of second­
ary importance. In war, or under the immediate threat of 
war, they are central. Both countries are forced to make 
calculations, and predictions of the future, that emphasize 
how different their circumstances are. It is not easy to 
envisage a future in which it will again be possible to neglect 
those different circumstances. Anglo-American relations at 
the moment are not bad. Whatever the outcome in Vietnam, 
they will often, one may hope, be good in the future. But if 
good, they will be good as relations between other states 
are good, and not by reason of any special relationship. The 
long-range predictions not about Britain or America but 
about the future of the world and the forces shaping it, 
which were the basis of the special relationship, have ceased 
to be plausible. 
From Contempt to Containment: 
Cycles in American Attitudes 
toward China 
WARREN I. COHEN 
UNDER FIRE in 1967 because of an unpopular war in 
Southeast Asia, the American secretary of state explained 
the administration's policy in terms of the need to contain 
an aggressive China. In 1968, as the season for elections 
neared in the United States, William Buckley, a leading 
spokesman for American conservatism, urged upon the 
Republican party a foreign policy platform that included 
provision for making Japan into a nuclear power, as a 
counter to China. The knowledge that Dean Rusk and Amer­
ican conservatives saw China as a threat to the interests of 
the United States could hardly have come as a surprise to 
anyone familiar with American attitudes toward China 
since 1950—when the outbreak of war in Korea led the 
Truman administration to apply the policy of containment 
to Asia. Much had changed since the beginning of the cen­
tury when American attitudes toward China were such as to 
lead a later student, Harold Isaacs, to categorize the period 
1840-1905 as the "Age of Contempt." 
Fear now reigned where once contempt had spat—and in 
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the years between, China had struggled to become a modern 
nation-state. As China awakened, how did the United States 
respond? What was the American reaction to the process of 
modernization in China, to the development of nationalism? 
To what extent was the United States willing to interpose its 
power between China and Japan's pretensions to hegemony 
in East Asia? These are the questions with which I am con­
cerned in this essay, another approach to the study of Sino-
American relations in the twentieth century. 
When Theodore Roosevelt became president of the 
United States, his inherited secretary of state, John Hay, had 
already placed the world's major powers on notice of Ameri­
can interest in China. Long involved in Chinese affairs, en­
meshed in the treaty system shaped largely by other imperial 
powers, the United States had chosen not to follow when 
the Japanese and European powers sought to divide China 
into spheres of influence. But the interest in China that 
antedated American independence, the involvement that 
began in 1784 with the arrival of the first American mer­
chantman at Canton, was not to be abandoned. Indeed, the 
acquisition of an insular empire in the Pacific in the closing 
years of the nineteenth century had heightened American 
concern over the course of events in the Far East, and in 
1899 and 1900 in his Open Door notes, John Hay both ex­
pressed this concern and requested assurance that the posi­
tion of the United States in China would not be undermined 
by the course upon which the powers had embarked. 
Over the years there has been much debate over the 
meaning and wisdom of Hay's message to the powers. There 
have been suggestions that he benignly and/or foolishly 
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claimed for the United States a role that it had neither the 
will nor the power to play—that of protector of China. What­
ever the merits of the various arguments, it should be pat­
ently clear that no matter what else was involved, Hay's 
policy was intended to serve the interests of the United 
States. If his notes proved to be of value to China also, that 
was incidental. But to assert the truism that American policy 
was designed to serve American ends is not to suggest that 
this policy was antithetical to the interests of China. At times 
there may well have been conflicts of interest, but there is no 
iron law of interests such as classical economists postulated 
for wages. A nation in the course of serving its own interests 
may as easily serve as infringe upon the interests of others. 
In short, to demonstrate that American statesmen, in formu­
lating and executing policy toward China, consistently 
sought to further the interests of their own country does not 
prove a priori that they consistently sought to or did exploit 
China. 
Hay, as he wrote his notes, served in a government that 
held China in contempt. China was less a part of the inter­
national order with which he dealt than it was an inert mass 
to be acted upon. If the other imperial powers expressed 
their contempt by carving China into spheres, the American 
government, in defending its interests, did not consult with 
the Chinese government, nor did Hay at any time seek an 
expression of Chinese needs. In fact, during the period in 
which the Open Door notes were formulated and delivered, 
Hay was involved in a heated debate with the Chinese 
minister to the United States over the issue of American 
discrimination against Chinese in Hawaii and the Philip­
pines. September, 1899, the month in which the first notes 
were sent to the powers was the same month in which the 
Chinese minister, Wu T'ing-fang, protested against the 
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"utter disregard" of the United States for "the friendly rela­
tions which should exist between the two governments."* 
The American minister to China, E. H. Conger, expressed 
another facet of the American attitude toward China, ex­
plaining the merits of gunboat diplomacy to Hay: "The 
Chinese Government really care little for anything but 
power, and an earnest exhibition of it always promptly 
moves them." As Conger mustered gunboats to protect the 
rights of Americans in China, Wu T'ing-fang could arm 
himself only with indignation in his efforts to protect the 
rights of Chinese in the United States. "Mr. Secretary," he 
wrote to Hay, "the archives of your Department will show 
how futile have been the representations of the Chinese 
Government." He charged officials of the American govern­
ment with treating the Chinese "not as subjects of a friendly 
power lawfully seeking the benefit of treaty privileges, but 
as suspected criminals." Why, he asked, could not the Chi­
nese in the United States receive the same treatment af­
forded other foreigners—and "demanded and secured" by 
the Chinese Government "for American citizens in China— 
an open door and a fair field."2 
And the answer was that China was weak and held in 
contempt by the United States no less than by the other 
powers. And before Wu left for home, Roosevelt, whose 
contempt for China was rarely concealed, took over the 
reins of the American government. 
Roosevelt's Far Eastern policies have received consider­
able scholarly treatment, but the major focus, including two 
recent volumes, has been, justly, on his handling of Japanese­
1. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899
(Washington, 1901), pp. 202-15 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations).

2. Foreign Relations, 1900 (Washington, 1902), p. 94; Foreign Relations, 
1901 (Washington, 1902), pp. 76-97. 
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American relations. The most extensive analysis of Roose­
velt's attitudes and policy toward China is probably the 
long chapter in Howard K. Beale's Theodore Roosevelt and 
America's Rise to World Power. In a book that clearly dem­
onstrated Roosevelt's fascination with power politics and his 
commitment to imperialism, Beale was particularly critical 
of his failure to come to terms with Chinese nationalism, of 
his "failure to formulate a foreign policy that would have 
helped solve China's basic problems and would have been 
in line with China's future role in world affairs." Indeed, 
Beale carried the argument one step further and declared 
that the rise of nationalism in China "was precisely what 
Americans like Roosevelt feared." Moreover, he implied that 
in the failure of the United States to befriend Chinese na­
tionalism, to guide it, the United States lost China and 
"missed perhaps the greatest opportunity of its twentieth 
century career."s 
Whether greater wisdom or decency in Roosevelt's policy 
would have spared the Chinese Communists the necessity 
of organizing and averted the unpleasantness that followed 
World War II is a question probably best left to some able 
Chinese geomancer, but Roosevelt's attitudes toward China 
and Chinese nationalism merit examination. And examina­
tion immediately indicates a contempt for China so strong 
that "Chinese" became in Roosevelt's vocabulary a derisive 
adjective. Thus the Russians in June, 1905, by refusing to 
come to terms with the Japanese, were accused of behaving 
with "Chinese folly." Over the years, his frequent dissatis­
faction with the unwillingness of his fellow Americans to 
3. For Roosevelt and Japan, see Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt 
and Japan (Seattle, 1966) and Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: 
Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967): 
Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World 
Power (Baltimore, 1956), pp. 248, 252. 
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endorse his programs for military preparedness brought 
clumsy attempts at analogies with presumed Chinese paci­
fism, the most picturesque example coming after Wilson's 
statement about being "too proud to fight." Roosevelt wrote: 
"If I thought the mood was permanent, I would feel that 
Uncle Sam would do well to wear a pigtail at once." Herein 
lay the source of his attitude toward China and the 
Chinese.4 
For all Roosevelt's inane prattle about Anglo-Saxon su­
periority, for all his peculiar racial classifications, it was not 
race as normally understood that determined his view. No 
one could deny his most obvious respect for the Japanese. 
He himself expressed this most characteristically to John 
Hay: "What nonsense it is to speak of the Chinese and 
Japanese as of the same race! They are of the same race only 
in the sense that a Levantine Greek is of the same race with 
Lord Milner." The Japanese had built a nation—they had 
modernized their society. In time, he believed, they would 
build a great civilization. For most of his life, however, 
Roosevelt did not believe the Chinese could become civilized 
—did not believe the Chinese could create a modern 
society. Perhaps when the moon was blue: "If China be­
came civilized like Japan," and a number of other wondrous 
things occurred, "then," he wrote to Henry White, "an 
international disarmament agreement would be possible." 
He was repelled by the apparent lack of patriotism in 
China, explaining its semicolonial status in terms of the 
inability and unwillingness of the Chinese to fight, and he 
made frequent invidious comparisons with Japan. In short, 
4. Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June 16, 1905; to Arthur
Hamilton Lee, June 7, 1916, in Elting E. Morison et al., eds., The Letters of 
Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-54), IV, 1232; VIII,
1055 (hereafter cited as Letters). 
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Roosevelt's disgust with China was markedly similar to that 
of Sun Yat-sen: the Chinese people were as loose sands that 
could not be held together to create a modern nation state.5 
Obviously, Roosevelt's concern for China was not quite 
equal to Sun's, but neither was his attitude toward Chinese 
nationalism antithetical to Sun's, as Beale's analysis would 
suggest. If, to Roosevelt, Chinese rights and aspirations were 
never of equal importance to American rights and aspira­
tions, he could still recognize that they existed and fault 
those who trod on them—even Americans. For Roosevelt, 
the imperialist had obligations as well as privileges, and the 
greatest obligation was to behave in a manner that clearly 
demonstrated superiority. To Finley Peter Dunne he once 
admitted that "your delicious phrase about 'take up the 
white man's burden and put it on the coon,' exactly hit the 
weak spot in my own theory." So long as this weak spot 
existed, so long as this uneasiness existed, the "civilized" 
nations had to perform in exemplary manner in the presence 
of their victims. Thus Roosevelt was infuriated by the 
brutality of European troops in the relief expedition that 
liberated Peking during the Boxer Rebellion. He wrote to 
Mahan, noting that the American officers in the expedition 
felt that the "awful outrages committed by many of the 
European troops . . . the wanton so-called punitive ex­
peditions of the German troops, and indeed the original 
misconduct of some of the foreigners, notably the Germans 
and the Russians, have left the count against us rather than 
against the Chinese." Though proud of the role played by 
American forces, especially General A. R. Chafee's efforts to 
secure justice for the Chinese, he readily called Mahan's at­
tention to reports of misconduct on the part of American 
5. Roosevelt to John Hay, September 2, 1904; to Henry White, August 
14, 1906, Letters, IV, 917; V, 359. 
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missionaries. Nothing could be lower than an imperial power 
that sank to such levels; and in 1905, in the midst of a crisis 
in Sino-American relations, Roosevelt, expressing dissatisfac­
tion with China to his minister, W. W. Rockhill, insisted 
that "bad as the Chinese are, no human beings, black, yellow 
or white, can be quite as untruthful, as insincere, as arrogant 
—in short as untrustworthy in every way—as the Russians 
under their present system."6 
Now, in the latter part of the twentieth century, few 
Americans would be pleased with the patterns of Roosevelt's 
thought, with his overt imperialism and racial condescension. 
But his attitudes must be kept in perspective. Russians were 
contemptible "under their present system." He was appalled 
by the massive inefficient bureaucracy that obstructed 
modernization. China was contemptible, not because Chi­
nese were yellow, not because they were Asians, but because 
they had no national spirit and made no effort to modernize. 
Implicit in his thought was not hostility toward, or fear of, 
Chinese nationalism, but rather the assumption that China 
would never develop a national spirit—that it would remain 
forever a weak clumsy empire with even less capacity to 
mobilize its energies than the bureaucratic Russian empire. 
Rather than condemn the Chinese to an eternal role as 
victim of international politics, he constantly pointed to the 
Japanese example as one that the Chinese might well em­
ulate. 
In 1905, however, the Chinese surprised Roosevelt with a 
nationalist movement that took the form of an anti-American 
boycott. Here indeed was a trying test of his attitudes and 
policy, and Beale has contended that he "offered the young 
Chinese nationalists not sympathy but a show of force," that 
6. Roosevelt to Finley Peter Dunne, January 16, 1900; to Alfred Thayer
Mahan, March 18, 1901; to William W. Rockhill, August 29, 1905, Letters, 
II, 1134; III, 23; IV, 1326-27. 
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he even "prepared to invade China."7 Although evidence 
does exist to support Beale's contentions, this same evidence, 
in context, permits a very different interpretation. 
The anti-American movement of 1905 came in response 
to the immigration policy of the United States and to the 
discrimination against Oriental immigrants in California. 
The movement took the form of a boycott against American 
trade and was undertaken by the Chinese people rather than 
by their government—although some representatives of the 
Chinese government, like Wu T'ing-fang, supported it. With 
regard to immigration policy, Roosevelt's attitude was clear, 
consistent, and creditable. He accepted the exclusion of 
Chinese labor that he was powerless to prevent and made 
every effort to obtain fair treatment for Chinese businessmen 
and students. This did not satisfy the Chinese, nor should 
it have. The Chinese exclusion acts were unquestionably a 
disgrace, a mockery of American ideals—but they were the 
will of the majority of Americans and not the work of Roose­
velt. 
Roosevelt dealt with the boycott by attempting to alle­
viate its causes in the United States and to limit its applica­
tion in China. On both fronts he had limited success because 
he had but limited power. Within the United States he could 
dictate neither to Congress nor to the particular states, which, 
like California, legalized discrimination against Orientals. 
Over events in China, he had still less control. To American 
businessmen, political figures, and friends, he contended that 
the Chinese had just cause for complaint, that "undoubtedly 
one of the chief causes of the boycott has been the short­
comings of the United States Government and people in the 
matter of the treatment of Chinese here." He demanded 
support, particularly from Pacific Coast sufferers from the 
7. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 242, 247. 
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boycott, for his efforts "to do justice as well as to exact jus­
tice." Of Senator George Perkins of California, Roosevelt 
asked for help "to secure rational action by Congress in legis­
lation and treaties affecting Chinese merchants, professional 
men, students, travelers, and the like, so as to secure to them 
exactly the same treatment in the United States as would be 
given to similar people of other nationalities." He insisted 
he was doing what he could and demanded that Pacific 
Coast representatives aid "in undoing the injustice in our 
treaties and legislation as regards the Chinese, which has 
probably been the whole, and certainly the main, cause of 
the present boycott."8 
On the administrative level Roosevelt could act alone, 
and he did. Victor Metcalf, the secretary of commerce and 
labor, received orders to send "specific and rigid" instruc­
tions to immigration authorities "that we will no more toler­
ate discourtesy or harsh treatment in connection with the 
Chinese merchant, traveler or student than in connection 
with . . . [those] who visit us from other nations." He in­
formed the acting secretary of state, Herbert Peirce, that 
immigration authorities had been put on notice that harsh­
ness in the administration of the laws would not be tolerated 
and that "any discourtesy shown to Chinese persons by any 
official of the Government will be cause for immediate dis­
missal from the service."9 
In his efforts to have the Chinese government stop the 
boycott, Roosevelt's methods, contrary to Beale's allegations, 
were unexceptional. The American minister in Peking made 
frequent protests and warned that the Chinese government 
would be held accountable for losses sustained by American 
8. Roosevelt to George C. Perkins, August 31, 1905; to T. C. Friedlander, 
November 23, 1905, Letters, IV, 1327-28; V, 90-91. 
9. Roosevelt to Victor Metcalf, June 16, 1905; to Herbert Peirce, Tune 
24,1905, Letters, IV, 1235, 1251. 
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businessmen. He demanded the punishment of the man al­
leged to be the leader of the boycott movement. In short, 
given the fact that the boycott violated American treaty 
rights and was, to say the least, an unfriendly gesture, Rock-
hill's actions were routine. There was no threat of force— 
even after the Chinese government denied responsibility 
for the boycott and refused to take further action. And in 
the fall, after the movement had been sustained for about 
five months and Chinese businessmen began to suffer, the 
boycott lost its vitality.10 
Beale's charges of Roosevelt meeting this expression of 
Chinese nationalism with a show of force and preparations 
for invasion are misleading. At the close of 1905 the Ameri­
can Asiatic Fleet was increased by two cruisers and three 
gunboats, and Roosevelt did ask the War Department to 
prepare plans for possible operations against China; but 
neither move was taken with any intention of crushing the 
boycott in particular or Chinese nationalism in general. In 
October a number of American missionaries were murdered 
in China, and as the boycott faded, physical attacks on 
Americans increased. With the memory of the Boxer upris­
ing only five years old, it would have been irresponsible for 
Roosevelt not to have considered the possibility of a new 
relief expedition. And so the secretary of the navy was noti­
fied that "the Chinese are not showing a good spirit" and 
that the United States "ought to be prepared for any con­
tingencies there." Fortunately, no expedition to China 
proved necessary, "but," Roosevelt wrote to General Leon­
ard Wood, "I wanted to be sure that if it was needed we 
would not be unprepared." " 
10. Foreign Relations, 1905 (Washington, 1906), 204-34. 
11. Roosevelt to Charles J. Bonaparte, November 15, 1905; to William H. 
Taft January 11, 1906; to Leonard Wood, April 2, 1906, Letters, V, 77, 
132-133, 205. See also Foreign Relations, 1933, 5 vols. (Washington, 1950), 
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In December, 1905, with the situation in China relatively 
quiet, Roosevelt chose the occasion of his annual message 
to Congress to express his essential sympathy with the Chi­
nese cause. Although he condoned the policy of excluding 
coolies, he insisted that in practice "grave injustice and 
wrong have been done by this nation to the people of China, 
and therefore ultimately to this nation itself." He reminded 
his audience of American insistence upon justice being 
shown Americans by the Chinese, but warned that "we can­
not receive equity unless we are willing to do equity." "We 
cannot," he maintained, "ask the Chinese to do to us what 
we are unwilling to do to them." In direct reference to the 
boycott, he attributed it to the resentment felt by all the 
Chinese leaders against the harshness of American immigra­
tion policy.12 
Roosevelt's most characteristic expression of sympathy 
for Chinese nationalism came almost two years later when 
the Chinese government announced that it intended to re­
appoint Wu T'ing-fang as minister to the United States. In 
his previous tour Wu, a master of the English language, had 
persistently bested the Department of State in exchanges 
over the treatment of Chinese in America and in the new 
American empire in the Pacific. A strident nationalist, he 
had been active in the boycott movement of 1905 and sub­
sequently allied himself with Sun Yat-sen, remaining Sun's 
principal adviser on foreign affairs until his death in 1922. 
In 1907 the question was raised as to whether the United 
States should accept as minister a man who had consistently 
harassed the American government during his earlier tenure 
III, 31-39, for a Department of State review of the events of 1905. This
document contains evidence that negates Beale's charge but, by illustrating
the routine practices of the Asiatic Fleet, precludes any sanguine view of
American imperialism in China. 
12. Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, 1899­
1909 (New York, 1925), pp. 376-77 (hereafter cited as State Papers). 
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in office and who had been deeply involved in anti-American 
activities ever since. And Roosevelt replied: 
My feeling would be strongly that we ought not to object to 
Wu. He is a bad old Chink and if he had his way he would 
put us all to the heavy death or do something equally un­
pleasant with us; but we cannot expect to get a Minister like 
the one that has just gone, and the loss is far more China's 
than ours; while I do not object to any Chinaman showing a 
feeling that he would like to retaliate now and then for our 
insolence to the Chinese.13 
During his last two years in office, Roosevelt indicated an 
awareness of the changes that were occurring in China, of 
the modernizing (he would have said "civilizing") process 
struggling to break through the shell of Chinese conserva­
tism—and he did not deny American sympathy or assistance. 
In his annual message of 1907 he asked for authority to re­
fund the punitive part of the Boxer Indemnity, declaring 
that the United States "should help in every practicable way 
in the education of the Chinese people, so that the vast and 
populous empire of China may gradually adapt itself to 
modern conditions." Although Beale contended that Roose­
velt did not realize that it was nationalism that was emerging 
in China and that he viewed an exhibition of nationalist 
aspirations as misbehavior, before he left the White House, 
Roosevelt published an article, "The Awakening of China," 
which read like a paean to the new spirt there. He called 
upon his countrymen to note the awakening of China: the 
increased contact with foreigners, increased trade, modern­
ization of communications, evolution of industry, and a 
change in attitudes toward Western education. With his 
usual enthusiasm Roosevelt visualized a new China freed 
13. Roosevelt to Elihu Root, September 26, 1907, Letters, V, 809. 
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from the shackles of ancient superstitions. At last there had 
come a movement that meant "the growth of a real and intel­
ligent spirit of patriotism in all parts of China." 
Having learned much of what he knew of events in China 
from missionaries, Roosevelt exaggerated the influence of 
Christian education on Chinese nationalism; but that devia­
tion hardly detracted from his message: China had awak­
ened and was preparing to join the modern world, "one of 
the great events of our age." And there would be no reason 
to fear a modern China provided that Chinese discontent 
was met not with repression but with justice and education: 
"The best way to avoid possible peril, commercial or mili­
tary, from the great Chinese people, is by behaving right­
eously toward them and by striving to inspire a religious 
life in them." After this expression of regard for religious 
works, he concluded by insisting that the object of the mis­
sions should not be limited to the saving of souls but should 
also work toward the creation of the kingdom of God on earth 
—which, after all, was the modest goal of the New Nation­
alism." 
Almost as if to demonstrate that these ideas were not 
merely the result of some Sunday morning uplift but rather 
an integral part of his view of world politics, Roosevelt ex­
pressed them quite differently when addressing Tang 
Shao-i, a prominent nationalist reformer, a few days after 
publication of the article. He declared that the United States 
hoped, "so far as the opportunity and the power permit, to 
aid those Chinese citizens who in working for the betterment 
of conditions in China, in working to bring China abreast 
of the general movement of civilized mankind, are showing 
themselves to be the truest friends and supporters of the 
ancient Chinese Empire." Roosevelt's reasons for desiring a 
14. Roosevelt, State Papers, p. 571; Beale. Theodore Roosevelt, p. 251; 
Roosevelt, "The Awakening of China," Outlook XC (1908), 665-67. 
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strong China came from his conception of the world's need 
for a stable balance of power. A weak China invited foreign 
aggression and a competition for power in East Asia—a com­
petition that provided a much more certain danger of insta­
bility than did the emergence of a strong Chinese nation. 
To T'ang, he declared: 
I believe that the world now realizes more than ever before 
that normally it is to the advantage of other nations when 
any nation becomes stable and prosperous, able to keep the 
peace within its own borders, and strong enough not to in­
vite aggression from without. We heartily hope for the 
progress of China, and so far as by peaceful and legitimate 
means we are able we will do our part toward furthering 
that progress.15 
Nothing that Roosevelt said or did generally or specifically 
with regard to Chinese nationalism proves that Roosevelt 
was any less an imperialist or superpatriot than he appears 
in others' portraits of him. Even at his most benign, he was 
condescending to the Chinese, and he never willingly sacri­
ficed any American interests in China, as Beale and others 
have shown clearly in their studies of the Canton-Hankow 
railroad dispute. Scholars are agreed that he was willing to 
acquiesce in Japanese infringements on Chinese sovereignty 
in Manchuria, rather than risk involving the United States 
in war with Japan. But if his principal concern was always 
his country's national interest, the desire for a strong China 
was not incompatible with American interests. If the United 
States benefited from a stable international order, a strong 
China was ultimately a surer guarantee of such an order 
than a weak China over which other powers vied. 
Roosevelt was contemptuous of weak countries that in­
15. Roosevelt to the Department of State, December 2, 1908, Letters, 
VI, 1405-7. 
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sisted upon retaining their ancient customs and traditional 
societies. Such countries are currently referred to as "under­
developed"—he called them uncivilized. For the Chinese he 
seemed to have particular contempt, perhaps because a 
once great civilization seemed unable to revitalize itself, be­
cause the Chinese, lacking a spirit of nationalism, were un­
willing to create a modern nation-state. When, in 1905, he 
perceived the new spirit in China, he met it with respect and 
even admiration. He did not fight for Chinese nationalism 
because it was not in America's interest to fight China's bat­
tles. "Alliance with China," he wrote in 1910, "in view of 
China's absolute military helplessness, means not an addi­
tional strength to us, but an additional obligation which we 
assume."16 A strong China might well be in the interest of 
the entire world; but in Roosevelt's time it did not exist, and 
he guided his nation through the shoals of world politics 
with a surer sense of the limits of its power than is apparent 
in some historians with benefit of fifty or more years of hind­
sight. 
77 
In the decade following Roosevelt's brief retirement from 
American politics, the men who concerned themselves with 
Far Eastern policy proved to be still more sympathetic to 
the national aspirations of the Chinese people. But there 
were differences of tremendous significance. Roosevelt had 
compartmentalized his thoughts. His sympathy for Chinese 
nationalism was genuine, but he never let it interfere with 
his perception of the realities of power. He did not believe 
that the interests of the United States could be served by 
16. Roosevelt to Taft, December 22, 1910, Letters, VII, 190. 
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aligning the country with China in such a way as to antag­
onize Japan—in his time and for long after the dominant 
force in East Asia. With all his rhetoric about America's 
mission, he suffered no illusions of a Pax Americana; no 
messianic impulse drove him to risk the security and inter­
ests of the United States on behalf of China. 
His successors, especially Taft and his secretary of state 
Philander C. Knox, and Wilson, had a more immediate sense 
of the identity of American and Chinese interests—and a 
lesser understanding of the role of power in world affairs. 
They sympathized with Chinese aspirations, considered 
them just, and considered diplomatic and financial support 
of these aspirations consistent with the interests of the 
United States. That such policy antagonized Japan con­
cerned them far less than it had Roosevelt. For Taft and 
Knox, perhaps, it was the power of the dollar, for Wilson, the 
power of right; but both administrations dared Japanese 
military power without fear of conflict. 
Roosevelt's disagreement with Taft and Knox over dollar 
diplomacy in Manchuria illustrates the difference between 
mere sympathy for China and a policy that, partly on the 
basis of sympathy, would have the United States act to assist 
China in attaining its goals. Charles Vevier and Raymond 
Esthus have shown Willard Straight's role in the schemes 
to force Russia and especially Japan out of Manchuria." 
Despite differences in their interpretations of Straight's 
motives, both men agreed that the neutralization scheme, 
whereby an American-sponsored international loan was to 
enable the Chinese government to buy up foreign railroad 
17. Charles Vevier, "The Open Door: An Idea in Action, 1906-1913," Pa­
cific Historical Review XXIV (1955), 49-62; Raymond Esthus, "The 
Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review XLVI (1959), 435-54. 
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concessions, would have given China an opportunity to re­
gain sovereignty over Manchuria. Great advantages would 
also have accrued to American railroad and banking inter­
ests, but this was the bait necessary to raise the capital, for 
neither banks nor railroads are designed to be eleemosynary 
institutions. And yet, if for the moment dollars were intended 
to serve the ends of diplomacy, it should not be forgotten 
that the ultimate purpose of Knox's diplomacy was the fur­
therance of American trade and investments abroad. Here, 
in the Far East, this led to an assumption of the congruity 
of Chinese and American interests. Every step taken to re­
lieve the Chinese from the pressures of European and Jap­
anese imperialism provided a new hope for American profit. 
To paraphrase Samuel Flagg Bemis, the liberation of China 
was to provide America's opportunity. 
The assumption of the congruence of American and Chi­
nese interests disturbed Roosevelt. In a letter to his son he 
bemoaned the inability of "poor Taft" to understand that a 
successful policy toward Japan necessitated a "coherent plan 
for treating affairs in Manohuria, affairs in China, affairs 
about immigration." Finally, he went to Taft and told him 
that Japan could be a serious menace to the security of the 
United States and its possessions. He noted that the Japanese 
were very sensitive to threats to their interests on the con­
tinent of Asia, especially in Manchuria, "where American 
interests are really unimportant, and not such that the Amer­
ican people would be content to run the slightest risk of 
collision about them." With both Taft and Knox he argued 
that the United States should do nothing that might be con­
strued as challenging Japanese interests in Manchuria. To 
identify the interests of the United States with those of 
China was utter madness. Roosevelt contended that to chal­
lenge Japan in Manchuria required tremendous military 
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power—a fleet equivalent to England's and an army com­
parable to Germany's.18 
Indeed, Roosevelt went further and contended that the 
Open Door policy of the United States was worthless when 
a powerful nation chose to disregard it and was prepared 
to use force if necessary to pursue its ends. To this, Knox 
took exception, preferring the higher moral ground implicit 
in his draft for Taft's reply to Roosevelt. He asked "why the 
Japanese need Manchuria any more than does China who 
owns it now." And he posed what was to become the crucial 
problem for those who would determine American policy 
in the Far East for years to come. Charging that Roosevelt 
saw no alternative "between silently renouncing our historic 
policy in China whenever it may cross the interest of another 
power and being prepared to go to war in defense of that 
policy," Knox began the quest for that alternative." 
To Taft and Knox, as to Willard Straight and perhaps to 
men of good will everywhere, China had the right to control 
its own territory and its own resources, as its people sought 
to create a modern nation. But Japan posed obstacles to the 
modernization of China, which threatened Japanese hegem­
ony in East Asia. Where Taft, Knox, and Straight differed 
from others who shared their sentiments was in their con­
viction that opposition to Japan in support of Chinese aspira­
tions was consistent not only with the ideals but also with the 
interests of the American people. And they made the effort 
to provide China with the capital needed to return to the 
Chinese people control over their internal communications 
and over the exploitation of their resources. 
18. Roosevelt to Lodge, May 24, 1910; to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 
December 5, 1910; to Taft, December 8, and December 22, 1910, Letters, 
VII, 86, 178, 180, 189-90. 
19. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 
2 vols. (New York and Toronto, 1939), II, 685-86. 
 521 WARREN I. COHEN
Knox's plans for Manchuria foundered when Japan and 
Russia unexpectedly chose to manuever together and the 
complexities of European politics required England and 
France to chart courses other than those hoped for by the 
United States. But the Chinese themselves, discarding the 
jetsam of the Manchu dynasty, sailed forward, hoping to 
find in a republican form of government a shorter and calmer 
channel to modernization. 
Ill 
Of the efforts of Taft and Knox to force American capital 
into China, it may be said that the interests of neither China 
nor the United States were served thereby. Ultimately, to 
Woodrow Wilson was left the future of American participa­
tion in the Six Power Banking Consortium, organized to 
provide loans to the Chinese government. 
In its initial handling of American policy toward China, 
the administration of Woodrow Wilson provided a marvel­
ous example of the all too common blend of arrogance and 
ignorance. First came the consortium question: the Ameri­
can participants asked if the new administration desired 
continued American participation. Perhaps the most strik­
ing glimpse of the decision-making process is afforded by 
the diary entries of Josephus Daniels. At no time were the 
members of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of 
State consulted—or the inherited assistant secretaries—or 
even the Chinese themselves. Mistrustful of the militarism 
and dollar diplomacy of the administrations that preceded 
theirs, Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan 
had no use for the bureaucratic remnants of darker days. 
Progress, the new world toward which the new diplomacy 
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of Wilson and Bryan led, could only be obstructed by the 
advice of "experts" deeply rooted in the immoral milieu of 
old style, Old World, power politics. 
Bryan needed no one's advice to know that bankers in­
volved in monopolistic praotices boded ill for China. Two 
decades of tilting against the "interests" had taught him at 
least that. The secretary of the interior, "who had made a 
long study of Chinese affairs," argued that "old time favor­
itism" should be dropped now that China "had declared for 
new ways." He opposed assistance to China that was condi­
tional upon China being "beholden to a group of financiers 
in the largest nations." The secretary of commerce suggested 
that withdrawal from the consortium might jeopardize 
American trade and sought some "proper way" to help 
China. No one else seemed concerned with economic con­
siderations, and no one at all raised questions about how 
withdrawal would effect American relations with other na­
tions or the position of the United States in East Asia. Dan­
iels found Wilson "clear in his conviction that we could not 
request the trust group of bankers to effect the loan, and 
that we ought to help China in some better way." And so 
Wilson informed the press that American participation in 
the consortium would no longer have the support of the 
government. 
At a cabinet meeting shortly thereafter, Wilson explained 
his decision: "I feel so keenly the desire to help China that 
I prefer to err in the line of helping that country than other­
wise." If the United States had moved on with the consor­
tium, "we would have gotten nothing but mere influence in 
China and lost the proud position which America secured 
when Secretary Hay stood for the Open Door in China after 
the Boxer Uprising." But now, having demonstrated Ameri­
can disinterestedness, having purged itself from association 
with international bankers, the United States would be in an 
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excellent position to call the imperialists to account. For 
China, at least, the new order had begun.20 
Neither the anger of "reactionary" elements in the Depart­
ment of State nor the outrage of the Japanese imperialists 
gave Wilson cause to doubt the wisdom or righteousness of 
his course. More likely these responses confirmed his judg­
ment. And Yuan Shih-k'ai, president of the unrecognized 
Republic of China, gave further testimony that Wilson had 
found a "better way." Through the Chinese minister to the 
United States, he sent word of his appreciation, and to the 
American charge d'affaires he announced that Wilson's ac­
tion would be "of great assistance to us."21 
If Yuan expected loans on a more generous basis to be 
forthcoming, he did not live to see them. If his praise of 
Wilson could be repaid by American recognition of his re­
gime, he was not to be disappointed. Within a week Wilson 
informed the cabinet that he had decided to recognize the 
Republic of China. The attorney general wondered if it 
might not be best to cooperate with the other powers, but 
Wilson would have none of this. Their ambassadors would 
be informed confidentially, and they could join with the 
United States if they wished; but the United States would 
not be bound by the decision of the other nations. The high 
moral purpose of the president exhilarated Daniels, but 
there were complications. The Japanese government called 
attention to the fact that Sun Yat-sen and his party disputed 
Yuan's right to the presidency and that recognition at this 
time "would practically amount to interference in favor of 
Mr. Yuan." Into cabinet discussions also crept the fact that a 
•"prominent Chinaman" (the Kuomintang leader, Sung 
Chiao-jen) had been assassinated and that President Yuan 
20. E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 
1913-1921 (Lincoln, Neb., 1963), pp. 7-8, 17. 
21. Foreign Relations, 1913 (Washington, 1920), 173-75. 
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might have been involved. But these objections do not seem 
to have been given serious consideration. The parliament 
of the new republic was to meet for the first time, and the 
great democratic republic, the United States of America, 
extended its blessing in the form of recognition.22 
But somehow, despite this policy of obvious friendship 
and good will toward China, little progress was made toward 
the modernization of China. Little indeed was the evidence 
that traditional Chinese society had changed, that a sense 
of nationalism had come with the creation of a republic. 
Little indeed was the evidence that the Chinese people 
sought change or that there existed an indigenous leadership 
prepared to coax or coerce China into the modern era. De­
velopments in industry or internal communications were 
minimal. To go forward—or perhaps more accurately, to 
survive—China needed capital and aggressive leaders. As a 
result of Wilson's decision on American participation in the 
consortium, China's principal source of economic assistance 
was Japan, a country that, unlike the United States, did not 
believe that its interests would be served by a strong, modern 
China. With the withdrawal of the United States from the 
consortium and the coming of the war in Europe, Japan es­
tablished a virtually unchecked hegemony over China's 
finances. Given the absence of competitors, the Japanese 
were able to dictate the terms of the loans, exacting conces­
sion after concession, gnawing away at Chinese sovereignty. 
In short, as Tien-yi Li, Arthur Link, and Roy Curry have 
shown, Wilson's well-intentioned policy toward China, mo­
tivated by anti-imperialism, worked to the detriment of 
China.23 
22. Cronon, Cabinet Diaries, pp. 20-23; Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 109. 
23. Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917 (New York, 
1952); Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 
especially pp. 283-88; Roy W. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern 
Policy, 1913-1921 (New York, 1959). 
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The Japanese entered the war shortly after it began and 
seized the German concessions in Shantung. Helplessly, the 
Chinese turned to the United States for assistance. In Wash­
ington, Robert Lansing, then counselor of the Department of 
State, insisted that it would be "quixotic in the extreme to 
allow the question of China's territorial integrity to entangle 
the United States in international difficulties." A few months 
later, he suggested a Rooseveltian bargain by means of 
which the United States would acquiesce in Japanese poli­
cies in Shantung and southern Manchuria in return for an 
end to Japanese complaints about land tenure legislation in 
the United States and the directing of Japanese emigrants 
to Manchuria rather than the United States. Of Bryan he 
asked: "Can there be any harm in attempting to reach a 
reciprocal understanding?" For Lansing, American interests 
in China were limited to commerce, and a Japanese promise 
not to create monopolies for Japanese trade, not to permit 
discriminatory railroad rates, and a general agreement to 
permit equal opportunity for American trade satisfied the 
requirements of the Open Door. In his analysis and recom­
mendations, there was none of the ebullient idealism that 
had permeated cabinet discussions of China in 1913, but 
rather an old-fashioned attempt to assess national interest 
and to serve this end without particular regard for China. 
This proved to be too narrow a vision for Woodrow Wilson.24 
Another view of America's interests in the Far East, one 
that joined more smoothly with Wilson's attitude toward 
China, was presented by E. T. Williams, chief of the Division 
of Far Eastern Affairs. Arthur S. Link refers to Williams as a 
member of a small but influential group in the Foreign Serv­
ice who believed that the development of China would 
24. Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement (Washington, 1928), pp. 189­
90; U.S. State Department, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, 2 vols. (Wash­
ington, 1936), II, 407-8. 
526 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
provide "America's great economic opportunity in the fu­
ture." Williams recognized that existing commercial interests 
were greater in Japan than in China, but believed that the 
myth of the China market would be the morrow's reality, 
and "the look ahead shows our interest to be a strong and 
independent China rather than one held in subjection by 
Japan." Williams urged that the United States press Japan 
to soften its approach to China, then insist that the Chinese 
do what was necessary to bring order to the country and to 
be able to defend their country themselves: to create a mod­
ern nation-state. "We can and ought to assist her in this," 
wrote Williams to Bryan, "and in so doing we shall be build­
ing up a strong defense for ourselves." Here, as an alternative 
to Lansing's proposal, was offered the argument that Amer­
ica's interests as well as the ideals of its people, could best 
be served by an Asian policy that was aggressively pro-
Chinese. And it was in this direction that Wilson ultimately 
tended. 
In the crisis over Japan's notorious Twenty-one Demands, 
Wilson chose for the United States the role of China's de­
fender—a role Lansing called quixotic and Roosevelt con­
sidered mad. Though he carried the torch perilously close to 
where Roosevelt believed could be found the fuse of Japa­
nese military power, Wilson entertained no thought of war. 
Indeed, Link contends that neither Bryan nor Wilson seri­
ously considered policies that might provoke war, believing 
that "American interests in China did not justify taking any 
such chances."25 
Japan's pressures on China forced Wilson to recognize 
China's need for an alternative to Japanese financial assist­
ance, and he realized that only the United States could 
25. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 
(Princeton, N.J., 1960), pp. 276-77. Italics in Williams quote added by 
Link. 
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provide that alternative. Significantly, he was forced to re­
consider the question of American participation in the con­
sortium, to reexamine his attitude toward monopoly capital. 
A man confident of the benefits of the free market, certain 
of the salutary effects of competition, committed to the con­
cepts of laissez-faire liberalism, had to find a way to provide 
economic aid to an underdeveloped country. Wilson and 
Bryan had come to power determined to put an end to mo­
nopoly; to clear away the obstructions to competition; to 
provide equality of opportunity for all. And just as these 
ideas were to prove inadequate domestically, they provided 
an inadequate foundation for a policy whose object was to 
aid China. 
Roy Curry has written that Wilson failed to understand 
that American bankers would not be willing to take the risks 
of advancing credits or aiding in China's development be­
cause banditry and conditions approaching anarchy made 
investments unsafe. China could not attract capital on the 
free market. To aid China, the American government had to 
play a positive role, an active role, such as it was philosophi­
cally unprepared to play even in the domestic economy. 
Richard Hofstadter has suggested that it was not until the 
coming of the New Deal that the American people and their 
elected representatives came to realize that equality of op­
portunity was not enough; that those who failed in a fan-
race still deserved to live. And yet, interestingly enough, in 
his policy toward China, Wilson began to move in this direc­
tion in 1917: in the creation of the New Consortium, Wilson 
demonstrated his understanding that China could not sur­
vive in a free market situation and that the desire to aid 
China required government intervention in the economy. 
Wilson swallowed his pride and asked the bankers to help, 
agreeing to their condition that he publicly announce that 
the New Consortium would be created, the new loan made, 
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at the suggestion of the administration. He further agreed 
that the government would help the bankers to collect in the 
event China defaulted. Good or evil, as in the eyes of the 
beholder, it was dollar diplomacy—the use of American cap­
ital to serve the ends of American diplomacy in East Asia. 
And American ends were stated most succinctly by Breck­
inridge Long: "to drive Japan out of China." 26 
Ironically, it was the most obvious failure of Wilson's Far 
Eastern policy, the defeat at Versailles of his effort to regain 
Shantung for China, that provided the occasion for the first 
great demonstration of Chinese readiness for change, of 
Chinese willingness to enter the modern world: the May 
Fourth Movement. After word of the decision to permit 
Japan to retain the German concessions in Shantung reached 
China, hundreds of thousands of Chinese students took to 
the streets in protest, first in Peking, then in cities through­
out China. A boycott of Japanese goods was organized, and 
allegedly pro-Japanese members of the Chinese government 
were attacked. For months the movement steamrollered, 
and in September, 1919, the American minister reported: 
"A storm of popular indignation swept over the country 
which is without parallel since the days of foreign inter­
course with China. . . . The mobilization of an active pub­
lic opinion, definite in its aims, was a new development in 
Chinese political life." China's students had become the 
necessary ingredient for the jelling of China's "loose sands" 
into a powerful nationalist force, and reports of new evi­
dences of Chinese patriotism became commonplace. Busi­
nessmen, naval officers, and the visiting philosopher John 
Dewey commented enthusiastically on the awakening, the 
"real" awakening, of China. As Ch'ou Ts'e-tsung, the leading 
26. Curry, Wibon and Far Eastern Policy, pp. 26, 191-94; Richard 
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955); 
Foreign Relations, 1918 (Washington, 1930), pp. 171-74. 
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student of the movement has shown now, for the first time, 
Chinese intellectuals felt a need for the complete transfor­
mation of Chinese civilization. They had come to realize 
that the destruction of traditional society was the essential 
prerequisite to the modernization of China." 
Generally, Americans in China responded favorably to the 
May Fourth Movement in all its manifestations. The social 
and intellectual changes demanded by the Chinese students 
led in the direction of civilizing, Westernizing, modernizing 
China. Politically, the most apparent activity was the anti-
Japanese boycott, confirming the American assumption that 
Chinese nationalism, should it develop, would be directed 
against Japan and the European imperialists—but never 
against the United States. In addition, the students were 
working for an end to the civil strife that had dominated 
China since the collapse of Yuan Shih-k'ai's regime. If all 
went well, the movement might reasonably be expected to 
result in a unified, modern China, friendly to the United 
States and able to protect its own territorial and administra­
tive integrity. In sum, there was no apparent reason for 
Americans to respond with anything short of enthusiasm. 
Looking back over the decade that followed, the historian 
obviously has a perspective denied the men who lived 
through the events of those troubled years. Perhaps the 
pattern that now seems apparent, the inevitable triumph of 
anti-imperialism, of Chinese nationalism, is a trick the his­
torian plays on himself. But a process does seem clear now— 
27. Paul S. Reinsch to Robert Lansing, July 25, 1919, State Department
Numerical File 893.00/3235; T. J. N. Gatrell to F. M. Dearing, June 5, 
1919. Copy to Breckinridge Long, 893.00/3184; Annual Report of 
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Copy to State Department dated 
February 1, 1920, item 2 (x), 893.00/3314; ONI to J. V. A. MacMurray, 
January 24, 1920, 893.00/3456, State Department Papers (National 
Archives); Evelyn Dewey, ed., Letters from Japan and China, by John
Devoey . . . and Alice Chipman Dewey (New York, 1920), pp. 237, 246­
47; Ch'ou Ts'e-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution 
in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass., 1960). 
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a process that gives meaning to a decade of nearly constant 
chaos: the brushing aside of the old order of warlords, war­
lord armies, inert masses; the power, the energy of the ideas 
generated by the May Fourth Movement waning, waxing, 
reaching politicians, soldiers; the attempts to reach the 
masses, in the cities and even in the countryside, culminat­
ing in the successful Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang 
armies in 1926, in significant mobilization of the masses, and 
ultimately in a national government that exercised essential 
control over China proper and could exact at least nominal 
allegiance from Manchuria. As the decade closed, China was 
no longer a mere geographic expression: a nation-state had 
been formed, and its leadership, China's first modern politi­
cal elite, had notified all the powers that a unified people 
would no longer tolerate a semicolonial status. 
The first substantive American response to this striving 
for modernization came in the agreements reached at the 
Washington Conference of 1921-22. At Washington the 
powers, at the insistence of the United States, made a com­
mitment to allow the Chinese to determine their own des­
tiny, to work out their own problems, free of foreign inter­
ference. In addition, they agreed to begin the process of 
abolishing the "unequal treaties" that provided the legal 
basis for the privileges of the imperialists in China. Unfor­
tunately, plans for restoring to the Chinese control over 
their tariff and jurisdiction over foreigners were contingent, 
in fact, upon the prior restoration of order in China. When 
the years following the conference brought chaos instead, 
neither the United States nor the other Washington signa­
tories would take any further initiative. 
Some scholars, like William Appleman Williams and Akira 
Iriye, have been critical of American policy in the 1920s, 
contending that the United States lost an opportunity to 
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shape the subsequent course of Chinese history. Iriye ap­
parently believes that the United States might have been 
able to avert the conditions that led to Japanese aggression 
in the 1930s, and Williams claims that more aggressive sup­
port of Chinese nationalism might have prevented the com­
ing of Mao. Both are particularly critical of American cool­
ness or opposition to Sun Yat-sen, which they interpret as 
hostility to Chinese nationalism.28 
There can be no denying that Sun was held in low esteem 
by most American officials. During the Wilson administra­
tion Paul Reinsch, the ardently Sinophile American minister 
to China, had questioned his wisdom, and Lansing had 
questioned the genuineness of his professed principles. 
Charles R. Crane, Reinsch's successor, reported that Sun's 
own associates were embarrassed by his "impractical and 
grandiose schemes." In 1922 Harding's appointee, Jacob 
Gould Schurman, confirmed these reports, writing that 
thoughtful Chinese and foreigners no longer sympathized 
with Sun. Schurman himself thought Sun "would be impos­
sible as a responsible statesman" and estimated that Sun's 
influence was ebbing.29 
It would be a mistake, however, to view this criticism of 
Sun, offered between 1918 and 1922, as evidence of Ameri­
can opposition to Chinese nationalism. In these years, Sun 
was not yet the personification of Chinese nationalism, not 
even to the Chinese. On the contrary, he was merely China's 
28. William A. Williams, "China and Japan: A Challenge and a Choice
of the Nineteen Twenties," Pacific Historical Review XXVI (1957), 259-79; 
Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far 
East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 
29. Foreign Relations, 1918 (Washington, 1930), p. 94; Curry, Wilson 
and Far Eastern Policy, p. 205; Foreign Relations, 1921, 2 vols. (Washing­
ton, 1936). I, 325; Foreign Relations, 1922, 2 vols. (Washington, 1938), I, 
707. See also Charles Evan Hughes to Warren G. Harding, May 24, 1922,
Harding Papers, Ohio Historical Society. 
532 TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
best-known politician, consorting with a variety of warlords 
in a desperate effort to capture the reins of power. To many 
Chinese intellectuals, Sun's ambition seemed the primary 
obstacle to internal peace and the unification of China. It 
was not, therefore, inconsistent of Schurman to report en­
thusiastically on China's new sense of nationalism and pa­
triotism and endorse the demands of Chinese nationalists 
while simultaneously criticizing Sun. 
Against this setting the Harding administration refused 
to take Sun's pretensions seriously and scrupulously avoided 
any contact with him that could be construed as interference 
in China's internal affairs. When the vice-consul at Canton, 
Ernest Price, forwarded a letter from Sun to Harding, he 
was rebuked for "permitting the Consulate General to make 
itself a vehicle of official communication for an organization 
in revolt against a Government with which the United States 
is in friendly relations." Sun's letter was returned to Canton. 
Williams sees in this rebuff evidence of an anti-Kuomintang 
policy, which he contends had Hughes's "unqualified ap­
proval" despite his awareness "of Sun's new strength and the 
Kuomintang's political potential." In fact, Sun's strength 
was rapidly approaching its nadir, and it might have been 
difficult to find a Chinese who would have wagered any 
cash on the Kuomintang's potential. In June, 1922, Sun's 
protege, General Ch'en Chiung-ming, turned on him and 
drove him out of Canton, and China's intellectuals de­
manded that he resign the presidency of the rebel govern­
ment to clear the way for unification. His "new strength" 
had evaporated, and he was fortunate to escape to Shanghai. 
Interestingly enough, Akira Iriye is critical of American 
policy at this juncture. Such was American coolness to Sun 
that he "was refused use of an American naval vessel to 
transport him, after his defeat by General Ch'en, to Shang­
hai." Iriye does not explain why the United States should 
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have provided an American warship for the use of a man in 
rebellion against the recognized government of China after 
his defeat by his own supporters.30 
By the spring of 1924, with the help of the Soviet Union, 
Sun's movement had been revitalized. To be sure, Sun had 
offered the Russians greater concessions against Chinese 
sovereignty than the warlord regime at Peking had dared 
offer, but this fact meant little in face of the dogma that the 
Soviet Union could not be imperialistic nor could great 
leaders of nationalist movements be their running dogs. 
Schurman's view of Sun did not change for the better, but 
he was increasingly impressed by Sun's power. Iriye suggests 
that if Sun's brand of nationalism disturbed Americans, they 
could have supported Tuan Chi-jui's Peking government at 
the close of 1924, to "encourage mild, as opposed to radical, 
nationalism in China"; but this idea, of course, assumes that 
nationalist movements can be controlled from outside. How 
does one nation encourage "mild" nationalism in another 
nation—how do you ride the tiger?31 
Without denying the desirability of a better relationship 
between the United States and Sun, it remains difficult to see 
how this would have been possible. Had the United States 
intervened in Sun's behalf, who could divine how the na­
tionalist spirit would have responded to this foreign inter­
ference? Who would dare predict the reaction of the other 
signatories of the Washington agreements? Moreover, the 
consequences of the American failure to come to terms with 
Sun were hardly apocalyptic: neither China's destiny nor 
the future of Japanese-American relations were thereby re­
30. Hughes to George Christian, April 12, 1921, Harding Papers; Foreign 
Relations, 1921, I, 324, 334-35, 339-40; Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 47. 
31. Jacob Gould Schurman to Calvin Coolidge, April 8, 1924, Schurman
Papers, Collection of Regional History, Cornell University; Iriye, After 
Imperialism, p. 45. 
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vealed. For Sun's successor and for a generation of Japanese 
and American statesmen, there still existed ample oppor­
tunity for constructive action. 
But whatever the virtues of observing the traditional 
principle of nonintervention, the American response to Chi­
nese nationalism in the years between the Washington Con­
ference and the Northern Expedition was unsatisfactory. 
Chinese patriots demanded the abolition of the "unequal 
treaties," and, insensitively, the United States clung to its 
privileges under the treaty system. And the reason for Amer­
ican policy in this instance was not hostility to Chinese na­
tionalism, not the desire to impede China's economic mod­
ernization, but the same sterile legalism that critics like 
George Kennan have seen in other areas of American policy. 
To the Chinese extraterritoriality was a hated symbol of im­
perialism—an explosive issue. To the American government 
it was a matter of law and order to be dealt with dispas­
sionately. The Chinese had certain obligations to protect the 
lives and property of foreigners, and until they restored or­
der and proved both willing and able to carry out these 
obligations, the United States could not abandon the extra­
territorial system. 
In 1925 J. V. A. MacMurray, the leading exponent of this 
legalistic approach to the demands of the Chinese national­
ists, was designated minister to China. He reached his post 
shortly after the May 30 Incident, in which police of the In­
ternational Settlement at Shanghai had fired into a crowd 
of Chinese demonstrators. Nationalism, particularly in its 
anti-imperialist manifestations, burned with a white heat; 
but MacMurray still opposed concessions, insisting that 
treaty revision could not be considered before China met its 
treaty obligations. To yield, he advised his superiors, would 
"encourage a spirit of irresponsibility with which even the 
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soberest Chinese have recently been infected through vari­
ous Bolshevik and juvenile nationalistic influences."32 
In sum, the failure of the United States to surrender the 
privileges its citizens enjoyed under the unequal treaties de­
rived first from a failure to appreciate the intensity with 
which Chinese nationalists, radical or "mild," abhorred these 
symbolic fetters. Second, the American government at­
tempted at first to deal with these highly emotional issues 
within the same rational and legal framework that char­
acterized its relations with nations traditionally treated as 
equals and enjoying the luxury of civil order: it insisted on 
observance of treaty obligations. Accepting the need for 
modernization and encouraging the process, the United 
States nonetheless demanded order, seemingly unaware that 
the ancient scales of Chinese society could hardly be scraped 
away without the sword. One thoughtful scholar, C. F. Re-
mer, in a letter congratulating MacMurray on his appoint­
ment as minister to China, searched for a parallel, recalling 
that Carlyle was said to have remarked that "the American 
civil war was the burning out of a foul chimney."ss 
But as the Northern Expedition gathered force, the United 
States was confronted with a clearly defined problem. With 
virtually all Chinese demanding treaty revision and the 
Kuomintang-Communist coalition indicating its intention to 
abrogate the treaties unilaterally if necessary, would the 
United States yield or not? And if not, what action was the 
American government prepared to take to prevent China 
from unilaterally abandoning its treaty obligations? 
MacMurray's position was clear: firmness and the use of 
32. Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 508; transcript of lecture given at the 
Foreign Service School, J. V. A. MacMurray Papers, Princeton University; 
MacMurray to Kellogg, quoted in Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the 
Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York, 1947), p. 63. 
33. C. F. Remer to MacMurray, April 24,1925, MacMurray Papers. 
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force, if necessary, would alone contain Chinese foolishness. 
Aware of Soviet influence in China, he inclined to blame 
Bolshevism for the unruliness of the Chinese nationalists. In 
Washington, however, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and 
his principal adviser on Chinese affairs, Nelson Johnson, 
were forced by domestic conditions to try a different tack. 
As Dorothy Borg has shown, public opinion in the United 
States would no longer tolerate gunboat diplomacy. The 
American milieu of the 1920s was increasingly anti-imperial­
ist, increasingly sensitive to the use of force against under­
developed countries, whether in Latin America or in Asia. 
Indeed, one legacy of intervention in World War I had been 
the greatly increased vigor of movements opposed to the 
use of force in world affairs. At a time when domestic pres­
sures were driving Kellogg toward signing a pact outlawing 
war, he could not but be hesitant about preserving American 
privileges in China with military action. Similarly, at a time 
when increasing numbers of Americans believed that they 
had been involved in World War I to serve the selfish ends 
of a privileged few, the American government could not 
easily respond to the demand for gunboats voiced by the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. 
With American opinion virtually united in the view that 
peaceful solutions to all problems were necessary and possi­
ble, the only course was to yield as gracefully as possible to 
the Chinese demand for treaty revision, brushing aside Mac-
Murray's protests and the legal considerations upon which 
they were based. Once having determined to yield, the rest 
should have been relatively easy, but to whom should the 
United States yield? From October, 1925, to the close of 
1928, China was torn by civil strife more violent than that 
which had plagued that benighted country since 1920. In 
1926 the Kuomintang-Communist coalition, though mobiliz­
ing the masses behind demands for abolition of the unequal 
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treaties, was in fact opposed to any treaty revision for the 
simple reason that such revision would aid their enemies by 
increasing their revenues and their prestige. On the other 
hand, failure to implement the promises of the Washington 
Conference was alleged to be unneutral by the enemies of 
the Kuomintang. Considerations of this kind, rather than 
hostility to the aspirations of Chinese nationalists, dictated 
American policy in the years before Chiang Kai-shek 
achieved at least nominal control over all of China. 
Dorothy Borg and Russell Buhite have shown that Kellogg 
and Johnson, the two men who directed the course of Ameri­
can policy from 1925 to 1928, were driven principally by the 
desire to retain what they believed to be American primacy 
in friendship to China. Despite occasional fits of nervousness 
caused by evidence of Soviet influence in China, Kellogg ac­
cepted the basic premise that Remer had offered to Mac-
Murray: that the revolution and its concomitant violence 
and disorder were necessary to enable the Chinese to slough 
off the ancient civilization that thwarted their development. 
Similarly, as he watched China struggle to modernize, he 
recognized instinctively that the rationale for the old im­
perialistic perquisites was disappearing: that the United 
States and all the powers had to prepare to give China com­
plete independence as soon as possible. And if public opposi­
tion to the use of force in China made the Kellogg-Johnson 
policy a necessity, their instincts and assumptions about 
China converted necessity into virtue. Concerned about So­
viet imperialism, they concluded that the success of the 
Chinese nationalists would be the best defense against that 
threat. Even before the split between the Kuomintang and 
the Communists, it was relatively easy from the vantage 
point of Washington to brush aside MacMurray's fear of 
Bolshevism with the fragile conviction that communism was 
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too alien a concept, too removed from Chinese realities, to 
succeed in China. Thus fortified, Americans in Washington 
could view the Chinese revolution as a worthy imitator of 
the American revolution—a thoroughly praiseworthy quest 
for the freedom to determine their own future—a freedom 
promised to the people of China at the Washington Confer­
ence. And if the United States remained in the van, foremost 
of China's friends, proponent of self-determination, Chinese 
nationalism could only reciprocate this friendship. In short, 
the necessary policy of yielding to Chinese demands for 
treaty revision and the abrogation of the treaty system, of 
accepting rather than attempting to obstruct the moderniza­
tion process, was ultimately discovered to be congruent not 
only with American ideals but with the interests of the 
United States as well.34 
Looking back over the decade of the 1920s, whether one 
admires American adherence to the principle of nonin­
tervention or castigates those responsible for determining 
policy for failing to give active assistance to Chinese nation­
alism, it is worth noting that at the close of the decade 
Americans had cause for satisfaction with their government's 
policy. The Soviet Union, the nation that had taken the 
greatest initiative—aiding the Kuomintang, manipulating 
the Chinese Communist party, giving welcome focus to the 
nationalist movement—had been rewarded with the almost 
total expulsion of Soviet influence in China. Japanese med­
dling won few friends in Nanking. As Iriye is forced to con­
clude, the other powers—and particularly the United States 
—"sat by and by their very caution were laying the ground 
for understanding with Nationalist China."35 
34. Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, especially pp. 
116-23- Russell Buhite, "Nelson Johnson and American Policy toward 
China, 1925-1928," Pacific Historical Review XXXV (1966), 451-65. 
35. Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 214. 
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IV

One of the peculiarities of writings on Sino-American rela­
tions has been the general assumption that in the years 1931 
to 1945 America was most sympathetic to, and most ready 
to come to the aid of, China. Dorothy Borg's recent work 
has done much to dispel the illusion for the period 1933-38 
—and yet the larger era needs examination.36 
Probably the most important point to be made about the 
men who shaped American policy in this period, especially 
Henry L. Stimson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, is that they 
were generally uninterested in China or her problems—ex­
cept insofar as they viewed the difficulties besetting China 
as part of a threat to the peace machinery of the world. 
Stimson and Roosevelt viewed events in Europe as of far 
greater significance to the United States than anything that 
might occur in East Asia. Neither man considered the preser­
vation of the Open Door essential to the security of the 
United States or had any illusions about the importance of 
China to the United States. 
The recent scholarship of Iriye and James Crowley has an­
swered many questions about Japanese policy and presented 
several interesting arguments in mitigation of Japan's crimes, 
but their work confirms the fact that Japan's aggressive con­
tinental policy was her response to the creation of a modern 
nation-state in China.37 The question facing the United 
States from 1931 to 1941 was, given American support for 
the modernization of China, how to respond to Japanese de­
termination to deny Chinese aspirations. 
36. Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 
1930-1938 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). 
37. Iriye, After Imperialism; James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for 
Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J., 1966). 
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In 1931 and 1941 the United States led the opposition to 
Japanese aggression in China. However, it must be recog­
nized that in the first instance, the limited action taken by 
the United States was motivated far less by any desire to 
come to the aid of China than to uphold the existing peace 
machinery and the sanctity of treaty obligations. In the sec­
ond instance, the Roosevelt administration's appeasement of 
Japan ended only when Roosevelt became convinced that 
Japan's ties with Nazi Germany augmented the German 
threat to American security. 
A few months before the Mukden Incident, Nelson John­
son, then minister to China, exchanged ideas on American 
Far Eastern policy with William Castle, undersecretary of 
state. Johnson was unquestionably sympathetic to China, 
and Castle, previously ambassador to Japan, was generally 
considered friendly to Japan. Nonetheless, Johnson declared 
that he had no quarrel with Castle's ideas on American pol­
icy toward Japan and thought it best to leave Japan alone 
in the Far East. On the other hand, he expressed the belief 
that the United States "should follow a policy in regard to 
the Far East which would encourage the establishment and 
development of a strong government and nation here in 
China. I have believed this necessary to the peace of the 
Pacific." Recognizing that the policies he advocated for Ja­
pan and China might be deemed in conflict, he informed 
Castle that he had "never believed that Japan could or 
would take charge in China." He reported that Manchuria 
was daily becoming more Chinese, "but if Manchuria is 
destined to become part of Japan, I do not see why that 
should necessarily embroil us." Here was essentially a re­
turn to the position of Theodore Roosevelt: sympathy for 
China and the belief that a strong China fending for itself 
could best preserve the peace of East Asia—combined with 
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a disinclination to interfere with Japan, the principal power 
in the area, particularly with regard to Manchuria.38 
But in one important respect, the world had changed since 
the day of Theodore Roosevelt. There now existed an inter­
national organization, a multilateral promise to leave the 
Chinese free to work out their own future, and a nearly uni­
versal agreement among nations not to resort to war as an 
instrument of national policy—machinery for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and treaty obligations barring mili­
tary solutions. The United States had rejected membership 
in the League of Nations, but had been instrumental in 
working out the Pacific settlement of 1921-22 and in the 
creation of the Paris Peace Pact, first signed in 1928. The 
latter treaty had aroused great hopes for perpetual peace 
among Americans, and it was within the peace movement 
that Japanese aggression created the gravest concern. 
In the Department of State, Stanley Hornbeck, chief of 
the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, a man long reputed to 
be pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese, approached the problem 
not from the standpoint of Japan's threat to China or to spe­
cific American interests in the Far East but as a threat to the 
peace of the world. To Stimson he argued that the Japanese 
had violated the Paris Peace Pact and "that any American 
protest should not appear as part of traditional American 
Far Eastern policy but as cooperation with the international 
movement for world peace."39 As Hornbeck apparently 
realized immediately, the events in Manchuria had a sig­
38. Nelson T. Johnson to William Castle, March 25, 1931, Johnson 
Papers, Library of Congress. As instructed by Johnson, Castle passed the
letter on to Stanley Hornbeck, who endorsed it on May 20, 1931, and filed
as 893.00/11642, State Department Papers. 
39. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression:
Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven, Conn., 1957), 
p. 131. In a letter to Norman H. Davis, May 1, 1925, MacMurray wrote
that Hornbeck, under consideration for a position at Columbia University,
"has rather too distinctly the attitude of being pro-Chinese and incidently
somewhat anti-Japanese," MacMurray Papers. 
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nificance far greater than the territory involved or the con­
crete and limited interests of the United States in China. 
Herbert Hoover, president of the United States, deeply 
immersed in the problems of the Great Depression, was al­
most totally uninterested in the Asian crisis. Stimson, no less 
concerned with the effort to end economic stagnation, al­
lowed some of his energies to be diverted toward Manchuria 
—not out of friendship for China, but as Robert Ferrell, 
Elting Morison, and Richard Current have shown, because 
of his conception of the importance of treaty obligations to 
international peace. Nelson Johnson, his representative in 
China, concurred, remaining indifferent to the fate of Man­
churia, but apprehensive of a second world war if the Kel­
logg Peace Pact and the League were brushed aside. For all 
Americans who put their hope in international cooperation 
and regretted the failure of the United States to join the 
League, the decision by Stimson and Hoover to work with 
the League provided a new, albeit short-lived, hope.40 
All of these men—Hoover and Stimson, Johnson and 
Hornbeck, and even Castle with his great sympathy for Ja­
pan—were in complete agreement on two points: first, that 
American policy had to serve American interests; and sec­
ond, that American interests in Manchuria in particular and 
China in general were insignificant. William Neumann has 
40. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression; Elting E. 
Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. 
Stimson (Boston, 1960); Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study 
in Statecraft (New Brunswick, N.J., 1954); Russell Buhite, "Nelson T. 
Johnson and American Policy Toward China, 1925-1941" (Ph.D. disserta­
tion, Michigan State University, 1965); Raymond B. Fosdick to Wil­
liam A. White, October 31, 1931, White Papers, Library of Congress; 
Fosdick to Herbert Hoover and Henry L. Stimson, November 10, 1931, 
793.94/2779; Irene Johnson, League of Nations Association, to Stimson, 
October 5, 1931, 793.94/1990; Richard R. Wood, Friends Peace Committee,
to Stimson, October 9, 1931, 793.94/2085; Memorandum of Conversation 
between T. G. Rogers, Assistant Secretary, and Frederick J. Libby, National
Council for the Prevention of War, December 4, 1931, with enclosure, 
500.A 15 A 4/637, State Department Papers. 
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noted that none of these men, nor any other American states­
man of the interwar period, ever offered "a public and ex­
plicit statement of the priorities of American interests in 
Asia" or indicated which of these interests, if any, would 
justify war. Indeed, in departmental memorandums, reports, 
and personal correspondence, Hornbeck, Johnson, and Cas­
tle made clear their conviction that no American interests 
in China justified war—that nothing short of a Japanese at­
tack on the Philippines or on American commerce in the 
Pacific would justify war with Japan. Certainly these men 
had moved away from the conception of congruent Chinese 
and American interests that had led to the anti-Japanese 
policies of the Taft and Wilson administrations. But Stimson 
in particular had a larger view than that of his aides—though 
Hornbeck and Johnson were rarely far behind. In place of 
the earlier conception of congruent Sino-American relations, 
Stimson had a vision of a worldwide unity of interest in 
peace. Only in the sense that Japanese aggression, as it vio­
lated Japan's treaty obligations and ignored the League of 
Nations, threatened the peace of the world, did it threaten 
the interests of the United States. But for Herbert Hoover, 
so indirect a threat could not compete with the very concrete 
problems he faced within the United States—and not even 
Stimson was prepared for the United States to take the 
principal role in East Asia when the League members ap­
peared to abdicate their responsibilities.41 
The failure of words to stop the Japanese shattered one of 
the primary assumptions of American policy: that moral 
sanctions, appeals to world public opinion, could keep the 
peace. And when Japanese actions demonstrated that words 
41. William Neumann, "Ambiguity and Ambivalence in Ideas of National
Interest in Asia," in Alexander DeConde, ed., Isolation and Security(Durham, N.C., 1957); Buhite, "Johnson and American Policy toward 
China, 1925-1941"; Castle to Johnson, December 21, 1932, Johnson Papers; 
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression. 
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and empty threats would not suffice, there was no responsi­
ble American prepared to take the next step of resort to 
force. If Stimson doubted that the particular interests of the 
United States in Manchuria warranted significant protest 
and doubted that the interests of world peace warranted any 
more than protests, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt 
was composed almost entirely of men who were determined 
not to antagonize Japan on behalf of China or abstract con­
ceptions of the indivisibility of world peace. 
The early years of Roosevelt's power found idealism re­
served for domestic affairs, a narrow construction of na­
tional interest prevailing and a general retreat from the Open 
Door underway. American interests in Asia were once again 
measurable, limited to tangibles like commerce, investments, 
and occasionally missionary activities. Available evidence 
suggests that all thought of mutuality of interest between the 
United States and China had vanished for the moment, and 
even those most sympathetic to China in the past had given 
up on the Chinese government and had concluded that Chi­
nese modernization under Chinese leadership was probably 
impossible. Some were even forced to the conclusion that 
Japanese domination of China would be in the best interests 
of the United States—and China, too! Not only Grew, but 
Hornbeck as well, fought vehemently against measures that 
might give offense to Japan.42 
In May, 1933, Hornbeck announced that settlement of the 
Sino-Japanese dispute in North China might be detrimental 
to American interests—that it might be best to keep the 
Japanese involved in an indecisive struggle in an area where 
the United States had no vital interests. And the price, al­
42. Entries for December 31, 1934 and January 7, 1935, Diary of Wil­
liam Phillips, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Hornbeck was par­
ticularly upset by the U.S. Navy's announcement of spring naval maneuvers
on the same day that Japan denounced the Washington Naval Treaty. 
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lowing the "principles of our FE policy and our ideals with 
regard to world peace" to be "further scratched and dented," 
seemed slight enough. Johnson wrote that none of these 
Japanese transgressions concerned the United States di­
rectly. Not only did they cost the United States nothing, but 
"the development of this area under Japanese enterprise may 
mean an increased opportunity for American industrial 
plants to sell the kind of machinery and other manufactured 
goods that will be needed where so much energy is being 
displayed." At a meeting of military and naval intelligence 
representatives with Undersecretary of State William Phil­
lips and his Far Eastern staff, Admiral Wainright, returning 
from duty on the Yangtze, informed those assembled that 
he thought the Chinese "hopelessly miserable" and that 
Japanese domination would probably be to their advantage.43 
From all corners came support for what Phillips called 
our policy of "hands off." He called in MacMurray, for whom 
he had great respect, and MacMurray recommended the 
utmost caution in any approaches to Japan—and then be­
fore returning to his post at Riga, he prepared a 105-page 
memo that provided a brilliant rationalization for doing 
nothing. Wilfred Fleisher, Japan-based journalist, stopped 
by and advised "a policy of caution, avoidance of pin-pricks, 
in other words, a reversal of the Stimson policy, in fact the 
policy we were now pursuing." Even a man like Thomas La­
mont, deeply involved in world affairs, an advocate of col­
lective security, and prominent in China famine relief work, 
could not countenance any other role for the United States 
in the mid-1930s. To Johnson he wrote that he regretted see­
ing China under Japanese control, "but if she lacks the 
43. Hornbeck memorandum in Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, quoted in 
Borg, United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, p. 569 n. 101; Johnson to 
Stanley Hombeck, June 1, 1933, Johnson Papers; Entry for November 11,
1935, Phillips Diary. 
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strength to protect herself from aggression and exploitation, 
she cannot reasonably expect the other nations to do the job 
for her." He might well have summed up the attitude of the 
Roosevelt administration when he concluded: "Certainly 
America is not going to court trouble by any quixotic at­
tempt to checkmate Japan in Asia." " 
Perhaps the best indication of American indifference to 
the fate of China can be found in Dorothy Borg's account of 
United States silver policy and its disastrous effects upon 
China. The Chinese begged the United States to stop pur­
chasing Chinese silver, and Phillips went to Morgenthau 
and Roosevelt. The president insisted that the problem was 
"China's business and not ours; that they could stop the out­
flow of silver if they so desired and that it was not up to us 
to alter our policy merely because the Chinese were unable 
to protect themselves."45 
Johnson, in China, reported growing dissatisfaction with 
the United States, but for the most part, it seemed to irri­
tate him. He and Hornbeck often felt it necessary to remind 
the Chinese that American policy was supposed to serve 
American ends first. They were quick to counter what they 
viewed as Chinese suggestions that the United States fight 
China's battles, quick to tell Chiang Kai-shek and other 
members of his regime that the United States had done its 
share and more for China. Hornbeck, approving such a re­
ply by Johnson to Chiang's complaints, added the thought 
that in relations with China, "we are fortunately situated in 
that our interests and those of China usually run along paral­
lel lines; at least they do not conflict." As the Japanese be­
gan the full-scale invasion of China, Hornbeck made sub­
44. Entries for June 14, 24, 1935, Phillips Diary; Thomas Lamont to 
Johnson, May 19, 1936, Johnson Papers. 
45. Borg, United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 121-37; Entry 
for December 12,1934, Phillips Diary. 
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stantially the same points in a conversation with H. H. 
Kung, China's minister of finance, and C. T. Wang, Chinese 
ambassador to the United States. He declared that the 
United States had always favored "a strong, unified China" 
but that American policy in the Far East was designed to 
do more than merely help China. He claimed for the United 
States the privilege of acting on its own conception of na­
tional interest—a privilege which the Chinese sometimes 
seemed to think was exclusively their own.46 
In the weeks that followed, Chiang became extremely bit­
ter about the role the United States played, particularly over 
what he viewed as the American failure to cooperate with 
Great Britain's efforts on China's behalf. Though Chiang 
took his case to Roosevelt, he received naught but sympathy 
at that level and not even that much from Nelson Johnson, 
who wrote: "Certainly nothing makes me lose patience with 
my Chinese friends so quickly as when I hear them talk 
about the responsibility of America for aiding to preserve 
the independence and integrity of China. . . ." " 
But if the summer of 1937 provided the nadir of American 
concern for China, the Japanese attack, coming as hopes for 
peace in Europe dimmed, forced Roosevelt and men of good 
will all over the world to think anew of the dangers to the 
peace and security of their own countries. The interests of 
the United States in Manchuria, then North China, then 
Ethiopia, and now the rest of China might not warrant the 
use of force or the risk of war. The interests of the United 
States in the Versailles settlement, which it did not sign, in 
the Pacific settlement, which it had sponsored, and in the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact might not warrant the use of force or 
the risk of war. But as violence spread abroad and treaties 
46. Hombeck to Johnson, March 13, 1937, 711.93/350; Memorandum
of Conversation, July 10, 1937, 893.0146/549, State Department Papers. 
47. Borg, United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 309, 315. 
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were violated, men troubled by the nationalism of the mid­
1980s spoke again of the need for international cooperation, 
of collective security. A man like Norman Davis would read­
ily concede "that our interests in the Far East are not worth 
risking a fight" and then go on to shock those with narrower 
conceptions of national interest by arguing that "the main­
tenance of collective action or the defeat of an aggressor like 
Japan might be principles that would be well worth waging 
war for."48 
In his famed "Quarantine Speech," Roosevelt groped for 
a way to take some action on behalf of world peace but char­
acteristically allowed fine-sounding phrases to outstrip his 
thoughts. At the Brussels Conference of the Nine Power 
Treaty signatories, nothing was accomplished as Roosevelt 
retreated from the implications of his speech. But Davis, 
heading the American delegation, indicated clearly to An­
thony Eden that the concern of the United States was not 
primarily China, "that we did not view the problem as 
merely a Far Eastern one but as a world problem where the 
forces of order had a direct interest in preventing lawlessness 
and aggression." Davis failed to win his point at the confer­
ence, but his idea was taking hold at home. By Christmas, 
1937, J. Pierpont Moffat, a brilliant young career diplomat 
who was unsympathetic to Davis's conception of the prob­
lem, concluded that the collective security idea was gaining 
momentum in the United States "at the very moment when 
most countries in Europe have reached the conclusion that 
collective action is unworkable and are trying to divest them­
selves of their responsibilities under the [League] Cove­
nant." Moffat was outraged to find that Clark Eichelberger 
of the League of Nations Association had drafted a speech 
for the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
48. Entry for September 29, 1937, Diary of J. Pierrepont Moffat, Hough­
ton Library, Harvard University. 
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in which he "kept repeating that the violation of the Nine 
Power Treaty by Japan was more important to us than the 
sinking of our ships or the danger to the lives of our 
citizens."49 
Moffat was, however, overly pessimistic. For the time, the 
tide of public and congressional opinion still ran with his 
conception of national interest, and the man in the White 
House, whatever his personal convictions, was taking no 
chances. Throughout 1938 and well into 1939, the Japanese 
pushed on, bombing civilians, brutalizing those who did not 
flee before them; and the United States held its peace. 
American property was destroyed, American commerce dis­
rupted, American citizens injured, even killed—but the 
"lessons" of World War I prevailed. Not for the advantage 
of a few investors, a few merchants, a few Americans who 
risked their lives in war zones would the United States again 
be drawn into war. 
In the spring of 1939 Moffat's fears approached realiza­
tion. As the European situation grew more ominous, Roose­
velt sought to have the neutrality legislation revised. The 
very nature of the proposed revision, the extension of the 
cash-and-carry concept to arms and munitions, indicated 
relative indifference to the war in Asia. "Cash and carry" 
meant, simply, that any nation that had the money and the 
means to transport the goods could purchase anything it 
needed from the United States. The advantages to Great 
Britain in the event of a European war were obvious, and 
presumably Hitler would be forewarned of Britain's ability 
to secure aid and would have second thoughts about pro­
voking war. But if, as proposed in the bill before the Senate, 
the new law were applied to the Far Eastern war, the dis­
advantages to China were equally obvious. China had not 
49. Entries for November 2, 1937, December 23-26, 27, 1937, ibid. 
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the cash or any means of transporting purchases from the 
United States. Japan controlled the western Pacific—at least 
every conceivable port of entry into China. And the Chinese 
ambassador protested to Senator Key Pittman, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, contending that 
the proposed legislation had the "unintended effect of help­
ing aggression in the Pacific."so Even the program preferred 
by the Department of State provided nothing for China, no 
end to the sale of war materials to Japan. Moreover, bills 
proposing economic sanctions against Japan were opposed 
by the administration. 
And finally, primarily to head off legislation that might 
antagonize Japan, the administration chose to support a pro­
posal by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, an opponent of sanc­
tions, to give Japan the required six-months notice of termi­
nation of the 1911 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. As 
Herbert Feis has indicated, the administration had no plan 
for sanctions against Japan. Making a virtue of necessity, 
Hull decided that this step, without indication of what 
would follow, might have a salutary effect on the Japanese. 
Perhaps then it would not be necessary to plan the next 
step.51 
Soon after war came in Europe, Roosevelt met with suc­
cess in his efforts to revise the neutrality legislation. "Cash 
and carry" became the law, with the attendent benefits to 
Great Britain—and to Japan. The efforts of pro-Chinese 
groups like the American Committee for Non-Participation 
in Japanese Aggression brought little in the way of tangible 
results. With the coming of the European war, its chairman, 
Roger S. Greene, and many of its supporters shifted their 
50. Hu Shih to Key Pittman, April 10, 1939, SEN 76A-F9 CFR Neu­
trality China-Japan, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, National 
Archives. 
51. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J., 1950), 41. 
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energies toward what they considered a more vital cause: 
aid to Great Britain.62 
Through the winter of 1939-40 and on into the spring, 
Hull thwarted the efforts of those who sought economic 
sanctions against Japan. Not until summer, when Japan had 
made gestures against the British and French positions 
in Southeast Asia and appeared to be flirting anew with 
Nazi Germany, did the United States take significant action 
to retard the Japanese war effort. Even then, Roosevelt was 
persuaded not to prevent the sale of all scrap iron and oil. 
In fact, the year following brought a tremendous increase 
in the sale of petroleum products to Japan. 
Clearly, American policy toward Japan was being deter­
mined without particular regard for China. Nonetheless, it 
was also apparent that the American conception of national 
interest was more broadly conceived in 1940, after the Nazi 
blitzkrieg, than it had been in the mid-1980s. To the ad­
ministration and to a growing number of Americans, the sur­
vival of the Western democracies was vital to the security 
of the United States. The administration had embarked on a 
policy of all aid short of war to support Great Britain's bat­
tle, and significant public support was being mustered by 
the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies—an 
organization with close ties to the government. To this or­
ganization, as to most of the men in Washington, "allies" 
meant France and England. In May, 1940, Nelson Johnson 
wrote to William Allen White, chairman of the committee, 
expressing his concern over the course the world had taken 
52. For a contrary view of the accomplishments of the American Com­
mittee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, see Donald J. Fried­
man, The Road from Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968). For Greene's own estimate, see Roger S. Greene to Admiral
Harry Yamell, February 27, 1941, and Yarnell to Greene, March 3, 1941,
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies Papers, Princeton 
University. 
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since Mukden, his fear for democracy if the democracies 
would not fight. Interestingly enough, Johnson, though am­
bassador to China, focused his attention on the war in Eu­
rope; and White, in reply, told of the work of his committee, 
its efforts on behalf of France and England, making no men­
tion whatever of the Far East.63 
Stated most simply, few Americans in the summer of 1940 
conceived of China as an ally. Few Americans considered 
the defense of China essential to the security of the United 
States. Few Americans related the struggle in China to the 
events in Europe, where their attention was focused. Then, 
in one of history's greatest diplomatic blunders, the Japanese 
changed all this. On September 27, 1940, the Japanese con­
cluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy and with 
one stroke tied together two wars and elevated China to the 
status of "ally" in the battle against Axis aggression. Ironi­
cally, her use of the pen rather than of the sword proved to 
be Japan's undoing. 
Several scholars, especially Paul Schroeder, have ex­
plained the impact of the Tripartite Pact on Japanese-Ameri­
can relations. This is obviously the appropriate focus, but the 
impact on Sino-American relations must also be kept in 
mind. Within the administration and within pro-administra­
tion organizations like the Committee to Defend America by 
Aiding the Allies, announcement of the Tripartite Pact 
raised the isue of regarding China as one of the Allies and 
prompted even those principally concerned with the war in 
Europe to agree to aid to China and to adopt the program 
of anti-Japanese sanctions pressed by the China-oriented 
lobbies. Without sacrificing stress on the idea of Great 
Britain's survival as the key to America's future, Clark 
Eichelberger, national director of the Committee to Defend 
53. Johnson to White, May 16, 1940, White to Johnson, May 31, 1940. 
White Papers. 
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America, advised chapter heads that the wars in the Atlantic 
and Pacific were now one war; "Britain and China in the 
Pacific, with Britain in the Atlantic, now constitute our first 
lines of defense." And as Schroeder has indicated, Japan now 
had to face stepped-up American aid to China and, of even 
greater significance, the impossibility of negotiating a new 
Pacific settlement without reference to China. Without 
doubt, the American response made China the principal 
beneficiary of the new Axis alliance.64 
Even after the Tripartite Pact became expendable—or 
very nearly so—to Japan, in the summer of 1941, China's 
status as an ally prevented a modus vivendi between the 
United States and Japan. Until the fall of 1940, appeasement 
of Japan had been an easy policy to pursue. Afterward, it 
meant the dashing of hopes raised in China and among 
China's friends in the United States. It meant betrayal of a 
nation so recently labeled a democracy and one of the allies 
in the war against aggressors. It meant renouncing all the 
"educational" efforts of the previous year. It meant risking 
the charge that Roosevelt was concerned only with Great 
Britain's chestnuts. Fear of a "Far Eastern Munich" gnawed 
at China's friends, and they redoubled their efforts in the 
summer of 1941—but they need not have feared.55 The 
United States, having once ceased to supply Japan with "the 
sinews of war," could not again accept the role of merchant 
of death. Having once proclaimed solidarity with China, 
there could be no return to the uncomfortable role of pas­
sive observer of China's sorrows. And the war came. 
54. Paul Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 
1941 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958); Clark Eichelberger to chapter chairmen, Oc­
tober 15, 1940; to Mrs. Lewis Mumford, October 22, 1940, enclosure, 
Committee to Defend America Papers. 
55. Greene to Yarnell, June 12, 1941; to T. L. Power, August 20, 1941,
September 19, 1941; Geraldine T. Fitch to Livingston Hartley, August 12, 
1941, Committee to Defend America Papers; Geraldine Fitch to White, 
August 5, 1941 (mimeographed), White Papers. 
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V 
The war came—and China was an honored ally. But 
Roosevelt and his advisers continued their focus on the war 
in Europe. To be sure, there were cries of discontent in high 
places: Hornbeck, for one, urged more attention and aid for 
China. Still, those who determined American policy con­
tinued in their belief that Germany was the gravest danger 
to the United States and Great Britain its most important 
ally. China's task was merely to keep Japan busy until her 
allies had completed the major task. In the interim, they 
would provide her with whatever supplies were not needed 
elsewhere—assuming a way could be found to transport 
these items over Japanese-held territory, or the Himalayas. 
Having viewed the bombing of Pearl Harbor as a heaven-
sent reprieve, the Chinese government was bitterly disap­
pointed by the American response. Exhausted by years of 
civil strife, Japanese pressures, and four years of war, the 
Chinese could not, would not, muster the men, energies, or 
morale necessary to meet American demands for action. 
Herbert Feis has told the story of the ensuing frustrations 
and frictions; and the problems of supply, command, and 
strategy are carefully and thoroughly analyzed by Romanus 
and Sunderland in three outstanding volumes of the history 
of the army in World War II.66 The point that remains to be 
made is that China never had more than symbolic impor­
tance to Roosevelt and his advisers. Throughout the 1930s 
they had been largely indifferent to China's fate, deeming 
American interests in China as slight, unwilling to concede 
that Japanese hegemony over China would threaten the 
56. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from 
Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton, N.J., 1953): Charles F. 
Romanus and Riley Sunderland, StilweU's Mission to China; StilweU's Com­
mand Problems; and Time Runs Out in CBl (Washington, 1953, 1956, 
1960). 
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United States. If the morass of China had been a good place 
to bemire the Japanese in 1935, it was as useful in 1942. 
China as a victim of aggression concerned men who were 
advocates of collective security, but they too turned away 
when Hitler provided them with more important victims. 
For the first three years of the Sino-Japanese war, the 
United States had allowed itself to be the most important 
supplier of the Japanese war machine. For the last eighteen 
months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
United States gradually tightened the screws on Japan—not 
out of sudden concern for China but because of the threat 
posed by Japan's southward thrusts and ultimately by her 
adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis. Thus, China was trans­
formed into an "ally"—not a real ally, but a symbolic ally, 
as she was transformed into one of the "democracies," but 
not a real one. China received all of the praise and some of 
the loyalty due an ally, but little of the substance. During 
the war nothing changed. On their part the Chinese did lit­
tle to change American estimates of their fighting will or po­
tential. In return the United States renounced the last of its 
privileges under the "unequal treaties"—at least in theory— 
and talked much of China as a great power after the war. 
China was given "face." 
Roosevelt's conception of China as a great power was ulti­
mately incorporated into the United Nations Organization— 
in part compensation for neglect during the war. But Roose­
velt also acted upon the assumption of a mutuality of inter­
est between the United States and China; of a China grate­
ful to the United States, dependent upon the United States 
—as Churchill suspected, "a faggot vote" on the side of the 
United States. Had Roosevelt read Chiang's China's Destiny 
or understood the Chinese Communist movement, he would 
have known better, would have understood that neither 
major force in China excepted the United States from the 
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hostility directed against the imperialists. And no matter 
what the Chinese might themselves have offered the Soviet 
Union at Yalta, the fact that Roosevelt took it upon himself 
to dispose of Chinese territory without prior consultation 
with China was not likely to make him the recipient of 
Chinese gratitude. 
VI 
For half a century after the first of Hay's Open Door notes, 
Chinese aspirations to create a modern nation-state were 
viewed with favor by the United States. Contrary to the al­
legations of writers like Beale and Williams, the United 
States did not at any time evidence hostility toward Chinese 
nationalism, in part because few Americans could conceive 
of China becoming a threat to the United States. Except for 
a few brief moments after the Revolution of 1911 and after 
the establishment of the Kuomintang regime in the late 
1920s, few men anywhere in the Western world could im­
agine a China able to defend her own borders, and fewer 
still feared an aggressive China. In addition, Americans as­
sumed that they were assured of China's friendship, as then-
due. What was salient about the involvement of the United 
States in the imperialism of the treaty system was not that 
Americans were imperialists but rather that because they 
denied to themselves the fact of American imperialism, they 
were confident that a nationalist China would be friendly to 
them—and thus favored the emergence of a strong, modern 
China. 
Throughout these fifty years, however, sympathy for 
China was tested by threats to China, especially from Japan. 
Theodore Roosevelt may not have renounced American in­
terests in face of Japanese power, but he did refrain from 
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supporting China against Japan. In this decision he was 
guided not by hostility to Chinese nationalism but by the 
realization of the limits of American power. Unprepared to 
fight Japan, Roosevelt chose not to dare her. But his succes­
sors, both Taft and Wilson, sought ways to offer China posi­
tive support, perceiving no danger from Japan. Unconcerned 
with Japanese power, they asserted American interests and 
Chinese rights with impunity—if not with success. 
The decade following World War I brought a new situa­
tion. China was threatened less from outside than by inter­
nal chaos—and she required assistance less than patience. 
In patience some American officials were lacking, but their 
government was not. And when the Kuomintang established 
a semblance of order, it did not want for support from the 
United States. But in 1931 the Japanese, by their actions in 
Manchuria, posed a new threat to Chinese nationalism, and 
Stimson led the offensive against Japan. Like Taft and Wil­
son, however, he did not contemplate the use of force against 
Japan. In this sense he responded to Japanese pressures on 
China by seeking the alternative Knox had hypothesized be­
tween abandoning China and preparing for war. Where 
Knox employed dollar diplomacy, Stimson chose moral di­
plomacy; condemnation rather than investments served as 
his weapon. 
Stimson, however, was moved by an idea far greater than 
any Knox had ever had, far broader than concern for China. 
He feared for far more than China: he feared for the peace 
of the world, if nations could violate their treaty obligations, 
resort to force, to aggression, whenever it served their pur­
poses. The policy he and HooVer pursued was not so much 
pro-Chinese as it was anti-Japanese—and it was anti-Japa­
nese because Japan, violating the sanctity of treaties and 
committing aggression, had acted immorally, had become 
an outlaw. In all this, China became an abstraction: the vie­
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tim in a test case of the interwar peace system. The system 
failed the test; the powers lost the system—and China lost 
Manchuria. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt returned to the position taken 
years before by his cousin Theodore. Unprepared to fight 
Japan, he was unwilling to oppose her, to appear in any way 
as China's champion. In the mid-1980s the appeasement of 
Japan was central to his East Asian policy. Informed Ameri­
cans were increasingly less optimistic about the prospects 
for the Kuomintang, and informed or uninformed, Ameri­
cans were at that time less willing to risk involvement in 
overseas quarrels than at any time in their history. But even 
as the public view of the role of the United States in world 
affairs changed when confronted with the events of 1939 
and 1940, the Roosevelt administration remained unwilling 
to oppose—or even stop aiding—Japan. Not until 1940 or 
1941 was the United States willing to fight—not for China 
but for democracy, the Four Freedoms, and world peace, 
against Japan as a fascist, totalitarian outlaw. In other words, 
in the years following Hay's notes, not until the fall of 1940 
was the government of the United States prepared to use 
force against Japan—and at that time, for reasons that in­
volved China only incidentally. And when, after the Japa­
nese attack on Pear Harbor, the United States went to war, 
ultimately defeating Japan, the liberation of China was 
merely a by-product of Japan's defeat rather than an impor­
tant American priority. 
VII 
All this changed after 1949. Although the Chinese Com­
munists had launched a virulent anti-American campaign in 
July 1946, the American people did not really take cogni­
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zance of Chinese hostility until three years later, when the 
establishment of the Peoples Republic was proclaimed. To 
this shock of a China neither grateful nor friendly to the 
United States was added a more severe shock, little more 
than a year later, when China's "Red Hordes" marched 
across the Yalu and smashed MacArthur's forces. Suddenly 
the contempt for Chinese power that World War II experi­
ence had only heightened gave way to fear and a new con­
cept of the Yellow Peril. A new cycle of American attitudes 
toward China had begun. 
After 1950 it was clear that for the first time, China's lead­
ers showed signs of successfully mobilizing the peasant 
masses and of overcoming the corruption inherent in tradi­
tional Chinese society. But because they were also Marxist-
Leninists, hostile to the West in general and the United 
States in particular, Americans lost all sympathy for China's 
aspirations. Regrettably, just when the prospects for the mod­
ernization of China seemed most promising, the United 
States for the first time determined to oppose that moderniza­
tion. There was no longer any question of whether the 
United States would interpose itself between China and her 
enemies, for the United States had become China's principal 
enemy. Beginning in 1950, the United States embarked upon 
a course designed to isolate, weaken, and ultimately to bring 
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